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Summary 
 
In Argentina and Brazil, the future never seems to arrive. Over the last three decades, 
successive waves of neoliberal and neodevelopmentalist reforms invariably ended in 
disappointment. The most relevant question defying the contemporary Brazilian and 
Argentinian political economy literature is why, despite being repeatedly predicted in 
economic programs and promised in political discourses, catch-up development never 
materialises? Neoliberal and neodevelopmentalist authors offer apparently contradictory 
answers to that question. For the former, economic underachievement is a result of 
insufficient or ill-conceived pro-market reforms. For the latter, it is a consequence of the 
lack of state-led national development projects. In this thesis, I challenge both mainstream 
narratives. I claim that the roots of Brazilian and Argentinian permanent 
underachievement are intrinsically related to the fragilities of neoliberal and 
neodevelopmentalist development strategies, which result in inherently inconsistent 
policies. Although representing themselves as complete opposites, both sides actually 
share two problematic premises: a narrow view of development, understood as capitalist 
catch-up, and a simplified opposition between state and market. My critique starts from 
a radical reappraisal of the very concept of development, informed by Leon Trotsky’s 
idea of uneven and combined development and its contemporary interpretations. Defining 
development as the dynamic outcome of the interplay between class disputes and 
international pressures and opportunities, I argue that the shortcomings of the neoliberal 
and neodevelopmentalist reforms were determined by the specific responses given by 
dominant class alliances in the face of successive international crises. The argument is 
advanced through four in-depth case studies of the state reforms carried out in Brazil and 
Argentina since the 1990s, with particular attention to macroeconomic and foreign 
policies. By breaking the oligopoly of narratives about Brazilian and Argentinian 
development shared by neoliberals and neodevelopmentalists, I aim to contribute to the 
rise of alternative strategies of development from below.            
 
Keywords: Neoliberalism; Neodevelopmentalism; Uneven and combined development; 
Argentina; Brazil. 
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At this crucial moment, economic independence means, to this government, 
the defeat of stagnation, the victory of production, the triumph of 
development. 
         Carlos Menem 
 
 
 
Brazil will not always be a developing country. Its destiny is to be a 
developed and fair country. 
Dilma Rousseff 
 
 
 
Our utopias are to be enjoyed and admired: they are made of our concerns 
and they tell us about our now, about our pre-utopian selves. They are to be 
interpreted. And so are those of our enemies.  
China Miéville 
 
 
 
The philosophers have only interpreted the world, in various ways. The 
point, however, is to change it. 
          Karl Marx 
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Introduction – The political economy of permanent 
underachievement. 
 
 The spectre of a capitalist crisis is haunting Brazil and Argentina – yet again. 
Across both countries, its well-known effects are very visible. In the short distance 
between Avenida Ipiranga and the Municipal Theatre, at core of Sao Paulo, tens of 
thousands of jobless people wander every day, looking for work. In the industrial belts 
around Buenos Aires, factories are progressively reducing their capacity, cutting down 
shifts, dismissing workers, and closing their doors. In Rio de Janeiro, one of Brazil’s most 
prestigious universities – the State University of Rio de Janeiro (UERJ), with more than 
25 thousand students – does not have enough money to start the academic year. The 
austerity measures imposed by the state government hit the university hard – as well as 
the provision of many other public services. 
 The impact of walking on the streets and seeing with one’s own eyes the renewed 
face of poverty can hardly be captured in numbers. Claudio Katz mentions the ‘sudden 
generation of 1.4 million new poor people’ (2016, 1) in the first 90 days of Argentina’s 
new federal administration. Indeed, immediately after taking office, in December 2015, 
President Mauricio Macri announced a harsh structural adjustment package, including the 
revision of subsidies on public tariffs. The cost of essential household services such as 
electricity, water and gas increased by percentages varying from 400% to 1800% (Katz 
2016, 1). Equivalent hikes put small stores and industries under pressure. Largely 
influenced by that, as well as by a sharp devaluation of the Argentinian Peso, the inflation 
rate in 2016 reached 40%. At the same time, overall economic activity contracted by 
2.3%, affecting particularly the industrial sector. The Argentinian statistics institute 
reported 15 months of continuous contraction of industrial activity between February 
2016 and April 2017 (INDEC 2017b, 3). Per capita GDP was estimated in US$ 18.479 in 
2016, basically the same value as 2008, and 3.3% less than in 2015.1 In the second 
semester of 2016, 32.2% of the Argentinians were considered poor, while 6.3% suffered 
from extreme poverty (INDEC 2017a, 3). 
 Yet, the extent and the depth of the actual crisis in Argentina fades when compared 
with the situation in Brazil, where the crisis is not only economic, but also largely political 
                                                          
1 Constant 2001 international $, PPP (World Bank 2017).  
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and institutional. The laudatory political economy literature celebrating the rise of Brazil 
to a global power status aged much faster than anyone could have predicted. It started 
with Goldman Sach’s famous BRICS’ report, which predicted an average GDP growth 
of 7.5% over the ten years following 2001, putting Brazil side by side with Russia, India 
and China as new countries that should be taken into account for the designing of global 
economic governance structures (O’Neill 2001). After that, a number of authors 
embarked on a short-lived Brazil Mania. Brainard and Martinez-Diaz (2009) 
optimistically evaluate the chances of Brazil becoming an ‘economic superpower’ in the 
foreseeable future. James Davidson was so convinced that ‘Brazil is the new America’ 
that he finishes his book recommending his readers to ‘secure a foothold in Brazil for 
yourself and your family. Obtain a Brazilian residence, or even a Brazilian passport, to 
assure that you will always be welcome in the country of the future’ (2011, 308). More 
critical approaches, as suggested by Nederveen Pieterse and Cardoso (2014), recognise 
potential social problems related to Brazil’s ‘emergence’, but take for granted that the 
emergence was happening indeed.         
 Contrasting with the widespread optimism of just a couple of years ago, instead 
of taking off to become a world ‘economic superpower’, Brazil slid to what seems to be 
the worst economic crisis in its modern history. After stagnating in 2014, GDP contracted 
by 3.8% in 2015 and 3.6% in 2016. In per capita terms, GDP contracted by almost 10% 
between 2014 and 2016, putting it back to the levels of 2010 (World Bank 2017). 
Following the ILO methodology, the World Bank estimates that youth unemployment 
reached 24.6% in 2016, while the national statistics institute estimates overall 
unemployment in the second quarter of 2017 in 13%, rising to 15.8% in the Northeast 
region (IBGE 2017, 7). More importantly, a very questionable impeachment was moved 
against President Rousseff, immediately denounced by a number of authors as a 
‘parliamentary coup’ (Singer et al. 2016). In the media process of discrediting President 
Rousseff and her party, a Pandora’s Box of corruption allegations and shady relations 
between politicians and some of Brazilian biggest corporations was opened, affecting the 
whole Brazilian political system. How the current crisis will end is still impossible to tell. 
The only thing certain is that the grandiose development perspectives of a couple of years 
ago have failed to materialise. 
 It is not the first time that Brazil or Argentina have woken up from dreams of 
joining the first world and have had to face the bitter reality of unemployment, poverty 
and political turmoil. Fifteen years ago, the cycle of neoliberal reforms ended up in 
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similar, if not worse disappointment. After adopting many of the Washington Consensus’ 
prescriptions in the hope of attracting a wave of foreign investments and surfing in the 
soaring tide of ‘globalisation’, sustained economic growth failed to materialise, 
unemployment surged and very unpopular neoliberal administrations were ousted from 
office. Then the epicentre of the crisis was Argentina. In the last weeks of 2001, the 
country descended into a state of ungovernability, with banks closed, the streets taken by 
protesters and the incumbent president fleeing the government palace in a helicopter.  
 Why does the future never seem to arrive to Brazil and Argentina? Why are the 
big development promises contained in the politicians’ discourses – independent of their 
ideological colour – never fulfilled? Why do successive waves of state reforms fail to 
produce the expected results? 
 In this thesis, I will argue that the mismatch between high expectations and bitter 
reality over the last twenty five years is not merely the result of ill-conceived or poorly 
implemented economic policies. Nor is it a lifeless reflex of the cycles of global 
capitalism. Brazilian and Argentinian perceived permanent underachievement have 
deeper roots. These roots, I claim, are to be found in the two mainstream development 
strategies that dominate the political economy debate in Brazil and Argentina: 
neoliberalism and neodevelopmentalism. 
 Although they superficially appear as opposites, neoliberalism and 
neodevelopmentalism actually share two problematic theoretical presuppositions. Firstly, 
they are based on similarly idealised views of development as capitalist catch-up. 
Secondly, they rely on the artificial division between states and markets. It is true that 
neoliberals and neodevelopmentalists recognise that neither states nor markets can be 
totally supressed. Nevertheless, neoliberals place great emphasis on the putative powers 
of free markets to promote best allocation of scarce resources, while 
neodevelopmentalists insist that a national-interest oriented state is crucial in taming 
market forces, correcting market failures and promoting development.  
Because the ‘free market’ or the ‘national-interest driven state’ are never fully 
materialised, neoliberalism and neodevelopmentalism take the form of mutually 
excluding market and state utopias. As such, they produce discourses and policies that 
are intrinsically incomplete, inasmuch as the work of freeing markets or building the 
capabilities of the state for national-interest interventions is infinite. As a consequence, 
their repeated failures in achieving catch-up development can always be justified by 
excessive or insufficient state control over markets.   
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Neoliberalism and neodevelopmentalism are thus considered here as development 
strategies, i.e., discourses about how to achieve development, involving catch-up 
promises, concrete policy suggestions, and retrospective narratives about the results of 
the policies effectively implemented. To these development strategies correspond 
different class alliances, which may change across space and time. My research on Brazil 
and Argentina has shown that the neoliberal development strategy tends to be favoured 
by the financial fractions of the ruling class and international capital, while 
neodevelopmentalism tends to be favoured by the fraction of the ruling class linked to the 
domestic market, in association with some fractions of the working class. These class 
alignments are justified by the fact that policies favouring the first group are more 
consistent with the market utopia, while the second group is better contemplated by 
policies derived from the state utopia.  
This thesis is a critique of both neoliberalism and neodevelopmentalism. From a 
theoretical standpoint, the critique here proposed systematically calls into question the 
underlying presuppositions of neoliberalism and neodevelopmentalism. From an 
empirical standpoint, the critique unveils the contradictions of the neoliberal and 
neodevelopmentalist political discourses, and uncovers the conflicting social interests 
behind the implementation of key public policies in Argentina and Brazil. Finally, going 
beyond neoliberalism and neodevelopmentalism, I suggest an alternative political 
economy narrative of the neoliberal and neodevelopmentalist cycles in both countries 
since 1990.  
The theoretical starting point of my critique is a radical redefinition of the very 
concept of development. The conception of development at the core of both neoliberalism 
and neodevelopmentalism is simple: to develop is to follow the path of global north 
countries. This involves increasing productivity and consumption levels so as to converge 
to those seen in ‘developed’ countries. Accordingly, Brazil and Argentina – or any 
‘underdeveloped’ country, for that matter – can become developed by adopting the right 
set of policies. At that point, neoliberals and neodevelopmentalist split paths, for the 
policies they suggest stem from their respective competing market and state utopias. 
Contrary to that, based on Leon Trotsky’s concept of uneven and combined 
development, and building on the contemporary literature that has recently expanded its 
meaning, I define development as the material transformations that emerge from the 
interplay between international relations and class disputes. Development, therefore, can 
take many different forms, convergence with global north consumption and production 
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standards being but a rare one. This redefinition of what development is – and what to 
expect from development – allows me to ask questions beyond the reach of the neoliberal 
and neodevelopmentalist literatures. Instead of inquiring as to why catch-up development 
fails to materialise and proposing yet another set of state-led or market-friendly policies 
to finally fix Brazilian and Argentinian perceived underdevelopment, I examine how 
international pressures and opportunities were appropriated by conflicting classes and 
class fractions, resulting in differentiated social gains and losses. This theoretical 
perspective makes it possible to explain what neoliberals and neodevelopmentalists see 
as constant policy errors as something much more complex. For the reforms adopted in 
Brazil and in Argentina over the last twenty five years may not have resulted in catching-
up with global north countries, but they certainly resulted in some kind of development. 
Understanding development as an uneven and combined process of material 
transformation, I am able to specify what kind of development actually resulted from the 
neoliberal and neodevelopmentalist reforms, identify its international conditionings and 
show who benefited from it.  
The twofold – theoretical and empirical – critique of neoliberalism and 
neodevelopmentalism here proposed is advanced in three steps. In part one (chapters 1 
and 2) I further define what I am calling neoliberalism and neodevelopmentalism, through 
an engagement with representative authors of both traditions. In my literature selection, I 
have privileged contemporary Brazilian and Argentinian writers, particularly those that 
have taken important roles in public administration during the period under analysis. I 
clearly show how they rely on an idealised view of development as catching-up, as well 
as on market or state utopias.  
After that, in chapter 2, I define an alternative theoretical perspective. The chapter 
starts by engaging with the post-development literature’s calls for the abandoning of the 
concept of development altogether. Against that, I argue that some understanding of 
development is paramount to make sense of material changes, and inform struggles for a 
better life. The concept of uneven and combined development, I claim, can do exactly 
that. I then place that concept in the historical materialist tradition, as an attempt by 
Trotsky to fill in an important theoretical gap left by Karl Marx, namely the lack of a 
consistent definition of development. The contemporary literature that expands Trotsky’s 
original ideas is analysed, as well as some of its most important critiques. Finally, I 
address the still largely unexplored potential of the concept of uneven and combined 
development for contemporary political economy analysis. Here, drawing on insights 
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from classical Latin American political economy, particularly Celso Furtado, I define 
some mid-range concepts consistent with the uneven and combined character of 
development, further specifying concrete forms taken by the interplay between 
international pressures and opportunities and class struggle in peripheral countries. 
Part 2 (chapters 3 and 4) and part 3 (chapters 5 and 6) form the empirical core of 
this thesis. Their overarching aim is the critique of concrete manifestations of 
neoliberalism and neodevelopmentalism in Brazil and Argentina. In chapter 3, I take a 
closer look at the neoliberal reforms in Argentina in the 1990s; in chapter 4, my focus is 
on Brazil and the neoliberal policies implemented by Presidents Collor and Cardoso. In 
chapter 5, I turn to the neodevelopmentalist policies of Presidents Lula and Rousseff in 
Brazil; finally, in chapter 6, I return to Argentina to analyse the neodevelopmentalist 
reforms of Presidents Nestor and Cristina Kirchner.  
The structure and the argumentative strategy followed in the empirical chapters 
are similar. Each chapter starts with an analysis of the political discourse. Particular 
attention is given to the representation of ‘development’, and to how the state or the 
market utopia is mobilised to justify public policies. After that, two sets of policies are 
analysed: macroeconomic management policies and foreign policies. I chose to focus on 
these two areas because they are crucial in determining the differentiated social outcomes 
of development and the responses to international pressures and opportunities. The last 
section of each chapter reviews the answers offered by neoliberal and 
neodevelopmentalist authors for the perceived developmental shortcomings of each 
period. Finally, building on the contemporary Brazilian and Argentinian Marxist 
literature, I use the concept of uneven and combined development and the mid-range 
concepts defined in chapter 2 to challenge the neoliberal and neodevelopmentalist 
narratives, and propose a more nuanced picture of recent social and productive 
transformations in both countries. 
At the end of parts 2 and 3, in an effort at synthesis, I bring together the results of 
the previous chapters in short comparative conclusions. Indeed, because of the 
coincidence of timespans between the neoliberal (1989-2002) and the 
neodevelopmentalist (2003-2015) cycles in Brazil and Argentina, interesting parallels can 
be traced. The juxtaposition of cases reveals how different responses were possible in the 
face of similar external shocks, represented by international crises. Nevertheless, because 
this research is based on only two interacting cases, with no control case, my comparative 
notes do not aim at universal claims. Rather, following the spirit of Philip McMichael’s 
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‘incorporated comparisons’, my ‘goal is not to develop invariant hypothesis (…), but to 
give substance to a historical process (a whole) through comparison of its parts’ (1990, 
386). 
Beyond ‘incorporated comparisons’, mixed methods are employed to approach 
the empirical data used in this research. In the first section of each empirical chapter, I 
analyse speeches, statements, press interviews and political propaganda in order to 
establish the aims of neoliberal and neodevelopmentalist policies. In the policy analysis 
sections, besides the secondary literature, I use official reports from the Brazilian and 
Argentinian governments, as well as macroeconomic data from the World Bank and the 
ECLAC online databases. An effort was made to use comparable data for both countries. 
Finally, the empirical material is complemented by fourteen original interviews with 
relevant analysts and policy makers in Brazil and Argentina.         
 The contribution I am seeking to make in this thesis can be described as theoretical 
and political. Theoretically, I modestly add a distinctive perspective and suggest new mid-
range concepts to the contemporary literature on uneven and combined development, 
particularly in the fields of development studies and political economy. After Adam 
Morton’s recent study on Mexico (2013), this is the only other lengthy research to explore 
the potentiality of the contemporary formulation of the concept of uneven and combined 
development in relation to Latin American political economy, and the first to do so 
focusing on a relatively short time span (1989-2016). I also see the theoretical points 
raised here as a contribution to the renewal of the dependency theory tradition and Latin 
American historical materialism at large. From a political perspective, I would like to see 
the critique carried out in this thesis as an invitation for the Brazilian and Argentinian left 
to dare and think beyond neoliberalism and neodevelopmentalism. For too long, the 
horizons of the political economy debates in both countries – and for that matter in most 
of Latin America – have been limited by these two mainstream perspectives. By 
challenging neoliberalism and neodevelopmentalism, I wish to contribute to the 
emergence of new and radical development perspectives. 
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Part 1 – Neoliberalism, Neodevelopmentalism and Beyond 
 
Introduction 
 
 For the observer of contemporary Brazilian and Argentinian political economy, it 
may appear as if there are no alternatives to neoliberalism and neodevelopmentalism. The 
sharp opposition between the two mainstream development strategies leaves no room for 
other options. Criticising one side places the analyst necessarily on the competing field.  
 In the following two chapters, I explain why neoliberalism and neoliberalism can 
present themselves as polar opposites, emptying of meaning any other competing 
development strategy. Furthermore, I use the concept of uneven and combined 
development to challenge the view of development that is at the very core of both 
perspectives. After exposing the fragile theoretical underpinnings of both neoliberalism 
and neodevelopmentalism, I move one step further in order to define the theoretical 
toolkit employed in the empirical chapters of this thesis. In short, the two chapters that 
follow aim at creating the theoretical space for the empirical critique of neoliberalism and 
neodevelopmentalism attempted in the substantial part of this thesis.  
 My claim is that the divide between neoliberalism and neodevelopmentalism is 
premised on the false dichotomy between states and markets, complemented by a shared 
narrow view of development as catching-up with the global north. This dichotomy is an 
expression of mutually excluding state and market utopias. While neoliberals believe that 
free and self-regulated markets are conducive to development, neodevelopmentalists 
believe that the state can stand above class interests, neutralise external shocks and tame 
market forces in order to lead the nation towards development.  
The contemporary Brazilian and Argentinian expressions of neoliberalism and 
neodevelopmentalism are, therefore, here defined as utopic development strategies. 
Because the perfectly free market never fully materialises, neoliberal writers can always 
claim for the deepening of market friendly policies. Conversely, as the purely national-
interest driven state is also never realised, neodevelopmentalists can always claim for the 
strengthening of state capabilities. Furthermore, the failures of the policies recommended 
by neoliberal and neodevelopmentalist in bringing about the idealised view of 
development at the centre of both perspectives can always be attributed to excessive or 
insufficient state control over the markets. For that reason not only neoliberal and 
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neodevelopmentalist authors offer necessarily misguided policies, but they also produce 
circular narratives about the social and productive changes brought about by the state 
reforms carried out in Brazil and in Argentina.    
 By highlighting the utopic character of the neoliberal and neodevelopmentalist 
strategies, I am not implying that utopias are necessarily evil and should be dismissed. In 
fact, the alternative here proposed is deeply rooted in the historical materialist tradition, 
which is arguably also based on a utopia, namely that of social emancipation. The 
problem, therefore, is not with utopias per se, but with capitalist utopias and the use 
privileged social groups make of them. As recently put by China Miévele in his 
introduction to the new edition of Thomas More’s Utopia, ‘Utopias are necessary. But 
not only are they insufficient: they can, in some iterations, be part of the ideology of the 
system, the bad totality that organises us (…) and condemns millions to peonage on 
garbage scree’ (Miéville 2016, 16). 
 The neoliberal and the neodevelopmentalist strategies belong exactly to that kind 
of utopia. By promising a capitalist development that never arrives, they justify policies 
involving concrete sacrifices for the working class and other subordinated groups. At the 
same time, while the theoretical difference between neoliberalism and 
neodevelopmentalism is nothing but an illusion, the fact that they are used by different 
class alliances under the leadership of different fractions of the ruling class makes for real 
political differences. While the market utopia is particularly useful for the defence of the 
interests of the financial fraction of the ruling class and its international partners, the state 
utopia is a traditional banner of the productive fractions of Brazilian and Argentinian 
ruling classes, dependent on the internal market and government subsidies.  
 After engaging with representative texts of Latin American neoliberalism and 
neodevelopmentalism and exposing their problematic theoretical foundations in chapter 
1, I start the effort of building a theoretical alternative in chapter 2. This is done through 
a redefinition of the very concept of development following Trotsky’s insights and the 
contemporary literature on uneven and combined development. Development is thus 
defined as the changes in productive and social structure brought about by the constant 
interaction between international pressures and opportunities and class struggle.  
Finally, a contribution to the emerging literature on the political economy of 
uneven and combined development is suggested, by the framing of mid-range concepts 
capable of capturing particular expressions of unevenness and combination over the short 
run. These concepts will be instrumental for the alternative narrative of the neoliberal and 
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neodevelopmentalist reforms implemented in Brazil and Argentina that follows in Parts 
2 and 3 of this thesis. By taking development as an uneven and combined process of 
transformation, I am able to move beyond the mainstream neoliberal and 
neodevelopmentalist narratives, explain particular policy choices and uncover the socially 
differentiated results of the reforms.       
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Chapter 1 – Development through the prism of neoliberalism and 
neodevelopmentalism 
 
 
In this chapter I claim that neoliberalism and neodevelopmentalism rest on 
similarly fragile theoretical bases. Although they appear in the contemporary political 
debate across Latin America as polar opposites, this opposition is premised on a 
simplifying divide between the market and the state. Accordingly, neoliberalism is 
defined as the development strategy premised on the market utopia, while 
neodevelopmentalism is the development strategy that arises from the state utopia. In both 
cases, it is supposed that individual countries can overcome the condition of 
backwardness by undertaking a series of market-friendly or state-led polices. 
Development, taken as capitalist catching-up, is thus portrayed as the undisputed national 
goal of underdeveloped countries.  
 Both perspectives understate the role of class conflicts and ignore the uneven 
social consequences of development. Furthermore, neodevelopmentalist and neoliberal 
authors fail to organically co-relate international pressures and opportunities and 
sociological analysis. The complex interplay between class struggle in developing 
societies and international relations is never explored. As a consequence, neoliberal and 
neodevelopmentalist authors suggest intrinsically inconsistent policy agendas, which 
cannot be fully applied in the real world. At the same time, the shortcomings of the 
policies effectively adopted can always be circularly attributed to excessive or insufficient 
state intervention in the market. In short, neoliberalism and neodevelopmentalism can 
only offer a circular political economy of permanent underachievement, coming from and 
resulting in never-ending reforms, that are never capable of delivering what they promise. 
 The common theoretical fragilities of neoliberalism and neodevelopmentalism are 
revealed through a literature review of some of the most representative works of each 
perspective. In the selection of the texts, I privileged those authors that played important 
roles in the Brazilian and Argentinian recent administrations, including ambassadors, 
senior political advisors, finance ministers and central bank governors.   
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1.1 – Neoliberalism as a development strategy premised on the market utopia 
 
Neoliberalism is a slippery concept.2 A precise definition is never fully proposed 
by those who are commonly seen as its intellectual fathers. For instance, the words 
‘neoliberalism’ and ‘neoliberal’ are entirely absent from classics normally associated with 
the neoliberal political economy, such as The Road to Serfdom, by F. Hayek, and 
Capitalism and Freedom, by M. Friedman. Both authors, as well as L. Von Mises, define 
themselves more commonly as ‘liberals’ and identify their respective doctrines in 
broader, less specific terms as ‘liberalism’ (Friedman 2002, 5) or ‘individualism’ (Hayek 
2001, 32).  
The contemporary literature that actually uses the concept is overwhelmingly 
critical of neoliberalism, attaching to it a wealth of meanings. Ben Fine and Alfredo Saad-
Filho, for instance, identify four ‘ways’ in which neoliberalism may be understood: (a) 
‘as a set of economic and political ideas’; (b) ‘as a set of policies, institutions and 
practices’; (c) ‘as a class offensive against the workers and the poor’, and (d) ‘as the 
current phase, stage or mode of existence of capitalism’ (2017, 686). Critical articles, 
handbooks and readers on neoliberalism multiply (Saad-Filho and Johnston 2005; 
Springer, Birch, and MacLeavy 2016; Eagleton-Pierce 2016), amplifying the cacophony 
around the concept. 
Although incorporating some of its insights, this thesis is not primarily intended 
as a contribution to the contemporary debate on the nature of neoliberalism. Instead of 
pinpointing some specific shortcoming of the critical literature on neoliberalism and 
proposing yet another way of understanding the concept, my critique aims at the Latin 
American neoliberal literature itself. I claim that this literature, best represented by 
Williamson (1990, 1993, 2004), Fraga (1994; 2004; Fraga, Goldfajn, and Minella 2003), 
Franco (1995, 1998), Cavallo (1995; 2005; Cavallo and Mondino 1995; Cavallo and 
Cottani 1997); Rodriguez (1995); Giambiagi (Pinheiro, Giambiagi, and Moreira 2001; 
Averbug and Giambiagi 2000; Giambiagi and Schwartsman 2014); Mansueto, Lisboa, 
and Pessoa (2015) – among others – has two crucial flaws. First, it cannot offer consistent 
                                                          
2 The difficulties of assigning an exact meaning to that concept are almost universally recognized. See, 
for instance Wacquant (2012, 68) and Brenner, Peck, and Theodore (2010, 183). The term ‘neoliberalism’ 
is said to have been used for the first time in the Colloque Walter Lippmann, an international congress of 
liberal thinkers held in Paris in 1938. Originally identified with the German economist Alexander 
Rüstow, the purpose of renovating ‘traditional liberalism’ apparently never commanded a consensus 
among the participants at the congress (Mirowski and Plehwe 2009, 49). 
14 
 
 
policy prescriptions to promote catch-up development, its declared goal. Second, it cannot 
explain why actually adopted economic policies fail to produce catch-up development.  
In the Latin American political economy literature, neoliberalism takes, therefore, 
the concrete form of a development strategy – i.e. a policy-oriented discourse about 
development. The neoliberal literature represents development as catching-up with global 
north countries. Furthermore, it offers policy prescriptions on how to achieve 
development, and at the same time evaluate adopted policies. As such, the main rival of 
neoliberalism in Latin America, as in the rest of the global south, are competing 
development strategies, such as developmentalism (Connell and Dados 2014, 122). 
The specificity of the neoliberal development strategy – the distinctive trace that 
separates it from the developmentalist tradition – is the supposition that catch-up 
development can be achieved through the unleashing of ‘market’ forces. This is exactly 
what I am calling the ‘market utopia’, as opposed to the ‘state utopia’. The ‘international’ 
in general, and the international market in particular, is perceived as a sphere of 
opportunities for development, whose negative aspects can always be neutralised. As 
summarised by Jeffrey Webber in his recent critique of the contemporary mainstream 
sociological literature on Latin America: 
 
Liberal ideology presents the global capitalist system as an arena of free exchange and 
the source of potential opportunities for the development of less developed countries. The 
problems of poverty and inequality are generally framed as originating in exclusion from 
the market. Human development, the amelioration of problems of poverty and inequality, 
is possible only through proper integration into the world market (2017, 90-91). 
  
Neoliberal writers believe in a tendency of convergence among nations through 
international trade, investments and the diffusion of technologies and business practices 
globally. Free markets are supposed to lead to a world where the productive resources are 
allocated the most efficiently. Capital, seeking always the best returns, would spread 
evenly across the globe and activate the comparative advantages of each territory. In a 
nutshell, neoliberalism appears in the contemporary Latin American political economy 
literature as a development strategy based on the market utopia. 
The characterisation of neoliberal writers’ faith in the developmental powers of 
the market as utopic is hardly original. Pierre Bourdieu, for instance, defined 
neoliberalism as a ‘utopia’, converted into a ‘political program’, which nonetheless 
‘manages to see itself as the scientific description of reality’ (1998, 94). Similarly, for 
David Harvey, 
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We can (…) interpret neoliberalism either as a utopian project to realize a 
theoretical design for the reorganization of international capitalism or as a 
political project to re-establish the conditions for capital accumulation and to 
restore the power of economic elites (2006, 19). 
 
 By stressing the utopic character of Latin American neoliberalism, I do not wish 
to understate its political dimensions, as suggested by Harvey. Nor am I ruling out the 
possibility of also interpreting neoliberalism in a larger sense as the contemporary phase 
of global capitalism, as suggested by Fine and Saad-Filho (2017). Rather, I am 
highlighting theoretical roots of the shortcomings of Latin American neoliberalism, 
which can be clearly traced back to the uncritical faith in the virtues of the international 
market. 
 As widely recognised in the contemporary critical literature on neoliberalism, 
which recently incorporated Polanyi’s insight that capitalist markets themselves are social 
creations largely dependent on state intervention (2002),3 the completely free and self-
regulated market can never be materialised. Consequently, the policies proposed in the 
neoliberal literature are never complete, as there is always more work to be done towards 
market liberalisation. Moreover, individual countries’ failure to catch-up with the global 
north can always be attributed to the necessarily incomplete implementation of the 
neoliberal program. The market utopia on which the neoliberal development strategy is 
based, therefore, is not only an innocent faith in a free market that never comes into full 
existence. It is a convenient excuse, which allows for continued implementation of 
policies that have uneven distributive consequences, normally resulting in privatisation 
of gains to fractions of the ruling class and socialisation of losses for the rest of society 
(see chapter 2).    
In order to further specify the distinctive features of the neoliberal development 
strategy in Latin America and lay bare its fragile theoretical bases, I turn now to the work 
of some of the most influential neoliberal authors in the region: Williamson (1990; 1993; 
2004); Fraga (1994; 2004) and Escudé (1992; 1995; 2009). By closely analysing these 
texts, it is possible to appreciate the progressive theoretical building of the neoliberal 
development strategy. The fact that Fraga and Escudé came to play crucial roles in the 
actual implementation of the policies they advocate in Argentina and Brazil (see chapters 
                                                          
3 For a review and a critique of the ‘Polanyian turn’ in the literature about neoliberalism see Knafo 
(2017). 
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3 and 4) strengthens the argument that their writings offer important clues on how 
neoliberalism shaped public policies in Latin America.  
 
 
1.1.1 - Neoliberalism and the Washington Consensus 
 
John Williamson’s ‘Washington Consensus’ is the most famous expression of the 
neoliberal development strategy in Latin America. In the landmark article ‘What 
Washington Means by Policy Reform’, the author sets out ‘what would be regarded in 
Washington as constituting a desirable set of economic policy reforms’, in order ‘to 
establish a baseline against which to measure the extent to which various countries have 
implemented the reforms being urged on them’ (1990, 1).  
The remarkable easiness with which Williamson claims that Washington ‘urges’ 
Latin American countries to undertake reforms reminds us of the historical context of 
triumphant victory of the US in the cold war, illustrated by the then recent fall of the 
Berlin Wall. It is also important to bear in mind that most of the Latin American countries 
were suffering major economic difficulties in the aftermath of the debt crisis, including 
fiscal deficits and high inflation. Williamson’s text was, therefore, a perfect product of its 
time, a fact later recognized by the author himself (2004, 199). 
One of the most notable features of the Washington Consensus is the 
straightforward way it presents a list of ten policies that should be carried out by Latin 
American countries. These policies are: 
 
1) Eliminating fiscal deficits, or at least reducing them in relation to the GNP. 
Failure to keep ‘fiscal discipline’ is not considered as a legitimate political 
choice, but constitutes ‘a lack of political courage or honesty to match public 
expenditure and the resources available to finance them’ (1990, 3). 
2) Defining public expenditure priorities. In other words, in order to accomplish 
‘fiscal discipline’, countries are asked to cut budgets instead of raising taxes. 
(1990, 4). 
3) Reforming the tax system. Taxation must follow the principle that ‘the tax 
base should be broad and the marginal tax rates should be moderate’. The tax 
system is seen therefore as instrumental to avoid fiscal deficits, not as a means 
to distribute wealth (1990, 4). 
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4)  Providing positive interest rates. Interest rates must be moderately positive in 
real terms, but at the same time they should be freely determined by the 
market. In fact, ‘one expects market-determined interest rates to be positive 
but moderate in real terms’ (1990, 5). 
5) Providing ‘competitive’ exchange rates. The exchange rate is deemed central 
for the strategy of ‘outward-oriented’ growth, that is, growths based in the 
international demand (1990, 5). 
6) Liberalizing trade, meaning facilitating imports that were previously 
restricted. This is ‘the second element of an outward-oriented economic 
policy’ (1990, 6). 
7) Facilitating foreign investment, inasmuch as ‘a restrictive attitude limiting the 
entry of foreign direct investment is regarded as foolish’. (1990, 6). 
8) Privatising state-owned companies. This should be done primarily because 
‘private industry is managed more efficiently than state enterprises’. (1990, 7). 
9) Deregulating different areas of the economy. Deregulation ‘is generally 
judged to have been successful within the United States, and it is generally 
assumed that it could bring similar benefits to other countries’ (1990, 7). 
10) Protecting property rights. They are ‘highly insecure in Latin America’, in 
spite of ‘their fundamental importance for the satisfactory operation of the 
capitalist system’ (1990, 8). 
 
The market utopia appears very clearly in the ten items of the Washington 
Consensus. The international market is portrayed as a potential source of investments and 
demand for Latin American products, hence a major driver of development. The role of 
the state is basically to let the international market work its magic. At the same time, 
exactly because premised on the market utopia, the policies in Williamson’s list can be 
potentially applied to an infinite extent. The public budget can always be further squeezed 
and there will be always be something else to deregulate or privatise.  
Perhaps more revealing than the list of policies suggested by Williamson is his 
attempt to justify them in an article published three years later. In fact, in the original text 
the author does not provide much argumentation in favour of the policies suggested. In 
this later article, nevertheless, Williamson goes further and argues that the ‘substantial 
body of economic advice’ he summarized in the ‘Washington Consensus’ is more than a 
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suggestion from Washington to Latin America, and ‘deserves to be endorsed across the 
political spectrum’ (1993, 1329). 
This set of policies is regarded as standing beyond the democratic political dispute, 
as it supposedly stems from truly scientific and universal knowledge. Defying it is 
therefore plainly irrational: ‘I can see no advantage to democracy in having major parties 
espousing economic nonsense’ (1993, 1330). The author recognizes that, in social 
sciences, ‘truth is never absolute’, therefore ‘eccentric minorities’ must be tolerated. For 
the good of democracy and of the economic policy, however, the scope of the political 
debate should be de facto limited within the boundaries of the Washington Consensus 
(1993, 1331).   
The technocratic discourse proposed by Williamson, and later espoused by several 
Latin America policy-makers, leaves no room for agency of subordinate groups in the 
definition of development alternatives. A developed society would be the natural result 
of the diligent implementation of the Washington Consensus. Political resistance to 
deregulation, privatisation, liberalisation and cutting in public budgets is ruled out as 
irrational. The uneven aspect of development is not considered. Material losses of the 
social classes and class-fractions affected by Washington Consensus policies are simply 
ignored. 
In addition to ignoring class conflicts and how they may affect the implementation 
of development strategies, Williamson also presents a very limited view of the 
international. While the developmental potentialities of the international market are 
praised, in line with the market utopia, constraints to development in the form of 
international crisis are left out of the picture. As clarified in a later text ‘[t]he list focused 
exclusively on what Latin American countries could do for themselves, not on the world 
conditions that would give them a reasonable chance of prospering’ (2004, 197). The 
author admits that this meant that his list was unbalanced ‘especially in the short run’. 
Nevertheless, according to him, ‘in the long run, countries' progress is primarily 
dependent on their own efforts rather than on the international environment’ (2004, 197).  
In short, the Washington Consensus can be described as the crudest theoretical 
expression of the neoliberal development strategy in Latin America. It posits a notion of 
development as capitalist convergence towards a world formed exclusively by developed 
capitalist countries. Underdeveloped Latin American countries would become developed 
over time by the adoption of its supposedly uncontroversial policies. Structural 
impediments to catch-up development – namely class conflicts in each society as well as 
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international constraints – are simply ignored. Because the Washington Consensus 
policies are based on the market utopia, they can never be fully implemented in the real 
world. Nevertheless, failure to implement those policies and finally catch-up is always 
regarded as individual countries’ fault, never as a theoretical limitation of the model itself.   
 
1.1.2 – Beyond the Washington Consensus, the political economy of the neoliberal 
development strategy 
 
It is no exaggeration to suggest that, in the 1990, the Washington Consensus 
became a blueprint for economic policies in Latin America. A measure of its influence is 
the fact that policy-makers directly implicated in the implementation of the neoliberal 
development strategy eventually felt obliged to justify deviations from Williamson’s 
model (Cavallo and Cottani 1997).4  
Among the most enthusiast defenders of the Washington Consensus is Armínio 
Fraga, the former president of the Central Bank of Brazil (1999-2002) and the leading 
economist identified with the PSDB (Party of Brazilian Social Democracy). A Princeton 
trained economist and a very successful private investor who worked for George Soros’ 
investment funds for several years, he explicitly argues in favour of the neoliberal reforms 
(1994; 2003; 2004), adding a distinctive political economy perspective to Williamson’s 
ideas. According to Fraga, ‘the nations of Latin America that were more active in carrying 
out Washington Consensus reforms also experienced better economic performance’, 
therefore ‘rather than seeking to reverse the economic reforms that have been carried out, 
Latin American nations should be thinking about how to extend and complement the 
existing reforms’ (2004, 90). 
Fraga bases his argument on the comparison of aggregate macroeconomic and 
social data.5 He contrasts per capita GDP growth, inflation rates, total factor productivity 
growth and social indicators in an effort to show a general tendency towards ‘progress’ 
in the 1990s. On a country-by-country basis, the author supposedly finds a correlation 
                                                          
4 Brenta (2002) convincingly shows how much the economic policies in Brazil and in Argentina in the 
1990s derived from the Washington Consensus. The exchange rate policies appear to be the main explicit 
deviation from the Washington Consensus in Brazil and in Argentina. Interestingly, the same could be 
said in relation to the neodevelopmentalist strategy, which indicates a structural difficulty in keeping 
relatively undervalued exchange rates in the long term.  
5 The countries analyzed by the author are Argentina, Brazil, Colombia, Chile, Mexico, Peru and 
Venezuela. The seven countries selected represent more than 90% of the region’s GDP (Fraga 2004, 90). 
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between the adoption of the Washington Consensus reforms and the ‘progress’ achieved. 
Therefore, in conclusion, Fraga claims for the deepening of these reforms (2004, 90). 
Although carefully handpicked, the data provided by the author hardly sustains 
his own argument. The improvement in social indicators in Latin America shows a 
continuous pattern from the 1970s – associated with demographic transition and 
urbanization – which obviously cannot be attributed to the Washington Consensus. On 
the other hand, there is no evidence that the very modest improvement in per capita GDP 
growth (1.7% in the 1990s, in contrast to -0.6% in the 1980s and 3.8% in the 1970s) 
celebrated by the author was a direct result of the neoliberal policies. Other causes not 
mentioned by Fraga may include reduced levels of population growth between 1980 and 
1990, in comparison to the period 1970-1980, as well as a more favourable international 
conjuncture in the 1990s. 
More relevant than questioning the fragile numeric arguments made by Fraga is 
uncovering the broader reasoning behind those arguments and showing how they are 
based on a narrow view of development associated with the market utopia. According to 
the neoliberal narrative championed by the author, the ‘development strategy’ adopted by 
Latin American Countries from the 1950s was ‘exhausted’ by the 1980s (2004, 94). The 
insistence on this old development strategy – based on industrialisation by substitution of 
imports (ISI) – supposedly led to the debt crisis after external shocks caused by the 
elevation of oil prices in the 1970s. Therefore, in the 1990s, ‘something had to be done 
to re-ignite growth and development in Latin America’, and at this point ‘the set of 
economic reforms known as “the Washington Consensus” enters the stage’ (2004, 96). 
 Here the Washington Consensus explicitly appears as a development strategy 
rival to the traditional developmentalist strategy, confirming the insight by Connell and 
Dados that, in the global south, neoliberalism is primarily opposed to other development 
strategies (2014, 122). As clarified by Fraga:  
 
Broadly speaking, the reforms sought to control the plague of inflation, to reduce 
the incidence of balance of payments crises and to move growth policy away from 
the closed-economy government-led strategies of the three decades that preceded 
the 1980s. (2004, 96) 
 
 
The ‘new’ development strategy proposed by the author rests on the hope of using 
external demand in order to foster a long term ‘outward-oriented’ economic growth, 
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instead of insisting on the potential of the domestic market. It is not difficult to identify 
behind it the faith that the full integration into the global trade flows would be beneficial 
to developing countries, leading to a world-wide convergence of development levels. 
Once again, the market utopia is used to justify policy reforms. In due course, 
underdeveloped Latin American countries would rise to the standards of the developed 
world, provided their governments do not disturb the markets by curbing international 
trade and artificially promoting suboptimal allocation of productive factors. 
Fraga goes beyond the original argument made by Williamson, and asks why it 
was so difficult to implement the policies of the Washington Consensus, if they were so 
beneficial to Latin American countries (2004, 98). This fundamental question leads him 
to tackle some interesting political economy considerations. In Williamson’s texts, the 
resistance to neoliberal reforms was discarded as irrational, inasmuch as the Washington 
Consensus supposedly deserved the endorsement of every rational political party (1993, 
1329). For Fraga, in contrast, there is an identifiable political enemy to the neoliberal 
reforms, namely, ‘populism’. This concept is defined following Kauffman and Stalling 
as a ‘set of economic policies designed to achieve specific political goals’ (1991, 16; cited 
in Fraga 2004, 101). Accordingly, ‘populism’ subordinates the macroeconomic 
management to the interests of organized labour and domestically oriented business, in 
opposition to the interests of the rural oligarchy, foreign enterprises and large domestic 
industrial elites. 
 According to Fraga, the populist discourse conveys the illusion that there are no 
‘trade-offs’,6 ‘while good economic policies often creates a mix of losers and winners, 
whether real or perceived’ (2004, 104). Astonishingly, it is admitted that the neoliberal 
development strategy (aka ‘good economic policies’) causes distributive conflicts. As a 
consequence, ‘special interest groups then gang up and obstruct the path of development-
friendly reforms’ (2004, 104). This resistance to the reforms is only overcome during 
economic crisis, when the ‘demand for populism’ diminishes. As an example, the author 
quotes the case of Chile, as ‘it seems likely that memories of the economic fiasco under 
Allende in the early 1970s were still fresh in the minds of the highly competent group 
that took over after the military’ (2004, 103).  
                                                          
6 This resounds with the wisdom expressed in Milton Friedman’s famous phrase ‘there is no such a thing 
as a free lunch’ (1977), as well as the narrow conception of economics as the science of the best 
allocation of scarce resources. 
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 Although far more elaborated than Williamson’s original ideas, Fraga’s argument 
has some fundamental flaws. Firstly, the faith in the market utopia is constantly 
reaffirmed. Secondly, the author considers the working class as a special interest group, 
which is rather problematic, since it constitutes the overwhelming majority of the 
population. In Argentina, for instance, the trade-union bureaucracy – that is, the fraction 
of the working class that can indeed be seen as a special interest group – actually 
supported the neoliberal reforms, in direct contradiction to Fraga’s argument (see chapter 
3). In general, the simplistic social analysis proposed by the author – aware of entrenched 
interests, but ignoring class struggle – unfairly suggests that only ‘populism’ represents 
the interest of specific groups, while his ‘good economic policies’ were just scientific 
economic advice. 
Fraga also fails to offer a nuanced understanding of international pressures and 
opportunities, repeating Williamson’s belief in the progressive powers of the international 
market. Although his texts occasionally include some scattered references to the 
international conjuncture, the relations between national development and international 
constraints is never fully explored. Thus, much like in Williamsons’ Washington 
Consensus, the combined aspect of development is ignored – as if every individual 
country could become ‘developed’ based on their own efforts.  
 
 
1.1.3 Neoliberalism and Peripheral Realism 
 
 The international aspect of the development process is systematically 
incorporated into the neoliberal development strategy only by Carlos Escudé and his 
‘Peripheral Realism’ (1992; 1995; 2009). The author re-signifies the realist principles in 
an ‘effort to build a theory of foreign policy strategies for states that are peripheral, 
dependent, vulnerable and essentially little relevant for the vital interests of the great 
powers’ (1992, 18). For Arlene Tickner, Escudé’s ideas constitute ‘the only exhaustive 
conceptual endeavour in recent Latin American IR’ (2003, 332).  
 Similarly to Fraga, Escudé is concerned with the justification of a set of public 
policies undertaken by neoliberal governments in the 1990s (nominally, the Argentinian 
foreign policy). Again like Fraga, Escudé’s main rival is ‘populism’ (2009, 14), and his 
argument is entirely built in contrast with the developmentalist foreign policies adopted 
by Argentina in the four decades before 1989, when President Menem took office. 
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Finally, it is implied that the Peripheral Realist policies are conducive to development – 
which is supposedly something achievable in national terms.  
 Escudé’s theoretical argument starts with his affiliation to the ‘classical’ realist 
presuppositions extracted from the work of Hans Morguenthau (1948). Therefore, he 
fully subscribes to the idea that ‘the world is a result of the forces inherent to human 
nature’ (Escudé 1995, 146). This leads him to propose that the foreign policy should be 
conducted ‘rationally’.7 One expression of the lack of rationality behind Argentinian 
traditional foreign policy is the ‘power politics without power’ (1992, 18), meaning that 
the country behave as if it could participate in the disputes of the great powers, despite its 
structural weakness. The confrontational foreign policy adopted by Argentina was 
justified in terms of the ‘anthropomorphic fallacy’, that is, the equating of the nation with 
a single individual. Therefore, according to Escudé, concepts such as ‘dignity’, ‘pride’ 
and ‘honour’ are misleading when used in reference to the nation (1992, 51). The sole 
purpose of the foreign policy, following his approach, is to maximize the well-being of 
the individuals that form the population, since the state is nothing more than the sum of 
the citizens, having no higher form of existence (1992, 51).   
The market utopia appears in peripheral realism in a particularly original way. 
Despite inserting geopolitical concerns into the neoliberal strategy, the state itself is 
emptied as a privileged driver of development, particularly in peripheral countries. 
Instead, the foreign policy of a peripheral country must simply aim at neutralising 
international pressures, through an alliance with the superpower of the time. Necessary 
geopolitical laws are coupled with market laws. To develop, peripheral countries must 
invariably accept them. Escudé evokes examples from the ancient world to prove his point 
that ‘ill-understood nationalism is the worst enemy of the peoples both in Modernity as 
in Antiquity’ (2009, 3). This pragmatic, peripheral-realist perspective is supposedly the 
secret behind the foreign policy of Germany and Japan since their defeat in World War 
II, as well as Canada and Australia (2009, 3). 
 Argentina – the author’s main case study –, in contrast, has been too antagonistic 
to the United States in the long term, and therefore suffers marginalization by the super-
power, which disturbs its ‘progress’ (1992, 24). Examples of the policies that displeased 
                                                          
7 Specifically, he distinguishes between different kinds of rationalities (citizen-centered, state-centered, 
elite-centered, etc.), and claims that his approach is citizen-centered because it ‘serves the people’ (1995, 
148). In doing so, Escudé distances himself from the neorealist, accused by him of treating the ‘State’ as a 
‘person’, and therefore ignoring to whom the foreign policy serves (1995, 148–49).   
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the superpower include the refusal to subscribe to the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty, 
the development of a medium-range ballistic missile, the confrontation with the United 
Kingdom over the Islas Malvinas8 and the engagement in the Non-Aligned Movement 
(1992, 29–50). All of these polices were reversed in Menem’s administration, following 
Escudé’s advice (see chapter 3).9 
 Despite its theoretical fragilities, stemming from the principles of realism itself – 
for instance, the quest for trans-historical laws, the reification of ‘human nature’ and a 
dubious notion of rationality – peripheral realism adds something extremely important to 
the neoliberal development strategy, namely its international-geopolitical aspect. The 
market utopia is broadened and re-signified. Integration into the international market is 
still perceived as a necessary condition for development, but it does not suffice to accept 
the market rules. Side by side with market rules, it is also necessary to accept geopolitical 
rules, which also derive from inescapable features of human nature. 
Evidently the policies suggested by peripheral realism are not necessarily 
restricted to the neoliberal development strategy. In different historic contexts, they can 
be coupled with other development strategies. Nevertheless, the reliance on 
methodological individualism and the rational choice postulates, as well as the scepticism 
towards the developmental powers of peripheral states, makes peripheral realism a perfect 
international relations theory match to neoliberalism. As I show in detail in chapters 3 
and 4, peripheral realism and its Brazilian equivalent – ‘autonomy by participation’ 
(Fonseca 1998) – give sense and coherence to a foreign policy functional to the interests 
of the same class-fractions that benefit from the neoliberal reforms. Moreover, it plays a 
complimentary role in portraying previous development strategies (namely 
developmentalism) as irrational and failed, as they necessarily implied some level of 
confrontation with the established powers.  
 
 
1.2 Neodevelopmentalism as a development strategy premised on the state utopia 
 
As seen in the previous section, authors identified with the neoliberal development 
strategy build their argument in opposition to the Latin American developmentalist 
                                                          
8 Also known as Falkland Islands. 
9 Escudé was senior political advisor for the Argentinian Minister of Foreign Affairs Guido di Tella. 
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tradition, which they dismiss as ‘populism’. Conversely, neodevelopmentalist authors 
return the favour and also define their development strategy in contrast with 
neoliberalism. Nevertheless, the anti-neoliberal agenda they set up is not a simple return 
to the developmentalist approach (Bresser-Pereira 2012a, 348). In this section, I argue 
that despite the updated set of policies suggested by neodevelopmentalists, the state 
utopia that was at the core of older versions of developmentalism remains central to 
neodevelopmentalism. Accordingly, the state is perceived as a virtuous institution, 
standing above class conflicts, and concerned with the national interest. Development is 
to be achieved through the decisive guidance of the state, which is supposed to tame the 
market forces and manage international constraints and opportunities.     
The original expression of Latin American developmentalism appeared in the 
aftermath of the 1929 crisis and gained momentum during the Second World War. 
Originally adopted by nationalist governments in Brazil (under President Vargas), 
Argentina (under President Perón) and México (under President Cárdenas), and 
sometimes identified by Gramscian scholars as passive revolutions (Morton 2013, 22), 
these policies aimed at industrialization, involving decisive state activism. Protection of 
the internal market by high trade tariffs and subsidies boosted the ISI model. The results 
of these policies are contested and contradictory (Mariña-Flores 2014, 147), but they 
clearly changed the productive structures of the biggest countries of the region.  
The nationalist industrialization policies of the 1930s and 1940s were posteriorly 
formalized and theoretically developed in an impressive and original body of economic 
literature. 10  Deeply rooted in the ideas of John Maynard Keynes (1978), the Latin 
American developmentalist school effectively denounced the liberal supposition that the 
full integration into the world market would lead to Latin American development.  
The Argentinian economist, former UNCTAD Secretary-General, and the key 
ECLAC11 thinker Raúl Prebisch pioneered the theoretical argument for the state-induced 
industrialization of the region, claiming that its primary productive structures were 
especially vulnerable to the cyclical crisis of the capitalist system. From a purely 
theoretical standpoint, Prebisch does not question the ‘benefits of the international 
                                                          
10 See Kay (2010, chap. 2) for an outstanding review. 
11 The United Nations Economic Commission for Latin America and the Caribbean (ECLAC), founded in 
1948, is the traditional home of Latin American developmentalism. Influential economists and 
sociologists that have produced works identified with the ECLA are, among others, Celso Furtado; Maria 
da Conceição Tavares; Osvaldo Sunkel; Aníbal Pinto; Jorge Graciarena and Fernando Fajnzylber. Texts 
by these and other writers were collected by Bielschowsky in the extensive, two-volume compilation 
Cinquenta anos de pensamento na CEPAL [Fifty Years of ECLA Thought] (2000).    
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division of labour’. Nevertheless, because in reality technical progress happens unevenly 
across sectors, and because of Latin American historical lack of capital, free trade would 
tend to perpetuate backwardness in the region, ‘[t]hereof the utmost importance of the 
industrialization process of the new countries.’ (Prebisch 2000[1949], 71-72). Just like in 
the liberal tradition, development is perceived as a process of capitalist convergence at 
the production and consumption levels of global north – or ‘central countries’. The 
fundamental point of disagreement between developmentalists and liberals concerns the 
dispute over whether or not the dynamics of the international markets are conducive to 
development in the periphery.  
Recently, the terms ‘neodevelopmentalism’ or ‘new developmentalism’ have been 
incorporated into the academic debates in the fields of Development Studies, International 
Relations and Political Economy (Sicsú, Paula, and Michel 2005; 2007; Bresser-Pereira 
2006; 2012a; 2012b; Bresser-Pereira and Theuer 2012; Féliz 2012; 2014; Katz 2014; 
Morais and Saad-Filho 2011; Ebenau 2014; Mollo and Fonseca 2013; Boito Jr and 
Berringer 2014, among others). Normally employed in an effort to conceptualize the 
economic policies of post-neoliberal, left-of-centre governments in Latin America over 
the last 15 years, the concept is still subject to much controversy regarding its meaning 
and extension. 
As defined by its contemporary proponents, neodevelopmentalism is a doctrine of 
catching-up development, which explicitly presupposes the possibility for individual 
nations to become ‘developed’ over time by taking the right set of economic policies. In 
fact, like old versions of developmentalism, neodevelopmentalism does not pose a radical 
theoretical threat to mainstream marginalist economics. Instead, it reaffirms Prebisch’s 
idea that in reality free markets do not work because of historical conditions, although 
through decisive state intervention the market’s failures can be corrected. Once the state 
steps in and manages market forces sensibly, peripheral countries can finally develop. In 
short, the market utopia is replaced by a state utopia. Instead of a faith in the 
developmental powers of the free market, neodevelopmentalists believe in the powers of 
the state to rise above classes and generate development for the whole nation.  
Claudio Katz rightfully remarks that the differences that neodevelopmentalists 
claim to have in relation to neoliberals are based on an oversimplification, as at the end 
of the day ‘all of them appeal to a strong presence of the public sector in order to manage 
the economy (…) what is always at stake is the kind of state intervention in each period, 
not the existence or the intensity of this presence’ (2014, 102). The distinction between 
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neoliberalism and neodevelopmentalism is particularly tenuous in moments of crisis, 
when both sides agree on the necessity of saving endangered private capital, particularly 
banks. Indeed, both development strategies are based on a similar concept of development 
as capitalist catch-up. As such, their incidental differences are to be seen as simply 
disagreements on the means, and never on the final end: prompting capital accumulation 
and raising productive and consumption standards to the levels of global north countries. 
At a theoretical level, therefore, the distinction between neoliberalism and 
neodevelopmentalism rests on the artificial antagonism between state and market 
capitalist utopias. These utopias, in turn, unfold in very real and consequential political 
differences, revealed through discourse and policies, as analysed in the empirical chapters 
of this thesis. Although based on similarly fragile theoretical presuppositions, the 
development strategies carried out in Menem’s, De la Rua’s, Collor’s and Cardoso’s 
administrations in the 1990s are substantially different from the development strategies 
carried out in Lula’s, Rousseff’s or the Kirchner’s administrations one decade later.  
The key to understanding the material difference between neoliberalism and 
neodevelopmentalism must be found in the different class alliances behind each 
alternative. Discourses and policies drawing on the market utopia are mostly favoured by 
the international capital and the financial and exporting fraction of Brazilian and 
Argentinian ruling classes. Alternatively, the state utopia is most easily used to justify 
discourses and policies advancing the interests of organised labour and the fraction of the 
ruling class dependent on the internal demand. Neodevelopmentalism, in short, is a 
development strategy based on the state utopia, used to cement a national alliance 
between certain fractions of the ruling class and the working class. This understanding of 
neodevelopmentalism largely follows Ruy Mauro Marini’s original usage of the term 
(1978). Although part of the growing contemporary critical literature on 
neodevelopmentalism (Castelo 2012; Boito Jr and Berringer 2014; Boito Jr and Saad-
Filho 2015; Feliz 2014) adopts a similar understanding of the concept, they seem to ignore 
its genealogy. Indeed, the term was used for the first time in an internal controversy within 
dependency theory, opposing Marini and Serra and Cardoso (1978).     
In the remainder of this section I further explore the theoretical shortcomings of 
neodevelopmentalism. First, the forgotten origins of neodevelopmentalism in Cardoso’s 
reformist dependency theory are uncovered and the genealogy of neodevelopmentalism 
is revealed. Then, I engage with the most outspoken contemporary expression of 
neodevelopmentalism, which is to be found in Bresser-Pereira’s writings and in a 
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manifesto called ‘Ten Theses on New Developmentalism’. The foreign policy aspect of 
neodevelopmentalism is discussed through an engagement with the work of Ambassador 
Samuel Pinheiro Guimarães (2007; 2008a; 2008b), who offers a counterpoint to Carlos 
Escudé’s peripheral realism.  
 
1.2.1 Reformist dependency theory and the forgotten origins of 
neodevelopmentalism 
 
 Although the concept of neodevelopmentalism has only been consistently 
incorporated into academic debates in the aftermath of the rise of left-of-centre 
administrations in Latin America – particularly in Brazil and Argentina – it was first 
coined by the Marxist dependency theorist Ruy Mauro Marini four decades ago. In an 
article called ‘The reasons of neodevelopmentalism’, Marini answers the criticism 
levelled against his revolutionary dependency theory by José Serra and Fernando 
Henrique Cardoso, and accuses his critics of ‘neodevelopmentalism’ (Marini 1978, 102–
3). 
 The links between Marini’s original formulation and contemporary 
neodevelopmentalism have been largely missed. Indeed, what appeared in the late 1970s 
as a grave accusation of capitulation in face of international capital and national elites, 
now sounds almost like a praise for Cardoso and Serra, considering how much lower they 
would sink during the 1990s. As remarked by Perry Anderson, ‘[i]n pursuit of office 
Cardoso had sacrificed not only his early convictions, which were Marxist and socialist, 
but over time his intellectual standards’ (2016, 19). In fact, Cardoso’s administration can 
be better described as neoliberal, while full-fledged neodevelopmentalist discourse and 
policies would appear only in Lula’s administration (see chapter 5). Nevertheless, the first 
theoretical justifications of neodevelopmentalism can be traced back to Cardoso’s 
reformist dependency theory. Furthermore, traces of neodevelopmentalism also appear in 
Cardoso’s first administration program and his early political speeches (see chapter 4). 
Cardoso’s conversion to neoliberalism was not sudden, therefore. Before fully embracing 
the market utopia, particularly in his second term as President, he laid out the intellectual 
basis of neodevelopmentalism.   
To uncover the forgotten roots of neodevelopmentalism, it is necessary to revisit 
the context of its original formulation. Dependency theory appeared in Latin America in 
the early 1960s as a response to both, modernisation theory and classical Latin American 
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developmentalism from the ECLAC. Exiled in Chile after the military coups in Brazil 
(1964) and Argentina (1966), a group of left-wing intellectuals including Vania Bambirra, 
Theotonio dos Santos, Gunder Frank, Ruy Mauro Marini, José Serra, and Fernando 
Henrique Cardoso challenged Raúl Prebisch’s state-cantered ideas and the 
developmentalists’ theories at large. Although a considerable diversity exists among this 
first generation of dependentistas, all of them recognised that the structural impediments 
to development in Latin America could not be simply corrected by virtuous state-led 
policies, premised on progressive class alliances between capital and labour. As famously 
put by Gunder Frank, the ‘present underdevelopment of Latin America is the result of its 
centuries-long participation in the process of world capitalist development’ (1969, 7). 
Therefore, within global capitalism, Latin America could only experience ‘Development 
of Underdevelopment’ (1966). 
Cardoso and Faletto’s ‘Dependency and Development in Latin America’ (1979 
[1967]) is one of the most nuanced version of dependency theory. The authors place great 
relevance on historical specificity and focus particularly on the role of the emerging 
middle classes, which appeared in Latin America in the first three decades of the 20th 
century, following the initial diversification of merely export-based economies (1979 
[1967], 75). Contradicting the idea that capitalist development would be totally 
impossible in peripheral countries, Cardoso and Faletto claim that state-led processes of 
industrialization, based on the domestic market formed by these new middle classes, 
succeeded in reshaping the old, colonial structures of dependency. The dynamism 
provided by the growing internal market allowed the bigger countries of Latin America – 
Brazil, Argentina and Mexico – to overcome the condition of simply commodities-export 
economies, successfully constituting important industrial economies. Nevertheless, 
dependency was renewed, inasmuch as the dynamics of industrial investments in Latin 
America were dictated by multinational companies whose decisions were taken in central 
economies (1979 [1967], 160).  
Building on his previous works, Cardoso explicitly rejects Frank’s model for its 
incapacity to explain the capitalist development that actually happened in Latin America 
after the diversification of export-based economies. In Cardoso’s own words, ‘[t]he idea 
that there occurs a kind of development of underdevelopment, apart from the play on 
words, is not helpful’ (1972, 89). For the author, given that dependency and development 
are not intrinsically incompatible, it would be more accurate to conceptualize the 
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transformation of the economic and social structures in Latin America as a form of 
‘dependent capitalist development’ (1972, 89).  
Since its original formulation, Cardoso’s concept of ‘dependent capitalist 
development’ stood on the brink of falling back to the classical developmentalist 
perspective that capitalist development could potentially be achieved by Latin American 
countries, if only they adopt a suitable development strategy. Only the ‘dependent’ 
character of this development, a necessary consequence of the association with foreign 
capital due to the structural lack of capital in Latin America, differentiated it from the 
catching-up conceptions of the ECLAC. The thin line between Cardoso’s dependency 
theory and the developmentalist tradition was finally crossed three decades after the 
publication of his first texts, when he came to power in Brazil (see chapter 4). The limits 
he previously identified to associated or ‘dependent’ development were finally erased. In 
a text published in 1995, Cardoso denies that peripheral countries are doomed to develop 
in ‘distorted’ ways: 
 
Today we know that it is not true. Countries which were able to manage their 
economies sensibly to the transformation of modes of production within 
capitalism, as well as to social issues, have had more favourable trajectories than 
others. The case of the Asian Tigers is well-known. What remained of 
‘determinism’ in the dependency theory, maybe a Marxist trait – and I always 
criticized determinism – certainly must be fundamentally reformulated. The level 
of influence of political choice over the economic structure is greater than it 
appeared to us in the 1960s (1995a, 151).12   
 
By abandoning the last ‘Marxist traits’ of his former dependency theory, Cardoso 
came full circle back to the developmentalist field, from which dependency theory had 
arisen in the first place. Nevertheless, the conjuncture of the 1990s was substantially 
different from that of the 1950s and 1960s. The discursive reframing of the 
developmentalist ideas in the new conjuncture, defined by what Cardoso came to 
increasingly call ‘globalisation’ (Batista Jr. 1999), marks the final leap from classical 
developmentalism to neodevelopmentalism. Accordingly, classical themes of the 
developmentalist tradition – such as the protection of infant industry and ISI – were 
replaced by a more positive view towards the potentialities of international trade. The key 
role of international investments – an insight from Cardoso’s ‘dependent capitalist 
development’ – is fully incorporated into the ‘new development strategy’ he proposes in 
                                                          
12 Similar claims are made in Cardoso and Font (2001). 
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his first administration program (2008[1994]). Notwithstanding eventual updates, clearly 
influenced by the context of the 1990s, Cardoso’s first administration program keeps the 
hallmark of developmentalism, namely the faith in the state capacity to stand above class 
struggle and direct national development to the benefit of all. The same could also be said 
about the works of some of Cardoso’s close collaborators, including Bresser-Pereira, 
named Minister of Administration and State Reform under Cardoso’s first presidency, 
between 1995 and 1998.13       
The neodevelopmentalist seeds already present in Cardoso’s concept of 
‘dependent capitalist development’ were denounced by Marini almost two decades before 
their fruits began to mature. Making the first recorded use of the term 
‘neodevelopmentalism’, Marini strikingly foresees the future degeneration of Cardoso’s 
ideas: 
 
(…) today, the new ideologists of the Brazilian bourgeoisie [Serra and Cardoso] 
find themselves obliged to retake this tradition [developmentalism] and try to 
give credibility to a Brazilian capitalist development in an American or European 
fashion. In a nutshell, we are facing a neodevelopmentalism, still ashamed of 
itself, but that will soon lose its inhibitions (1978, 102–3). 
 
Against Cardoso and Serra, Marini reaffirmed the structural impediments to 
capitalist development in Latin America. According to him, Frank’s concept of 
‘development of underdevelopment is impeccable’ (Marini 2009a [1973], 111). 
Cardoso’s critiques to that concept are seen as a ‘step back’, incorporating ‘precisions 
that claim to be theoretical, but in fact are nothing more than semantic’ (2009a [1973], 
111). Reaffirming his strong scepticism regarding the possibility of capitalist 
development in dependent countries, and, specifically, in an effort to explain the 
undeniable process of industrialization of Brazil, Argentina and Mexico, Marini offers a 
complex historical materialist analysis of production and circulation from the perspective 
of dependent countries.14 
                                                          
13 See, for instance, Bresser-Pereira, Maravall, and Przeworski (1993); Bresser-Pereira (1997, 1998).   
14 Marini’s argument relies on Marx’s distinction between relative and absolute surplus value. While the former is 
based on a reduction of the relative value of labour, by pushing down the value of the working class’ consumption 
goods (i.e. its reproduction cost), the latter is based on an increase in the absolute exploitation of labour, via 
increasing working hours, or intensification of the work day. In both cases, capitalists extract surplus value, but in the 
first case the side effect is the creation of a dynamic mass consumption market for the working class, while the latter 
leads to a continued depression of internal markets in peripheral countries due to low salaries, sometimes below the 
cost of reproduction of labour itself (super-exploitation). Furthermore, these two forms of surplus extraction 
complement each other, as the extraction of relative surplus value in central economies requires the continued 
reduction of the value of consumption goods produced elsewhere (Marini 1978, 2009a, 2009b).  
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Marini’s historical materialist dependency theory very convincingly lays bare the 
reactionary character of Cardoso’s incipient neodevelopmentalism. Nevertheless, exactly 
because of the lack of a consistent concept of development in the historical materialist 
tradition – a theoretical gap which has been filled over the last decade (see chapter 2) – 
he had to fall back to the problematic negation of any possibility of capitalist development 
for Latin American countries. Meanwhile, despite their theoretical shortcomings, 
Cardoso’s ideas completed their metamorphosis to contemporary forms of 
developmentalism. Ironically, however, the class alliance that would make possible the 
translation of neodevelopmentalism into concrete policies would only emerge in Brazil 
after Cardoso left office (see chapters 4 and 5).   
  
 
1.2.2 Contemporary expressions of neodevelopmentalism and the ‘Ten Theses’. 
 
There are a number of different contemporary expressions of 
neodevelopmentalism. Economists close to the Brazilian Workers Party (PT) propose a 
form of social developmentalism, emphasising the role of the state in reducing poverty 
and inequality (Mercadante 2010; Pochmann 2010; Neri 2010). In Argentina, a new 
generation of developmentalist economists close to Kirchnerism highlight the importance 
of industrial policies and ‘fine-tuned’ economic management  in order to bridge the 
technological gap characteristic of underdevelopment (Kicillof, Nahón, and Costa 2006; 
Kicillof 2016). The best articulated theoretical expression of neodevelopmentalism is to 
be found in the recent works of Bresser-Pereira (2012b, 2006; Bresser-Pereira and Theuer 
2012), which place great relevance on macroeconomic management, particularly 
regarding exchange rates. Despite differences of emphasis, all variations of 
neodevelopmentalism share the state utopia. Even when potentially conflicting social 
interests are recognised, it is supposed that the state can raise above social classes, 
neutralise negative international influences and promote development.   
 The problematic state versus markets dichotomy – from which both the market 
and the state utopias arise – remains unresolved in the neodevelopmentalist theoretical 
formulations. Of course, neodevelopmentalists do not argue for the total suppression of 
the market, just as neoliberals do not claim for the total suppression of the state. Instead, 
state and market switch places as the main driver of development. In other words, 
neodevelopmentalists believe that the state can tame and direct the market to the benefit 
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of all. As explained by Sicsú, de Paula and Michel, neodevelopmentalism is based on 
Keynesian conceptions of the intrinsic limitations of the free market (2007, 508).15 Taking 
into account the market failures, the authors claim for a ‘strong state that fosters the 
blooming of a strong market’ (2007, 509).  
  The core tenets of the neodevelopmentalist strategy are unequivocally 
summarised in a manifesto called ‘Ten Theses on New Developmentalism’ (Ten Theses 
2012), subscribed to by a number of leading heterodox economists, including Sicsú; 
Bresser-Pereira; Davidson; Ha-Joon Chang; Chandrasekhar; Ferrer; O’Connell; Palma; 
Nakano and Przeworski, among others. Just like the Washington Consensus, which it 
emulates, the Ten Theses are surprisingly straightforward. The document aims at 
establishing a ‘national development strategy that middle income countries are today 
using or should use to promote development and economic catching-up’ (2012, 336). This 
strategy is based in the following assumptions: 
 
1- Development is a ‘structural process’ of ‘capital accumulation’. The main aim 
of this process is to provide full employment of labour and constant increase 
in productivity (2012, 336). 
2- ‘Markets are the major locus’ of the development process. Nevertheless, they 
should be complemented by the ‘strategic role’ of the state. The state should 
guarantee that the domestic resources are being channelled to innovative 
sectors, aiming at promoting ‘international competitiveness’ (2012, 337). 
3- To generate development, it is necessary to have a ‘development strategy’ that 
takes advantage of international opportunities, such as ‘economies of scale’ 
and ‘technological learning’. This strategy must also mitigate challenges such 
as ‘excessively strong intellectual property regimes’ (2012, 337). 
4- The demand side of the development process is ‘where the major growth 
bottleneck unfold[s]’ (2012, 337). 
5- There is a tendency for salaries to grow less than productivity caused by 
abundant supply of labour and by the characteristics of labour markets in 
developing countries. It can be counterbalanced by policies like ‘a legal 
                                                          
15 Stiglitz and Davidson are also mentioned as major influences. Bresser-Pereira indicates some classical 
authors as the original inspirers of neodevelopmentalism, including Smith, Marx, Weber, List and Veblen 
(2010, 102). 
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minimum wage, cash transfers to the poor, and principally a government 
guarantee to provide employment at a living wage’ (2012, 337). 
6- The tendency of appreciation of the exchange rate is caused by ‘excessive 
reliance on external savings’ and by the ‘Dutch disease’. It happens ‘in the 
context of excessively open capital markets and lack of appropriate regulation’ 
(2012, 337). 
7- The structural cause of the ‘Dutch disease’ is the export of commodities based 
on ‘natural resources’ or on ‘ultra-cheap labour’. It creates a disjunction 
between the ‘current account equilibrium exchange rate’ and the ‘industrial 
equilibrium exchange rate’ ( 2012, 337). 
8- Domestic savings must be the main source of investments. Public financial 
institutions are instrumental to make it happen. Financing investments with 
foreign savings ‘increases domestic indebtedness and reinforces financial 
instability’ (2012, 337). 
9- Two are the key variables to provide ‘the appropriate framework for 
development’: the exchange rate and the fiscal equilibrium. Specifically 
regarding the second, ‘the government must ensure a stable long term relation 
between the public debt and GDP’ (2012, 337). 
10- Finally, the centrality of full-employment and stability is reaffirmed: ‘To 
achieve long term development, economic policies should pursue full 
employment as their primary goal, while assuring price and financial stability’ 
(2012, 337) . 
 
 As with the Washington Consensus, the Ten Theses are excessively schematic 
and demand further clarification. Nevertheless, behind the list of policies, it is possible to 
identify a coherent economic reasoning. Starting from the simple idea that development 
is capitalist catch-up, Bresser-Pereira (2012a, 350) summarises the classical 
developmentalist problem and asks what is hindering accumulation of capital and 
investment in developing countries? At this point, the two factors mentioned in item 4 of 
the Ten Theses come to the forefront, namely the tendency of wages to grow less than 
overall productivity and a chronic tendency of overvaluation of the exchange rates 
(2012a, 350).  
 These tendencies boil down to the ‘Dutch disease’ argument, which has been 
repeatedly restated by Bresser-Pereira over the last few years.  The author reinterprets 
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Corden’s original model (1984), assuming two equilibrium exchange rates instead of the 
existence of two sectors in the economy (Bresser-Pereira 2012a, 353). The first, called 
‘current-equilibrium’, tends to be chronically overvalued in relation to the second, the 
‘industrial-equilibrium’ exchange rate, because of the existence of cheap and abundant 
natural resources (2012a, 354; 2012b, 65). The commodities produced using this 
extraordinary advantage ‘can be exported at a considerably higher exchange rate than is 
required to make other business enterprises using state-of-the art technology competitive’ 
(2012b, 65). This ‘market failure’ must therefore be ‘neutralised’. The state can do that 
by, for instance, overtaxing exports (2012a, 354; 2012b, 66), in an effort to bring the 
exchange rate to the ‘industrial-equilibrium’. 
 Bresser-Pereira reckons that the manipulation of the exchange rate in order to keep 
it at the ‘industrial-equilibrium’ level may be unpopular, particularly when it involves 
significant devaluation. The short term consequences of currency devaluation include 
relative wage lowering and inflation increase, which renders it politically difficult to 
adopt (2012a, 355). The only answer the author can offer to this problem is an repeated 
call to ‘national unity’ (2006, 10; 2010, 87; 2012a, 363). According to Bresser-Pereira:  
 
A nation involves a basic solidarity among classes when it comes to competing 
internationally. Businesspeople, workers, state bureaucrats, middle-class 
professionals and intellectuals may come into conflict, but they know that they 
share a common fate and that this fate relies on their successful competitive 
involvement in the world of nation-states. It involves, therefore, a national 
agreement (2010, 87). 
  
Despite heavily relying on an idealised view of the nation, which goes hand in 
hand with the state utopia, Bresser-Pereira’s neodevelopmentalist theses are evidently 
more sophisticated than the neoliberal development strategy advanced by Williamson and 
his followers. The two crucial elements which I claim throughout this thesis are central 
to the understanding of the development process (see chapter 2) – namely, class conflicts 
and international relations – are indeed present in the neodevelopmentalist narrative. 
Nevertheless, the interaction between these spheres is not sufficiently explored.  
The international appears as a source of both, constraints to and opportunities for 
development, mainly via foreign trade. The general assumption is that the 
neodevelopmentalist policies are conducive to the neutralization of international shocks, 
and, at the same time, can induce development by boosting exports. There is a 
fundamental disjunction between the national and the international, with a primacy of the 
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first over the second. This idea does not essentially differ from Williamson’s 
presupposition that, in the long term, one country’s destiny rests upon its autonomous 
choice of policies (2004, 197). The importance of the international in the development 
process is therefore at once understated and exaggerated.  
It is exaggerated because neodevelopmentalists have unrealistic expectations 
about the potential of export-led growth. These expectations are based on the 
universalization of the East Asian experience, which cannot be indefinitely emulated, 
inasmuch as each and every export is necessarily also an import by some other country. 
If every single country devalues its currency to promote exports, the combined effect is 
null. In other words, export-led growth is not a universal ‘lesson’ that can be learned by 
every developing country, and was only possible for some East Asian countries in a 
specific historical conjuncture. 
 At the same time, the neodevelopmentalist view underestimates the power of the 
whip of external necessity (see chapter 2), assuming that it can be neutralised by national 
unity. The agency and the good faith of political elites are largely exaggerated. Putting 
aside the very questionable idea that a national consensus in the interest of the ‘nation’ as 
a whole is possible (and desirable), the fact that international relations influence the 
distributive disputes in each society is not considered. The presupposition is that if only 
the different groups forming a society can put their heads together, the ‘nation’ would 
successfully compete in the world economy, resulting in gains for all. This sociological 
view – blind to the inherent opposition between capital and labour – does little to explain 
why so many nations fail to build lasting progressive class alliances, and, much more 
importantly, disguises fierce political repression of the working class under the idea of a 
national consensus. This is illustrated by the fact that the period Bresser-Pereira (2010, 
89) mentions as an example of national unity in Brazil around the old developmentalist 
strategy was in fact characterized by 31 years of dictatorship, intermingled with 19 years 
of unstable and very limited formal democracy.16 
In a nutshell, the standard theoretical formulation of the neodevelopmentalist 
ideas, as expressed in the Ten Theses and in Bresser-Pereira’s texts, do not successfully 
integrate class analysis and international relations, largely ignoring the distributive 
consequences of the international for specific societies. The possibility and desirability 
                                                          
16 Eloquent examples of the limits of Brazilian liberal democracy in that period were the banning of the 
Communist Party (except for a brief period in 1945-46) and the prohibition of illiterate people from 
voting. 
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of world convergence to the living standards of high income countries are never 
questioned. Finally, it does not convincingly explain why underdeveloped nations fail to 
form solid national alliances and effectively adopt the policies suggested. This last point 
is particularly relevant for the analysis of the neodevelopmentalist policies implemented 
in Brazil and in Argentina in the 2000s, which came way short of fulfilling the grand 
promises of development announced in the neodevelopmentalist political speeches (see 
chapters 5 and 6).  
 
 
1.2.3 The geopolitics of neodevelopmentalism. 
 
As argued in the previous section, neodevelopmentalism does not convincingly 
integrate sociological analysis and international relations. On the one hand, the 
complexities of social relations are oversimplified, and the fundamental opposition of 
interests between capital and labour is understated. On the other hand, although ‘external’ 
influences are acknowledged as important, there is a general supposition that, led by a 
virtuous state, the ‘nation’ can overcame the international constraints and become 
developed.   
 There is, nonetheless, one author that explicitly explores the international aspects 
of the neodevelopmentalist strategy. Ambassador Pinheiro Guimarães (1998; 2000; 2007; 
2008a; 2008b), former vice-Minister of External Relations of Brazil (2003-2009), and 
Minister of Strategic Affairs (2009-2010), couples the neodevelopmentalist strategy with 
a very interesting realist approach to international relations, deeply rooted in his lifelong 
experience as a diplomat. In doing so, he offers a counterpoint to Escudé’s peripheral 
realism, which he severely criticizes (Guimarães 2008a, 268).  
 According to Guimarães, the contemporary international stage is characterized by 
a growing multipolarity, after a brief moment of unipolarity following the end of the cold 
war (2008a, 255). This conjuncture opens up new possibilities for large peripheral 
countries. For the author, Brazil can become a new world power. For this to happen, 
Brazilian backwardness must be overcome by ‘gradually’ reducing its internal 
inequalities, eliminating its ‘external vulnerabilities’ and realizing its economic, military 
a political potentialities (2008a, 259–62). 
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 The author portrays the international political system as inherently competitive, 
dismissing with some irony the liberal views suggesting that ‘the end of the competition 
between the East and the West would result in the end of all conflicts and wars, in the 
cooperation and fraternity among states and that the globalization would bring growth to 
all economies and to all sectors in each country’ (2008a, 257). Contrary to that rose view 
of globalisation, Guimarães identifies a ‘hegemonic macro-structure’ that reinforces the 
power of central states, while perpetuating the subordinated condition of the states on the 
periphery. Although the author recognizes the secondary role new actors like large 
multinational companies, NGOs and International Organizations may play, according to 
him states remain at the core of the system (2007, 33).  
 In the model depicted by Guimarães, states are essentially self-interested entities 
concerned only with the maximization of their power resources. As a consequence, the 
quest for development must be seen in the context of the competition among states. 
Therefore, in Guimarães own words:  
 
(…) the foreign policy of a country must have as its primordial goal the defence 
and the promotion of the national interests, without any illusions regarding the 
friendship of other states or the supposedly benign tendencies of the international 
system (2008a, 246). 
 
The origin of the inequalities in the international system can be found in the 
colonization process, an idea that is captured in the title of Guimarães’ first book, 
Quinhentos anos de Periferia [Five hundred years on the periphery] (2007). Examining 
the Brazilian case, the author claims that there is a mutual causation between the deep 
social inequalities and the chronic external vulnerability of the country, which are the 
sources of its difficulties in overcoming underdevelopment (2008a, 26). Both negative 
features were inherited from the colonial system, which was designed to perpetuate the 
subordination of the colony to the metropolis (2008a, 26–29).  
 Notwithstanding the strength of the ‘hegemonic macro-structure’ that keeps the 
big peripheral countries like Brazil from fully developing their potentialities, the author 
reckons that there is still some room for change, inasmuch as the system is dynamic. For 
Guimarães, the system tends towards the continued concentration of power in the centre, 
but also in the emerging poles, including China, India and Russia (2008a, 291). The best 
strategic choice for Brazil would be to establish an independent pole of power in South 
America, by preventing it from being incorporated into larger economic and political 
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blocs (such as the NAFTA) and by exerting a ‘non-hegemonic leadership’ in the region 
(2008a, 299). As Guimarães explains: 
 
[t]his ascension of Brazil to the great power status shall not be considered a 
utopia, but is a necessary national goal, because failing to realize it would mean 
the failure to deal with the challenges facing Brazil’ (2008a, 267). 
 
 Contrary to Bresser-Pereira’s neodevelopmentalist perspective previously 
analysed, Guimarães’ account is acutely aware of the international constraints on the 
development of peripheral countries. These constraints are not only economic, but also 
geopolitical. As noted by the author, the rise of Brazil as a great power would affect the 
regional and the world power correlation, with special consequences for the US 
hegemony over South America (2008a, 265–75). The logical conclusion of Guimarães’ 
argument is that development is only possible when the national economic policies are 
followed by a geopolitical strategy that neutralizes the negative pressures the ‘hegemonic 
macro-structure’ casts over peripheral countries.  
 Although the actual strategy suggested by Guimarães for Brazil totally differs 
from the strategy Escudé puts forward for Argentina, in theoretical terms both authors 
actually agree more than disagree. Both, drawing from a classical realist perspective, view 
the international system as necessarily competitive, and clearly identify the geopolitical 
impediments to development of non-hegemonic countries. Development, in both cases, 
is seen as the process of convergence to the standards of the supposedly ‘developed’ 
countries, as well as the overcoming of the peripheral condition in geopolitical terms, and 
the consequent rise to the centre of the international power structures. The disagreement 
fully appears only when it comes to defining the best means to achieve this end. 
Guimarães suggests the creation of a defiant South American pole in an increasingly 
multipolar world, while Escudé insists in the benefits of bandwagoning with the 
hegemonic power.  
 As such, and despite the author’s admirable courage in confronting the imperialist 
interests of the United States, Guimarães argument is subject to the same criticism that 
applies to every realist model. Willingly or not, the author reifies the role of the states, 
supposes some form of ahistorical balance of power between nations and relies on the 
problematic notion of ‘the national interest’. Despite the author’s concern for the social 
inequalities in Brazil, his calls for the ‘collective action through an efficient state’ (2008a, 
265) echoes Bresser-Pereira’s claim for state-led national unity around a development 
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project. In both cases, the state utopia looms large as a problematic theoretical 
presupposition. 
In fact, even Guimarães’ claim for the ‘gradual’ reduction of social inequalities is 
subordinated to the imperatives of the geopolitical competition. Internal inequalities are 
seen as one of the causes of weakness of the Brazilian nation, not as a problem in itself. 
His theoretical approach, therefore, is instrumental to the construction of the hegemony 
of the productive fraction of the national bourgeoisie. Exactly as Escudé’s Peripheral 
Realism offered to the Argentinian financial bourgeoisie the perfect match for their 
neoliberal economic policies, Guimarães geopolitical ideas are totally coherent with the 
neodevelopmentalist economic policies which benefited in the first place the productive 
fraction of the Brazilian ruling class (Boito and Berringer 2014).  
 Another important aspect of Guimarães’ ideas relates to the impossibility of 
universalizing his development strategy. Indeed, differently from other 
neodevelopmentalist thinkers, the author rightly stresses the relative aspect of the 
development process (2008a, 25), suggesting that development and underdevelopment 
mutually constitute each other. Nevertheless, the author seeks to secure a favourable 
position for Brazil in this unequal and competitive world. By relating the possibilities of 
development for large peripheral countries to their capacity to become great powers, the 
author legitimises Brazilian sub-imperialist practices (Fontes 2010), despite his somewhat 
vague calls for ‘non-hegemonic’ leadership. 
 In conclusion, Guimarães’ original geopolitical formulations offer an important 
political complement to the neodevelopmentalist strategy, but do not solve its core 
theoretical fragilities. In fact, just as Argentinian neoliberalism would involve policies 
influenced by Escudés’ peripheral realism (see chapter 3), Brazilian neodevelopmentalist 
foreign policy – including the creation of the BRICS, the UNASUR and the strengthening 
of MERCOSUR – was largely premised on Guimarães’ ideas (chapter 6). In both cases, 
however, the respective neoliberal and neodevelopmentalist foreign policies proved 
insufficient to prevent the shortcomings of neoliberalism and neodevelopmentalism at 
large.   
 
 
1.3 – Swallow this bitter medicine: Neoliberalism, Neodevelopmentalism and the 
disease metaphor 
 
41 
 
 
In this chapter I have reviewed representative texts of the Latin American 
neoliberal and neodevelopmentalist literature, with special attention to writers who 
occupied important positions in recent administrations in Brazil and Argentina. As a 
general conclusion, I claim that both sides rely on mutually exclusive utopias. Neoliberal 
writers believe that the free market leads to development, while neodevelopmentalist 
writers believe that the state can stand above class interests, control the market and 
promote development for all. Both sides rely on an artificial market versus state divide. 
Furthermore, both sides make repeated appeals to a narrow idea of development, 
understood as the convergence to the consumption and productive standards of global 
north countries.  
Despite being equally premised on fragile theoretical bases, both neoliberal and 
neodevelopmentalist writers constantly present their knowledge as scientific and 
unbiased. The public policies they suggest may involve sacrifices – particularly for the 
working class and the poorest tiers of society – but they are necessary, if development is 
to be achieved. This reasoning is captured in the disease metaphor, used by neoliberals 
and neodevelopmentalists alike. 
The disease metaphor appears explicitly, for instance, in Fraga’s title: ‘Latin 
America Since 1990s: Rising from the Sickbed’ (2004). It is also present in less 
straightforward ways, as when Williamson suggest that the left must overcome its 
historical ‘antipathy to the market’ in order to ‘remedy’ social inequalities (1993, 1334). 
Still in the neoliberal side, Franco starts his analysis of the reforms in Brazil by quoting 
Michael Bruno’s comparison between high inflation and fever in a sick body. According 
to Franco, the reforms implemented in the 1990s tried to reach the deeper causes of the 
country’s disease and not only the symptoms, by emphasizing fiscal austerity (1998, 121–
22). 
On the neodevelopmentalist side, unsurprisingly the same metaphor is used to 
exhaustion. One of the most serious threats to development is identified as the ‘Dutch 
disease’ (Ten Theses 2012). References to the disastrous consequences of that economic 
illness appear in almost every single text published by Bresser-Pereira in the last few 
years (for instance 2006; 2010; 2011; 2012a; 2012b). Kiciloff and his colleagues compare 
the situation of Argentina in the 1990s with a sick person that does not show symptoms: 
‘just like it happens in some cases of degenerative diseases, the deterioration is only 
manifested in the moment of acute crisis, although the patient looks like he is enjoying 
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perfect health for years, in fact he is dying from the inside’ (Kicillof, Nahón, and Costa 
2006, 5).    
What is implied in the disease metaphor? First, it involves the comparison 
between a society and a human body. Second, it is suggested that this body can potentially 
have a normal (healthy) form of existence, but some alien agent (the disease) is harming 
it. Nevertheless, hopefully there are wise physicians (or economists, for that matter) 
around, and they happen to have just the right medicine. 
This metaphor fits like a glove in neoliberal and neodevelopmentalist narratives. 
The notion of a unitary body of the nation hides class struggles, while the external causes 
of the illness illustrates how the international is perceived. Another external agent – the 
medicine – may be used to restore health, indicating a renewed faith in international 
opportunities, as long as they are wisely and prudently used. The most interesting idea 
concealed in the disease metaphor is, however, the suggestion that underdevelopment is 
not a normal condition, but something that will pass as soon as the right remedy is applied. 
In short, the patient (the society) must only trust the scientific knowledge of the doctors 
(or economists) and swallow that medicine, no matter its potential side effects and how 
bitter it may taste. 
The disease metaphor suggests a fundamentally non-relational view of 
development. After all, there is no impediment to everyone being healthy at the same 
time. The good health of some cannot be plausibly seen as the cause of the others’ disease. 
Moreover, being healthy is seeing as the incontestable aim of the organism as a whole. 
There cannot be a fundamental disagreement between feet and head regarding which 
medicine should be taken. Accordingly, the metaphor implicitly equates the putative 
neutrality of medical science with the neutrality of economics. The economist stands 
above society’s disputes with his prescriptions to achieve development. 
This view of development, present in both the neoliberal and neodevelopmentalist 
literature, must be challenged. Both neoliberalism and neodevelopmentalism are based 
on utopias that can never be fully realised. Both reinforce the hegemonic position of 
different fractions of the ruling class by subordinating the priorities of the working class 
to national development strategies under the leadership of national elites.  
In this chapter, I have exposed the fragile theoretical presuppositions of the two 
dominant contemporary development strategies in Brazil and Argentina. In addition to 
offering problematic sets of policies, neoliberal and neodevelopmentalist writers also fail 
to provide convincing explanations for the fact that their policies never produce the 
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expected results. Because both the perfect free market and the perfect state never fully 
materialise, the sacrifices required from the subordinated classes can always be renewed, 
while the ‘cure’ for underdevelopment is never completed. 
The negative work of criticising these mainstream perspectives does not suffice, 
however. It is necessary to move one step further and start imagining consistent 
alternatives to neoliberalism and neodevelopmentalism. To do so, the very concept of 
development must be radically reframed. The interplay between international pressures 
and opportunities and class struggle must be fully acknowledged. The agency of 
subordinated classes in defining its own development perspective must be recovered. 
In the next chapter, I claim that the concept of uneven and combined development, 
in its contemporary formulation, can fill in this theoretical gap and provide a basis for 
alternative development strategies.  
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Chapter 2 – Uneven and combined development – a radically 
perspectived17 concept of development 
 
 
Who is to decide who is sick and who is healthy? Who is to identify the countries 
that are deviating from a normal development trajectory and administer the required 
therapy? 
For neoliberals and neodevelopmentalists, the answer is clear. Enlighted elites – 
be they academic, bureaucratic or entrepreneurial – are in the privileged position of 
identifying underdevelopment and directing the country towards development. 
Neoliberalism and neodevelopmentalism can be seen, therefore, as variants of ‘elite 
development theory’, in the definition of Ben Selwyn. Subordinated classes are seen as 
‘inputs into the development process’ (2016, 784), not as drivers of development or 
legitimate perspectives in the definition of developmental aims. As suggested in the 
disease metaphor, the poor are there to be cured. 
The contested social meanings of illness and cure are the central subject of the 
The Alienist, by Machado de Assis (2013 [1882]). In this celebrated novel – one of the 
pioneering works of Brazilian realist literature – Simão Bacamarte, a distinguished 
medical doctor trained in Europe, returns to his hometown in the countryside of Brazil to 
apply his scientific knowledge to the putative benefit of the local population.  
Dr. Bacamarte takes particular interest in mental health. After convincing the local 
town council to build a hospice to lock up the mentally ill, he starts his crusade against 
sickness. One by one, the local people that are not in full command of their mental 
capacities are incarcerated. When two thirds of the population are under his custody, Dr. 
Bacamarte makes an astonishing discovery. Actually, it is normal for people not to be 
perfectly sane. Indeed, pushing his research further, he realises that he was the only person 
in the whole town that was in full command of his mental capacities. The honest scientific 
mind of Dr. Bacamarte gives him no other choice: releasing all the people from the cells, 
he locks up himself in the hospice.  
                                                          
17 The neologism ‘perspectived’ is used here to highlight the crucial role of competing social perspectives 
in the definition of development. As it will be argued in this chapter, the concept of uneven and combined 
development makes it possible to go beyond Eurocentric definitions of development, opening the 
possibility of imagining many different, and potentially non-converging, development paths.  
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 Unfortunately, most of the economic doctors that adhere to elite development 
theories seem not to follow Dr. Bacamarte example. Although the world is 
overwhelmingly composed of so-called ‘underdeveloped’ countries, neoliberal and 
neodevelopmentalist authors insist on taking ‘developed’ countries as models of sanity. 
Not converging towards the standards of global north countries is perceived as abnormal. 
Capitalist development is normalised, i.e., global south countries, representing almost 4/5 
of the world’s population, are expected to reproduce the idealised developmental 
trajectories of a handful of global north nations. As put by a Nobel Prize winner: 
 
The task of less developed countries today is in some ways easier than that which 
faced Europe and the United States as they industrialized in the nineteenth 
century: they simply have to catch up, rather than forge into unknown territory 
(Stiglitz 2007, 30).  
 
The epistemological and political problems with this view of development are 
many. First, the very notion of stages or known paths towards development defies the 
historical evidence, as the material transformation undergone by each society is unique. 
Although general patterns can eventually be found at the cost of overlooking specificities, 
an enormous gap necessarily remains between concrete policy prescriptions and the 
general, highly abstract history offered as evidence that these policies indeed work.  
Second, by reifying the state as the privileged unity where development levels are 
to be judged, the social relations within and across states are obfuscated. On the one hand, 
the differentiated social outcomes of economic growth in global south countries are not 
taken into account. On the other, the living conditions in ‘advanced’ countries are 
romanticised, notwithstanding the permanent insecurity and alienation under which 
subordinated classes and class fractions live in much of the global north – particularly 
women, immigrants and ethnic minorities. 
Third, the dichotomy developed-underdeveloped glorifies the culture and the 
social values of the perceived ‘developed’ countries while stigmatising the vast majority 
of humanity. This stigmatisation is crystal clear in the characterisation of more than forty 
countries as having ‘low human development’ (UNDP 2014, 162). Euphemisms such as 
‘under development’, ‘developing’ or ‘emerging’ can barely disguise the entrenched 
supposition that global north countries are the model to be followed.  
Last but not least, extending the consumption standards of ‘developed’ countries 
to the whole world would mean environmental disaster. The material limits of 
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development understood as economic growth and increase in consumption standards are 
now more than evident.  
 For my purpose in this thesis – the critique of Latin American neoliberalism and 
neodevelopmentalism – defining a radically different concept of development is 
paramount. For if the idealised view of development shared by both neoliberals and 
neodevelopmentalists is kept, the debate is hopelessly reduced to the never-ending 
endeavour of curing Latin American countries’ underdevelopment. Furthermore, 
neoliberal and neodevelopmentalist historical narratives starting from this view of 
development can only tell the familiar story of permanent underachievement due to 
insufficient or excessive state intervention in the market.  
The alternative narrative I present in the empirical chapters of this thesis refuses 
idealisation and focuses on the kind of development that actually happened in Brazil and 
Argentina over the last 25 years. That development, I claim, was uneven and combined. 
It was the material result of the interplay between class conflicts and international 
pressures and opportunities, resulting in uneven gains and losses for different social 
groups.  
 In this chapter, I further specify the concept of uneven and combined development 
and define some key mid-range concepts employed to operationalise it in my political 
economy analysis of recent Brazilian and Argentinian development. The theoretical 
toolkit here deployed is derived from the historical materialist tradition, particularly from 
the work of Karl Marx and León Trotsky. Concepts coming from classical Latin 
American political economy are also incorporated and resignified. Finally, I am heavily 
influenced by the recent reframing of the concept of uneven and combined development 
in the field of International Relations by Justin Rosenberg, Kamran Matin, Alexander 
Anievas, Kerem Nisanciolgu, among others. What follows is an attempt to explore the 
potentialities of the contemporary formulation of the concept of uneven and combined 
development in the fields of global political economy and development studies, a 
theoretical avenue still largely unexplored.18 
 The chapter unfolds as follows. First, I engage with the post-development critique 
of the very concept of development and define why we still need some notion of 
development. Then, I explore an important gap in the historical materialist tradition, left 
by Marx’s unclear use of the concept of development. Turning to Trotsky, I explain how 
                                                          
18 For pioneering examples see Selwyn (2011); Morton (2013); Makki (2015) and Bieler and Morton 
(2014); Germann (2017). 
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he attempted to fill in this gap with the original formulation of the concept of uneven and 
combined development. The contribution of the contemporary literature on uneven and 
combined development is assessed in section 2.3, together with two of the most important 
critiques. Finally, the potentialities of the concept of uneven and combined development 
for global political economy analysis are spelt out in section 2.4, where I define a broader 
understanding of ‘whip of external necessities’, and propose mid-range concepts such as 
‘socialisation of losses’ and ‘privatisation of gains’.  
 
2.1 – Why development? 
 
Before moving any further, it is necessary to deal with a pre-emptive critique. Post 
development writers rightfully identify the problems mentioned in the introduction of this 
chapter regarding mainstream conceptions of development. Their answer, however, is not 
an attempt to reframe and reclaim the concept of development, but a rejection of any kind 
of development – including uneven and combined development (Blaney and Tickner 
2017a). Why not follow their bold call for thinking of alternatives to development, instead 
of development alternatives? 
In fact, genealogies of the concept of development have revealed its problematic 
origins in the modern idea of progress (Escobar 1995; Rist 2002). Post-development 
authors have convincingly emphasised the epistemological violence involved in the 
representation of two thirds of humanity as ‘underdeveloped’ (Esteva 1992). For 
Boaventura de Sousa Santos, Western promises of modernity – among which are 
‘progress, and the sharing of progress’ – have been converted ‘into an ideology that 
legitimizes subordination to Western Imperialism’. This ideology of progress is part of 
the process of ‘epistemicide’ of non-European cultures, destroying alternative systems of 
knowledge. Consequently, ‘social groups that use these systems to support their own 
autonomous paths of development have been humiliated’ (Sousa Santos 2005, xviii).  
Yet, the vivid denunciations of the very concept of development coming from the 
post-development critique seems insufficient to touch the hearts of the editors of the 
UNDP Annual World Development Report, reduce the expectation around the 
Millennium Development Goals, stop the constitution of the BRIC’s New Development 
Bank and convince social movements claiming for variegated forms of development to 
reframe their positions. At least since US President Truman pledged to foster ‘the 
improvement and growth of underdeveloped areas’ (1949), development has become a 
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global obsession. Development institutes, programs, banks and ministries proliferated. 
Winning an election in Brazil, Argentina, or indeed any other self-perceived 
‘underdeveloped’ country is impossible without making repeated promises of 
development. Myriad public policies are justified in terms of development. Momentous 
choices are made, directly affecting the lives of millions of people, all in the name of 
development. 
There are two reasons for the resilience of the concept of development, 
contradicting its declared death (Rahnema and Bawtree 1997). Firstly, a concept of 
development is needed to make sense of material change. What differentiates a coherent 
narrative from a random juxtaposition of facts is precisely some idea of development – 
be it implicit or explicit. Even fierce post-development writers cannot escape the 
epistemological necessity of organising their narratives as a progressive chain of events, 
as exemplified by Escobar’s own analysis of the recent rise of the left in Latin America 
(2010). 
Secondly, problematic as it is, the idea of development catalyses the legitimate 
desire for a better life (Vries 2007). In itself, the aspiration for positive change should not 
be rejected or repressed. On the contrary, it is a pre-condition for the conscious 
transformation of productive structures. In other words, the concept of development fills 
in a real epistemological and political gap. Therefore, it does not suffice to repeal its 
Eurocentric and stageist formulations, as post-development authors very convincingly do 
on a theoretical level (Sachs 1992; Escobar 1995; Rist 2002; Ziai 2007). The challenge is 
to forge a new concept of development, capable of replacing the old, Eurocentric notion 
of development, in its capacity of organising narratives and informing political struggle 
for a better life.   
Is it possible to imagine such a concept of development? The core idea that it must 
capture is the notion of radically perspectived material change. For there can be no doubt 
that material reality is dynamic. Organised social groups can certainly bring about 
substantial transformation in the relations within and across societies. Positive change is 
certainly possible. Nevertheless, what counts as positive change? Indeed, what may 
appear as a positive change from one social perspective can feel very different from 
another. Bringing to the forefront the multiplicity of legitimate perspectives on 
development and the necessary interaction between them, the objective materiality of the 
dichotomy between development/underdevelopment is dissolved into a complex and 
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interactive reality, filled with potentially contradictory claims for development. In a 
nutshell, development is what different social groups make of it. 
This is the main idea I try to capture with the concept of uneven and combined 
development. ‘Born in struggle’ – as required in emancipatory epistemologies of the 
south (Sousa Santos 2014) – Trotsky’s concept of development defied the canonical 
Marxism of his time, opposed the stageist thesis that a liberal revolution was a necessary 
pre-condition for the socialist revolution, and finally clashed with the Stalinist doctrine 
of socialism in a single country. In the process, Trotsky's idea performed exactly the two 
tasks required from a concept of development: it provided a better understanding of 
historical events (the Russian Revolution) and showed new possibilities for struggle from 
below.  
In this thesis, I use the concept of uneven and combined development to make 
sense of the recent state reforms in Argentina and Brazil. The perspectived view here 
proposed allows the narrative presented in the following chapters to go beyond the 
neoliberal and neodevelopmentalist accounts, both of which take the nation as the 
standard unit of analysis and reduce development to capitalist catch-up. Instead of asking 
the ever-repeated question about why Brazil and Argentina have yet again failed to 
‘develop’ – i.e. catch-up with the global north – the concept of development used here 
allows for the raising of more sensible questions, such as: what kind of transformations 
did the productive structures in Brazil and Argentine undergo after the reforms, and which 
social classes and class fractions benefited from those changes? In other words, instead 
of seeing permanent underachievement, we can see uneven and combined development 
and enquire into who benefited from it.  
 
 
2.2 From Marx to Trotsky – The missing concept of development in historical 
materialism  
 
In the original writings of Marx, there is no consistent use of the concept of 
development. Sometimes the author echoes the stageist and methodologically nationalist 
views of his time, abstracting from European history the model of development for the 
entire world. However, in other passages, Marx privileges the agency of oppressed classes 
in concrete historical situations, recognises the uneven dynamics of global capitalist 
expansion and points towards a concept of development related to human emancipation.  
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The lack of a consistent concept of development within the historical materialist 
tradition would lead to political and theoretical problems. Politically, stageist perspectives 
of development derived from some passages of Marx’s work would subordinate the 
socialist revolution to the pre-existence of a bourgeois revolution, limiting worker’s 
agency in countries where the transition to capitalism was not perceived as complete. 
Theoretically, historical narratives based on rigid stageist perspectives of development 
would have problems to make sense of concrete class struggles, as in many cases the 
national bourgeoisie did not play the role expected from it.  
 As remarked by Wallerstein, ‘like all great thinkers, there was the Marx who was 
the prisoner of his social location and the Marx, the genius, who could on occasion see 
from a wider vantage point. The former Marx generalized from British history. The latter 
Marx is the one who has inspired a critical conceptual framework of social reality’ (1974, 
393). Accordingly, in several sections of Capital volume 1, it is possible to find references 
to ‘stages of development’ and ‘civilization levels’, signs of a stageist and Eurocentric 
perspective.19 In the preface to the first German edition of Capital, Marx is very clear 
when alluding to the ‘iron laws’ of capitalist production: ‘the country that is more 
developed industrially only shows, to the less developed, the image of its own future’ 
(Marx 2010c [1867], 9). Most notably, in a very controversial paragraph from A 
Contribution to the Critique of Political Economy, Marx seems to confirm stageist 
interpretations of his ideas: 
 
The general conclusion at which I arrived (…) can be summarised as follows. In 
the social production of their existence, men inevitably enter into definite 
relations, which are independent of their will, namely relations of production 
appropriate to a given stage in the development of their material forces of 
production. (…) At a certain stage of development, the material productive forces 
of society come into conflict with the existing relations of production (…). No 
social formation is ever destroyed before all the productive forces for which it is 
sufficient have been developed (…). In broad outline, the Asiatic, ancient, feudal 
and modern bourgeois modes of production may be designated as epochs marking 
progress in the economic development of society (Marx 2010b [1859], 263–64). 
 
Influenced by the mechanical perspective of history suggested in passages like 
this, several Marxist writers of the early twentieth century sustained that any socialist 
revolution should be necessarily preceded by a bourgeois revolution. Given the 
                                                          
19 See, for instance, Marx’s remarks on different needs caused by different ‘levels of civilization’ when 
defining the concept of surplus value (2010c [1887], 181). 
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inexorable logic of development, it would be the historical task of the working class in 
backward countries to support their respective national bourgeoisies to first bring about 
their own revolution. Only after this necessary step, would a direct fight for worker’s 
power be possible. Each society would only be ready for socialist revolution when ‘all 
the productive forces’ of the capitalist mode of production within it were ‘developed’. As 
summarized by Kautsky: 
 
Marx and Engels acknowledge (...) that a revolution could not be made at will, 
but only as far as it was the necessary product of determinate conditions, and to 
the extent that these conditions were lacking, revolution was thus impossible. It 
is only where the system of capitalist production has achieved a high level of 
development that economic conditions permit public power to transform the 
means of production into social property (1909, cited in: Löwy 2010, 1–2). 
 
Many authors identify historical materialism tout court with this simplistic notion 
of development. Citing the same passage from Marx’s Contribution to the Critique of 
Political Economy mentioned above, Nisbet criticizes Marxism for its supposedly linear 
view of history. According to his reading, the very notion of ‘revolution’, which could 
indicate a breach in Marx’s stageism, is only the most dramatic expression of the idea of 
evolution, inasmuch as ‘[an] acceleration of the process, even by an armed revolt, does 
not show discontinuity’ (1969, 178). For Landes, Marx ‘saw the British experience as an 
expression of historical logic’ (1998, 236).  
Apart from the stageism and methodological nationalism present in some of 
Marx’s writings, his Eurocentric perspective is also commonly criticized by post-
colonialist authors. For Edward Said, although Marx often demonstrates identification 
and empathy with the suffering of the subjugated peoples, a form of ‘romantic 
Orientalism’ is still dominant in his account of colonialism. The Eurocentrism of Marx is 
especially clear when he praises the modernizing role of the British colonial relations: 
 
England has to fulfil a double mission in India: one destructive, the other 
regenerating—the annihilation of the Asiatic society, and the laying of the 
material foundations of Western society in Asia (1973, cited in: Said 2007, 154). 
 
In short, many critical interpretations of Marx stress the theoretical limitations of 
his views on development. More than one hundred and fifty years after Marx wrote his 
controversial words, it is now evident that capitalism never reaches its stage of full 
development. Sousa Santos is right in suggesting that left to itself, capitalism can lead 
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only to more capitalism (2002, 117). Contradictorily, this insight is also partially present 
in Marx writings, specifically in his definition of capitalism as endless accumulation 
(Harvey 2010, 259). This indicates that Marx’s view on development may be more 
complex than suggested by partial readings. In the last few years, more generous and 
perspicacious readers have been willing to explore different interpretations of Marx’s 
ideas on development.  
 Michael Löwy was one of the first contemporary scholars to recall Trotsky’s 
concept of uneven and combined development and to challenge the view that historical 
materialism is inherently stageist. The author remarks that in his writings about the 
political conjuncture in specific countries, such as Spain, Germany and Russia, Marx 
suggests that in concrete cases the national bourgeoisie may be unable to accomplish the 
revolutionary task expected from it (2010, 13-24).  
In a similar vein, Shanin argues that, if Capital volume 1 and the works preceding 
it can indeed be seen as Eurocentric and stageist, the late Marx had a substantially 
different view regarding development (1983, 3-6). Analysing Marx’s correspondence 
with Vera Zasulich, including unsent drafts, Shanin highlights the fact that Marx admitted 
that the ‘archaic’ Russian rural communities could eventually be the basis for progressive 
social change in Russia, thus totally subverting the previously expected succession of 
modes of production.  
 
The historical inevitability of this course [progressive ‘expropriation of the 
agricultural producer’]  is therefore expressly restricted to the countries of 
Western Europe (…) The analysis in Capital therefore provides no reason either 
for or against the vitality of the Russian commune. But the special study I have 
made of it (…) has convinced me that the commune is the fulcrum for social 
regeneration in Russia’ (Marx 1881 in: Shanin 1983, 123–124. Emphasis on the 
original).  
 
This suggests that there would be a specific ‘Russian road’ towards socialism, an 
assumption that radically undermines the previously mentioned claim that the socialist 
revolution would only be possible in the most advanced capitalist countries. As Shanin 
puts it, ‘the consideration of co-existence and mutual dependence of capitalist and non-
capitalist (pre-capitalist?) social forms made Marx increasingly accept and consider 
“uneven development” in all its complexity’ (1983, 15).   
Supported by an extensive analysis of published and unpublished text by Marx, 
Lucia Pradella (2013; 2014; 2015) argues that, in Marx’s theory of value, development 
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and underdevelopment are mutually related. The differences in wages, productivity and 
levels of accumulation, mediated by international trade, would explain the inequalities 
among nations. According to Pradella (2015, 152), Marini’s ideas on the material 
reproduction of dependency were substantially anticipated in the original texts of Marx.  
Another instance of a non-stageist and non-Eurocentric interpretation of Marx’s 
views on development is Selwyn’s concept of labour-centred development (2014a; 
2014b; 2016a; 2016b). For Selwyn, Marx’s theoretical framework, revealing the inherent 
contradiction between capital and labour, is conducive to the emancipation of the working 
class through its own organization. From the labour-centred development perspective, 
which ‘derives from the political economy of labour’ (Selwyn 2016b, 6), development is 
thus fundamentally identified with the emancipation of the working class, instead of with 
the accumulation of capital on a national basis.  
Selwyn’s reading is especially powerful inasmuch as it concentrates on Marx’s 
core ideas, instead of looking for counter-examples of stageism or Eurocentrism in rather 
marginal texts. From his interpretation emerge at least two radically distinct concepts of 
development: the development of capital, which is nothing but endless accumulation 
taking labour as a simple input, and the development of labour, which is the fulfilment of 
human creative and productive potentialities. As summarized by Selwyn: 
 
Capitalist development (entailing capital accumulation, industrial diversification 
and augmentation of state power) (…) ‘distort[s] the worker into a fragment’ of 
a person (Marx 1990, 799). In contrast to this miserable existence, Marx argued 
for the need to create an alternative political economic system organized to 
achieve maximum collective and individual fulfilment, based on the ‘absolute 
working out of [her] creative potentialities’, where ‘the free development of each 
is the condition for the free development of all (Marx and Engels 1967 
[1848],105)’ (Selwyn 2014a, 207). 
     
Löwy, Shanin, Pradella and Selwyn, among others, convincingly question stageist 
and Eurocentric interpretations of Marx’s ideas on development, painting a more nuanced 
picture. At the very least, they show that the historical materialist notion of development 
is still open to debate. This is because Marx himself had no consistent concept of 
development throughout his texts, vacillating between radically different uses of that 
word and allowing for contradictory interpretations. The important challenge facing a 
historical materialist political economy of development is, of course, not trying to find 
out what Marx really meant in order to save him from his own polemical statements. 
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Much more important than engaging in Marxology, is filling this theoretical gap and 
clearly defining a concept of development that overcomes stageism and Eurocentrism.  
 The crucial elements needed to define this missing concept of development can 
be found in Trotsky’s works. His critique of mechanical interpretations of Marxism 
appeared for the first time in the pamphlet Results and Prospects, published in the 
aftermath of the failed 1905 Revolution: 
 
It is possible for the workers to come to power in an economically backward 
country sooner than in an advanced country. (...) To imagine that the dictatorship 
of the proletariat is in some way automatically dependent on the technical 
development and resources of a country is a prejudice of ‘economic’ materialism 
simplified to absurdity. This point of view has nothing in common with Marxism 
(1986 [1906], 63). 
 
 And four paragraphs later: 
 
Is it true that, in Russia, the weakness of capitalist liberalism inevitably means 
the weakness of the labour movement? Is it true, for Russia, that there cannot be 
an independent labour movement until the bourgeoisie has conquered power? It 
is sufficient merely to put these questions to see what a hopeless formalism lies 
concealed beneath the attempt to convert an historically-relative remark of 
Marx’s into a supra-historical axiom (1986 [1906], 64). 
 
 These and many other passages of Results and Prospects reveal a rejection of 
stageism and Eurocentrism that could hardly be more striking. For Trotsky, there is no 
direct causality between the level of ‘technical development’ and the possibility of a 
workers’ revolution. Furthermore, the particular historical path of one single country is 
dismissed as a guide for the development of other countries.  
 These early remarks on development are more political than theoretical. Writing 
in 1906, the young Trotsky, then 27 years old, could not go much further than suggesting 
that specific conditions of class formation in each society should be taken into account 
for the analysis of the possibility of radical social change. The author clearly identifies 
problems in the stageist interpretations of Marx, but cannot formulate an alternative 
notion of development yet.20  
                                                          
20 Despite the theoretical limitations of Trotsky’s early ideas, Burawoy considers that ‘[w]riting in 1906, 
Trotsky not only anticipated the Russian revolution, but the processes whereby it would take place as well 
as its outcomes’ (Burawoy 1989, 787).  This leads the author to boldly claim that Trotsky offers an 
original, progressive contribution to the ‘Marxist research program’, tackling one fundamental anomaly 
of Marx’s model, constituted by the fact that the first socialist revolution succeeded in a backward 
country.   
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 According to Löwy (2010, 85), a ‘systematic, coherent and rigorous’ theory on 
the dynamic of social revolutions in backward countries would appear for the first time 
only twenty two years later, in Trotsky’s The permanent revolution (1986 [1928]). And, 
I would add, the first lengthy attempt to apply the concept of uneven and combined 
development to the analysis of a concrete historical case is the History of the Russian 
Revolution (2008 [1932]). In these two seminal books, Trotsky tries to tackle the 
theoretical and political conundrum he identified many years earlier:  
  
One stage or another of the historical process can prove to be inevitable under 
certain conditions, although theoretically not inevitable. And conversely, 
theoretically ‘inevitable’ stages can be compressed to zero by the dynamics of 
development, especially during revolutions, which have not for nothing been 
called the locomotives of history (1986 [1928], 241).  
  
 Thus, as Trotsky realised, the stageist concept of development derived from the 
traditional reading of Marx could not perform the two tasks a concept of development is 
supposed to perform, namely organising and explaining historical change and informing 
struggles for a better life. After radically undermining the basis of the stageist approach 
of historical materialism, Trotsky starts the positive effort of rebuilding Marx’s theory of 
social transformation by systematically introducing a key element that should be taken 
into account for the historical analysis of the development process. At this point, the 
‘international’21 comes to the forefront of the analysis: 
 
The socialist revolution begins on the national arena, it unfolds on the 
international arena, and is completed on the world arena. Thus, the socialist 
revolution (…) attains completion only in the final victory of the new society on 
our entire planet. The above-outlined sketch of the development of the world 
revolution eliminates the question of countries that are ‘mature’ or ‘immature’ 
for socialism in the spirit of that pedantic, lifeless classification given by the 
present programme of the Comintern. Insofar as capitalism has created a world 
market, a world division of labour and world productive forces, it has also 
prepared the world economy as a whole for socialist transformation. Different 
countries will go through this process at different tempos (Trotsky 1986 [1928], 
279). 
 
  
                                                          
21 The lack of a consistent concept of development in Marx can be seen as a consequence of the lack of 
theorisation of ‘the international’ in classical sociology (Rosenberg 2006; Makki 2015). No consistent 
concept of development is possible without a proper theorisation of international relations, as the inter-
societal character of development is missed.  
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 Trotsky seems to realize that the problems of stageism and methodological 
nationalism are inextricably intertwined. Defining invariable stages of development for 
any individual country implies theoretically isolating it from its international relations, as 
if each society necessarily followed a pre-defined parallel line towards development. 
Implicit here is the notion that societies are in permanent relation with each other, 
mutually determining the development of their productive structures. Instead of a model 
that takes states as basic units of analysis and posits development as an autochthone 
process, it is possible to envisage a complex model, in which development appears as a 
relational concept. Finally, the best, most synthetic and general expression of this idea – 
condensed in the formula ‘uneven and combined development’ – appears in the first 
chapter of the History of the Russian Revolution: 
 
The laws of history have nothing in common with pedantic schematism. 
Unevenness, the most general law of the historic process, reveals itself most 
sharply and complexly in the destiny of backward countries. Under the whip of 
external necessity their backward culture is compelled to make leaps. From the 
universal law of unevenness thus derives another law which, for the lack of a 
better name, we may call the law of combined development – by which we mean 
a drawing together of separate steps, an amalgam of archaic with more 
contemporary forms. Without this law, to be taken of course in its whole material 
content, it is impossible to understand the history of Russia, and indeed of any 
country of the second, third or tenth cultural class (Trotsky 2008 [1932], 5. 
Emphasis in the original).  
  
 Although chronologically Trotsky coined the concept of permanent revolution 
before the ‘law’ of uneven and combined development, logically the definition of 
development as an uneven and combined process of social transformation is exactly what 
makes possible the permanent revolution. Using Trotsky’s example, it is only because 
Russia materially combined features of different modes of productions in 1917 that it was 
possible for the soviets to perform at the same time a democratic and a socialist 
revolution. In the process of theoretically justifying the possibility of the working class 
leading a socialist revolution in a ‘backward’ country, and as a theoretical tool for the 
narration of the successes of the Russian Revolution, Trotsky coined the missing concept 
of development within the historical materialist tradition. Development appears as the 
uneven and combined process of social change, i.e., the material transformations brought 
about by the interaction between societies and the class disputes within and across them.  
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2.3 Contemporary U&CD and its critiques 
 
 Is Trotsky’s theoretical innovation – the uncovering of the inherently uneven and 
combined character of development – sufficient to redefine the concept of development 
in a way that overcomes stageism and Eurocentrism? Apparently not, one could say. 
Indeed, in the very same paragraph of the History of the Russian Revolution where he 
challenges linear views of development, Trotsky makes arguably Eurocentric references 
to ‘backward’ cultures and the ‘cultural class’ of countries. The overarching notion of an 
unfolding Western modernity necessarily spreading across the globe remains 
unchallenged. Sooner or later – with or without ‘leaps’ and ‘whips of external necessity’ 
– capitalism would end up creating a world after its own image. In the end, Trotsky’s 
‘law’ of uneven and combined development would only replace one pre-determined view 
of history for another – perhaps more complex, but no less deterministic or Eurocentric. 
 The recent debate on uneven and combined development – coming mainly from 
the fields of International Relations and International Historical Sociology and still 
largely unexplored in International Political Economy and Development Studies – allows 
us to move beyond Trotsky’s dated remarks, while retaining his key insight: the 
necessarily inter-societal character of development. At the core of Trotsky’s concept of 
development lies a crucial element bypassed by classical sociology in general, including 
historical materialism – ‘the international’. It is exactly this element that prompted the 
contemporary reframing of the concept of uneven and combined development as a ‘big 
idea’ capable of grounding the very discipline of International Relations (Rosenberg 
2016).  
Justin Rosenberg originally introduced the concept of uneven and combined 
development (U&CD) in the field of International Relations as an alternative to the realist 
paradigm still dominant in the discipline, the ‘old theory which has shown us only an 
empty, meaningless struggle for power’ (Rosenberg 1996, 4). Indeed, one of the 
previously identified theoretical problems of the mainstream concept of development, 
namely methodological nationalism, is at the heart of International Relations. The 
discipline was built precisely on the assumption that states can be taken as coherent units 
of analysis, and that the interaction between these units follow a different logic from 
social relations within each state, due to the anarchic character of the international system 
(Waltz 1979).  
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The theoretical challenge Rosenberg was trying to tackle was the mutual exclusion 
of geopolitical-international and sociological-internal analysis. Rosenberg’s originality 
rests neither in the identification of this enduring theoretical divide, nor in his criticism 
of the reification of states by realism. His approach, contrary to the simple denial of 
anarchy and the balance of power, promises a way of reconciling geopolitical and social 
analysis, by identifying a sociological origin of the international.     
Assuming ‘unevenness’ as a general principle of inter-societal differentiation, the 
relations between societies can be seen as emerging from ‘the nature of society itself’, 
that is, ‘the international’ is considered an aspect of the very existence of societies, and 
not a supra-societal fact. Rosenberg claims that U&CD is, therefore, capable of 
overcoming the long-standing divide between internal sociology and international 
geopolitics, as ‘the international’ can be organically derived from the fundamental 
sociological category of ‘unevenness’. ‘[T]he international, quite simply, (…) is nothing 
other than the highest expression of uneven and combined development. This is its 
sociological definition’ (2006, 328); or, as later rephrased: ‘U&CD is therefore the 
sociological formula of the international as a general abstraction’ (2013a, 194). 
It cannot pass unnoticed that Rosenberg’s reading involves a substantial extension 
of Trotsky’s original concept. In the History of the Russian Revolution, uneven and 
combined development refers to the particular way capitalism penetrates Russian 
‘backward’ society. At most, the original concept can be seen as referring to late capitalist 
countries in general, which are then supposed to follow unique patterns of development 
instead of repeating pre-determined steps. Nevertheless, Rosenberg consciously suggests 
that ‘Trotsky’s idea entailed an underlying claim — extending far beyond the analysis of 
capitalist development — about the significance of the international in human history’ 
(2006, 309). Only so, would U&CD serve as the foundation of a sociological definition 
of the international.   
This bold claim attracted from the start a number critiques. Ashman, for instance, 
argues that in positing U&CD as a transhistoric abstraction, Rosenberg ‘loses sight of the 
“great transformation” brought about by capitalist relations and political forms’ (2009, 
31). A similar point is made by Davidson, who insists that ‘U&CD is produced by the 
impact of different aspects of the international capitalist system’ (2009, 19), therefore it 
is historically specific. Rioux considers ‘the unexplained and unjustified transformation 
of Trotsky’s laws of history into a full-blown theory of U&CD’ as an ‘unwarranted and 
highly problematic’ move (2014, 27). For the author, a theory of U&CD exists only as a 
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‘stratospheric abstraction’, which cannot elucidate the concrete dynamics of historical 
development, generating only self-validating historical narratives (2014, 28-29). 
For my purpose in this chapter – the redefinition of the concept of development – 
the two most interesting and consequential critiques of U&CD are proposed by Teschke 
(2014) Blaney and Tickner (2017a). The supposed law-like character U&CD was picked 
upon by Teschke (2014), who takes issue with its conception as a ‘causal and 
transhistorical IR theory’. According to him, the focus on an overarching logic of 
development empties agency, rendering U&CD incapable of providing concrete historical 
explanations. ‘[S]ince the theoretical premises of UCD – development, unevenness, 
combination – are explicitly evacuated of social agency and socio-historical content, it 
cannot, despite its stated objective of explaining interactive change over time, account for 
change, unevenness, and differences’. Because of its lack of specificity and its disregard 
for agency, uneven and combined development ‘is fundamentally barred from explaining 
not only social change, but development itself – not to mention non-development and de-
development.’ (Teschke 2014, 33).  
Another version of essentially the same critique was proposed recently by de-
colonial authors (Blaney and Tickner 2017a). Instead of taking issue with the law-like or 
trans-historic character of U&CD, they aimed at the very concept of development that 
resists at the core of U&CD, perceived as irremediably Eurocentric. For Blaney and 
Tickner, ‘UCD remains grounded in an ontology of development.’ Exactly because of the 
centrality of ‘development’, U&CD necessarily fails to effectively account for 
multiplicity, as ‘development is part of the colonial/capitalist political and economic 
grammar and knowledge production central to and constitutive of cultural encounters as 
moments of violence in which alternative ontologies (or worlds) are subordinated or 
destroyed.’ Hence, U&CD’s explicit negation of a linear logic of development would not 
be enough: ‘[t]he ladder of development may be tipped a bit, but not brought down’ 
(2017a, 74).  
Although certainly valuable as pre-emptive efforts to avoid the enshrining of 
U&CD as yet another version of a-historical Western laws of history, these critiques miss 
the point by at the same time misrepresenting the scope of the concept of uneven and 
combined development and not taking into account the full consequences of Trotsky’s 
ideas. Conversely, the contemporary literature on U&CD22 is unpacking the theoretical 
                                                          
22 It is beyond the scope of this thesis to fully review the booming contemporary literature on U&CD, 
including tens of articles, a number of PhD theses and edited books. Beyond the work of Justin 
60 
 
 
and political potential of Trotsky’s revolutionary concept of development and producing 
interpretations that can hardly be classified as deterministic or Eurocentric.  
To start with, the rigid law-like character of U&CD is not claimed by any 
contemporary author and has been largely exaggerated by Teschke. In my own view, 
instead of a necessary causal law, capable of predicting concrete developmental 
outcomes, uneven and combined development is better understood as a concept of 
development, i.e., a definition of what development is. Of course, concepts can also be 
seen as ‘laws’, in the rather limited sense that they rule upon what shall be included under 
their representation. As such, U&CD can be captured by the following formula: 
development is always uneven and combined. Or, in other words, material transformation 
happen in relation to external pressures and opportunities, resulting in differentiated gains 
and losses within and across societies.  
These apparently law-like formulations, however, are purely analytical. They just 
spell out what was already presupposed under the concept of development. No material 
prediction can be made solely based on the concept of development, just as no prediction 
can be made based on any concept on its own. Nevertheless, exploring alternative 
understandings of key concepts – like development, production or class – helps to craft 
better historical narratives and to frame political action. The point of a conceptual 
definition is precisely to shed light on the constitutive parts of the concept under analysis, 
directing the attention to previously neglected aspects. In this sense, the sentence 
‘development is uneven and combined’ belongs to the same category as E.P. Thomson’s 
claim that ‘classes’ are ‘formed in the process of conflict and struggle’ (Wood 1982, 47). 
They are both general conceptual definitions of what shall be understood as ‘classes’ or 
‘development’. Classes are those things that arise from conflict and struggle; development 
is that thing that arises from unevenness and combination.      
Defining development as the outcome of unevenness and combination 
immediately raises the question about what exactly shall be understood as ‘unevenness’ 
and ‘combination’. In Trotsky’s original usage, unevenness was defined as ‘the most 
general law of the historical process, (2008 [1932], 5). This broad definition 
notwithstanding, in the History of the Russian Revolution, the leading form of unevenness 
identified by Trotsky was between the ‘backwardness’ of Russia capitalist development 
                                                          
Rosenberg (2006, 2009, 2010, 2013b, 2013a, 2016; Callinicos and Rosenberg 2008), notable examples 
are Matin (2013b, 2013a); Anievas (2014); Anievas and Nisancioglu (2013); Anievas and Nişancıoğlu 
(2015); Anievas and Matin (2016).  
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and the existence of ‘advanced’ capitalist powers. Relying on ‘levels of development’ – 
or differences between the ‘cultural class’ of societies – is deeply problematic, as the post-
development literature and the critique of U&CD put forward by Blaney and Tickner 
(2017a) makes abundantly clear. Even if the refence to ‘levels of development’ is 
considered merely descriptive, the normative implications of fixing the historical 
experience of a handful of ‘advanced’ societies as the standard against which the 
achievements of rest of humankind are to be evaluated cannot be easily dismissed. At a 
more fundamental level, however, unevenness does not have to refer to the coexistence 
of ‘advanced’ and ‘backward’ societies. As recently shown by Germann (2017), 
meaningful forms of unevenness can be found in the relations between so-called 
‘advanced’ societies as well. In this thesis, in an explicit effort at discharging any 
normative connotation of the concept of development, unevenness is understood simply 
as social difference, i.e., the difference between distinct social groups. In this more 
general sense, unevenness unfolds externally in the multiplicity of societies, and 
internally as class differentiation.  
The second key element of the concept of development is combination. Again 
here Trotsky’s original formulation seems to be hopelessly limited by a certain 
Eurocentric gaze. Combined development is defined as the ‘drawing together of separate 
steps, an amalgam of archaic with more contemporary forms’ (2008 [1932], 5). In this 
sense, the intriguing combined development seen in late capitalist societies suggests, by 
contrast, an originally ‘unamalgamated’ or ‘uncombined’ development path – the one 
supposedly followed by ‘advanced’ countries in their transition to capitalism. It is only in 
comparison with this idealised original transition to capitalism that late capitalist societies 
appear as exotic amalgamations between different modes of production and social 
structures. This is the reason why, according to Trotsky, the ‘law of uneven development’ 
is particularly relevant for countries of the ‘second, third of tenth cultural class’ (2008 
[1932], 5).  
The same Eurocentric mentality is reproduced by contemporary authors always 
keen to highlight the ‘bizarre’ features of global south societies. Chico de Oliveira, a 
leading sociologist of the University of Sao Paulo, for instance, compares Brazilian 
capitalist development with a duck-billed platypus, implying that it is an evolutionary 
mistake (Oliveira 2003). Just like with unevenness, however, it is possible to devise a 
more fundamental meaning of combination, one that is not tainted by Eurocentrism. In 
this thesis, combination is simply taken as the complex outcomes of the interaction 
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between uneven social groups, a process that tends to endlessly reproduce unevenness, 
instead of erasing it. Social, cultural and productive amalgamations are, therefore, not 
only to be found in late capitalist countries, but across all societies, since they are in 
constant interaction.  
If development can be defined as the outcome of unevenness and combination, 
then the concrete historical expressions of development go far beyond the particular form 
observed in so-called ‘developed’ or ‘advanced’ countries. Here is the exact point where 
the contemporary extension of Trotsky’s insight potentially dissolves Eurocentric views 
of development. No wonder uneven and combined development cannot account for ‘non-
development’ or ‘de-development’ (Teschke 2014, 33). When uneven and combined 
development is brought to its full consequences, it becomes clear that there are no such 
things. The negation of absolute forms of development, defined after European models, 
logically implies the negation of absolute forms of ‘non-development.’ Instead, a 
radically perspectived notion of development arises, admitting variegated concrete 
expressions. The point, therefore, is not formulating causal laws of ‘development’ or 
‘underdevelopment’, as if they were unproblematic characteristics of nations. Indeed, this 
is the trap that prevented Marini’s dependency theory from moving any further (see 
chapter 1). Taken in its contemporary form, the concept of uneven and combined 
development makes it possible to overcome the fixed dichotomy developed-
underdeveloped, shedding light instead on mixed forms of development.       
Since unevenness is inscribed in the very definition of development, not only 
multiple ways to achieve ‘development’ are possible, but, much more radically, different 
peoples and social groups can create many alternative ‘developments’. Therefore, Blaney 
and Tickner underestimate the role of multiplicity in uneven and combined development. 
U&CD is not about ‘tipping’ the ladder of development (2017a, 74) – rather, it is about 
imagining multiple, non-converging possible ladders, which are nonetheless in constant 
interaction with each other.  
If the multiple development ladders are represented as an interactive whole, it is 
possible to have a glimpse into the ‘pluriverse’ evoked by Blaney and Tickner as an 
alternative to the universe of colonial modernity (2017a, 2017b). As noticed by 
Rosenberg, the very fact that Blaney and Tickner refer to the pluriverse in the singular – 
as in ‘a pluriverse’ – indicates that some form of unity is still presupposed over the 
overwhelming multiplicity of human social existence (2017, 98). Indeed, the ladders of 
development are multiple, but they are placed in relation to each other, forming a single 
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picture that can only be intuited through an extraordinary act of imagination. 
Notwithstanding the fact that we, concrete historical people, with our inevitable 
positionalities, can never fully access the totality of the pluriverse, imagining it is 
paramount if any form of translation and fruitful exchange between societies is deemed 
possible. The concept of uneven and combined development offers exactly this kind of 
grand imagination, allowing us to grasp ‘the human world as simultaneously multiple and 
yet – by virtue of its interconnections – making up a single whole’ (Rosenberg 2017, 98).  
Inasmuch as all development is uneven and combined, the very rise of capitalist 
modernity must be understood as an expression of unevenness and combination. The 
challenge of rewriting the history of the rise of the west from that perspective was recently 
met by Anievas and Nisancioglu in their landmark book How the West Came to Rule 
(2015). As an alternative to the World-System Analysis of Wallerstein and the Political 
Marxist thesis of Brenner, the authors reclaim the agency of extra-European sources of 
the breakthrough of capitalism in Western Europe and the subsequent ‘great divergence’ 
between the west and the rest of the world.  Anievas and Nisancioglu’s book is an 
outstanding example of how the concept of uneven and combined development can be 
used to inform historical narratives that empty the clear-cut dichotomy between 
development and backwardness. As the authors show, the developmental trajectory of 
each society – both in the centre and on the periphery – can be analysed in terms of their 
relations with other societies, always resulting in mixed and amalgamated social 
formations.    
 
 
2.4 The political economy of uneven and combined development 
 
The rather abstract considerations of the last section, stretching all the way back 
to the origins of capitalist modernity, may appear to have led us further away from the 
aim of this chapter, which is defining a theoretical alternative to contemporary Latin 
American neoliberalism and neodevelopmentalism. As I argued in Chapter 1, 
neoliberalism and neodevelopmentalism are development strategies, i.e., discourses 
about development, used to justify and evaluate public policies. Development is seen by 
neoliberal and neodevelopmentalist writers as capitalist catch-up. The theoretical detour 
of the last section made it possible to define development in a radically different way. 
Instead of taking the experience of global north countries as a model to be universally 
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emulated, these experiences can be seen a unique expression of unevenness and 
combination. The interaction between societies and class struggle always produce 
differentiated forms of development. The neoliberal and neodevelopmentalist quest to 
follow the global north model is, therefore, fundamentally flawed. Consequently, the 
narratives offered by neoliberal and neodevelopmentalist writers are circular. The 
persisting non-convergence to global north standards is always represented as a problem 
or a national illness, that has to be remedied with yet another round of ‘market friendly’ 
or ‘state led’ reforms. 
My claim is that the concept of uneven and combined development, in its extended 
version, can be fruitfully used to inform better narratives about the recent state reforms in 
Brazil and in Argentina. Instead of showing a history of permanent underachievement, 
the concrete changes in productive structures under international pressures and 
opportunities can be analysed in terms of the differentiated outcomes they produce for 
different classes and class fractions. Put differently, the concept of uneven and combined 
development allows us to ask a crucial question, beyond the theoretical reach of 
neoliberalism and neodevelopmentalism: development for whom? For the productive 
structures in Brazil and Argentina – and everywhere else, for that matter – are in constant 
transformation, under the impacts of international pressures and opportunities and class 
struggle. While neoliberals and neodevelopmentalists ask why these changes did not 
make Argentina and Brazil more similar to global north countries, we can inquire into 
who benefited from these changes, within and across national borders.   
Nevertheless, exactly because every instance of development is uneven and 
combined, the concept of uneven and combined development actually captures very little 
of the historical specificity of each development trajectory. No doubt it offers a better 
theoretical starting point than Eurocentric or stageist notions of development, but to 
inform fruitful analysis of concrete developmental outcomes, it requires mid-range 
concepts that specify the way international pressures and opportunities interact with class 
struggle.  
Still drawing on Trotsky’s History of the Russian Revolution, Rosenberg identifies 
some of the mechanisms through which the combined character of development manifests 
itself. The first is the ‘whip of external necessity’, meaning the geopolitical competition 
among political entities, with the stronger ones exerting pressure on the weaker (2013a, 
196). The second is the ‘privilege of backwardness’, which, in Trotsky’s words, ‘permits, 
or rather compels, the adoption of whatever is ready in advance of any specified date, 
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skipping a whole series of intermediate stages’ (2008 [1932], 4). Both mechanisms 
influence material changes, although they should not be seen as provoking a 
‘straightforward acceleration of an ultimately unidirectional developmental process’ 
(Rosenberg 2013a, 196). Rather, the effects of the ‘whip of external necessity’ and the 
‘privilege of backwardness’ are mediated by the specific characteristic of the hegemonic 
‘political groups’ in a given society (2013a, 197). In Trotsky’s example quoted by 
Rosenberg, because of the weakness of the native ‘capitalist class’ in Russia, 
industrialization at the beginning of the 20th century had been largely state-induced, which 
ended up ‘reinforcing the existing social structure of Czarism’ (2013a, 197).  
The ‘whip of external necessity’ and the ‘privilege of backwardness’ were 
originally defined in Trotsky’s work as referring to geopolitical competition. A similar 
use appears in contemporary historical sociological narratives informed by U&CD. In 
Kamran Matin’s Recasting Iranian Modernity, for instance, the ‘centralised and absolutist 
character of premodern Iranian states’ are explained in terms of the impacts of the 
‘nomadic whip of external necessity’, generating ‘an amalgamated nomadic-sedentary 
state form’ (2013a, 20). In Anievas and Nişancıoğlu’s How the West Came to Rule (2015) 
there are many instances of the operation of the whip of external necessity, one of the 
most notable being the geopolitical pressure of the Ottoman Empire on European 
Christendom. Both works rely on a number of subsidiary, mid-range concepts beyond the 
whip of external necessity and the privilege of backwardness, including ‘substitution’, 
‘historical reshuffling’ (Matin 2013a, 18), ‘advantages’ and ‘penalties of priority’ and 
‘contradictions of sociological amalgamation’ (Anievas and Nişancıoğlu 2015, 44).   
These mid-range concepts employed in historical sociological narratives capture the 
dynamics of inter-societal interaction over the long-term. Indeed, they are directly derived 
from Trotsky’s narrative of the formation of the Russian state in the first chapter of the 
History of the Russian Revolution, the ‘locus classicus’ of the concept of uneven and 
combined development (Rosenberg 2013b, 583).  
For political economy narratives, however, mid-range concepts capable of 
connecting the general concept of uneven and combined development and specific 
outcomes are still largely missing. Adam Morton’s Revolution and State in Modern 
Mexico – a pioneering lengthy study on political economy of uneven development in 
Latin America – fills in this gap by coupling uneven development with a Gramscian 
theoretical framework. For Morton, ‘the struggle-driven course of uneven and combined 
development and modern state formation in Mexico can be best understood as a set of 
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constructed and contested class practices characteristic of a passive revolution (…)’. 
Accordingly, the Mexican passive revolution under the condition of uneven and 
combined development is defined as a ‘mode of class rule’ that resulted in ‘both a 
“revolutionary” rupture and a “restoration” of social relations’ (2011, 4). 
For the analysis of Brazilian and Argentinian recent state reforms, I also reach 
beyond Trotsky’s work in order to find operational concepts capable of grasping the 
changing class dynamics within uneven and combined development. In the relatively 
short period this thesis focusses on – the 1990s and 2000s – the most important form of 
international pressures conditioning the development trajectories of Argentina and Brazil 
were not the threat of wars or foreign invasions, but a series of international crises. This 
tumultuous period was marked by the Mexican crisis of 1995, the Asian crisis of 1997, 
the Russian crisis of 1998, the Brazilian crisis of 1999, the Argentinian crisis of 2001, 
culminating in the great financial crisis of 2008 and the subsequent drop in commodities 
prices in 2013 and 2014.  
From a political economy perspective, the contemporary forms of the ‘whip of 
external necessity’ repeatedly hitting Brazil and Argentina are, therefore, successive 
international economic crises. This realisation follows Marini’s insight that ‘the use of 
political and military violence to exploit weak countries’ becomes increasingly 
‘superfluous’ under the conditions of global capitalism. Instead, ‘international 
exploitation can progressively rest on economic relations’ (2009a, 120). In the absence 
of military confrontation from abroad, the crucial danger for the reproduction of Brazilian 
and Argentinian ruling classes came in the form of sharp international capital fluctuations 
– entailing no less destructive effects, as exemplified by the war-like social catastrophe 
witnessed in Argentina after the 2001 crisis (see chapters 3 and 5). These crises forced 
the class fractions in control of Brazilian and Argentinian states to react and advance 
neoliberal or neodevelopmentalist reforms.23 
The mid-range concepts necessary to connect this specific form of the whip of 
external necessity and concrete class dynamics can be retrieved from the Latin American 
political economy tradition. The economist Celso Furtado – Professor at Sorbonne and 
Cambridge during his exile years – famously defined a mechanism deployed by the state 
as a reaction to the external pressures on Brazilian pre-industrial economy, culminating 
in the 1929 crisis: the ‘socialisation of losses’ (Furtado 2005, 166). 
                                                          
23 A similar argument is suggested by Germann (2017) in relation to the exaggerated austerity policies 
imposed by German elites as a response to the 2008 international crisis.  
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During periods of international economic expansion, the high prices of export 
commodities – in the Brazilian case, coffee – were appropriated by the ruling class as 
increased profits. The abundance of land and workers prevented any substantive upward 
pressure on salaries. Conversely, during periods of international economic contraction, 
which appeared ‘to the dependent economy as a cataclysm, coming from outside’ (2005, 
167), the state tried to defend the exporting sector by devaluing the exchange rates and 
expanding government expenditure. State resources were channelled into buying the 
surplus coffee production and destroying it in order to try and prevent the prices from 
falling any further.  
 
The process of correction of external imbalance meant, at the end of the day, a 
transfer of income from those who paid for imports to those who sold exports. 
Because imports were paid by the general collectively, the exporting 
entrepreneurs were actually able to socialise the losses (…) (2005, 166).           
 
The ‘socialisation of losses’ can be defined, therefore, as a defence mechanism 
used by fractions of ruling classes when hit by the whip of external necessity in the form 
of international crisis. Using their control of the state, they are able to deflect losses 
imposed from abroad to the society as a whole, particularly its lower layers. The 
counterpart of the socialisation of losses is the ‘tendency of income concentration during 
periods of prosperity’ (2005, 167), which results in the privatisation of gains of 
international trade for fractions of the ruling class, preventing the general increase in 
living standards of the working class, even when international prices of export 
commodities are high. 
The analysis of the political economy of Brazilian and Argentinian uneven and 
combined development presented in the following chapters derives inspiration from 
Furtado’s economic concepts. Indeed, the international crisis that appeared for Furtado as 
an externality – or a ‘cataclysm’ – can now be theoretically integrated into a wider 
analysis of development that explicitly incorporates inter-societal factors. ‘The 
international’ and the strategies of reproduction of competing classes and class fractions 
are bridged through socialisation of losses and privatisations of gains. My research shows 
that the configuration of the class alliance in control of the state at different moments 
determines the use of institutionalised tools of socialisation of losses or privatisation of 
gains. These tools typically comprise the exchange rate and fiscal policies, as originally 
identified by Furtado. Other contemporary examples are monetary and interest rates 
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policies, the direct appropriation of public property via privatisations, targeted cash 
transfer programs, as well as official political responses through active of defensive 
foreign policies.  
Furthermore, the rise of neodevelopmentalist administrations in the 2000s – which 
included important fractions of the working class – brought about two new and 
complementary outcomes, not foreseen by Furtado. Because his classical study described 
the mechanisms of reaction of oligarchies in control of the state in face of external 
pressures and opportunities, he focussed on the socialisation of losses and privatisation 
of gains, overlooking the possibility of the contrary, namely socialisation of gains and the 
privatisation of losses. Although to a limited extent, the neodevelopmentalist 
administrations in Brazil and particularly in Argentina proved that the gains of positive 
international conjunctures can be effectively socialised through labour-centred policies, 
while the losses imposed by international crises can be at least partially channelled to 
historically privileged fractions of the ruling class (see chapters 5 and 6). 
One last conceptual clarification is necessary before I can move to the empirical 
analysis of the political economy of Brazilian and Argentinian uneven and combined 
development over the last three decades. So far, concepts such as class and class-fractions 
have been used without a proper definition. Of course, defining what social classes 
actually are and what are the relations between class, structure and agency is a mammoth 
challenge, both at theoretical and empirical levels. In this regard, this thesis makes no 
claim of originality. The class analysis advanced in the empirical chapters relies heavily 
on contemporary Brazilian and Argentinian sociology, particularly the work of Boito Jr. 
(2006), André Singer (1999, 2012, 2015), Jesse Souza (2012, 2015, 2016), Eduardo 
Basualdo (2010, 2011), and Claudio Katz (2014). Although with important nuances, all 
these writers identify an overarching opposition between the material interest of capital 
and labour, the pivotal role of urban middle classes, as well as historically determined, 
specific divisions, or class fractions, within the Brazilian and Argentinian working and 
ruling classes. In short, instead of proposing a lifeless, abstract notion of class and 
applying it to my case studies, I chose to follow the contemporary class analysis of leading 
Brazilian and Argentinian authors. The relative position of each class and class fraction 
will be defined in the following empirical chapters in reference to concrete historical 
circumstances.     
In conclusion, the principle of unevenness entails development not happening in 
isolation. Different societies are in permanent relation with each other, mutually 
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determining their respective developmental paths. Under pressure from external shocks, 
each nation deals with different whips of external necessity. In the contemporary world, 
and from the perspective of the global south, the whip of external necessity often comes 
in the form of international crisis, entailing a shortage of badly needed foreign 
investments and a drop in commodities export prices. Competing classes and class 
fractions mobilise institutionalised state tools to profit from internationally favourable 
circumstances and deflect the impact of the whip of external necessity when the tide turns. 
The resulting development trajectory is uniquely combined, since it depends on specific 
class configurations. Although this combination may reveal itself in many forms, one of 
its most notable material expressions is a particular balance of socialisation or 
privatisation of losses, as well as a socialisation or privatisation of gains.  
Informed by the theoretical toolkit just described, the following empirical chapters 
show that the neoliberal and the neodevelopmentalist narratives on the recent state 
reforms in Brazil and in Argentina miss the point by taking deliberate strategies of class 
reproduction as potentially amendable ‘errors’ of policy. Instead, to make sense of 
Brazilian and Argentinian uneven and combined development, I uncover how key public 
policies were used by competing classes and class fractions to advance their interests in 
the face of international pressures and opportunities.    
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Conclusion to Part 1 – Beyond Neoliberalism and Neodevelopmentalism 
 
In the first chapter of this thesis, I spelt out the limitations of neoliberalism and 
neodevelopmentalism. In the second chapter, I defined an alternative political economy 
perspective, based on the concept of uneven and combined development. Taken together, 
my main theoretical claim is that when development is understood as the outcome of the 
interplay between international pressures and opportunities and class struggle, better 
historical narratives can be framed and new possibilities of struggle from below become 
visible.  
Both neoliberalism and neodevelopmentalism are based on a much more limited 
understanding of development. For neoliberal and neodevelopmentalist writers, 
development is the process of capitalist convergence to the standards of global north 
countries. To achieve this idealised view of development, neoliberalism and 
neodevelopmentalism take the concrete form of development strategies. Because these 
strategies are premised on incompatible state and market utopias, neoliberalism and 
neodevelopmentalism appear on the surface of the political discourse as radically 
opposed. This opposition, however, is a theoretical mirage, as the borders between state 
and markets can never be clearly defined.  
From an uneven and combined perspective, the real differences between 
neoliberalism and neodevelopmentalism can be better explained as expressions of the 
social struggle for the appropriation of key policy tools – such as exchange rates, interest 
rates, fiscal and monetary policies, and foreign policies. Representing different class 
alliances, the neoliberal and the neodevelopmentalist fields compete to determine a 
balance of socialisation of losses and privatisation of gains in the face changing 
international economic conditions. 
By exposing their fragile theoretical bases and the concrete interests they 
represent, my argument challenges the scientific calibre that neoliberal and 
neodevelopmentalist writers claim for their own perspectives – paradigmatically revealed 
in the disease metaphor both sides often use. Instead of seeing underdevelopment as a 
mysterious disease that can eventually be cured by the administration of wise policies, 
the theoretical perspective here suggested is much more akin to the findings of Dr. Simão 
Bacamarte, the ironic character created by Machado de Assis in The Alienist (2013). 
Calling into question the sharp dichotomy between perfectly sane and totally crazy – or 
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developed and underdeveloped –, the picture here depicted is much more nuanced. The 
crucial task of the critical political economy analysis of Brazilian and Argentinian 
development carried out in the following chapters is, therefore, to reveal both countries’ 
mixed forms of development and to uncover the differentiated social gains associated 
with them. 
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Part 2 – Neoliberalism and market utopia  
 
Introduction 
 
 Neoliberalism has swept Latin America over the last four decades, replacing 
traditional state-centred development strategies. In Brazil and Argentina, where 
developmental states played a key role in promoting industrialisation throughout the 20th 
century, the change was momentous. The social basis of the old national developmentalist 
strategy broke down under the weight of the debt crisis and accelerating inflation. At the 
same time, the return of liberal democracy and the end of the Cold War substantially 
changed the conditions under which protectionist import substitution policies had been 
implemented. 
 After the profound political and economic uncertainties of the 1980s, a neoliberal 
administration rose in Argentina during the winter of 1989. A few months later, the same 
happened in Brazil. In both cases, inflamed new political discourses reframed old 
promises of development. Taking advantage of the perceived dynamism of the 
international market, development was to be achieved not through state-led strategic 
planning, but through modernising reforms, which were supposed to unleash market 
forces. New social coalitions were formed, bringing together different fractions of the 
ruling class and urban middle classes. Legitimised by the prevalent market utopia, a 
number of neoliberal policies were undertaken during the following decade, including 
privatisations, monetary reforms, cuts in trade tariffs, and changes in foreign policy 
strategies.  
 Nowhere did these reforms go so far as in Argentina. Under the presidency of 
Carlos Menem, the Argentinian peso was officially pegged to the US. dollar, proud 
symbols of national developmentalism such as the railway system and the giant oil 
company YPF were sold to international capital, trade tariffs ware slashed and the non-
aligned foreign policy was reverted to a declared strategy of alignment with the US In 
Brazil, similar, if less radical policies were implemented. ‘The Vargas era is over’, 
President Cardoso declared to the press, while sanctioning a new law facilitating 
privatisation of public services (Folha de S.Paulo 1995).  
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 The actual results of the neoliberal reforms adopted in the 1990s ranged from 
disappointing in Brazil to catastrophic in Argentina. In the first case, instead of a period 
of sustained economic expansion and social mobility, the reforms produced sluggish 
growth rates, increasing public debt, high unemployment and social inequality. In the 
second case, the Argentinian crisis of 2001 marked the lowest point of neoliberalism for 
the whole region. Historically the richest country in Latin America, Argentina witnessed 
an explosion of poverty, unemployment and social inequality, as well as the dismantling 
of its industrial economy.     
 It is beyond dispute that the results actually achieved after one decade of 
neoliberal policies came far short of what was promised in the neoliberal discourses. 
Nevertheless, neoliberal and neodevelopmentalist writers offer two diametrically 
opposed narratives to explain the reasons for these shortcomings. While the former blame 
vested interests, governmental incompetence or unfortunate circumstances (Rodrigues 
1995; Cavallo and Cottani 1997; Cavallo 2005; Franco 1999; Onis 2000; Pinheiro, 
Giambiagi, and Moreira 2001; Williamson 2003; Fraga 2004), the latter blame the 
perceived retreat of the state (Pochmann 2001; Mantega 2001; Lavagna 2003; 2011; 
Ferrer 2006; Kicillof et al 2006). What is lacking in both mainstream narratives is an 
international and class-relational perspective. Because they idealise development as 
catching-up with global north countries and reify the state or the market as the privileged 
means to do so, they are blind to the uneven and combined development that actually 
occurred in the aftermath of the neoliberal reforms, as well as to its real driving forces: 
class struggle under international pressures and opportunities. 
 In the following two chapters I challenge the mainstream narratives about the 
neoliberal state reforms in Brazil and Argentina and offer an alternative perspective. 
Following the critical Argentinian and Brazilian political economy literature (Azpiazu, 
Basualdo, and Schorr 2001; Basualdo 2010; Boito Jr and Resende 2007; Boito Jr 2007, 
among others), I argue that the transformation in productive structures witnessed in both 
countries are better explained by shifting class relations. Building on that insight – and 
here is precisely the contribution my argument aims to make – I claim that these decisive 
shifts in class relations happened under the whip of external necessity, concretely 
instantiated in the 1997 Asian crisis, the 1998 Russian crisis, the 1999 Brazilian crisis and 
the 2001 Argentinian crisis. These crises, to which Brazil and Argentina were exposed 
given the reliance on international capital inherent in their respective development 
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strategies, finally forced the dismantling of the neoliberal class alliance forged in each 
country at the beginning of the 1990s.  
More specifically, in both countries neoliberal policies were supported by a 
heterogeneous coalition, including different fractions of the ruling class and the urban 
middle classes. While the fruits of the reforms were largely appropriated by the financial 
fraction of the ruling class through high interest rates and extremely favourable 
privatisations, the middle classes enjoyed their share of the short-lived neoliberal 
prosperity thanks to overvalued exchange rates, which increased their purchasing power. 
In order to promote this privatisation of gains to the top layers of society, a socialisation 
of losses was imposed on the remaining social classes and class fractions, particularly on 
the working class. The whole model was premised on the constant influx of external 
capital, which was indeed abundant in the context of the end of the Cold War. Towards 
the end of the 1990s, the international situation reverted. A series of international crises 
put the neoliberal development strategy under stress, prompting the Brazilian and the 
Argentinian governments to expand the socialisation of losses to the middle classes, 
thereby undermining the social bases of the neoliberal administrations.  
In short, international pressures and class conflicts coupled to bring an end to the 
neoliberal decade – through elections in Brazil, through a popular uprising in Argentina. 
The substantial changes in productive structures resulting from the neoliberal reforms 
certainly cannot be described as cases of catching-up development. In terms of per capita 
GDP, for instance, the growth experienced during that period is well in line with the 
average world growth, and the gap between Brazil and Argentina and the United States 
only widened (Graph 1). Instead, these changes and their causes are better captured by 
the concept of uneven and combined development.   
 
75 
 
 
  
The narrative sketched above is elaborated on in the two in-depth case studies that 
follow. Chapter 3 is dedicated to the neoliberal reforms in Argentina; chapter 4, explores 
the reforms in Brazil. In both of them, the structure of my argument is similar. First, I 
uncover the development promises used to justify the reforms through an analysis of 
speeches and official documents, showing how those promises were ultimately premised 
on a market utopia. Then, using primary and secondary data, I assess neoliberal policies 
in key areas, such as monetary management, privatisations and foreign policy. Finally, 
mainstream neoliberal and neodevelopmentalist explanations for the shortcomings of the 
reforms are questioned, and an international class relational interpretation based on the 
concept of uneven and combined development is fully presented. After chapters 3 and 4, 
my overarching argument is summarised in the conclusion to Part 2, where some 
incorporated comparisons between the experiences of Brazil and Argentina are suggested.      
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Chapter 3 – Neoliberalism in Argentina – the first world is here 
 
We set in motion a privatisation plan of unprecedented intensity. It has 
already been implemented in important areas as telecommunications, 
airways and, to a great extent, the oil industry. (…) All of this combined 
with a policy of total deregulation of the economy. (…) Dear 
Congressmen: For our program to produce its results, it is of capital 
importance that it receives support and concrete answers from abroad. 
  President Menem (1991, 114). 
 
 
In the evening of the 20th of December, 2001, President De La Rúa fled the 
presidential palace in Buenos Aires in a helicopter. Surrounding the building, the 
infuriated crowd in the historic Plaza 25 de Mayo chanted ‘everyone must go’.  
 The description provided by one of the many protesters offers a glimpse into that 
moment: 
December 19th and 20th was a historic process. I was there, with everyone else, 
combating a system. I believe no other country in the world had four presidents 
– and one day without a president – in just one week. (…) Clearly, when people 
unite, no one can bring them down. (…) On 19th and 20th the people took the 
streets. It wasn’t expected – the demonstrations multiplied from one second to 
the next. People didn’t know where they were marching or why they were 
marching, they were just so fed up with this typically neoliberal system that 
Menem implemented – that we lived under because of US imperialism – we were 
so fed up with everything (Anti-capitalist activist, cited in Sitrin 2006, 30). 
 
The popular revolt of the 19th and 20th of December, 2001, is the endpoint of the 
neoliberal journey in Argentina. Unprecedented rates of unemployment and poverty, 
limited access to banking deposits (corralito), dismantling of state services and a deep 
distrust in traditional political organisations (including parties and trade unions) fuelled 
massive protests across the country. Roads were blocked, unproductive factories were 
taken, supermarkets were looted and bank windows were smashed. The neoliberal dream 
of a developed capitalist Argentina, a first world country, melted into air. After 12 years 
of sweeping neoliberal reforms, the country was very far from the idealised view of the 
first world promised in the political speeches.     
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The neoliberal state-reform process had its epicentre in Menem’s government 
(1989-1999) 24  and involved change to laws and regulations, privatisations, trade 
liberalisation, the dismantling of public services and the forging of a new international 
identity. That these development strategies proved incapable of producing catch-up 
development in Argentina is beyond dispute. The questions worth asking are why that 
was the case, who benefited from the neoliberal reforms and what kind of development 
resulted from those policies instead?  
Neoliberals and Neodevelopmentalists cannot offer convincing answers to those 
questions. For neoliberals, the Argentinian crisis of 2001 was caused by insufficient 
discipline in applying pro-market policies, in particular a lack of fiscal responsibility 
(Williamson 2003; Fraga 2004; Cavallo 2005). For them, the reforms did not go far 
enough, despite being arguably the most comprehensive set of neoliberal reforms ever 
implemented under democratic conditions. Still, market rule was not sufficiently 
enforced, and the state, always captured by vested interests, spoiled the reforms by 
spending beyond its means.  
Neodevelopmentalists, on the other hand, make the opposite case. For them, the 
reforms went way too far. The state was dismantled and its capacity to promote catch-up 
development was severely curtailed, to the benefit of transnational capital. Privatisations, 
drastic reduction in trade tariffs and political alignment with the US left no space for 
development policies. In that context, the loss of control over the monetary policy after 
the Convertibility Plan, which resulted in a chronically overvalued exchange rate, is often 
presented as the ultimate cause of the crisis (Lavagna 2003; 2011; Ferrer 2006; Kicillof 
et al. 2006). 
As argued in chapter 1, the neoliberal and the neodevelopmentalist narratives are 
inverted twin sisters, based on opposing state and market utopias, and politically justified 
by a common promise of catch-up development. Exactly because the perfect state and the 
perfect market are never materialised in the real world, the failure to finally catch up with 
global north countries can always be attributed to insufficient state-led policies or market-
led reforms. As a consequence, real world development, with its uneven and combined 
nature, cannot be fully grasped. 
                                                          
24 The Argentine political economy literature normally points to Martinez de Hoz’s administration as 
finance ministry (1976-1981) – under the last military dictatorship – as the precursor of neoliberalism in 
Argentina (Ferrer 2006; Basualdo 2010). Nevertheless, the developmentalist state in Argentina was only 
thoroughly dismantled after President Menem took office.  
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My argument in this chapter is that the extent and the depth of the reforms in 
Argentina – as well as their ultimate failure in bringing about catch-up development – 
must be understood in the context of a particular configuration of class relations and 
international pressures and opportunities. Fiscal and exchange rate policies were not 
simply mismanaged. Instead, the fiscal imbalances and the overvaluation of the exchange 
rate were consequences of the interplay between the distributive conflict and international 
variations in capital flows. The exchange rates were kept overvalued, leading to growing 
fiscal difficulties, because of the initial abundance of international capital and the 
particular conjunction of interests that had to be satisfied within the social alliance 
supporting Menem’s government. As a consequence, the neoliberal scheme could only 
be sustained by the constant influx of capital from abroad, which was, in turn, largely 
dependent on the privatisation of former state-owned companies. Eventually, however, 
the contradictions of the social alliance backing the neoliberal reforms would emerge and 
international capital flows would reverse, leading to the collapse of the whole scheme, as 
effectively happened in December, 2001.  
The uneven and combined character of Argentine development in the 1990s is 
revealed through a specific combination of socialisation of losses and privatisation of 
gains. Fractions of the ruling class benefited from the privatisations and the possibilities 
of association with international capital, and the middle classes of Buenos Aires enjoyed 
the tide of cheap imports. At the same time, the working classes bore the costs of the 
reforms, enduring unemployment, cuts in government services and unprecedented 
poverty levels. The failure of neoliberal reforms in Argentina was, therefore, not simply 
a failure of implementation or management. It could not have been avoided by a more 
efficient state or an even more liberalised market.     
In this chapter, I substantiate these claims with an international political economy 
analysis of Argentine uneven and combined development and suggest an alternative 
interpretation of neoliberal reforms implemented in Argentina. My argument is built in 
four steps. In the first section (3.1), I analyse the neoliberal discourse of President Menem 
to show how promises of catch-up development were mobilised as a justification for 
extensive reforms, clearly based on a market utopia. After that (3.2), I scrutinise some 
key neoliberal public policies actually adopted during Menem’s government, with 
particular focus on the monetary reforms and privatisations. In section 3.3, the foreign 
policy of ‘carnal relations’ with the US is examined. The fourth and last section (3.4) 
brings together the results of the preceding sections and explains why the promises of the 
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political discourse failed to materialise, producing instead an uneven and combined form 
of development.  
 
 
3.1 From ‘Salariazo’ to ‘catch-up’ development – the promises of Neoliberalism in 
Argentina 
 
In the first chapter of the Eighteenth of Brumaire, Marx remarks that during 
convoluted times of social change men ‘anxiously conjure up the spirits of the past to 
their service’ (2010a [1852], 104). Accordingly, the neoliberal cycle in Argentina started 
by politically mobilising expectations of reviving a Peronist25 past. As the state reforms 
were implemented, that discourse changed to incorporate neoliberal economic jargon, 
particularly after Menem’s re-election in 1994. Instead of looking to the national past for 
inspiration, ‘first world’ countries were presented as development models to be emulated. 
The official discourse transitioned from state to market utopia. In both moments, 
however, promises of development were repeated to exhaustion in order to justify the 
socialisation of losses imposed by the reforms.  
If the traditional developmentalist strategy adopted in Argentina reached its limits 
in the 1980s, culminating in the social tragedy of debt crisis and hyperinflation, the 
neoliberal turn in Argentina started farcically. During the electoral campaign in 1988 and 
1989, amidst a deep economic crisis, Menem presented himself as a faithful, if renewed 
Peronist. Running for the presidency for the ‘Justicialist’ Party (PJ), founded in 1947 by 
Juan Domingo Perón himself after declared ideas of ‘social justice’ (hence the name 
‘Justicialista’), the then Governor of the remote province of La Rioja promised in his 
campaign to promote a ‘salarizo’ (substantial increase in salaries) as well as a ‘productive 
revolution’ (Canelo 2011, 77; Szusterman 2000, 199; Brenta 2013, 277; Ferrer 2006, 
257). Interviewed in a popular TV show in 1987, Menem so described the differences 
between him and President Raul Alfonsin: 
 
                                                          
25 Peronism is the labour-based political movement initiated by Juan Domingo Perón in 1947. Analysing the character of Peronism 
is a challenge that has defied generations of scholars (Murmis and Portantiero 1973; McGuire 1997; Levitsky 2003). For my 
purposes, whenever I refer to Peronism I mean the institutionalised version of the movement, represented by the Justicialist Party 
(PJ).   
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The differences lay in the economic aspect. While at this moment Radicalismo26 
has chosen to follow an economic policy with a clear monetarist character in 
which the economy and the people are at the service of Capital, we Justicialistas 
are for an economy of a social character, in which Capital and the economy are 
put at the service of the people. This is the big difference. On one side a social 
economy, on the other a monetarist economy of liberal character (Menem, 1987).  
 
 Although constantly reaffirming classic Peronist values such as social justice, 
solidarity and state regulation of the economy in interviews and campaign documents 
(see, for instance, Menem [1988]; Menem and Duhalde [1989a]; Menem and Duhalde 
[1989b]), Menem also tried to mobilize the image of renovation. The need for state 
reforms and privatisations was mentioned in the campaign, side by side with the 
denunciation of enemies of the people such as the old ‘oligarchy’ and the ‘parasite class’ 
(Canelo 2011, 77–78). 
 Menem’s discourse tried to maintain a broad political appeal while progressively 
leaning towards market utopia after the elections. In his inaugural address to Argentine’s 
National Congress, in 1989, alongside traditional mentions of social justice, it is possible 
to identify a clear anti-statist approach. ‘Everything that private enterprise can do for 
itself, the national State will refrain from doing’, announced Menem, claiming at the same 
time that the forthcoming reforms would take into account the interests of the ‘most 
humble people’ (1989, 18). After recognizing the situation of ‘economic emergency’, his 
calls for unity, collective sacrifice and austerity are justified by grand promises of 
development: ‘At this crucial moment, economic independence means, to this 
government, the defeat of stagnation, the victory of production, the triumph of 
development’ (1989, 20). 
 Six years later, in 1995, a triumphant Menem emboldened by the initial success 
of the Convertibility Plan and engaged in his re-election campaign addressed the National 
Congress of Argentina again to make an ‘evaluation of the entire period of the mandate’ 
(1995, 7). This time, although keeping a few references to ‘social justice’, the entire tone 
of the Presidential speech is definitively aligned with the neoliberal creed. Menem starts 
his address affirming that he has fulfilled his mission of ‘changing the history’, by 
‘turning away from decay’ (1995, 8). According to him, the reforms undertaken during 
                                                          
26 The expression ‘Radicalismo’ here refers to the followers of the Union Civica Radical Party (UCR). This traditional liberal party, 
formed after a split in Argentinian liberal forces in the last decade of the XIX century, incorporated from the beginning some 
populist and charismatic elements (Di Tella 2013, 47). The UCR and the PJ have been the main institutionalised political forces in 
Argentina since the end of World War II. Their supremacy was only suspended during periods of military dictatorship, and recently 
by the election of Mauricio Macri in December 2015. 
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his first term made this turn possible. Among the policies proudly enumerated by Menem 
before the Congress were: 
 
The liberalisation of markets, allowing the free game of demand and supply 
to be the only regulator. 
The reorganising of the State, putting an end to a gigantic, expensive and 
inefficient apparatus, a cradle for corruption. 
The privatisation of mammoth state enterprises, putting an end to a constant 
draining of hard currency, and starting the improvement of the services so as 
to bring them to the level of the leading nations (Menem 1995, 21). 
   
 The explicit comparison with the ‘leading nations’, the ‘developed’ countries or 
the ‘first world’ is a constant throughout this speech. Menem announces that economic 
growth rates of the previous three years were higher than in ‘Italy, Spain and other 
developed countries’. Also the inflation rates were lower than those ‘previously 
unreachable First World nations’ (1995, 18). According to him the production of cars and 
home appliances increased reflecting cuts in trade tariffs, and the quality of national 
products was elevated ‘to the level of the First World countries’ (1995, 23). The promises 
of catching-up development assume a rare concreteness towards the end of the speech. 
Talking about the plans for the next five years, Menem claims that per capita income 
should increase by fifty percent by the year 2000 (1995, 32).  
 Menem’s discursive transition from state to market utopia entailed the renewal of 
old developmental promises, although those promises took a new form. While the 1989 
inauguration speech and the first presidential campaign documents appealed to ideas like 
‘national unity’, ‘sovereignty’ and ‘national self-determination’, implying that a strong 
national State would be conductive to development, the 1995 inauguration speech fully 
embraced the mirage of neoliberal, market-based catch-up development, suggesting that 
Argentina was well on its way towards the ‘First World’. In the first instance, a strong 
Peronist Argentina of the past was a source of inspiration; in the second, selected 
developed countries were presented as models to be emulated.  
A curious merger of the two ideas can be seen in a short article published in the 
Harvard International Review (Menem 1998). In this remarkable example of 
combination of discourses, Menem makes an unusual move for a Peronist and praises the 
classical liberal insertion of Argentina into the international system at the beginning of 
the 20th Century. Supplying raw materials to Europe triggered ‘a process of economic 
development that by its first centennial rendered Argentina among the world’s most 
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prosperous nations’ (Menem 1998, 18). Here, Menem’s words resonate Carlos Escudé’s 
ideas reviewed in Chapter 1: the most rational international strategy for a peripheral 
country is to ‘bandwagon’ with the dominant world power, in exchange for economic 
benefits (Escudé 1995, 156). However, by representing the liberal Argentina of the 
beginning of the 20th century as a model of development, Menem empties his previous 
calls for social justice, as well as the traditional Peronist emphasis on industrialisation. 
Just like in his early speeches, the past is summoned again as a model for the future, but 
this time instead of evoking Peron’s nationalist policies and his dignified defiance of 
foreign powers, Menem, a declared Peronist, evokes the image of an agrarian country 
profoundly connected in international trade flows, i.e., the pre-Peronist, liberal Argentina.        
 This idealized image of the liberal past is complemented by a comparison with 
developed countries that were soon to be surpassed by Argentina, thanks to the market 
friendly policies adopted in Menem’s administration: 
 
By reshaping our entire economic and political system, we have leapt beyond 
many European countries that maintain structures from an era of statism and 
inefficiency. Within the next few years, Argentina will have surpassed some 
European Union countries in terms of population and economic growth (Menem 
1998, 19). 
 
 Summing-up, repeated promises of development always formed part of President 
Menem’s rhetoric. Sometimes totally ambiguous, sometimes taking the form of big 
figures, the promises of development have a clear catching-up character. Argentina was 
represented as a country that naturally should have a place alongside developed nations 
of the west. ‘For some time, Argentina lost consciousness of its Western orientation and 
devised for itself a leading role in a Third World to which it had been historically alien’ 
(Menem 1998, 19). The correction of the ‘statist’ policies that led Argentina astray would 
supposedly put the country back on the development track.   
  
 
3.2 ‘The Economy of the Garden of Eden’ – and how to pay for it.  
 
 Neoliberalism in Argentina went far beyond the discursive turn in the traditional 
Peronist rhetoric. Concrete public policies, materialised through a series of laws, decrees 
and government acts, reshaped the productive structure of the country. So extensive and 
deep were the reforms adopted after 1989 that it would be impossible to detail all of them 
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in this thesis.27 The drastic monetary reforms and an extensive program of privatisations 
are remarkable examples of the way the class fractions in control of the Argentine state 
concretely reacted to international circumstances, promoting privatisation of gains and 
socialisation of losses. Therefore, this section will focus on these two interconnected sides 
of macroeconomic management. Overall, my argument here is that the monetary reforms 
produced concentrated gains – particularly for the urban middle classes of Buenos Aires 
and big capital owners – that had to be paid for through a sweeping process of 
privatisation. This represented a clear case of socialisation of losses, since the privatised 
companies were a public heritage built by the Argentine working class over generations. 
The reform process was not linear, however. In the first three years of Menem’s 
administration (1989 to 1991), Argentina had four finance ministers. The first one, 
Miguel Angel Roig, died of a heart attack only five days after taking office, on the 
fourteenth of July, 1989. He was immediately replaced by Nestor Mario Rapanelli, who 
implemented the first stabilization plan of Menem’s government, known the ‘BB Plan’. 
The acronym ‘BB’ refers to the agro-industrial group Bunge & Born, then considered the 
most important of Argentina (Basualdo 2010, 285). Both Roig and Rapanelli were 
recruited from top executives of that group, in an effort to reassure the private sector of 
the new government’s market-friendly intentions, despite the ambiguously defiant tone 
adopted by Menem in the presidential campaign (Gerchunoff and Torre 1996, 736; 
Campello 2015, 161). 
The economic policies implemented in this early phase comprised the sharp 
devaluation of the national currency in order to foster commercial surpluses, thereby 
favouring the exporting sectors, particularly the agro-industrial complex. Also public 
tariffs were raised and State expenditure was cut (Ferrer 2006, 258). Some increase in 
nominal salaries was announced but its effects were rapidly offset by inflation, falling 
well short of the promised ‘salariazo’ (Rapoport 2005, 63). The most significant actions 
taken by the government in this phase were the approval of two very important bills – the 
Law of Economic Emergency (Law 23.697 [Argentina 1989a]) and the Law of State 
Reform (Law 23.696 [Argentina 1989b]) (Basualdo 2010, 287). Also important was an 
                                                          
27 Rarely in history have neoliberal reforms gone so deep in so little time, including many instances of deregulation, cuts in trade 
tariffs, tax reforms, reduction of state services and privatisations. For a classical overview of these reforms, see Gerchunoff and 
Torre (1996); for a detailed and critical account, see Basualdo (2010); for a mainstream marginalist appreciation of the reforms, see 
Pastor Jr and Wise (1999). Finally, for a defence of the reforms, in particular of the Convertibility Plan, see Rodriguez (1995) and 
Cavallo and Mondino (1995).    
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early agreement with the IMF, which would guide the fiscal austerity policies of the next 
few months (Brenta 2013, 278). 
Recognizing the situation of ‘State emergency’ (art.1), Law 23.697 declared a 
draconian cut in the public budget and considerably broadened the government’s powers. 
All state subsidies were suspended for 180 days (art.2), as well as incentives for the 
manufacturing industry (art.4), the mining industry (art.11) and the hiring of new workers 
in the public sector (art.42). A commission was created to reform the Central Bank of 
Argentina so as to ‘grant the functional independence necessary to accomplish its 
essential mission of securing the value of the currency’ (art.3). Incentives for external 
investments were approved (arts.15-18) and internal public debt was restructured (art.38). 
Finally, the Congress agreed to granting special powers to the government regarding 
budget flexibility (arts.24-27) and the negotiation of agreements with international 
economic institutions (arts. 85-87). Not surprisingly, this law has been described as a 
‘straightforward attack to the heart of the assisted capitalism that developed in Argentina 
since the post-war years’ (Gerchunoff and Torre 1996, 736).      
    
 
      
 Profound as those reforms were, they proved unable to rebalance the public 
budget and control inflation. In a context of contracting GDP (see Graph 2), lack of 
credibility in government plans and distrust in the national currency itself, complicated 
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by distributive struggle between different classes and class fractions in the absence of a 
clear political direction from the government, inflation peaked again in December 1989. 
Minister Rapanelli was forced to resign. His successor, Erman Gonzalez, took office on 
19th December, 1989, remaining in charge until March, 1991, when public discontent with 
the repeated austerity measures coupled with corruption allegations forced his 
substitution with the then Foreign Minister, Domingo Cavallo (Brenta 2013, 279). During 
his months as Finance Minister, Gonzalez made use of the extraordinary government 
powers and determined by decree the compulsory exchange of saving deposits and short 
term public debt for US dollar denominated bonds, to be redeemed in ten years. This 
caused the ‘sterilisation of 60% of the monetary base existing in the beginning of 1990’ 
(Ferrer 2006, 258), a move known as the ‘Bonex plan’. According to Carlos Rodriguez, 
one of the leading orthodox economists in Argentina and an enthusiastic supporter of 
Menem’s government, this restructuring of the public debt made possible the ‘adoption 
of measures to permanently stabilize the economy’ (1995, 4).   
 The ‘stabilization’ mentioned by Rodriguez would be achieved after the adoption 
of the Convertibility Plan, announced by Domingo Cavallo in 1991. Nevertheless, with 
the benefit of hindsight, the economic meltdown of 2001-2002 may be mentioned as 
evidence that the ‘permanency’ of this stabilization was questionable. What is beyond 
question is the immediate success of the Convertibility Plan in controlling inflation, as 
well as its deep consequences for the Argentinian productive structures (see Graph 3 and 
section 3.4 below). 
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 The backbone of the Convertibility Plan was a simple law of no more than 14 
articles, contrasting with the long and abstruse dispositions of the previous Laws of State 
Reform and Economic Emergency. So straightforward are the main dispositions of Law 
23.938 (Argentina 1991) that I shall quote it at length: 
 
TITLE I – On the Convertibility of the Austral 
Article 1: It is hereby established the convertibility between the austral and the 
United States dollar as from April 1, 1991, in a ratio of ten thousand australs (A 
10,000) per each dollar, selling price, under the provisions of this Law. 
Article 2: The Central Bank of the Argentine Republic shall sell the currencies 
that may be necessary for exchange operations according to the exchange rate 
established in the previous Article, and shall withdraw from circulation the 
australs received in exchange. 
Article 3: The Central Bank of the Argentine Republic may buy foreign 
currency at market price, out of its own resources, by order and for the account 
of the National Government, or by issuing the necessary australs to meet that 
end. 
Article 4: The unrestricted reserves of the Central Bank of the Argentine 
Republic in gold and foreign currency shall always be equivalent to, at least, a 
hundred percent (100%) of the reserve money. (…)(Argentina 1991) 
   
 
According to this legal disposition, the Central Bank of Argentina took as its 
principal mission the safeguard of a fixed exchange rate parity between the austral and 
the US dollar, acting as a currency board. All currency in circulation, as well as the 
deposits of commercial banks in the Central Bank, were guaranteed by the reserves of the 
Central Bank, in a scheme resembling the classic gold standard.28 The government tied 
its own hands, renouncing the use of monetary policies to accommodate economic cycles. 
‘Like Ulysses, who commanded his own tying to the mast of his ship so as not to be 
attracted by the misleading melodies of the mermaids, the government chose to renounce 
the use of key economic instruments in order to make credible its commitment to 
monetary and fiscal discipline’ (Gerchunoff and Torre 1996, 745–46). The monetary 
reform was completed with the substitution of the austral by a new currency, the 
Argentinian peso, at the rate of ten thousand australs per peso, i.e., 1000 australs = 1 peso 
= 1 US dollar. The new peso notes were issued on the first of January of 1992. Below the 
number indicating the value, the notes carried the statement: ‘convertible legal tender’ 
(Figure 1). 
 
                                                          
28 The monetary regime in Argentina during the 1990s was even more strict than the classic gold standard, whose supposed 
automatic functionality has been recently called into question by Knafo (2013).  
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Figure 1 – A promise in the money bill – Convertible legal tender. Argentinian 
Peso in 1990. 
 
 
This extreme move was designed to control the inflation by three means. First, it 
simply prohibited the multiplication of the monetary base, implying that the government 
could not finance its fiscal debts by creating money. Second, it grounded expectations, 
tying the value of the national currency to the US dollar, a currency already widely used 
as a stable store of value and unit of account. Third, coupled with the cuts in trade tariffs, 
it exposed commodities bought and sold in the internal market to direct international 
competition, establishing therefore a roof on domestic prices.  
Nevertheless, the potential problems associated with this strategy were 
considerable. By limiting itself to the role of a currency board, the Central Bank lost its 
capacity to adjust the monetary base so as to balance economic cycles, and could not 
function as a lender of last resort. Also, the Central Bank was legally prohibited from 
adjusting the exchange rate. As a result, taking into account the residual inflation and the 
high interest rates (Graphs 4), the national currency was permanently overvalued in real 
terms. Therefore, the Argentine economy became particularly prone to external shocks. 
As harshly noticed by Brenta, ‘the currency board can only be viable in the long term in 
a context of permanent growth of activity, external surplus and fiscal balance; in short, in 
the economy of the Garden of Eden’ (2002, 57).          
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In order to sustain the convertibility between the Argentinian peso and the US 
dollar promised in the new Argentine banknotes, it was paramount to attract dollars to the 
domestic economy. Deficits in the balance of payments, occasioning the reduction of the 
Central Bank reserves, meant that the monetary base itself would have to shrink, with 
dramatic consequences for the level of activity. As explained by Brenta, considering the 
legal impossibility of adjusting the exchange rate, cyclical adjustments would have to be 
made through contractions on the level of activity (2002, 57). The pressing need of dollars 
after the Convertibility Plan, therefore, partially explains the intensity and the speed of 
the privatisation process in Argentina. 
The Convertibility Plan was not the only factor behind the privatisations, however. 
In fact, as mentioned before, ‘privatisation’ was one of the few neoliberal terms that 
figured in Menem’s speeches after the presidential campaign. Accordingly, the key legal 
text providing the basis for the privatisation process, the Law of State Reform (Argentina 
1989b), was approved in the first phase of Menem’s government, only a few months after 
he came to power and almost two years before the Convertibility Law.  
The Law of State Reform starts with the same catastrophic language of the 
previously analysed Law 23.697 (Economic Emergency).  Declaring the ‘State of 
emergency in the provision of public services, the fulfilment of public sector contracts 
and the economic and financial situation of Public National Administration’ (art.1), the 
law gives special powers for the government to intervene in state-owned companies 
(art.2). The appointed intervenor should ‘provisionally reorganise the entity, society or 
enterprise intervened’ (art.3), preparing its privatisation. The law also defines five 
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modalities of privatisation, ranging from concessions to private administration to the total 
liquidation of the company’s assets (art.17). The privatisation processes should ‘avoid 
negative effects on employment’, and take into account the need for a ‘stable and 
sustainable public provision’ (art.41). Trade unions’ political leaders – the labour 
aristocracy historically close to the PJ – were empowered, inasmuch as the law recognized 
their representativeness to negotiate the terms of employment with the new owners of the 
companies, as well as explicitly keeping the status quo regarding union affiliations 
(arts.41-42). Employees were theoretically given incentives to acquire part of their 
companies’ shares (arts.21-40), but none of the major privatised companies fell under 
direct workers’ control. Finally, the law listed 33 state-owned entities that should be 
privatized, including iconic Argentinian companies such as Aerolineas Argentinas 
(airlines); Yacimentos Petroliferos Fiscales-YPF (oil); Ferrocarriles Argentinos 
(railways); Canal 11 and Canal 13 (broadcasting) and Subterraneos de Buenos Aires 
(subways) (Argentina 1989b).      
In short, Law 23.696 gave Menem’s administration vast powers to set in motion 
the biggest privatisation plan in Argentina’s history, objectively transferring public assets 
to private hands. After the approval of the Law, the rhythm of privatisations was 
amazingly fast (Gerchunoff and Torre 1996, 740; Romero 2006, 257). In only one year, 
‘before October, 1990, almost all of the public companies listed were transferred to the 
private sector’ (Gerchunoff and Torre 1996, 739), although the biggest one, YPF, would 
be totally privatised only in 1999, bringing much needed dollars in a moment of crisis.  
Maria Julia Alsogaray, a former Member of the Congress (1985-1989) indicated as 
intervenor and posteriorly condemned for corruption, was instructed to ‘conclude the 
privatisation of the telecommunications company before the eighth of October, 1990, the 
date of Peron’s birthday’ (Romero 2006, 257).       
Not surprisingly, privatisations were defended in ideological terms by neoliberal 
economists. For Rodriguez, ‘The privatisation process in Argentina has efficiently 
dismantled the “entrepreneurial state” (…) which has proven itself totally incompetent 
and untrustworthy’ (1995, 14). Domingo Cavallo highlights the fact that privatisation of 
insolvent public companies alleviated the public budget. Moreover, inasmuch as 
‘Argentina’s public resources were misallocated, and investment was directed towards 
unproductive activities’, privatisations were conductive to better allocation of capital and 
increased microeconomic efficiency (1997, 461). Nevertheless, even Cavallo recognizes 
that the model adopted in the first wave of privatisations ‘could have been designed much 
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better’. According to him, ‘[e]mphasis was placed on maximising the sale price of the 
companies’, which was a political necessity to make the ‘privatisation process (…) 
palatable and assist the government in convincing the markets of its commitment to 
economic reform (…)’ (1997, 466).     
Cavallo’s benign self-criticism is partially followed by other authors writing in 
the 1990s. Instead of questioning the logic behind privatisations per se, these authors 
emphasise the shortcomings and incoherencies of the privatisation model adopted in the 
first years of Menem’s administration. Gerchunoff and Torre, for instance, highlight that 
in Argentina privatisations did not effectively break monopolies. Hence, ‘the newly 
privatised economies operated in a framework that was as far from the rules of market 
competition as the previous phase of protected industrialization’ (1996, 740). 
Furthermore, the fact that part of the payment for the privatised companies was made in 
government bonds, accepted at their face value instead of their much lower market value 
is also often mentioned as a circumstantial critique of the privatisation process (Calvert 
1996; Galiani and Petrecolla 1996). 
Beyond the temporary quelling of fiscal necessities, the attracting of dollars to 
Argentina and the need to send reassuring political signals to investors, there is little 
evidence that the privatisations improved the microeconomic efficiency of the privatised 
companies. Even more doubtful is the supposition that eventual efficiency gains were 
finally transferred to consumers in the form of real tariff reductions or improvement in 
services. There is some degree of consensus among liberal and developmentalist writers 
that the speed and the modelling of the first wave of privatisations did little more than 
transfer to private capital already existing monopolies, a situation aggravated by poor 
regulation (Goldstein 1998; Rapoport 2000; Cavallo 1997; Herrera 1993; Gerchunoff and 
Torre 1996). This explains why re-nationalisation of some of the privatised companies 
after 2003 was extremely popular (see Chapter 6). 
The privatisation process in Argentina can only be fully understood in the context 
of a much larger neoliberal development strategy. Within that strategy, privatisations 
played a double role, responding to a conjunction of political and economic factors 
(Calvert 1996, 147). On the one hand, from the outset Menem’s administration faced a 
credibility challenge, as not all fractions of the national ruling class were convinced of 
the pro-market conversion of the Peronist leader, much less international investors 
(Gerchunoff and Torre 1996; Rodriguez 1995; Cavallo 1997; Herrera 1993). By 
privatising flagship national companies such as Entel (telecommunications) and 
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Aerolineas Argentinas in his first years in office, Menem gave national and international 
capital proof of his commitment to neoliberalism. The privatisation of Argentina’s 
Railways was an unequivocally symbolic act, inasmuch as those had been proudly 
nationalised by Peron himself almost half a century earlier, in a controversial exchange 
for the British World War II debts to Argentina (Romero 2006, 99).  
On the other hand, privatisations played a very important role in attracting dollars 
to the national economy, keeping the convertibility possible and balancing national 
accounts in key moments. Even before the final privatisation of YPF, in 1999, 
privatisations brought to the Argentine government US$ 18.17 billion. Taking into 
account only the three initial years of the Convertibility Plan, when the influx of dollars 
was extremely important, privatisations generated an extraordinary figure of US$ 11.6 
billion (Rapoport 2000, 35). Therefore, in Argentina privatisations are as inextricably 
intertwined with the monetary reforms. To keep the ‘economy of the Garden of Eden’ 
(Brenta 2002, 57) going, a constant influx of dollars was needed, and that was met 
thorough a socialisation of losses in the form of privatisations.  
The political and economic sides of the privatisation process were synthetized by 
researchers of the influential Buenos Aires’ Latin American Faculty of Social Sciences 
(FLACSO). According to Eduardo Basualdo, the privatisations were ‘the most important 
structural process in Menem’s administration’ (2010, 392), inasmuch as they made 
possible the reconciliation of interests between fractions of the ruling class in Argentina 
and the international capital, creating the basis of a coalition that would be hegemonic 
over the following years (2010, 392–416; 2011, 41–109). I will build on this analysis in 
section 3.4 below, relating these class alliances to a broader uneven and combined view 
of Argentine development.  
 
 
3.3 – The foreign policy of Carnal Relations 
 
The association between Argentine and international capital brought about by the 
privatisation process and the dismantling of the developmentalist state went hand in hand 
with an active foreign policy, inspired by the work of Carlos Escudé (1992, 1995, 1999). 
Accordingly, Argentina’s diplomatic capabilities were intensely mobilised in order to 
renew the country’s international image, presenting it as a safe harbour for international 
capital. The monetary reforms and the privatisation process analysed in the last section 
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were evoked in speeches aimed at international audiences as proof of Menem’s 
administration’s commitment to market reforms. For instance, speaking at a joint session 
of the US Congress during a State visit in the 14th of November, 1991, Menem declared: 
 
Without any exaggeration, I come here at the best moment of our bilateral 
relations. 
We share the same values of Western civilization. (…) 
My administration has faced a sequence of profound transformations (…) 
Our Convertibility Plan assures the complete backing of the entire monetary base 
in hard currencies. (…)  
We set in motion a privatisation plan of unprecedented intensity 
It has already been implemented in important areas like telecommunications, 
airways and, to a great extent, the oil industry. 
All of this combined with a policy of total deregulation of the economy. (…) 
Dear Congressmen: 
For our program to fructify, it is of capital importance that it receives support and 
concrete answers from abroad (Menem 1991, 114). 
   
The bargain offered by Menem’s administration could not have been put more 
clearly. The Argentine government was prepared to guarantee extensive investment 
opportunities and friendly economic environment for foreign capital, asking in return 
support for its economic reforms. Indeed, the declared intention of attracting international 
capital – a necessity dictated by the monetary and exchange policies – can also be seen 
as the most visible face of the invitation for association extended by the hegemonic 
fractions the Argentinian ruling class to international capital (see section 3.4 below).  
Peripheral Realism, the foreign policy framework adopted by Menem’s 
administration, conveniently translated Argentina’s ruling class strategy into international 
relations terms, endowing it with social scientific reputability. Accordingly, it was in 
‘Argentina’s interest’ to cultivate privileged relations with the US, which was expected 
to materialise in the form of economic advantages. In Argentina’s Foreign Minister’s own 
words:         
 
We want to be part of the Western Club. I want to have cordial relations with the 
United States, and we are not talking of platonic love. We want carnal love with 
the United States; it is in our interest because we may benefit from it. 
(Di Tella, cited in: Bonnet 2007, 76) 
 
 Concretely, the support of the US was expected to facilitate negotiations with the 
IMF and with private banks in the restructuring of Argentinian debt. Regarding the IMF, 
after the first stand-by agreement closed in the context of the BB plan, already in 1989, 
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the Convertibility Plan was supported by seven new agreements (including extensions), 
approved between July 1991 and August 2001 (Brenta 2013, 165). Cavallo was keen to 
recognize that ‘the Convertibility Plan received strong support from the international 
financial community and, especially, from the International Monetary Fund’ (Cavallo and 
Cottani 1997, 19). Nevertheless, the Argentinian Finance Minister remarked about some 
points of contention in relation to the Fund: ‘the IMF was never comfortable with the idea 
of cutting taxes (…) even if the government was running a fiscal surplus. According to 
the Fund’s credo, accumulating reserves is always better’ (1997, 19).   
 The renegotiation of Argentina’s privately owned foreign debt was also dependent 
on direct US support. This restructuring happened in the context of the so-called Brady 
Plan, named after Ronald Reagan and George Bush’s Secretary of the Treasury, Nicholas 
Brady. Following the model adopted in other Latin American Countries (Costa Rica, 
Mexico, Venezuela, among others), the negotiations involved the exchanging of defaulted 
bonds for new, securitised, ‘Brady bonds’ including extensions in the repayment terms 
and reduction of the total debt. As explained by Sachs when the Brady Plan was first 
announced, ‘the [US] Treasury is relying on "market" solutions, based on the "voluntary" 
actions of creditors, to bring about the debt reduction’ (1989, 88). Nevertheless, these 
‘market’ solutions could only work with the support of the IMF, the World Bank and the 
US Treasury, in order to give credibility to the bond swap process.29 
How much of the support given by the IMF and the US government to the debt 
restructuring and the economic reforms at large can be credited to the special diplomatic 
relations Menem’s administration tried to cultivate with Washington is difficult to tell. 
There is no doubt that without the IMF’s positive reports and the unprecedentedly friendly 
relations with the US, attracting investments would have been more difficult. 
Nevertheless, the relatively low prices of the privatised companies and the expected high 
returns could have been enough to convince individual investors to bring their money to 
Argentina, particularly in the context of high international liquidity and stock market 
optimism that marked the end of the Cold War. The restructuration of Argentine debt 
under the Brady Plan would not be possible without US support, but the fact that similar 
programs of debt restructuring were carried out in the putative benefit of less aligned 
countries shows that Washington could have backed it independently of Argentina’s 
strong foreign policy alignment.  
                                                          
29 For a favourable overview of the restructuring of Argentine debt in the context of the Brady Plan, 
provided by a truly insider, see Oliver (2010). 
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The concessions made by Menem’s administration to signal Argentina’s openness 
to international capital and its intention to cultivate special relations with the US went far 
beyond the economic and financial spheres, involving important changes in multilateral 
diplomacy and security matters. Indeed, the most dramatic feature of Menem’s foreign 
policy is a marked inflection in Argentina’s traditional non-alignment in international 
political matters, a move recognized by defenders and critics alike (Candeas 2010; Cervo 
2001; Cisneros 1998; Balze 2001; Escudé 1992; Escudé 2009; Paradiso 2005; Russell 
and Tokatlian 2004).         
 An early example of this inflection is Argentina’s formal involvement in the Gulf 
War against Iraq, in support of the US led coalition, only a few months after Menem took 
power. The sending of a ship to the conflict zone was justified by Escudé as ‘free training 
at the highest level for the Argentine Navy’, which could also result in opportunities for 
national companies to participate in the rebuilding efforts once the war was over (1992, 
38). The involvement of Argentina in the Gulf War was officially acknowledged by 
George Bush during his visit to Buenos Aires in December, 1990: 
 
In the current crisis halfway around the world in the Gulf, you have also shown 
strength and vision by helping to lead international efforts to stop Saddam’s brutal 
aggression. Your contribution to the multinational force in the Gulf is a statement 
of your commitment to peace and a commitment to the rule of law and a clear 
sign that you are assuming your rightful place as a leader among freedom-loving 
nations (Bush 1991, 1756).  
 
 George Bush’s words complemented Menem’s catching-up development rhetoric 
and offered the Argentine ruling class a reflected image they wanted to see. The explicit 
approval of the US President of Argentina’s diplomatic shift coupled with the approval 
granted by international financial institutions to Argentina’s economic reforms, externally 
validated the official discourse, according to which the country was finally on the way to 
‘development’. The construction of a developed Argentina would comprise the 
abandoning of the out-dated ‘third world’ identity in order to fully embrace its 
‘reincorporation into the first world’ (Balze 1998), side by side with other developed 
Western nations.    
 Many other examples of Menem’s foreign policy initiatives further substantiate 
this perspective. Argentina’s definitive adhesion to Tlatelolco and Non-Proliferation 
Treaties in 1994 (Norden and Russell 2013, 98); the cancelling of the ballistic missile 
program ‘Condor II’ (Cavallo 1995, 15–17); the distancing from the Non-Aligned 
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Movement (Paradiso 2005, 285) and the vote in the UN Commission on Human Rights 
recommending investigations into human rights violations in Cuba (Russell 1991, 20) are 
frequently mentioned as clear implications of the Menem’s administration intention to 
avoid political disagreements with the US government, reinventing Argentina’s 
international identity as a trustworthy and mature ally.  
 One of the most enduring foreign policy initiatives of that period, the foundation 
of the Common Market of the South (Mercosur), in association with Brazil, Uruguay and 
Paraguay, should be interpreted in the same perspective, although with important 
nuances. In Menem’s administration view, ‘Mercosur represents substantial progress in 
the South American transition to a liberal model of an international market economy’ 
(Menem 1998, 20). The organization was settled, therefore, as an initial step towards a 
broader commercial integration, which would potentially comprise the American 
continent as a whole (Balze 2001). After 2002, nevertheless, during the 
neodevelopmentalist cycle, Mercosur was transformed into a substantially different kind 
of organisation, progressively acquiring institutional density and political relevance (see 
chapters 5 and 6).  
 Looking back to Argentina’s diplomacy of ‘carnal relations’ twenty years later, it 
is evident that its declared long-term political aims were not fully achieved. The alliance 
with the US were reversed, and bilateral relations reached a historic low after 2003. The 
IMF failed to support the country in the crucial moment of the 2001 crisis. The endeavour 
of guaranteeing Argentina’s membership in the ‘Western Club’ or promoting its 
‘reincorporation into the First World’ (Balze 1998) did not materialise in any meaningful 
way. A partial exception is the recognition of Argentina as a ‘major non-NATO ally’ of 
the US, a consolation prize after the country failed attempt at full NATO membership 
despite not being in the geographical area covered by that Treaty (Reficco 1998, 42).  
Regarding security issues, Escudé claims that Argentina’s commitment to non-
proliferation agreements put pressure on Brazil to adhere to the same international 
regimes. According to the author, this alone ‘is Argentina’s most important contribution 
to mankind in the entire history of our country’ (1999, 11). Nevertheless, organic 
intellectuals associated with Menem’s administration failed to convincingly demonstrate 
that the subordinate engagement in security regimes was conducive to catch-up 
development or brought Argentina any closer to the ‘First World’ (Cavallo 1995; 
Cisneros 1998; Balze 1998; 2001; Escudé 1992; 1999). 
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The short-term objectives of Argentine neoliberal foreign policy were largely 
achieved, however. For a brief period, until the Mexican crisis of 1995 and the Brazilian 
crisis of 1998-1999, Argentina succeeded in appearing as a stable and modern Western 
country, attracting substantial foreign investment and offering plenty of possibilities for 
association between Argentine and international capital. In short, the diplomacy of ‘carnal 
relations’, premised on the peripheral realist paradigm, was instrumental to the neoliberal 
development strategy as a whole. It offered a crucial bridge between the interests of the 
fractions of the Argentine ruling class in control of the state and international capital, 
providing at the same time a road-map for the incorporation of Argentina into the 
developed world.  
        
 
3.4 Uneven and combined development in Argentina – or what happens when the 
whip of external necessity lashes the economy of the ‘garden of Eden’? 
 
 In the previous sections, I argued that neoliberalism took a complex form in 
Argentina in the 1990s. It involved a discursive combination which twisted the traditional 
Peronist rhetoric to justify a series of reforms, premised on the market utopia and with 
the declared aim of promoting catch-up development. It also comprised concrete public 
policies – including a radical monetary reform, a comprehensive privatisation program 
and a substantial change in the Argentine foreign policy.  
The extent of the real damage caused by the neoliberal reforms can hardly be 
overstated. Unemployment surged to record levels, reaching 21.5% in the second quarter 
of 2002 (Graph 5). Historically one of the most equal countries of Latin America, 
inequality in Argentina as measured by the Gini index rose from 0.482 in 1992 to 0.578 
in 2002. Absolute poverty levels also increased. In 1992, 12.7% of the Argentinians were 
poor and 2.4% suffered from extreme poverty; in 2002, the figures were respectively 
45.3% and 20.9% (Graph 6). One of the few concrete promises made by Menem in his 
1995 Congress speech (see 3.1 above) was that there would be 50% increase in per capita 
GDP by the year 2000, which would put Argentina on par with some European countries. 
Instead, by the end of the neoliberal cycle, in 2002, per capita GDP was US$ 7215, 10% 
lower than in 1995.30 
                                                          
30 For the analysis that follows, I rely on statistics from the United Nations Economic Commission for 
Latin America and the Caribbean (CEPAL 2017) unless another source is indicated.   
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That the development strategy adopted in the 1990s failed to bring about catch-up 
development is not disputed, even by neoliberal analysts. The reasons behind the failures, 
nevertheless, are still an object of much controversy almost two decades after the 2001 
crisis. Implicit in this debate is the supposition that Argentina could have fulfilled 
Menem’s promises of entering into the ‘first world’, but deviated from its natural 
development path. The failures of neoliberal policies in Argentina are seen by the 
mainstream political economy literature, therefore, as merely circumstantial, not as an 
indication of the fundamental weaknesses of the neoliberal development strategy. From 
an uneven and combined development perspective, however, more important than 
identifying what went wrong with the neoliberal development strategy in the vain hope 
of fixing it is grasping what kind of development actually happened. 
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Neoliberal authors’ explanations for the disappointing results achieved after the 
reforms basically claim that Menem’s administration did not go far enough. Cavallo 
blames the lack of ‘political support in Argentina for the fiscal discipline necessary to 
preserve rapid growth’ (2005, 43). The former Finance Minister also resented the 
withdrawal of IMF support in 2001, which precipitated the run against the banks in the 
last months of 2001, causing the premature fall of De la Rua’s administration31 on 20th 
December, 2001.  
A similar point is made by Arminio Fraga. According to him, the Argentine 
government’s incapacity to maintain fiscal austerity and the appreciation of the exchange 
rate in real terms were the key factors behind the crisis of 2001-2002. For that reason, 
Fraga believes that Argentina’s debacle cannot be linked to the Washington Consensus, 
which ‘clearly calls for fiscal restraint and competitive exchange rates’ (2004, 98). For 
Williamson, ‘Argentina did indeed undertake many excellent reforms, particularly in the 
first half of the 1990s’ (2003, 2). Nevertheless, it persisted for too long in the strategy of 
keeping pegged exchange rates, causing the overvaluation of the peso in real terms, 
aggravated by the overall tendency of the appreciation of the US dollar vis-à-vis other 
main currencies and by ‘fiscal laxity’ (2003, 4). For that reason, Williamson resents 
                                                          
31 De La Rua was elected in President in 1999 and was supposed to remain in office until 2004. Although 
critical of Menem’s administration, during the presidential campaign he committed to keeping the 
Convertibility Plan, and recalled Domingo Cavallo to the Finance Ministry in 2001.    
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‘people trying to blame the Washington Consensus for the Argentinean collapse’ (2004, 
199). 
Neodevelopmentalist economists tell a different version of the same story. 
According to Roberto Lavagna, initially the pegging of the exchange rate was a suitable 
solution to curb inflation, but ‘the real mistake was ignoring that local and international 
reality did not provide the supposed conditions to keep the convertibility scheme 
sustainable’ (2011, 1737). Accordingly, the first ‘lesson’ to be drawn from the Argentine 
experience is that stronger regulation of international capital flows is key to maintaining 
economic stability in developing countries (2003, 2). In moments of expanded 
international offer of speculative capital, it becomes possible to finance ‘macroeconomic 
fantasies’ such as the convertibility plan, which end up ‘creating undesirable and long-
lasting structural effects’ (2003, 2). Because it allowed these artificial conditions to persist 
and legitimised Argentine monetary policy, the IMF should ‘do its own soul-searching 
on its responsibility during the long period of convertibility’ (2011, 641).  
Following that line of reasoning, the failures of the neoliberal model in Argentina 
were ultimately caused by the irresponsibility or incompetence of Argentine policy-
makers, encouraged by the support of international institutions, that kept the country 
living beyond its means for too long. At certain moments, Lavagna recognises that the 
monetary policy during the neoliberal decade was especially favourable to the interests 
of the financial sector. His solution to correct that, in line with the neodevelopmentalist 
postulates (see chapter 1), is to propose a national development strategy beyond classes, 
putting ‘the interests of society as a whole above sectorial claims’ (2011, 1773). 
Unfortunately, how ‘the interest of society as a whole’ is to be defined is never clearly 
explained. This perspective is exalted by Bresser-Pereira, in his preface to the Brazilian 
edition of Lavagna’s book. In Bresser-Pereira’s reading, Lavagna was right in searching 
for the way out of the crisis inside his own country, mobilizing the people’s will to turn 
‘disintegration into opportunity’ (Bresser-Pereira 2013b, 10). A complimentary point is 
made by Ferrer, who ultimately blames the lack of ‘national density’ for the intensity of 
the neoliberal reforms (Ferrer 2006, 264).  
In short, neoliberal analysts claim that the real problem was the lack of fiscal 
responsibility, while neodevelopmentalists stress the insufficiency of the state control 
over international capital flows, expressed in the overvaluation of the exchange rate in 
real terms. Both sides blame the IMF for insufficient or misconceived support and 
supervision, and identify fiscal and exchange rate policies as the Achilles’ heel of the 
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convertibility system. After this diagnosis, remedies vary from the radicalization of the 
convertibility system – including the complete dollarization of the economy32 – to the 
total reversion of the exchange rate policy, keeping the Argentine peso devalued in 
relation to the dollar so as to recover competitiveness and to rebalance national accounts 
(Lavagna 2011; see also Chapter 6).  
The neoliberal narrative of the state reforms in Argentina is thus premised on the 
market utopia, while the neodevelopmentalist narrative is premised on the state utopia. 
For the first, the government spoiled the reforms by failing to keep fiscal austerity and 
preventing the market from self-correcting. For the latter, the greed of the international 
financial markets was not effectively tamed by the state in the name of the national 
interest. The policy recommendations emanating from these competing narratives are not 
surprising: more market rule, less state intervention; more state intervention, less market 
rule. 
What both neoliberals and neodevelopmentalists miss is that neither the market 
nor the state are neutral arenas that automatically maximise the allocation of scarce 
resources or promote the national interest. Actually, the (lack of) support for the continued 
fiscal discipline and the external conditions of volatility in the capital markets must form 
an integral part of the analysis of Argentina’s development. Instead of accidents that were 
not efficiently neutralised and therefore spoiled the otherwise ‘excellent reforms’ 
undertaken during Menem’s administration (Williamson 2003, 2), these are precisely the 
variables that need to be explained by an international political economy analysis of 
Argentine neoliberal development. In other words, the uneven and combined form of 
development produced in Argentina in the 1990s is a result of class conflicts (reflected in 
the disputes around fiscal policies) and international constraints and opportunities (of 
which the flows of international capital are but an expression). 
At this point, the materialist sociological analysis proposed by researchers from 
the FLACSO is especially helpful (Azpiazu, Basualdo, and Schorr 2001; Basualdo, 
Nahon, and Nochteff 2007; Basualdo 2010; Basualdo 2011). Based on extensive 
empirical research on the dynamics of Argentine debt and on the transformation of the 
biggest economic groups in the country, Basualdo and his colleagues unveil the process 
of reorganisation of the national hegemonic bloc in the aftermath of the hyperinflationary 
                                                          
32 According to Brenta, this hypothesis was seriously considered by IMF staff and Argentinian neoliberal 
policy-makers (2013, 306). 
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crisis of 1989 and 1990, following the tendency towards financial accumulation that had 
imposed itself since the last military dictatorship, between 1976 and 1983.  
According to their narrative, rising interest rates – both nationally and 
internationally – put productive activities under increased pressure, undermining the 
traditional mode of capital accumulation based on state protection and substitution of 
imports. In this context, high inflation and the permanent drain on resources caused by 
the debt crisis opposed the interests of important fractions of national capital – dependent 
on state subsidies – and of international capital – whose priority was to guarantee the 
fiscal surplus necessary for the sustainability of Argentina’s debt obligations. The 
scenario was aggravated by severe fractures in the Argentine ruling class itself, expressed 
in distributive conflicts that undermined the series attempts to stabilize the economy in 
the 1980s. The definition of the exchange rate and fiscal policies always had, therefore, a 
strong political component in Argentina, directly affecting distributive disputes.  
The recomposing of the hegemonic bloc in a post-protectionist era involved the 
creation of conditions for association between national and international capital. Basualdo 
(2010) shows how those conditions were finally provided by the privatisation process. In 
fact, the economic conglomerates that acquired the privatised companies effectively 
represented a marriage of the biggest national private economic groups – Perez Companc, 
Techint, Astra, Roggio, CEI, Loma Negra, Macri and Soldati – and international banks 
and transnational service companies.33  
For the productive fractions of the national capital, privatisations offered a way of 
augmenting productivity due to gains of scale, the reduction of competition and the 
integration of the commodity chains, by acquiring state companies that supplied 
important inputs to their own activities. Basualdo cites among many other examples the 
acquisition of the traditional steel company SOMISA by Techint (a case of market 
concentration) and the purchase of part of the railway system by the oligopolistic cement 
company Loma Negra (Basualdo 2010, 398). For international service companies, 
privatisation offered an opportunity of stepping into a traditionally protected market, 
whose size was not to be neglected. Moreover the acquisition of Argentine companies 
could offer a platform to access the even bigger Brazilian market, due to the promising 
regional integration in the context of Mercosur. Spanish companies (BBVA, Telefonica, 
Repsol, among others) were quick in taking up the opportunity (Toral 2008). One example 
                                                          
33 For a detailed map of the participation of those groups in the privatisation process, see Basualdo (2010, 
402) 
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of the association of international service companies and private national capital in the 
privatisation process was the selling of Aerolineas Argentinas to the Spanish group Iberia 
and the Argentine group Cielos del Sur, whose payment was made almost exclusively in 
debt bonds (Petrecolla, Porto, and Gerchunoff 1993, 90).  
The analytical perspective proposed by Basualdo and the Buenos Aires’ FLACSO 
school explains very effectively the shifting class relations in Argentine society during 
the neoliberal reforms. Nevertheless, although explicitly recognising the importance of 
international capital, it does not organically relate international pressures and 
opportunities and the transformations in productive structures and class relations. As a 
result, the final crisis of the neoliberal development strategy appears as a consequence of 
the weakening of the Argentine state, largely echoing the neodevelopmentalist 
perspective. The rich social analysis they offer can be taken one step further if the 
interplay between international pressures and opportunities and social change is fully 
unpacked, using the uneven and combined development framework presented earlier in 
this thesis (Chapter 2). Accordingly, the successive international crises that put the 
neoliberal hegemonic bloc under increasing pressure can be seen as instances of the whip 
of external necessity, while the responses the Argentine state offered to these international 
crises can be described as forms of privatisation of gains and socialisation of losses.  
To reconcile the contradictory interests of different classes and class fractions that 
provided political support for Menem’s administration – particularly capital owners and 
the urban middle classes in the service sector – the neoliberal development strategy was 
based on the constant influx of foreign investments. This macroeconomic arrangement 
was particularly vulnerable to international crisis. Before 1995, the ‘economy of the 
garden of Eden’, performed well, in the presence of externally favourable conditions. The 
ephemeral catch-up development illusion guaranteed Menem’s initial popularity, 
although the gains of this phase were privatised to the top layers of the society. 
Nevertheless, in the second half of the 1990s, the whip of the external necessity repeatedly 
lashed the Argentine economy. As a consequence, successive waves of socialisation of 
losses were imposed – first to the working class, and finally to the middle classes. As a 
result, instead of the catch-up development promised in Menem’s speeches, the neoliberal 
development strategy could only produce a non-converging form of uneven and 
combined development.    
 To understand the apparent initial success of President Menem’s administration it 
is paramount to bear in mind that he took office amidst a hyperinflationary crisis. The 
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accumulated inflation rate for the year 1989 reached unprecedented 4923.5% (Graph 3). 
After the first wave of restrictive policies (BB plan) adopted in the second semester of 
1989, the hyperinflationary cycle lost strength, only to peak again from December 1989 
to March 1990 (Rapoport 2005, 64), reaching 1343,9% in 1990. This tense moment is 
referred in the specialised literature as the second hyper-inflation crisis (Basualdo 2010, 
289; Brenta 2013, 277–78; Gerchunoff and Torre 1996, 744), triggering a renewed set of 
restrictive policies, as well as the mentioned compulsory exchange of saving deposits and 
short term internal bonds for US dollar denominated bonds (Bonex plan). These measures 
deepened economic recession, but coupled with the first privatisations, the surplus in 
trade balance, and a new agreement with the IMF helped rebalance the public budget 
(Ferrer 2006, 259). Inflation, nevertheless, remained alarmingly high until the approval 
of the Convertibility Law, in March 1991.    
 In this context, the initial success of the Convertibility Plan in controlling 
escalating internal prices was immediately perceived as a remarkable economic 
achievement. Annual inflation rates (December-to-December) dropped from 84% in 1991 
to 17.5% in 1992, 7.4% in 1993 and only 3.9% in 1994 (Graph 3). Taking into account 
the equally impressive economic recovery from 1991, with GDP growth rates reaching 
10.6% in that year and 9.6% in 1992 (Graph 2), it is no wonder that a proud Finance 
Minister Domingo Cavallo would want to suggest that the recent experience in his country 
could qualify as a case of ‘Argentina’s Miracle’ (Cavallo and Mondino 1995). The 
economic boom, particularly in the services sector, and the renewed purchasing power of 
the Argentinian Peso – now pegged to the US Dollar – rendered Menem’s administration 
particularly popular among the urban middle classes. The brief prosperity experienced in 
this first phase made possible not only the privatisation of gains for the capital owners, 
via the direct appropriation of previously state-owned companies, but also for the middle 
classes, through access to a tide of imported consumption goods. 
 Yet, as mentioned earlier (see section 3.2 above), the strategy of currency 
stabilization based on a fixed exchange rate parity between the new Argentine currency 
and the US Dollar implied a permanent demand for dollars and left the country 
particularly vulnerable to external shocks. In the context of post-Cold War, the whip of 
external necessity would appear to Argentina’s ruling classes not in its classical form of 
a geopolitical threat, but as a series of international financial crises in emerging markets, 
putting the Convertibility Plan under pressure. The 1994/1995 Mexican crisis, the East 
Asian financial crisis of 1997, the Russian crisis of 1998 and, finally, the Brazilian crisis 
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of 1998/1999 made it increasingly difficult for Argentina to sustain the parity peso-dollar, 
requiring successive waves of socialisation of losses.  
An analysis of Argentina’s Balance of Payments 34  tables clearly reveals the 
imbalances of the neoliberal macroeconomic model. Because of the currency 
overvaluation in real terms, current account (including goods, services, income, and 
current transfers) shows consistently negative results between 1991 and 2001, reaching 
an unprecedented deficit of US$ 14.48 billion in the troublesome year of 1998. 
Traditionally an exporting country, Argentina suffered from deficits in the trade balance 
(amounting to a deficit of US$ 7.54 billion in 1998, including goods and services), 
aggravated by historically negative results in the income balance (reaching a deficit of 
US$ 7.40 billion in 1998) (Graph 7).  
Following the Convertibility Law, external deficits leading to the diminishing of 
national reserves would necessarily lead to the shrinking of the monetary basis, with 
profound impacts on the level of activity. The current account deficits had, therefore, to 
be compensated by the attraction of dollars via foreign investment. Hence, the central role 
played by privatisation of public companies and the foreign policy of carnal relations (see 
3.2 and 3.3 above). Accordingly, the financial account jumped from a deficit of 8 billion 
dollars in 1989 to a surplus of 21 billion dollars in 1993. Graph 7 shows the inverse 
relation between the financial account and the current account throughout almost the 
whole period.       
 The entry of dollars in the form of foreign investments could not last forever. 
Eventually, the government would run out of attractive companies to privatise, the 
positive conditions in the international financial markets would reverse and the foreign 
capital appetite for Argentina’s market would diminish. The strategy of socialising losses 
through privatisations had an absolute limit. This limit was tested for the first time in the 
aftermath of the Mexican crisis of 1994/1995, a concrete example of external necessity 
destabilising the neoliberal development strategy. Growing aversion to risk and rising 
interest rates in the US drastically reduced the international offer of capital. The surplus 
in the financial account was reduced to 12.33 billion dollars in 1994, and only 5.4 billion 
dollars in 1995, barely covering the deficit of 5.1 billion dollars in the current account 
(Graph 7). In order to keep the exchange rate parity, Argentina had to rely on IMF lending 
and exceptional credits, amounting to 1.35 billion dollars in 1994, and 2.22 billion dollars 
                                                          
34 The terminology and methodology adopted for balance of payments analysis in this thesis is that of the 
IMF Balance of Payments and International Investment Position Manual (2009). 
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in 1995. A further socialisation of losses was imposed on the working class, in the form 
of tightening of the public budget, tax rises and salary cuts (Brenta 2013, 290). 
 
 
 
 In-depth analysis of key macroeconomic figures for the year 1995 offers a good 
picture of the first hard lash of the whip of external necessity on Argentina’s neoliberal 
development strategy and the extent of the socialisation of losses it brought about (table 
1). In a context of international crisis, foreign trade could not function as a motor for 
economic growth, and the current account showed a deficit of 5.1 billion dollars. Given 
the difficulties of attracting capital to cover that imbalance, interest rates rose to 19.1% a 
year, despite inflation being only 1.6% from December 1994 to December 1995. 
Reflecting the external constraints, GDP decreased by 2.8%. This contraction had uneven 
effects across sectors; while more competitive sectors such as agriculture and cattle 
raising avoided the crisis growing 5.6%, industrial activity was reduced by 7.2%, and the 
construction sector shrank by 12.2% (Graph 9). The automotive industry, one important 
source of industrial jobs, was heavily hit, reducing the production of cars from 338.4 
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thousand units in 1994 to 226.7 thousand units in 1995. Overall unemployment reached 
18.6% in the second quarter of that year (Graph 5).    
 
TABLE 1 – SELECTED MACROECONOMIC FIGURES – ARGENTINA/1995. Source: 
CEPALSTAT 
Current 
account 
deficit  
Interest 
Rates 
Inflation GDP 
growth 
Agriculture 
and cattle 
rising 
Industrial 
activity 
Car 
Production  
Unemployment 
US$  
5.1 
billion 
19,1% 1,6% -2,8% 5,6% -7,2% 226.7 (‘000 
units)  
18,6%  
(QII) 
 
 From 1996, the recovery of international demand, combined with the initial 
success of the stabilization plan in Brazil (see Chapter 4) would rapidly improve the 
economic situation, producing a second ‘golden cycle’ of neoliberalism in Argentina 
(Agustín 2015, 195). GDP grew by 5.5% in 1996, 8.1% in 1997, and 3.9% in 1998 (Graph 
2). The socialisation of losses was not reversed, however. The gains continued to be 
privatised to the ruling class. Part of these gains were also appropriated by the middle 
classes, through high consumption standards boosted by the exchange rate overvaluation. 
As a consequence, Argentine industry was depleted and unemployment rates persisted at 
high levels throughout the period (Graph 5). 
 As soon as the whip of external necessity lashed again, the fragile basis of 
Argentina’s short prosperity were exposed once more. The Russian crisis of 1998 and 
especially the Brazilian crisis of 1998/1999 would drag Argentina’s economy down, 
culminating in the country’s severe crisis of 2001-2002. The pattern of this crisis 
resembles that of 1995, but this time the negative expectations of foreign investors could 
not be reversed by IMF loans. The current account deficit reached its peak of US$ 14.42 
billion in 1998, compensated by a surplus of US$ 18.93 billion (see Graph 7) in the 
financial account, thanks to the issue of US$ 10.90 billion in debt bonds. In the following 
year, the current account deficit of US$ 11.92 billion was partially compensated by the 
selling of the government’s participation in the Argentine oil company YPF, one of the 
last valuable assets to be privatised. The Spanish company Repsol payed US$ 14.9 to take 
control of YPF (Toral 2008, 537), including the purchase of state and private owned 
assets, thereby bringing some relief to the national accounts in 1999.  
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 Nevertheless, again, debt and privatisations could not play the role of a permanent 
source of much needed dollars in an economy based on a fully convertible currency. 
Confirming Brenta’s argument, in the absence of a flexible monetary policy, the variable 
adjusted in face of external shocks would have to be the real sector of the economy (2002, 
57). Accordingly, GDP shrunk 3.4% in 1999, 0.8% in 2000, 4.4 in 2001 an unprecedented 
10.9% in 2002 (Graph 2). Car production, a previously mentioned barometer of industrial 
work levels, dropped from 353.1 thousand units in 1998, to 238.9 thousand units in 2000, 
to only 111.3 thousand units in 2002, half of the total produced 10 years earlier (Graph 
8). Industrial activity in general was reduced by 7.9% in 1999, 3.8% in 2000, 7.4% in 
2001, and 11.0% in 2002 (Graph 9). It is worth noting that industrial contraction was 
worse than general contraction of the economic activity throughout the crisis period, 
confirming a de-industrialization tendency observed since the 1980s (for more evidence 
on Argentinian de-industrialization, see Basualdo 2010, 315-322).   
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 Mediated by the state’s capacity to promote privatisation of gains and 
socialisation of losses, the whip of external necessity produced uneven results across the 
Argentine society. The most privileged sectors were big Argentine corporations – in the 
agrarian and industrial sectors –, which had been created under state protection in the 
previous phase of ISI. With the reforms, and particularly the privatisation process, 
Argentine capital was released from the limitations of Argentine internal market and 
gained an opportunity to access international markets, in association with foreign capital.  
Even part of the industrial capital, affected by the reduction in subsidies, the cut 
in trade tariffs and, since 1992, by the overvalued exchange rate, found an opportunity to 
migrate to highly profitable new sectors opened by the state companies’ retreat, namely 
into the provision of services.35 In fact, the privatisations in Argentina were extremely 
generous to buyers not by mistake, as implied by neoliberal writers (Cavallo 1997), but 
to better serve the political end of transferring public property to private hands, a 
remarkable example of privatisation of gains and socialisation of losses. The neoliberal 
                                                          
35 See Graph 9 for evidence of differentiated growth performance across sectors, with services and 
agriculture growing significantly more than industry. See Azpiazu, Basualdo, and Schorr (2001) for an in-
depth study of Argentine de-industrialisation process during the neoliberal cycle. 
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reforms ‘freed’ Argentine national capital, which largely fled the country in the 2001 
crisis, leaving behind the closure of factories. In control of the state, capital owners were 
particularly successful in profiting from the privatisation of gains brought about by the 
neoliberal development strategy. 
Another key social actor that benefited from the neoliberal reforms – at least in its 
first phases – was the urban middle classes, including independent professionals and 
workers in the service sector. While industrial workers on the periphery of Buenos Aires 
and across the country were severely hit by the deindustrialization, the upper strata of 
workers in the service sector benefited from access to imported goods and enjoyed the 
purchasing power of the overvalued currency. Again here, what neoliberal and 
neodevelopmentalist writers see as potentially avoidable errors of macroeconomic 
management – nominally the imbalance between imports and exports causing the 
constant current account deficits (see Graph 7), as well as the universally criticised 
overvaluation of the exchange rate – are actually much more than that. They formed an 
integral part of the political strategy of Menem’s administration, which depended on the 
support of the middle classes. Therefore, the exchange rate overvaluation and the 
consequent de-industrialisation are better explained as a concrete example of privatisation 
of gains for the middle classes, accompanied by socialisation of losses for the working 
class at large.  
 In this context, Pucciarelli (2011) identifies the forging of an amalgamated form 
of political expression in the years between 1989 and 1991, which the author calls 
‘neoliberal Peronism’. The author convincingly documents the change in the support 
basis of Menem’s government, from the organised working class under the traditional 
banner of Peronism to the middle classes of the elegant neighbourhoods of the centre of 
Buenos Aires, who were directly benefited by his policies. However, the popular basis of 
the Justicialist Party took longer to realise the transformations of Peronism under 
Menem’s leadership. This partially explains the period of extraordinary popularity 
allowing the electoral victories of the government (1991-1995), despite the growing 
unemployment and the sustained tendency of income concentration (see Graphs 5 and 
10). The confusion in Peronist popular leaderships is exemplified by the case of Abdul 
Saravia, a ‘semi-illiterate, Peronist-born’, leader of the fishing union in Mar Del Plata, 
who at the same time enthusiastically supported President Menem and resisted the 
government reforms against the interest of the small fishermen  (Colombo 2015, 457). 
Saraiva was not a rare case in the 1990s. While ideology was enough to keep the support 
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of some union leaders despite the anti-popular reforms, others had their faith further 
stimulated through direct engagement in the privatisation process and other forms of co-
optation.36             
The gains of the neoliberal reforms were, therefore, highly concentrated at the top 
of the social pyramid. The lower 80% of the population saw their income being reduced 
from 45% to 35% of the total in one decade (see Graph 10). For the great majority, the 
promises of catch-up development did not materialize. For them, trade liberalisation and 
overvalued exchange rates did not mean investment opportunities, access to cheap 
imported goods and shopping trips to Miami, but rather unemployment. In face of the 
whip of external necessity represented by successive international crises, the costs of the 
socialisation of losses were borne by the working class. From a labour-centred 
perspective, therefore, the changes in the productive structures caused by the interplay 
between class struggle and international relations were highly regressive.  
Given the economic unsustainability of the fiscal and exchange policies needed to 
keep it together in face of international constraints, the hegemonic bloc that politically 
supported the neoliberal reforms started to break apart in the aftermath of the Brazilian 
crisis of 1999. When the unemployment rate rose enough to affect the service sector and 
the convertibility of the Argentine currency was threatened, the urban middle classes were 
required to partake in the socialisation of losses that the working class had endured since 
the start of the neoliberal reforms. Finally unable to attract the amount of dollars needed 
to keep the exchange rate parity, the government declared the ‘corralito’ on the third of 
December, 2001, severely restricting access to dollar denominated bank deposits. At that 
point, the middle class definitively turned its back on the government, joining the recently 
formed popular movements and organisations in their increasingly radical 
demonstrations. ‘I couldn’t believe it’ – says the anti-capitalist activist cited in the first 
page of this chapter, referring to the protests of December 2001 – ‘I saw the middle class 
fighting alongside me’ (cited in Sitrin 2006, 30).   
 
                                                          
36 For a detailed analysis of the relations between Menem’s government and trade unions, see McGuire 
(1997). For a critical evaluation of the changings in the PJ, see Levitsky (2003).  
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The dissolution of the hegemonic bloc was combined with the final withdrawal of 
international support for the government’s economic policies, expressed in the IMF’s 
refusal to provide new loans, coupled with private investors’ capital flight to more secure 
markets. As a result of the combination of internal distributive disputes and external 
material restrictions, the neoliberal decade came to an end with the deepest crisis in the 
history of Argentina. On December 20th 2001, after days of a spontaneous and 
decentralised civil unrest that could not be controlled even after the declaration of martial 
law, President De la Rua resigned. The country descended into a state close to anarchy in 
the following two weeks, until a relatively stable government could be formed again. It 
would take the entire year of 2002 to rebuild a political coalition under the banner of a 
renewed development strategy: neodevelopmentalism (see Chapter 6).     
  
  
1990 1992 1994 1997 1999 2000 2001 2002
Poorest 20% 4.2 4.4 4 3.8 3.4 3.2 3 2.8
Second Poorest 20% 8.2 8.4 7.8 7.4 7.2 7 6.6 6.4
Middle 20% 12.6 13.2 12.2 11.6 11.6 11.6 11.2 10.8
Second Richest 20% 20 20.6 19.6 19.2 19.2 19.2 19.2 18.4
Richest 20% 55 53.4 56.4 57.8 58.4 58.8 60 61.8
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Chapter 4 – Neoliberalism in Brazil – ‘A new development project’ 
 
We have recovered the faith in development. (…) This year will be better. The 
next, better still. Today, there is no single serious analyst that predicts for Brazil 
anything different from a long growth period. (…) Our economy is like a healthy 
plant after a long period of drought (…) now it is the time to grow and blossom.  
President Fernando Henrique Cardoso (1995, 25) 
 
 ‘A new development project’. 
 This was the title of the first chapter of President Cardoso’s administration 
program (2008 [1994], 2). Its core message was clear enough. The Brazilian traditional 
development strategy based on active state intervention had to be replaced. The world 
had changed. It had entered the age of ‘globalisation’, the then trendy word Cardoso 
incorporated in many of his speeches, replacing his former emphasis on ‘dependency’. In 
the new world setting, there was no room for isolation, protectionism or nationalism. It 
did not mean that Brazilian eternal aspiration for development should be abandoned. No 
candidate would dare to run for President of Brazil on such a message. It just meant that 
the country would have to find another way to continue its never-ending search for 
development. 
 When Cardoso presented his program, the ‘old’ development strategy had already 
been dismantled. Since the 1980s, the Brazilian state had lost its capacity to coordinate 
the economic activity, let alone to mediate class conflicts. The military dictatorship 
(1964-1985) had left behind a country politically divided, deeply indebted and profoundly 
unequal. The debt crisis of the 1980s evolved into an inflation crisis. A succession of 
economic plans unsuccessfully tried to curb inflation, actually worsening the problem. 
Fernando Collor, the first president chosen in free democratic elections after almost three 
decades, had been defenestrated in the aftermath of yet another failed stabilisation plan, 
not before starting a wave of liberalising reforms. 
 Despite the numerous difficulties that mounted over the previous decades, 1994 
was a year of hope. The economy was growing vigorously (5.85% - see Graph 11). The 
national football team – a popular passion for Brazilians – won the World Cup after 24 
years. The last time it had happened, in 1970, the country was experiencing the zenith of 
the national developmentalist model, the ‘Brazilian Miracle’. In people’s minds, the joy 
of winning the World Cup could be magically associated with faith in a prosperous future. 
Interestingly enough, there was something peculiar about the players that won in 1994. 
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Unlike the dream team of the 1970s, the 1994 squad was composed of mediocre but very 
dedicated players. Discipline and respect for the coach’s plans were key to the victory, 
achieved in the penalty kicks, after a painfully ugly 0-0 draw against Italy. 
 
 
 
 The 1994 Brazilian national team offers an opportune metaphor of the renewed 
development strategy Cardoso was proposing. Development was not to be achieved by 
talent or creativity. In the economy, as on the football pitch, the victory would be the 
consequence of hard team work and respect for the rules. The lack of discipline was 
regarded as an underlying cause of Brazilian backwardness. In Cardoso’s words: 
‘throughout our History, we had staggered from crisis to crisis mainly due to our 
resistance in accepting the rules’ (Cardoso and Winter 2015, 252). 
A former half-hearted reader of Marx, Cardoso was heavily influenced by the 
Weberian sociology of Sergio Buarque de Holanda (2015) and Raymundo Faoro (2012),37 
particularly identified with the University of Sao Paulo, where the future President made 
his academic career. That sociological perspective linked Brazilian backwardness vis-à-
vis the United States with a lax public morality inherited from Portuguese Catholic 
institutions, as opposed to the impersonal Protestant institutions. The confusion between 
                                                          
37 For a contemporary critique of this sociology, see Souza (2015). 
(12.00)
(7.00)
(2.00)
3.00 
8.00 
13.00 
1990 1991 1992 1993 1994 1995 1996 1997 1998 1999 2000 2001 2002 2003
Graph 11 - Brazil GDP Growth
(Annual % Source: World Bank)
Argentina Brazil World U.S.
114 
 
 
the public and the private was the cornerstone of Brazilian patrimonialism, which allowed 
the elites to control the state as their own property. Modernisation in Brazil would require, 
therefore, not only the adoption of new technologies, but mainly an institutional change, 
brought about by a mind-set change. Accepting impersonal rules, this was thought to be 
the way to development.   
In the international context of the 1990s, the rules Latin American states were 
supposed to accept were clear. They had been dutifully summarised in the Washington 
Consensus (Williamson 1990, see chapter 1). The Real stabilisation plan, implemented 
by Cardoso in 1994, was already showing very promising results based on respect for 
market fundamentals. Unlike previous stabilisation plans, it did not include freezing of 
assets, nor compulsory changes in existing contracts. It was entirely premised on market 
dynamics and the voluntary adhesion of rational subjects (see section 4.2). The promise 
embodied in Cardoso’s election was that Brazil would finally become a developed 
country by playing the game of neoliberalism. While the state was perceived as an easy 
prey to vested interests, the market was portrayed as a neutral sphere of compromising 
among legitimate interests, which would finally lead to development.  
Although not as evident as in Menem’s or Collor’s political speeches, the market 
utopia was at the core of the neoliberal development strategy implemented by Cardoso. 
Indeed, there is an intriguing mismatch between discourse and practice in the case of 
Brazilian neoliberalism. Undoubtedly, President Collor had the strongest pro-market 
rhetoric, contrasting with the more nuanced and intellectualised discourse of President 
Cardoso. However, the most effective neoliberal reforms were conducted by the latter. 
Indeed, the consolidation of neoliberalism in Brazil would only be achieved in the second 
Cardoso’s second administration (1999-2002), with the institution of the so-called 
‘economic triad’ (primary fiscal surpluses, floating exchange rates and inflation targets), 
a set of supposedly impersonal market-friendly rules that could not be easily dismantled, 
and would persist even after Cardoso left office (see chapter 6). 
With the benefit of the hindsight, there can be no doubt that the neoliberal 
development strategy did not live up to its promises. Traditional, patrimonialist elites did 
not only remain in power, but actually had their grip on the state apparatus reinforced. 
Rules were partially and selectively applied, as exemplified in the questionable 
amendment of the constitution in 1997 in order to allow for Cardoso’s own re-election 
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one year later. 38  Instead of becoming modern and competitive, Brazilian productive 
structures actually became more concentrated in primary sectors. Instead of unleashing a 
sustained period of economic growth, the reforms resulted in high unemployment, 
persisting poverty and inequality. The 1994 Human Development Report ranked Brazil 
in 63rd position (UNDP 1994, 102). In the 2003 report, the country resides in the 65th 
position (UNDP 2002, 238). After one decade of neoliberalism, there was no sign that 
Brazil was catching-up with the so-called developed countries. 
 Why did the ‘new development project’ announced by Cardoso fail to produce 
catch-up development? What kind of development did it deliver instead? 
 The mainstream political economy literature on Brazil’s recent state reforms – in 
its neoliberal and neodevelopmentalist branches – cannot offer convincing answers to 
these questions. Neoliberals either ignore the disappointing results of their policies or 
suggest that their lack of success was the consequence of their incomplete application. 
Market rule was not sufficiently enforced, many outdated state regulations were still in 
place and privatisations did not go far enough (Fraga 2004; Franco 1999; de Onis 2000; 
Pinheiro, Giambiagi, and Moreira 2001).  
Neodevelopmentalists make the opposite argument. They insist that the neoliberal 
development strategy failed because of the reduction of the state, whose central role in 
promoting development can never be substituted by the market (Pochmann 2001; 
Coutinho, Hiratuka, and Sabbatini 2003; Mantega 2001). Trapped in the a priori 
opposition between the market and the state utopias, both neoliberals and 
neodevelopmentalists fail to clearly spell out the role of class struggle and international 
pressures and opportunities as concrete determinants of development outcomes. Even 
when acknowledging the importance of international influences, both sides fail to offer 
an integrated international political economy analysis, capable of making sense of 
Brazil’s uneven and combined development during the 1990s.  
 My argument is that the neoliberal development strategy was inconsistent from 
the start. The different interests it tried to address could not be permanently reconciled, 
particularly under the whip of external necessity. After winning the 1989 elections thanks 
in part to favourable international circumstances – namely the dissolution of the Soviet 
bloc, seen as a failure of state-led development in general – President Collor could not 
build a stable class alliance to back his neoliberal reforms. President Cardoso, however, 
                                                          
38 The Constitution Amendment 16 (Brasil 1997a) was approved with the decisive support of Brazilian 
traditional oligarchic elites, involving never properly investigated accusations of bribery Dória (2013).  
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successfully forged a broad alliance between traditional oligarchies, the dominant 
fractions of the national bourgeoisie, the international capital and urban middle classes. 
Sustained by this heterogeneous alliance, he managed to selectively implement 
Washington Consensus reforms in his first administration, stabilising inflation and 
generating some economic growth, based on the growing influx of foreign investments.  
Nevertheless, the favourable international circumstances deteriorated after the 
Asian crisis of 1997, followed by the 1998 Russian crisis. In face of external pressure, 
Cardoso was forced to devalue the exchange rates, extending the socialisation of losses 
to the weakest part of the class alliance. At the same time, gains continued to be privatised 
for the financial fraction of the ruling class, though extremely high interest rates and 
continued fiscal austerity. As a result, the developmental outcomes of the neoliberal 
development strategy were uneven. The hard team work Cardoso demanded from the 
Brazilian society was actually heavily imbalanced, involving a socialisation of losses for 
the lower tiers of society, while eventual gains were channelled to the top.    
 In the remainder of this chapter, I substantiate the argument outlined above 
through a closer analysis of neoliberal discourse and the policies in Brazil. I do so in four 
steps. In the next section (4.1), I analyse the political discourse of Presidents Collor (1990-
1992), Franco (1992-1994) and Cardoso (1995-2002) to show how the neoliberal reforms 
where premised on the market utopia and justified by repeated promises of development. 
After that (section 4.2), I explore in closer detail key public policies actually adopted 
during the neoliberal decade, focusing specifically on the monetary reform and the 
privatisations. Here I show how the monetary stabilisation policies adopted to curb 
inflation evolved into the neoliberal economic triad after the 1999 crisis. In section 4.3, 
the neoliberal foreign policy, whose key objective was rebranding Brazil’s image abroad 
as a reliable liberal and stable democracy, is critically assessed. Finally, in section 4.4, I 
map the winners and losers of the reforms and show how the interaction between class 
conflicts and international constraints coupled to destabilize the neoliberal development 
strategy, resulting instead in a specific instance of uneven and combined development.                 
 
 
4.1 From market fundamentalism to reformism and back: the promises of 
neoliberalism in Brazil 
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The neoliberal decade in Brazil comprises at least two phases, with a period of 
intermission. The first phase started in 1989 with the election of Fernando Collor and 
ended in 1992 with his resignation to evade an impeachment process. Although clearly 
announced in speeches and official government plans, the neoliberal reforms were only 
partially implemented in this initial phase. The institutional consolidation of neoliberal 
reforms would only happen in Cardoso’s presidency (1995-2002). Contradictorily, at that 
point the official rhetoric assumed a much more nuanced tone, echoing Cardoso’s 
reformist dependency theory ideas. Between these two moments, Itamar Franco’s short 
presidency (1992-1994) combined features of the neoliberal and the traditional 
developmentalist discourses, while launching the monetary bases for the neoliberal 
policies later adopted by Cardoso. Despite the differences in styles and emphasis among 
the three Presidents of the neoliberal decade, the market utopia and repeated promises of 
development were a constant in their discourses.  
The most simplistic expression of the market utopia is to be found in President 
Collor’s speeches. The former governor of the small province of Alagoas – one of the 
poorest of the country – was elected in 1989, in the first democratic presidential election 
since 1960.39 Collor was also the youngest President ever to be elected in Brazil, walking 
up the ramps of the Presidential Palace in Brasilia only a few months after turning 40 
years old. Bearing these credentials in mind, it was not difficult for his campaign 
managers to sell him as a living symbol of Brazil’s modernisation (Velho 1990; Ramaldes 
and Prado 2008; Almeida 2013). That modernisation, in its turn, meant the dismantling 
of the developmentalist state. In his last television spot before the second round of the 
elections, Collor remarks upon the differences between himself and the trade union leader 
Lula da Silva:  
 
(…) It is not about being right or left wing, this discussion is being buried under 
the wreckage of the Berlin Wall. The real difference between me and my 
adversary is just one: it is a new idea against an old idea. It is a modern vision 
against a backward vision. It is a possible future, against a past already tested, for 
instance, in Poland, Hungary, East Germany and Czechoslovakia. A past that, as 
we can see, has failed. Who between the two of us is the new? The new, my 
people, is not creating an ever bigger and inefficient State (…). The new is 
diminishing the size of the State machinery in order to make the government 
stronger and more efficient in fulfilling its obligations (…), guaranteeing the 
development that we want and we will achieve. (…). With the help of God we 
                                                          
39 Janio Quadros was elected in direct elections in 1960, but resigned in 1961. His vice-president, Joao Goulart assumed power that 
year and was overthrown by a military coup in 1964. The military dictatorship lasted 21 years, with no direct elections for President. 
In 1985, the first civil government was indirectly elected by the Brazilian Congress. The elections of 1989 were, therefore, the first 
opportunity a generation of Brazilians had to vote for President.  
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will build the Brazil of our dreams. You can be sure. From next year on, nothing 
will be like it was before (Collor 1989).      
 
 
Collor’s discourse reveals a stageist view of History, coupled with a 
straightforward positivist notion of progress. According to that vision, humanity moves 
relentlessly towards the future, and the nations that are not willing to submit to the ‘new 
necessities’ of the world economy are destined to lag behind. Nevertheless, the nation’s 
fate can be transformed by the determination of its leader. By carrying on the required 
modernisation reforms, the leader guarantees the fulfilment of the final goal that ‘we want 
and we will achieve’, namely, ‘development’. By contrast, backwardness is identified 
with an ‘ever bigger an inefficient State’, a model that ‘failed’ in Eastern Europe.   
This simple and easy to grasp promise of development – aiming at the broadest 
possible audience – was combined during the 1989 presidential race with a strong anti-
corruption discourse. The state was portrayed as the source of inefficiency and 
clientelism. Traditional politicians and high level civil servants were described as a group 
of affluent parasites, sarcastically nicknamed ‘Maharajas’ by Collor (Fausto and Devoto 
2004, 465; Martuscelli 2012, 25; Schneider 1991, 324).  
The extent to which the idea of modernisation and the anti-corruption rhetoric 
determined the final results of 1989 elections is debatable.40 In any case, the appeal to this 
idealisation of development as progress – always linked to the need of pro-market reforms 
– remained present in President Collor’s speeches after his victory. In his assumption 
speech, for instance, he blatantly praised the market efficiency over the state inefficiency, 
manifesting his ‘conviction that the market economy is the superior form of wealth 
generation, of intensive and sustained development’ (1990, 15).  
Collor’s government was abruptly interrupted by his resignation to escape an 
impeachment process amidst a deep political and economic crisis, on the 29th of 
December, 1992. In the aftermath of the failure of his economic plans to control inflation, 
and facing escalating corruption charges, Collor clung to his promises of development. 
In his final broadcasted speech, the President’s discourse included an explicit catch-up 
promise:   
 
                                                          
40 Based on quantitative surveys carried out in 1989 and 1990, Andre Singer claims that ideas on the size 
of the State surprisingly did not play a key role in determining voters’ decisions in the 1989 election. 
Rather, the author identifies a strong relation between ideological identification – understood as 
expectations of changing or keeping the status quo – and voting decisions in that election (Singer 1999). 
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I will only take my mission as finished, I will only consider my administration 
program accomplished, after sanctioning those projects that will allow us to 
bequeath to the future generations a country structurally different from how I 
received it and capable of inserting itself among the modern nations of the world 
(Collor 1992). 
  
 Only three months after delivering that speech – and, arguably, before fulfilling 
his ‘mission’ of inserting Brazil ‘among the modern nations of the world’ – Collor 
resigned and the Vice-President Itamar Franco was sworn in as President.  
The exceptional circumstances through which President Franco came to power 
were reflected in his public speeches. Released from the necessity of disputing elections, 
his promises were significantly more modest than those of both his predecessor and his 
successor. The lack of clear long term objectives and the inherently contradictory 
character of a government formed by the provisional truce between many distinct political 
forces is reflected in the scarce academic literature about Franco’s presidency. In fact, in 
the political economy literature, Franco’s administration is normally mentioned en 
passant as a prelude to Cardoso’s administration (Giambiagi et al. 2005; Pinheiro, 
Giambiagi, and Moreira 2001).  
President Franco’s discourse shows an interesting combination of 
developmentalist and neoliberal features. In his first broadcasted address to the nation, on 
the 30th of December, 1992, he indirectly criticised his predecessor: ‘Too much has been 
said about modernity in recent months, as if anyone, in the full command of his mental 
capabilities, would intend to go back to the past, or to keep the country in backwardness’ 
(Franco 2008 [1992], 11). Franco goes further in his critique of the modernity discourse 
and effectively points to its contradictions: 
 
During the almost three years in which the false modernity has been proclaimed 
as a government plan, the result was some steps back in the country’s economy. 
(…) In conclusion: the modernity motto, so much proclaimed, impoverished the 
country by ten percent in just thirty months. We all want to modernise the 
country, and we will do so, without impoverishing the middle class and without 
deepening the sacrifice required from the workers (Franco 2008 [1992], 11).     
   
This strikingly progressive discourse, resembling the old tradition of Brazilian 
developmentalism, was contradictorily combined with important concessions to the 
Washington Consensus agenda (see chapter 1). For instance, in the same speech Franco 
recognised the necessity of promoting a ‘fiscal adjustment’ and announced that his 
government would look for means to ‘broaden privatisations, without bringing losses to 
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the nation’ (2008 [1992], 13). Even more important, he reassured external creditors that 
Brazil would ‘fulfil its obligations’ regarding the foreign debt. In the end, the market 
utopia reappears as the way to development, as ‘the peoples did only progress by 
participating in the world market’ (Franco 2008 [1992], 13).  
After serving as Foreign and Finance Minister in Franco’s administration, 
Cardoso was elected president in 1994. Unlike most of the politicians before and after 
him, Cardoso’s speeches are at times quite nuanced and thoughtful, reflecting his 
successful academic career as a sociologist. Moreover Cardoso produced much more 
discursive material than Collor and Franco, remaining in power for twice as long as his 
two predecessors combined (1995-2002). Overall, his public speeches and his campaign 
materials reveal a transition, from state to market utopia.  
Notwithstanding the more complex character of Cardoso’s discourse, repeated 
promises of development play a key role in his political speeches. One example of the 
political use of catch-up development’s promises can be seen in Cardoso’s last television 
campaign spot: 
 
Great nations of the world are not built by better people than ours. They are built 
by people like me and you. It so happens that in those places, the governments 
knew how to work side by side with its people and built fairer societies. And this 
is what we are going to do in the next four years. Brazil can be one of the great 
powers in the world. This is no exaggeration. This is an idea as big as Brazil itself. 
(…) Brazil is not an underdeveloped country. Brazil is an unfair country. (..) On 
the next the 3rd of October [the election day] I invite you, Brazil, to think big 
(Cardoso 1994a).     
 
      Much can be read between these lines. They are not simply patriotic calls to 
greatness. In fact, they translate in a straightforward language ideas already present in 
Cardoso’s debate with Marini (see chapter 1), representing the political culmination of 
the Weberian strain of dependency theories. Cardoso is calling for a cohesive society, led 
by a competent and well-intended government. The union between the ‘people’ and the 
‘government’ can potentially make Brazil ‘one of the great powers of the world’.  The 
‘Brazil’ to which Cardoso addresses his speech is not fundamentally divided by social 
classes with conflicting interests. Furthermore, it does not face fundamental international 
constraints in order to become a ‘great power’. Cardoso’s discourse identifies no enemies, 
no conflicts. The only challenge facing Brazil is getting the government and the people 
to work ‘side by side’.  
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In this context, the intriguing claim that Brazil is ‘not underdeveloped’, but 
‘unfair’, shall not be read as a step back in the development promises. On the contrary, 
the promise of catch-up development is clear enough by the explicit comparison between 
Brazil and the ‘great nations of the world’. The appeal for ‘fairness’ is better understood 
as part of the class compromise that the government is supposed to broker, comprising 
economic growth and social stability for the national bourgeoisie and gradual material 
gains for the working class. Indeed, these words apparently confirm Marini’s prediction 
that the incipient ‘neodevelopmentalism’ he saw in Cardoso’s dependency theory would 
‘soon lose its inhibitions’ (Marini 1978, 102–3). From this perspective, the similarities 
between Cardoso’s discourse in 1994 and Lula’s discourse in 2002 are striking, with the 
difference that in President Lula’s administration some material gains for the working 
class were actually delivered (see chapter 5).  
 Cardoso’s 1994 campaign discourse was, therefore, not typically neoliberal, like 
those of Menem and Collor. In it, praises to the market’s inherent efficiency are not to be 
found. In the first presidential debate, when questioned about his alliances with 
conservative political forces, Cardoso responded by emphatically defining himself as a 
‘social-democrat’. For Cardoso, ‘the fact is that the world has passed through a great 
transformation, and in this great transformation there is – so I believe, especially 
regarding Brazil – no room for neoliberal or conservative policies’ (1994b).  
Cardoso’s explicit rejection of neoliberalism notwithstanding, key elements of the 
Washington Consensus were incorporated into his discourse, figuring as preconditions to 
development. These elements appear in the official government plan (Cardoso 2008 
[1994]), the most detailed document of its kind produced in Brazil since the return of 
democracy. The plan starts by announcing ‘a new development model’, to be 
implemented in the aftermath of the ‘exhaustion of our development model based on 
protected industrialisation’ (2008 [1994] 4). The implementation of the ‘new 
development model’ involves continuing the privatisation process started in Collor’s 
government, promoting fiscal austerity though tax reform and curbing state expenditure, 
creating investment partnerships with the private sector, attracting foreign investment and 
further opening the economy to international trade. The market utopia surreptitiously 
appears in between the lines here, as market efficiency is presupposed in much of the 
economic policies included in Cardoso’s first administration plan. 
 President Cardoso’s first inauguration speech, however, can hardly be classified 
as neoliberal. ‘Uniting government and community’ he promised to ‘sweep hunger and 
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misery away from the Brazilian map’ (1995b, 32). Perhaps even more unexpectedly for 
a president elected with the decisive support of Brazilian traditional elites, Cardoso set as 
the government’s task ‘the reduction of inequalities until they disappear’ (1995b, 30). 
Broader, less specific development promises also abounded in Cardoso’s first 
inauguration speech. After claiming that he ‘fought and dreamed’ for many years to see 
‘justice, freedom and development’ become a reality in Brazil, Cardoso affirms: ‘without 
arrogance, but with absolute conviction, I say; this country will thrive!’ (1995b, 24).  
 Consistent with the tone of his campaign, an ideological defence of the efficiency 
of markets is totally absent from Cardoso’s first inauguration speech. Instead, policy 
reforms, when mentioned, are justified on the basis of the inevitable changes the world 
was passing through. ‘We cannot’ – says Cardoso, somewhat deterministically for a 
critical sociologist – ‘turn our backs to the course of History’ (1995b, 32). Apart from a 
quick mention to the need to promote ‘a broad reorganisation of the government’s 
apparatus’, involving ‘structural reforms necessary to give efficiency to the civil service’ 
(1995b, 31), not much is said about the state reforms that were to be implemented over 
the next eight years. 
 That Cardoso’s first public speech as President avoided mentioning neoliberal 
policies and remained close to his reformist, Weberian version of dependency theory is 
not entirely surprising. After all, he made his name as a left-leaning intellectual. The 
discursive transition from state to market utopia comes to the surface when we compare 
his first and his second inauguration speeches. Four years later, the promises of 
development were less grandiose and the pro-market policies being adopted simply could 
not be left unmentioned. Furthermore, Brazil was facing a serious crisis in the aftermath 
of the first wave of neoliberal reforms and the Asian crisis of 1997. This backdrop marked 
the tone of Cardoso’s second inauguration speech: 
 
I was not elected to be the manager of the crisis. I was the one chosen by the 
people to overcome it and to fulfil my campaign promises. To go on building a 
stable, modern, open and competitive economy. To consistently continue the 
privatisation. To support those who produce and generate jobs. And, through this 
path, to put the country back again in the trajectory of sustained and sustainable 
growth, with better wealth distribution among the Brazilians (1999, 28).   
            
 Here, leaving aside his usual carefully ambiguous language, Cardoso comes closer 
to the standard form of the neoliberal development discourse, premised on the market 
utopia. Economic growth – conflated with development – is deemed a consequence of 
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neoliberal state reforms (privatisation, trade liberalisation, promotion of a ‘competitive 
economy’). The aim of reducing inequalities is a vestige of Cardoso’s first inauguration 
discourse (1995b, 30). However, the final perspective of driving this reduction to the point 
of making inequalities ‘disappear’ is omitted. Moreover, it is interesting to remark that 
now ‘better wealth distribution’ is to be achieved by market mechanisms, while four years 
earlier it was considered the outcome of state policies. 
 In the same speech, Cardoso makes use of a common economic-physiological 
metaphor, which periodically reappears in the neoliberal and the neodevelopmentalist 
literature: the disease metaphor (see chapter 1). In order to justify cuts in the public 
budget, he claims that ‘it is better the bitter medicine that heals the disease, than the 
chronic fever that weakens the strength and pawns the organism’s health’ (1999, 29). 
Neoliberal policies – namely, fiscal austerity – are represented here as a form of treatment, 
involving a temporary sacrifice in order to achieve the greater good of development. 
Cardoso’s conversion to market fundamentalism was completed.     
 In conclusion, endless promises of development have constituted an integral part 
of the official discourses during the neoliberal decade in Brazil. Starting with President 
Collor, the association between market utopia, neoliberal policies and development 
promises was evident. Brazil would be included among ‘the modern nations of the world’ 
by unleashing international market forces. In the short presidency of Itamar Franco, a 
contradictory combination of the classical developmentalist discourse and the defence of 
neoliberal reforms took the stage. Finally, Cardoso’s administration started under the 
promise of turning Brazil into ‘one of the great powers in the world’. This great goal was 
to be achieved by a national class compromise, involving the decisive participation of the 
state – a model directly derived from Cardoso’s reformist version of dependency theory. 
In the course of his first term, and particularly after his re-election, however, Cardoso’s 
discourse shifted, coming closer to the standard neoliberal association between pro-
market reforms and development. 
   
 
4.2 Brazilian neoliberalism in action: monetary reforms and privatisation  
 
 Two key areas in which the neoliberal reforms were most clearly applied are 
monetary policies and privatisations. As in the case of Argentina, there is a strong link 
between the fiscal necessities created by the monetary reforms and the need for 
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privatisations. Not only were these two sets of public policies justified in ideological 
terms in reference to the market utopia, but they were also based on similar social 
alliances between international capital, big national corporations and the urban middle 
classes.  
Nevertheless, this class alliance involved contradictory demands. The middle 
classes expected the exchange rates to remain overvalued in order to allow for increasing 
consumption of imports, while national and international capital demanded high interest 
rates and fiscal austerity, to guarantee the sustainability of the government’s debt. These 
demands could only be reconciled through a constant influx of extraordinary resources, 
via privatisations and international investments. This delicate balance was maintained for 
a short period, between 1994 and 1998, until being destabilised by external shocks.    
 In the context of the early 1990s, there was no question that a monetary reform 
was badly needed. Controlling inflation was perceived as the most pressing priority for 
every administration in Brazil since the return of democracy, in 1985. In the five years 
between the elections of President Collor (1989) and President Cardoso (1994), Brazil 
had four different currencies: Cruzados Novos (NCz$); Cruzeiros (Cr$); Cruzeiros Reais 
(CR$) and, finally, Reais (R$). The substitution of currencies was so fast that it was 
impractical to print and distribute new notes. The provisional solution was stamping old 
notes with the name and values of the new currency, eventually cutting zeros in order to 
facilitate accounting (Figures 2 and 3). 
 
Figure 2 – Stamping the bill to change its name. Brazilian Cruzado Novo/Cruzeiro 
in 1990. 
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Figure 3 – Stamping the bill and cutting the zeros. Brazilian Cruzeiro/ Cruzeiro 
Real in 1993. 
 
  
When President Collor announced a new economic stabilisation plan, in his first 
day in office, inflation was out of control. Consumer prices had increased in the previous 
year by 1660% (see graph 12). Monthly inflation had peaked to 80% (Schneider 1991, 
321; Saad-Filho and Mollo 2002, 118). In these extreme circumstances, the mix of 
monetary and fiscal policies that constituted the ‘Collor Plan’ – officially ‘New Brazil 
Plan’ – was immediately launched and received extensive media coverage. 
 
 
 
 The most important feature of the economic plan was an unprecedented monetary 
squeeze. Almost 80% of the total money offer was immediately frozen, representing 30% 
of Brazilian GDP (Pastore 1991, 157). The government did so by compulsorily holding 
in the central bank all individual deposits above NCz$ 50.000 (roughly equivalent to US$ 
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Graph 12 - Brazil - Inflation (% December-December - consumer 
prices. Source: CEPALSTAT) 
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1.000), including current and saving accounts deposits. The total liquidity (M4) was 
reduced from US$ 112 billion to US$ 37 billion overnight (Crabtree 1991, 120). The 
frozen deposits were to be gradually repaid in the following two years, after the 
consolidation of the deflationary effects of the monetary squeeze. Finally, banking 
deposits below NCz$ 50.000 were converted to the new currency (Cr$) and declared 
immediately available. This radical and unprecedented assets freeze hit directly the 
middle class, who had voted overwhelmingly for Collor. While the biggest companies 
had ways of protecting themselves through international banking and the working class 
did not have enough money in the bank anyway, the middle classes suddenly lost access 
to their lifetime savings. This unique monetary reform was legally implemented through 
two Provisional Government Decrees, posteriorly converted into the Law 8.024/90 
(Brasil 1990a). 
 The plan also included severe cuts in the government’s budget, tax increases, 
privatisation of public companies, decisive cuts on trade tariffs, elimination of 
bureaucratic barriers to imports  and liberalisation of the exchange rate (Bresser-Pereira 
1991, 17–18). The plan combined, therefore, orthodox fiscal restrictions and unorthodox 
monetary reform. Accordingly, the underlying causes of the high inflation were identified 
as chronic fiscal imbalance coupled with excess of monetary supply. Fiscal austerity was 
supposed to tackle the first cause of inflation, while monetary reform and the liquidity 
squeeze would tackle the remaining causes. The plan succeeded in reducing inflation in 
the very short term. For three months after its announcement, in 16th March 1990, 
inflation was kept below 10% (Crabtree 1991, 123; Saad-Filho and Mollo 2002, 118). 
Towards the end of 1990, however, it became clear that President Collor’s did not ‘kill 
the tiger of inflation with one shot’, as he said he would (Crabtree 1991; Bresser-Pereira 
1991, 33).  
With the inflation accelerating again, partially due to external factors like the oil 
price shock caused by the gulf war (Schneider 1991, 331), the government announced the 
‘Collor Plan II’. The new measures basically reinforced the orthodox component of the 
plan, deepening fiscal austerity. Interests rates rocketed, and the government changed 
indexation taxes, so as to detach them from past inflation (Giambiagi et al. 2005, 150). In 
May 1991, the finance minister Zélia Cardoso de Mello was substituted by Marcilio 
Marques Moreira, who kept the fiscal austerity measures. At that point, liberal and 
developmentalist economists – and the population at large – had already turned their 
backs on the government (Bresser-Pereira 1991, 34; Pastore 1991). Inflation remained 
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extremely high (1149% in 1992 – see Graph 12), and growth rates were very 
disappointing (-4.4 % in 1990; about 1% in 1991 and -0.5% in 1992 – see Graph 11). 
After Collor’s resignation, in December 1992, President Itamar Franco named six 
different finance ministers. The first, Gustavo Krause, lasted only two months. The 
second and the third ministers, Paulo Roberto Haddad and Elizeu Resende, did not fare 
much better, remaining in office for around three months each. The literature normally 
skips this tumultuous period – between October 1992 and June 1993 – altogether (see, for 
instance, Giambiagi et al. [2005], an influential Brazilian textbook). Contrastingly, the 
subsequent period – the genesis of the Real Plan is studied deeply by economists from 
diverse inclinations.41 
Cardoso was President Franco’s fourth Finance Minister. He took office in June 
1993 and remained in charge until March 1994, when he stepped down to prepare his 
campaign for the upcoming presidential elections. The reason for the disproportionate 
attention the literature dispenses on his administration as Finance Minister is evident 
enough. Unlike the many economic plans launched in the previous ten years – of which 
Collor Plans I and II were just other examples – the Real Plan finally succeeded in curbing 
inflation. Annual inflation rates descended from 2477% in 1993, to 916% in 1994, and 
22% in 1995 (see Graph 12). For the rest of the decade, inflation remained below 10% a 
year. The social consequences of this stabilisation plan, however, were huge (Saad-Filho 
and Mollo 2002; Amann and Baer 2002; see 4.4 below). 
 Before implementing the new plan, a limited monetary reform was announced by 
a Provisional Government Decree and subsequently converted into Law 8.697 (Brasil 
1993b). Because of the galloping inflation of the previous years, this reform simply 
changed the name of the currency – now called Cruzeiros Reais – and cut three zeros in 
order to facilitate accounting (1000 Cr$ = 1 CR$). Once again, the money bills were 
stamped (figure 3). The new currency was set to have a short life, however. The Real Plan 
would culminate with its substitution for a new, stable, currency (R$) to be released in 
the second semester of 1994, just a few months before the presidential election. This final 
currency change was defined as the culmination of the stabilisation plan, which comprised 
three steps.  
                                                          
41 A well-balanced literature review of the different perspectives on the Real Plan is still to be written. For a comprehensive 
explanation of the plan and a passionate defence, see Franco (1995). For a more balanced perspective from one of the earlier 
architects of the plan, see Bacha (1997). For an developmentalist perspective, see Bresser-Pereira (1994). For a Marxist critique, see 
Saad-Filho and Mollo (2002). 
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The first step was an austerity package, including cuts in public spending and the 
freezing of up to 15% of the public budget, to be directed towards an ‘Emergency Social 
Fund’. Despite its misleading name, the main purpose of the fund was not to sustain social 
programs, but to reduce public deficit. The austerity package also included raising taxes 
and an agreement with the IMF and private banks (Giambiagi et al. 2005, 151). 
 The second step was the most interesting aspect of the plan. Its aim, the ‘de-
indexation’ of the economy, was based on the inertial inflation theory, ‘the most original 
contribution Latin American, and particularly Brazilian thought offered to 
macroeconomics’ (Bresser-Pereira 1994, 129). According to this theory, one of the main 
causes of inflation in Brazil was the widespread indexation of the economy – meaning 
the automatic price correction based on past inflation. Because contracts, including labour 
contracts, incorporated the provision of regular rises based on the inflation verified in 
previous periods, inflation could never retrocede, being always higher than in the past.42 
 Previous economic stabilisation plans – particularly the Cruzado Plan, in 1986 – 
had also recognised the inertial character of Brazilian inflation. They unsuccessfully tried 
to correct it by freezing prices and prohibiting indexation of new contracts. The 
innovation included in the Real Plan was the creation of a transitional bi-monetary 
system, instead of trying to de-index the economy by freezing prices. From 27th February 
1994, the government introduced a new semi-currency, the URV (Real Unity of Value). 
It was originally a semi-currency because it was meant to perform only one of the three 
classical functions of currency, namely, serving as unit of accounting. The old currency 
(CR$) kept the functions of medium of exchange and store of value (heavily affected by 
the ongoing inflation). Prices – including salaries – were then marked in both, CR$ and 
URVs. The value of URVs in CR$, however, changed daily, at pace with the inflation 
rate. In the economic jargon, the government created and ‘indexed money’. The value of 
the URV in CR$ started at URV 1 = 647.50 CR$, on 1st March 1994, and ended at URV 
1 = 2750.00 CR$, on 1st July 1994.  
After four months, when the URV was consolidated as a unit of accounting and 
most of the people learned to trust its stable value – in contrast with the falling value of 
the CR$ – the URV finally became the new currency, now called ‘Real’. Thus, the third 
and final step of the plan was the substitution of old CR$ notes by brand new R$ notes, 
at the URV conversion rate (CR$ 2750.00 = 1.00 R$). The result was that the new 
                                                          
42 For a review of the concept of inertial inflation, see Bresser Pereira (2010). Arida and Resende (1985) are normally considered 
pioneers on the topic. 
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contracts expressed now in R$ should not include automatic price correction based on the 
past inflation, because the inflation has been incorporated into the money itself. 
The successive steps and the rationale behind the plan were explicated in a series 
of official documents. The Exposition of Reason43 395/1993 stressed the necessity for 
fiscal austerity; introduced the already mentioned ‘Emergency Social Found’ (Brasil 
1993a, secs. 44–57) and defined the strategy of de-indexation via URV (Brasil 1993a, 
121–28). It also established, as the final step of the plan, the creation of the new currency 
(Brasil 1993a, sec. 129). The Exposition of Reasons 047/1994 (Brasil 1994a) detailed the 
monetary reform and reaffirmed the necessity of keeping fiscal austerity. Finally, the 
Exposition of Reasons 205/1994 (Brasil 1994b) summarised the three steps of the Real 
Plan and introduced the last piece of legislation necessary for the transition between the 
URV and the R$.  
The last document also contemplated another key aspect of the monetary 
stabilisation: the control of money creation. ‘It is proposed that the Real shall be ballasted 
by the country’s international reserves, in the exact proportion of 1 US$ for each Real 
issued’ (Brasil 1994b, sec. 38). In short, the cornerstone of the Argentinian stabilisation 
plan – then widely considered successful – was also adopted in Brazil, so as to give 
credibility to the new currency. In the Brazilian case, however, the fixed exchange rate 
parity between the national currency and the US dollar was deliberately not defined by 
law, so as to allow for some flexibility (Brasil 1994b, sec. 39).  
In fact, the strategy of using the exchange rate to back the stabilisation plan 
constituted what is normally referred to in the Brazilian literature as the ‘exchange rate 
anchor’ (De Paula and Alves 1999; Silva 2002). Exactly how much of the initial success 
of the Real plan should be credited to the exchange rate policy, the ingenuity of the 
currency substitution or the fiscal austerity is difficult to tell. The overvalued exchange 
rate coupled with trade liberalisation meant that internal producers had to face 
competition of imported goods, establishing a ceiling for price raises. At the same time, 
it guaranteed the support of the middle classes, which saw their purchasing power 
substantially increased. The smooth change of currencies de-indexed the economy, 
making sure past inflation would not automatically be transferred to the future. Finally, 
fiscal austerity prevented the government from financing deficits with further monetary 
                                                          
43 ‘Exposition of Reason’, in the Brazilian juridical lexicon, is the internal document whereby one or more State Ministers express 
their views to the President, eventually suggesting alterations in the legislation in order to implement public policies.  
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emission, at the same time guaranteeing the support of national and international financial 
capital. 
One additional factor that is rarely mentioned in the literature is the favourable 
international conjuncture. Not surprisingly, one of the few authors to stress this is 
dependency theorist Theotonio dos Santos, in his bitter open letter to his former colleague 
and now President Cardoso: 
 
Firstly, we must demystify the statement that it was the Real Plan that ended 
inflation. (…) From 1994 onwards all [national] economies of the world showed 
a reduction of the inflation to less than 10%. Of course, in each country local 
‘geniuses’ emerge claiming to themselves the authorship of that reduction. But 
this is false: it was a planetary movement (Santos 2010).  
      
It is not necessary to fully agree with Santos’ exclusively external explanation for 
the end of inflation in Brazil to recognise that the Real Plan was launched in a positive 
international conjuncture (see Saad-Filho and Maldonado Filho 1998). Soon, however, 
the fragilities of the plan would become clear. Akin to the Argentinian Convertibility 
Plan, the Real Plan relied on a constant external supply of capital, in order to cover 
growing current account deficits and keep the exchange rate overvalued. This involved 
privatising companies and keeping interest rates high, which ended up putting further 
pressure on the public budget. Simultaneously, permanent fiscal austerity and high 
interest rates meant less productive investments and rising unemployment. The result was 
sluggish GDP growth rates during most of the decade (see Graph 11). The most negative 
consequences of the plan would appear in the aftermath of the Russian crisis of 1998, 
when the ‘exchange rate anchor’ could not be kept. 
Privatisations played a key role in both, sustaining the overarching 
macroeconomic strategy and keeping together the class alliance forged by Cardoso – if 
only temporarily. In the first case, privatisations generated revenues, debt cancellations 
and foreign investments, allowing for the exchange rate to be kept overvalued. In the 
second case, it directly pleased national capital owners, by allowing them to take control 
over former state competitors or suppliers, substantially expanding their business in 
association with international capital. In order to produce tangible gains for these 
privileged class fractions, the losses of the privatisation process were conveniently 
socialised, mainly through the alienation of valuable assets built by the generations of 
Brazilian workers.     
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In speeches and public documents, privatisations were justified by a set of 
ideological reasons, clearly springing from the market utopia. These reasons are identified 
in the two most important pieces of legislation that regulated the privatisation process, 
respectively establishing and reforming the National De-nationalisation Program (PND). 
In fact, both laws 8.031/1990 (Brasil 1990b) and 9.491/1997 (Brasil 1997b) – approved 
respectively in President Collor and President Cardoso administrations – list the same six 
aims. Making reference to an idealised opposition between state and market, the law 
sustains that de-nationalisation was expected to ‘reorient the strategic position of the State 
in the Economy, by transferring to the private initiative activities that are unduly explored 
by the public sector’ (Brasil 1990b, sec. 1; 1997b, sec. 1). Ideological arguments for 
privatisation also included the idea that it would increase ‘competitiveness’ of the private 
sector (Brasil 1990, sec. 4; 1997, sec.4)44 and that the State should concentrate its efforts 
on the ‘realisation of national priorities’ (Brasil 1990, sec. 6; 1997, sec.6). Finally, 
privatisations were said to help to achieve budget balance, by reducing public debt (Brasil 
1990, sec. 2; 1997, sec.2). 45  Moreover, the government counted on privatisations to 
increase investments (Brasil 1990, sec. 3; 1997, sec.3) and to boost the stock market 
(Brasil 1990, sec. 6; 1997, sec.6).  
Despite his aggressive pro-market rhetoric and his explicit evocation of the market 
utopia, privatisations under President Collor were rather limited. In 1990, no state 
company was privatised. The technical reason for the delay in executing the PND was the 
time necessary to structure each individual privatisation. Before the final stage – the 
public auction of the company’s assets – the program encompassed seven previous steps, 
which were expected to take 275 days on average to complete (Almeida 2010, 281). These 
steps included the hiring of consultancy firms in order to structure the auction, effectively 
privatising privatisation itself (Schneider 1992, 16).  
In 1991, only four state companies were privatised, frustrating the government’s 
declared intention to pass to the private sector 27 companies worth of a total of U$ 18 
billion (Schneider 1992, 16). In 1992, 16 companies were sold (including provinces’ 
companies), but the government was able to collect only U$ 4.04 billion (Almeida 2010, 
289). Most of that was paid in government bounds, including ‘Privatisation Certificates’, 
                                                          
44 This point is phrased in the two laws in a slightly different ways. 
45 Again, this point is phrased in two slightly different ways, meaning substantially the same thing. 
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compulsorily bought by financial institutions as part of the liquidity squeeze comprised 
in the Collor Plan.  
It is also worth noticing that the first privatised companies were relatively small 
firms from the capital goods sector (steel, turbines, fertilisers, etc.). This is explained by 
less legal restrictions and potentially less political resistance associated with the sale of 
those companies (Paiva 1994, 105). After the resignation of President Collor, President 
Franco continued the privatisation process. The first well-known companies were 
privatised in 1993 and 1994. Those include the giant steelmaker CSN (proudly founded 
during Vargas administration as a symbol of Brazilian state-led development) and 
Embraer (a world class aircraft maker).  
Cardoso’s administration would bring the privatisation program to an 
unprecedented level. It did so by breaking long-lasting state monopolies, selling giant, 
previously-monopolistic companies and extending privatisations to the highly profitable 
service sector. The privatisation program had its most intense years between 1996 and 
1998, after legal adjustments approved in 1995. These included five Constitutional 
Amendments (Almeida 2010, 332–33), as state monopolies in areas such as oil, gas and 
telecommunications were enshrined in the Constitution. Even weakened by the continued 
crisis of the previous two decades, the institutions of the developmental state in Brazil 
were not easily dismantled. Only a specific conjunction of growing necessity to attract 
capital, the contradictory demands of a class alliance between the middle class and 
fractions of the ruling class and decisive international support (in the form of capital flows 
and official endorsement by the IMF and the World Bank) can explain how Cardoso’s 
first administration managed to substantially extend the privatisation program.  
The aforementioned necessity to attract capital was a direct consequence of the 
macroeconomic model established in the aftermath of the Real stabilisation plan. To keep 
the ‘exchange rate anchor’, the government needed to guarantee a constant influx of 
dollars to the Brazilian economy. At the same time, the overvalued exchange rate and the 
trade liberalisation boosted imports of consumption goods (Kume 1996; De Paula and 
Alves 1999). Without resorting to imports, the consumer demand unleashed by the 
economic stabilisation would have been directed to the internal market, exerting an 
upward pressure on prices and potentially re-igniting inflation. In this context, 
privatisations were a key part of the stabilisation plan, inasmuch as the government 
counted on the sale of public companies to compensate current account deficits generated 
by increased imports. Furthermore, the privatisation revenues helped keep the public 
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budget under control. The centrality of the privatisation program is clearly reaffirmed in 
public documents, as the Exposition of Reasons 205/1994 states that ‘the results of a 
privatisation program are considered to be an integral and fundamental part of the 
government’s budget balance’ (Brasil 1994b, sec. 13). 
This perverse dynamics of selling public property in order to allow for the 
relatively cheap import of consumer goods is described in a positive light by neoliberal 
economists. Pinheiro, for instance, mentions a ‘virtuous cycle’ between privatisations and 
economic stabilisation, ‘so that the second creates the political conditions for new sectors 
to be included in the [privatisation] process, while the first contributes to sustain the 
stability’ (Pinheiro 1999, 168). In short, the macroeconomic model demanded overvalued 
exchange rates and constant fiscal austerity, allowing the government to present 
privatisations as inevitable.  
In total, 80 companies were privatised in the first term of President Cardoso, 
generating US$ 60.1 billion, plus 13.3 billion in debt cancellation (Pinheiro 1999, 164–
165 - includes provinces' companies). Of that impressive amount, US$ 6.9 billion 
(including debt cancellation) refers to the sale of the giant mining company Vale do Rio 
Doce, in 1997. The telecommunications sector, often quoted by neoliberal economists as 
the best example of the success of the privatisation program in Brazil, generated US$ 29 
billion (including debt cancellation), with the split and subsequent sale of the national 
telecommunication system in 1997 and 1998.  
The privatisation rhythm slowed down in the second presidential term (1999-
2002), partially sparing some flagship state companies. Petrobras, the National Mail 
Service and Banco do Brasil, for instance, remained under government control. To 
understand these dynamics, it is necessary again to bear in mind the links between 
privatisations, their social conditionings, international constraints and the 
macroeconomic strategy at large after 1999.  
Battered by the Asian crisis of 1997 and the Russian crisis of 1998, the monetary 
policy adopted in the aftermath of the Real plan had to be substantially reformed. Even 
resorting to an IMF loan worth of US$ 42 billion in October 1998 (Couto and Abrucio 
2003, 284), the government could not avoid the current account crisis and was forced to 
abandon exchange rate controls in January 1999, just one month after the start of President 
Cardoso’s new term. The R$ lost more than 50% of its value against the US$ between the 
end of December/1998 and the end of January/1999. The ‘maxi-devaluation’ of the R$ 
(Gonçalves 1999; De Paula and Alves 2000; Palma 2006) negatively affected the 
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privatisation program in two different ways. Firstly, by severely impacting the popularity 
of President Cardoso, who had been recently re-elected on the basis of attaining monetary 
stability. The expensive dollar affected the urban middle classes, making the support 
needed for the privatisation of symbolic companies like Petrobras much more unlikely. 
Secondly, with the liberalisation of the exchange rates and the realisation of primary fiscal 
surpluses, the necessity of using privatisations to guarantee current account and budget 
balances did not hold anymore.  
Even so, the government did not abandon privatisations completely. Six 
companies were privatised in 1999, generating US$ 554 million (Pinheiro 2000, 22), a 
limited amount if compared with previous years. In 2000, the government tested the 
waters for the privatisation of Petrobras, selling shares of the company on the stock 
markets of Sao Paulo and New York and releasing a plan to change its name for 
‘Petrobrax’. Despite being able to raise US$ 2.6 billion in the international market only 
(BNDES 2000, 36), the changing of the name of the popular oil company faced strong 
opposition. Shortly after the announcement of the new brand, the government had to step 
back and President Cardoso himself published a note in the newspapers guaranteeing that 
Petrobras would not be privatised and would keep its name (Ednilson 2010, 144). 
Taken together, the monetary reforms and the privatisation process in Brazil 
during the 1990s reveal an intriguing mismatch between discourse and practice. While 
President Collor announced very vocally his adherence to a market utopia, it was only 
during President Cardoso’s administration that privatisations and a solid neoliberal 
monetary reform actually took-off. This apparent contradiction indicate that, in Brazil, 
neoliberalism cannot be reduced neither to discourse, nor to policies. The key to 
understand the differences between the two periods must be found in the class disputes 
that underpinned the neoliberal development strategy and the changing international 
settings.  
 
 
4.3 ‘Autonomy by participation’ and the resynchronisation of foreign policy with 
the neoliberal development strategy   
 
In the previous sections, I argued that Brazilian neoliberalism entailed a shift from 
classical developmentalism, which had been the dominant development strategy for 
decades after the Second World War. Accordingly, the international in general, and the 
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international market in particular, were represented as spheres of opportunities, into 
which Brazil had to be integrated. Privatisations and monetary reforms – among other 
policies – relied on the supposedly inherent efficiency of the market in allocating scarce 
resources to the benefit of the whole society. In short, a new market utopia replaced the 
old state utopia. In one key area of Brazilian public service, however, the state utopia was 
particularly entrenched. The Ministry of External Relations, with its steady and 
professional bureaucracy, has traditionally been an arm of Brazilian developmentalism. 
An important aspect of the neoliberal development strategy in Brazil was, therefore, a 
sharp change in foreign policy.  
Under the impact of the fall of the Berlin Wall, eloquently evoked by President 
Collor in his campaign, the changes in foreign policy initially took the form of an 
attempted rapprochement with the United States, coupled with a decisive liberal turn in 
trade policy. To the horror of an older generation of nationalist diplomats,46 the new 
president was not keen to confront the US in order to defend industrial policies. A 
concrete example was Brazil’s change of position regarding property rights standards and 
protection for the nascent computing industry. President Collor agreed to negotiate a 
revision of these policies bilaterally with the US and sent to the Congress a bill that 
contemplated many US demands (Batista 2009, 148; Sallum Jr 2011, 270). 
The negotiations on the foreign debt also stepped back from a more nationalist 
stance. After insisting in the first year that the restructuring of the debt should be 
subordinated to the capacity of generating growth, Collor’s administration ended up 
agreeing with the conditions imposed by the IMF and signed a deal with the Fund and the 
Paris Club in January 1992 (Batista 2009, 149; Sallum Jr 2011, 270). The final 
restructuring of the debt, however, following the model of the Brady Plans adopted in 
other Latin American countries, would only happen in President Franco’s administration 
(Hirst and Pinheiro 1995, 17). Regarding trade, the new government promoted a drastic, 
unilateral cut in tariffs. As a result, the average import tariff dropped from 32% in 1990 
to 14% in 1994 (Averbug 1999, 47). At the same time, non-tariff barriers were also lifted, 
so that by 1993 the only controls on imports were the falling tariffs (Corseuil and Kume 
2003, 15).   
                                                          
46 Given the hierarchical structure of the Foreign Service, few diplomats dared to speak out. For two 
notable examples among senior Ambassadors, see Nogueira Batista (2009) and Pinheiro Guimarães 
(2001).  
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Politically, notwithstanding President Collor’s best intentions to avoid 
confrontation with the US, the change in foreign policy he implemented did not go as far 
as a total alignment. Unlike Argentina, for instance, Brazil did not volunteer troops to the 
1991 Gulf War, despite having seconded the US’ position in the UN Security Council 
(Hirst and Pinheiro 1995, 22; Casarões 2012, 141). Another expression of the renewed 
image that the Brazilian foreign policy was trying to convey was the hosting of the United 
Nations Conference on Environment and Development. The Conference took place in 
Rio de Janeiro, in June 1992, bringing to the city an unprecedented number of Heads of 
States.  
In an influential article, Hirst and Pinheiro (1995) highlight the deadlock in which 
the Brazilian Ministry of External Relations found itself after the downfall of President 
Collor’s administration. The neoliberal turn broke the traditional nationalist line followed 
by Brazilian diplomacy, creating a division within the bureaucracy itself. This division 
opposed ‘positions closer to neodevelopmentalist ideals – therefore nationalist – to 
positions more akin to neoliberalism, with a more cosmopolitan perspective’ (Hirst and 
Pinheiro 1995, 9). At the same time, the challenge of formulating and implementing 
foreign policy in a liberal democracy confronted a generation of diplomats shaped during 
the long dictatorship and used to an authoritarian, top-down approach to public policies. 
In this context, a new foreign policy strategy emerged from within the Brazilian 
Ministry of External Relations. This strategy resynchronised the foreign policy with the 
official discourse and the economic policies, through a common view of the international 
setting as primarily a source of opportunities for development, as well as a shared faith in 
the market utopia. The best theoretical expression of this new strategy was the book ‘A 
Legitimidade e Outras Questoes Internacionais’ (Legitimacy and Other International 
Questions) by Ambassador Gelson Fonseca (1998). The book explains and justifies the 
most relevant traits of Brazilian foreign policy in 1990s from a liberal perspective, 
capable of placing the foreign policy within the general neoliberal development strategy. 
According to Ambassador Fonseca, the conditions posed by the end of the Cold 
War and the return of democracy led to a ‘rethink’ of Brazilian international strategies 
(1998, 363). Cautiously, as befits a professional diplomat, the Ambassador claimed that 
Brazil traditionally tried to preserve its national autonomy by distancing itself from deep 
engagement with international regimes. In the new scenario, this position should be 
replaced by a new strategy labelled ‘autonomy by participation’ (Fonseca 1998, 363). In 
order to effectively influence in the building up of new international regimes on issues 
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like the environment, human rights, international trade, and new technologies the country 
needed to ‘renew its credentials’ (1998, 367). In practical terms, the renovation of 
credentials meant abandoning old developmentalist positions and embracing a non-
conflictive international identity. Examples of diplomatic actions based on this 
perspective included taking part in the UN Security Council and in UN ‘peace 
operations’, engaging with nuclear control initiatives such as the Tlatelolco and the Non-
Proliferation treaties, and actively contributing to environmental and human rights 
conferences (1998, 368-369). 
Most importantly, however, is the change in position regarding economic and 
commercial matters. According to Fonseca, ‘today, Brazilian economic agents have the 
clear view that, to profit in the international economy, the initial and necessary step is to 
accept the premise of the competition and the constraints of the market laws’ (1998, 371). 
This perspective clearly empties the claim that developing countries should have special 
treatment in trade regimes, one of the cornerstones of the traditional developmentalist 
diplomacy, expressed in international forums such as the UNCTAD. Indeed, from the 
1990s, Brazilian diplomacy shifted its traditional priority, from Third World-oriented 
spaces such as UNCTAD to organisations such as the WTO and even the OECD.47 
This new international perspective fitted like a glove in the overall neoliberal 
development strategy, providing a complementary line of discursive justification for the 
market reforms being implemented. As clearly stated by Fonseca: 
 
[W]e know that (…) the conditions for competitiveness depend on “tidying up 
the house”, on the adaptation of the national economy to the new international 
conditions. Policies like trade liberalisation (…), privatisation, resuming contacts 
with the financial community and keeping stability are necessary preconditions 
to create a situation of “economic health”, with repercussions for the international 
performance of the economy (1998, 372). 
 
 During President Cardoso’s administration, therefore, foreign policy became one 
of the areas where the neoliberal development strategy expressed itself most clearly, 
displacing older developmentalist perspectives. From a traditional political non-
alignment that sought to guarantee spaces for nationalist policies occasionally 
contradicting US interests, Brazilian diplomacy moved to a more cooperative attitude 
                                                          
47 Brazil never became a full member of the OECD, but its engagement with the Organisation was 
intensified in the 1990s. In 1999, the OECD council launched a program specifically tailored for Brazil. 
After the downfall of Brazilian neodevelopmentalism, in 2016, the new administration is renewing its 
attempts to join the OECD, this time as a full member. 
138 
 
 
towards the US, in particular, and global north countries in general. 48  The personal 
prestige and diplomatic efforts of President Cardoso himself also helped to promote 
Brazil’s renewed international image as a vibrant liberal democracy. At the same time, 
trade liberalisation, which started with unilateral cuts in trade tariffs under President 
Collor’s administration, evolved into the formation of Mercosur, consolidating the new 
low tariffs by tying it to an international agreement involving Argentina, Paraguay and 
Uruguay.49 Potentially, trade liberalisation would reach its zenith with the creation of the 
Free Trade Area of Americas (FTAA), whose complex negotiations extended beyond the 
neoliberal decade and were finally discontinued in 2005.50         
 Ambassador Fonseca’s concept of ‘autonomy by participation’ and his calls for 
the ‘renewal of credentials’ updated the diplomatic discourse, resynchronising it with the 
overall neoliberal development strategy. Therefore, foreign policy and neoliberal reforms 
actually reinforced each other – while the reforms were internationally presented as 
‘tiding up the house’, international support legitimised further dismantling of the 
developmentalist state.  
Beyond the fog of diplomatic discourse, however, it is difficult to see actual 
diplomatic achievements in this period. The crucial support received from international 
financial institutions (IMF, specifically) depended more on the government’s willingness 
to promote the prescribed fiscal austerity agenda than on its foreign policy or cooperative 
bilateral relations with the US. A point can be made that the projection of a positive image 
was important to attract foreign capital, although it is more likely that the high interest 
rates overshadowed the foreign policy on that matter. Furthermore, the new international 
image of Brazil and the prestige of its President were not enough to guarantee to the 
country pre-eminent positions in international governance bodies. The long-lasting 
endeavour of conquering a permanent seat in the UN Security Council was not realised. 
Brazil also remained excluded from the OECD and the Group of Seven (G7), despite its 
expansion in 1997 to include Russia. Most importantly, Brazil remained under-
represented on the Executive Boards of international financial institutions such as the 
IMF and the Word Bank.  
                                                          
48 One rare case of limited diplomatic tension between Brazil and the US in the period was the dispute 
regarding property rights for anti-HIV drugs. 
49 Mercosur aspires to be more than a free-trade zone. In an effort to constitute a common market, the 
Organization adopted and common external trade tariff, ranging from 0 to 20 % (Azevedo and 
Massuquetti 2009). For a comprehensive overview of the formation of Mercosur, see Vaz (2002) 
50 The resistance against the FTAA is proudly presented as a decisive diplomatic victory by 
neodevelopmentalists in Brazil and in Argentina (see chapters 5 and 6).  
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As expected, the sharp shift in Brazil’s traditional foreign policy strategy 
marginalised the nationalist faction of the Ministry of External Relations, triggering the 
opposition of some of Ambassador Fonseca’s senior colleagues, most notably 
Ambassador Samuel Pinheiro Guimaraes. For them, while the benefits of the neoliberal 
development strategy were elusive, the costs of ‘renewing Brazilian credentials’ were 
perceived as very real in terms of policy-space limitation. From Ambassador Pinheiro 
Guimaraes’ perspective, the international regimes in which Brazil was aiming to get more 
involved actually formed part of the US’ ‘hegemonic power structures’ (2007, 36), 
actively hindering possibilities for state-led development in peripheral countries.  
The nuclear non-proliferation regime, for instance, arguably froze international 
power imbalances by creating a legal distinction between nuclear and non-nuclear 
countries (Batista 2009, 217). Acceptance of strict intellectual property regulations and 
of foreign trade parameters defined by the WTO are other examples. Consequently, 
international juridical limitations to the state’s policies are portrayed as a form of ‘indirect 
recolonization’. ‘What are the characteristics of a colony’ – rhetorically asks Ambassador 
Pinheiro Guimaraes, implying a comparison with the situation of Brazil in the 1990s – ‘It 
cannot have weapons; it cannot have foreign policy; it cannot have internal economic 
policies; it cannot have a currency’ (2001, 4).             
 
 
4.4 Neoliberalism and uneven and combined development in Brazil     
 
One decade of neoliberal reforms failed to lift Brazil out of underdevelopment, as 
repeatedly promised in the political discourses. The dismantling of the developmental 
state – involving monetary reforms, privatisations, and a shift in the foreign policy – did 
not boost economic growth, as predicted by neoliberal writers. After 12 years of market-
friendly policies, there was no sign that Brazil was catching-up with the global north in 
economic or social terms.  
‘Brazil can be one of the great powers in the world’, announced Cardoso, when 
running for office for the first time (Cardoso 1994a). In January 2003, he passed the 
yellow and green Presidential Ribbon to Lula da Silva. The country he left behind, before 
flying for a sabbatical period in Paris, was certainly not a ‘great power’. It was a poor and 
very unequal country, struggling with yet another economic crisis, and eager to believe 
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once again in the renewed development promises that the new president was about to 
make (see chapter 5).     
 My argument in this chapter is that the failure of the neoliberal reforms to live up 
to the grand expectations evoked in the neoliberal political discourse is not circumstantial. 
It stems from limitations of the neoliberal development strategy. For a short period, 
between 1994 and 1998, the internal contradictions of the neoliberal development strategy 
could be postponed. The declared aim of the Real Plan – reducing inflation – was actually 
achieved in 1994 (see graph 12). Nevertheless, the monetary reform created a situation of 
heavy dependence on international capital flows (De Paula and Alves 1999). 
Consequently, a reversal of these flows would put the entire macroeconomic strategy 
under pressure, leading to its collapse in the first months of 1999. 
 A closer look at Brazilian balance of payments tables reveals the fragilities of the 
monetary policy in face of external shocks (graph 13).51 Initially, the stabilisation of 
prices stimulated the aggregate demand, resulting in GDP growth rates of 5.85% in 1994 
and 4.22% in 1995 (see graph 11). Nevertheless, following cuts in trade tariffs, and 
responding to the overvaluation of the exchange rates, this demand was largely channelled 
to imports, failing to stimulate national industry (graph 14). The external balance of goods 
and services, for instance, went from historically positive results to a deficit of US$ 10.95 
billion in 1995. The pressure on the international reserves was exacerbated by historical 
deficits in rents (U$ 11.05 billion in 1995 alone), due to the constant remittance of profits 
from foreign capitals investing in Brazil (graph 13).   
 
                                                          
51 For the analysis that follows, I rely on statistics from CEPAL (2017), unless another source is indicated.   
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During the brief heyday of the neoliberal development strategy, this deficit could 
be counterbalanced by positive results in the financial account. In 1994, the country 
attracted US$ 7.9 billion in net investments. In 1995 this figure jumped to US$ 28.7 
billion, before reaching its peak – US$ 33.5 billion – in 1996. These impressive figures 
can be partially explained by the privatisation process, but also by the emission of public 
bonds, amounting to US$ 7.3 billion in 1995 and US$ 15.3 billion in 1996. The high 
interest rates played a significant role at this stage, attracting short term international 
capital, in a context of relatively low inflation. As a consequence, public indebtedness 
increased significantly. Net public debt (including internal and external debt, subtracting 
reserves) jumped from 26.0 % of the GDP in 1994, to 30.9% in 1996, to 42.6 % in 1999 
(Averbug and Giambiagi 2000, 12).  
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In short, the ephemeral golden age of the Real Plan – between 1994 and 1998 – 
was based on the attraction of volatile foreign capital, depredation of public property, and 
continuous public indebtedness. In other words, it required a continuous socialisation of 
losses. Because most of the economic surplus was appropriated by the ruling class via 
high remuneration for capital (interest rates) and direct transfer of undervalued public 
assets (privatisation), even during the best years of Cardoso’s administration, gains for 
the working class were very limited. Wages decreased, unemployment levels remained 
basically unchanged and social inequality did not diminish (graphs 15 and 16). 
 The dubious initial success of the stabilisation plan was dramatically reversed 
when the Brazilian economy was lashed by the whip of external necessity. External 
pressure took the concrete form of a sharp contraction in the international offer of capital 
in the aftermath of the 1997 (Asian) and 1998 (Russian) financial crises. In-depth analysis 
of key 1998 macroeconomic figures reveal how vulnerable the development strategy in 
place was in face of external shocks. To compensate for a mammoth current account 
deficit of U$ 33.4 billion, the government tried to attract foreign capital by raising the 
1990 1991 1992 1993 1994 1995 1996 1997 1998 1999 2000 2001 2002
Agriculture -3.7 1.4 4.9 -0.1 5.4 4.1 3.0 0.8 3.4 6.5 2.7 5.3 8.0
Industry -9.5 0.1 -4.2 8.4 7.3 2.1 0.1 2.5 -4.8 -1.9 5.7 0.6 2.2
Services (electricity, gas, water) 1.8 7.1 -0.1 4.9 4.2 7.6 3.1 5.9 1.2 0.5 4.2 -7.9 4.4
Finantial services / Rents -3.1 -1.4 -1.6 -0.5 0.8 -2.7 1.8 2.8 0.9 1.5 3.3 2.4 3.8
GDP overall variation -4.4 1.0 -0.5 4.9 5.9 4.2 2.2 3.4 0.4 0.5 4.4 1.3 3.1
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interest rates to 49.75%, despite inflation being only 1.6%. This severely penalised the 
productive sector. Overall GDP growth was only 0.34%, which actually represented a 
contraction in per capita figures. Furthermore, the monetary restrictions affected different 
sectors unevenly, promoting a regressive specialisation of the economy. Less competitive 
in the face of Asian exports, the industrial product contracted by 4.8%, while agriculture 
expanded by 3.4% (table 2).  
 
 
 
TABLE 2 – SELECTED MACROECONOMIC FIGURES – BRAZIL/1998. 
Souce:CEPALSTAT – BC/Brazil 
Current 
account 
deficit  
Interest 
Rates 
Inflation GDP 
growth 
Agriculture 
and cattle 
raising 
Industrial 
activity 
Car 
Production  
Unemployment 
US$  
33.4 
billion 
49,75% 
(Selic 
official 
rate 
10/1998) 
1.65 % 0.35% 3.4% -4.8% 353.0 
(thousand 
units)  
8.0%  
(second quarter 
of the year – 
underestimated 
by old Brazilian 
methodology) 
 
  In the course of 1998, it became clear that the current account deficit could lead 
to the collapse of the entire macroeconomic strategy, dependent on the exchange rate 
control. Incapable of attracting international capital to the extent necessary, the 
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government started contemplating a shift in the exchange rate policy. ‘We really feared 
devaluation’ – confessed many years later Gustavo Franco, then the President of the 
Central Bank (2004). In order to avoid it, or at least postpone it until after the elections 
scheduled for October 1998, the government tried to fix the growing hole in the balance 
of payments, imposing a further socialisation of losses. Fiscal austerity was reinforced 
and the biggest loan to date with the IMF was requested, worth U$ 42 billion (Averbug 
and Giambiagi 2000, 14). 
 It was not enough. In January 1999, Gustavo Franco was replaced by Francisco 
Lopes, who tried to promote a gradual devaluation of the exchange rate. The dollar was 
allowed to float within pre-established limits, which were supposed to be regularly 
adjusted. The new president of the Central Bank called this complicated strategy the 
‘diagonal endogenous exchange rate band’ (Lopes 2003). Again, it was not enough. With 
the general expectation that the government would end up liberalising the exchange rate 
market, capital owners forced the limits of the band in a speculative attack against the 
Brazilian currency. Losing international reserves, the government finally abandoned the 
gradualist strategy after only two days. The exchange rate was allowed to devalue 
drastically over the following few weeks – against the advice of the International 
Monetary Fund, which preferred the establishment of a currency board, the strategy 
adopted in Argentina. ‘I was astonished by the degree of control demanded by the IMF 
over our policy making decisions’, the President of the Central Bank would confess 
(Lopes 2003, 56). 
Demoralised, Lopes was replaced by Arminio Fraga after the liberalisation of the 
exchange rate. With the ‘exchange rate anchor’ lost, Fraga commanded the remodelling 
of the entire macroeconomic strategy, establishing the tripod that was kept even after the 
end of Cardoso’s administration. The tripod comprised continued fiscal austerity, floating 
exchange rates and inflation targeting. In practical terms, it meant that the Central Bank 
officially aimed at a pre-determined inflation rate (8% in 1999; 6% in 2000, 4% in 2001 
and 3.5% in 2002), hoping to settle expectations. In order to deliver the promised inflation 
rate, the Central Bank’s main tool was the manipulation of interest rates on government 
bonds. By raising the interest rates, the monetary supply and the level of activity would 
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diminish, therefore driving down inflation; by lowering interest rates, the inverse was 
expected.52  
Finally, the strategy was completed by strict fiscal austerity – as established in the 
original agreement with the IMF and further tightened in the agreement’s revision. The 
primary surplus target  (not including the payment of interest rates) was established at 
3.10% in 1999, 3.25% in 2000 and 3.35% in 2001 (Giambiagi et al. 2005, 178). These 
targets were achieved thanks to the continuous increase in taxes (Bresser-Pereira 2003, 
25). At the same time, total public debt was not reduced, despite the primary surpluses, 
because of the high interest rates throughout the period.  
 The consequences of the shift in the macroeconomic model after the 1999 crisis 
were not only economic, but also social. They would be most acutely felt by the 
productive fraction of the ruling class, as well as by the middle and working classes. The 
average annual GDP growth rate for the first four years (1995-1998), which had already 
been low by historical standards (2.6%), would further diminish to 2.1% between 1999 
and 2002 (Giambiagi et al. 2005, 181). Given the increase in population, per capita GDP 
remained almost stagnant throughout the entire period (see graph 1). Furthermore, most 
of the limited economic growth was led by the agricultural and services sector (graph 14). 
The growth rates in the industrial sector surpassed overall GDP growth in only one of the 
eight years of Cardoso’s administration, actually declining in absolute terms in two years 
(- 4.8 % in 1998 and -1.9% in 1999). In 2002, with the adoption of a new methodology 
by the Brazilian Statistics Institute (IBGE), unemployment was estimated at 12% (7.6% 
according to the old methodology), indicating that the real levels in the previous years 
were effectively much higher.  
 In this context of economic quasi-stagnation, de-industrialisation and growing 
unemployment, salaries were reduced and social inequality remained alarming. In real 
terms, average monthly income went from R$ 923 in 1995 to R$ 770 in 2003 (Saboia 
2007, 483). Despite the limited gains, the minimum wage remained extremely low, and 
in reality did not benefit all workers, as 19.3% of them earned less than the minimum 
wage in 2002 (Afonso et al. 2011, 565–66). As a result, the share of the poorest 20% of 
the population in the total income remained unchanged between 1990 and 2002 (at only 
2.4%). During the same period, the share of the top 20% increased from 65.0% to 66.40%.  
                                                          
52 For different views on the economic tripod and the inflation targeting strategy in Brazil, see Arestis, 
Ferrari Filho, and Paula (2011); Barbosa Filho (2008); Blejer et al. (2002); Fraga, Goldfajn, and Minella 
(2003). 
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The negative effects of the market-friendly reforms of Cardoso’s administration 
in the real economy are paradigmatically illustrated in the privatisation of the electric 
sector. After privatising only half of the sector – the distribution – investments in 
generation of electricity stalled, anticipating further privatisations. The brief acceleration 
of economic growth in 2000 (after two years of stagnation), meant that the demand for 
energy suddenly increased. The lack of investments and the disorganisation of the sector, 
coupled with a drastic water shortage, forced the government to announce a rationing 
policy. Tariffs increased and fines for residences consuming above a pre-determined limit 
were imposed. ‘The government failed to implement an adequate regulation environment 
as well as a reliable free market of energy (…), but succeeded in paralysing the 
coordinating role of Eletrobras [the state electricity company], rendering the system 
acephalous’ (Goldenberg and Prado 2003, 229). As a result, the electricity rationing of 
2001 negatively impacted GDP growth, increased the unpopularity of Cardoso’s 
1990 1993 1995 1996 1999 2001 2002
Poorest 20% 2.40 2.60 2.40 2.20 2.40 2.20 2.40
Second Poorest 20% 5.60 5.80 5.60 5.40 5.40 5.40 5.40
Middle 20% 9.60 9.80 9.40 9.40 9.20 9.20 9.20
Second Richest 20% 17.60 17.00 16.80 16.80 16.20 16.40 16.60
Richest 20% 65.00 64.80 65.60 66.20 66.80 67.00 66.40
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administration. At least in this key sector, market-led solutions to inefficiency and lack 
of investments clearly ended up aggravating the problem. 
 The above mentioned figures show how far President Cardoso went from 
fulfilling his promises of development. Instead of ‘thriving’, GDP growth rates were at 
best disappointing (see graphs 1 and 11). The bold aim of reducing social inequalities 
‘until they disappear’ (Cardoso 1995b, 30) was evidently not achieved. Other human 
development promises – for instance, to sweep ‘hunger and misery away from the 
Brazilian map’ (1995b, 32) – also failed to materialise. Despite some limited progress in 
poverty alleviation, due to the implementation of pioneering social programs, extreme 
poverty still afflicted 10% of the population in 2002, while 34.3% lived in poverty.  
 Why did the neoliberal reforms fail to deliver the developmental outcomes 
promised in the political discourse? What did they produce instead? Which social groups 
actually benefited from them? 
 There is little controversy about President Collor’s ill-fated administration. His 
failures are normally attributed to his political fragility and administrative incapacity, best 
represented by the almost universal condemnation of his monetary stabilisation plan 
(Pastore 1991; Schneider 1992; Bresser-Pereira 1991; Mérette 2000; Fiori 1990a; Fiori 
1990b, to quote just a few). In short, the accepted narrative is that Collor failed to 
modernise Brazil because his government was too weak politically and his economic 
plans were ill-conceived. As a media phenomenon, he managed to win a deeply polarised 
election against Lula da Silva on a thin anti-communist message (see section 4.1) – a 
discourse particularly alluring in the context of the fall of the Berlin Wall. Few neoliberal 
writers are willing to admit that Collor’s administration was instrumental to the pro-
market reforms effectively implemented during Cardoso’s administration. Nevertheless, 
Cardoso himself does exactly that in a revealing interview:  
 
[I]n our case we truly reshaped the structure of the state. Collor had dismantled it 
without creating anything. He didn’t offer any alternatives, did he? It is true that 
he dismantled things to such a degree that it facilitated the process of reassembly’ 
(Cardoso cited in Sorj and Fausto 2013, 37). 
 
When it comes to explaining the shortcomings of Cardoso’s administration, the 
picture becomes much more complex. At this point, neoliberals and neodevelopmentalists 
offer competing narratives. Whenever neoliberal writers are honest enough to recognise 
that the results of the pro-market reforms were less than ideal (Franco 1999; Dornbusch 
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and Cline 1997; de Onis 2000; Fraga 2004), they blame the limited character of the pro-
market reforms actually undertaken. Fiscal austerity was not as strict as it should have 
been (particularly in the period 1994-1998), privatisations should have been extended 
(after 1998) and other liberalising reforms should have been promoted (labour regulation 
reform, tax reform, pension reform, etc.). In any case, the problem was not with the 
neoliberal development strategy in itself, of course, but with the fact that Cardoso’s 
administration did not follow it to the necessary extent. Limited by their uncritical 
reliance on the market utopia, their analysis can only point to the necessity of further 
liberalisation, in the hope of unleashing the ever elusive market forces, which are 
supposed to bring about development. 
Franco (1999) and Fraga (2004) actually move one step further, towards a political 
economy analysis. To explain why Cardoso’s administration did not persist in 
liberalisation, they are forced to introduce an exogenous element: the political opposition 
to the reforms. Nevertheless, their simplistic social perspective (based on the same 
methodological individualist assumptions implicit in the market utopia) is blind to 
competing class interests. The result is that internal political disputes are presented as 
illegitimate corporatist pressures of ‘powerful interests’, against the diffuse common 
good of the ‘silent and unorganised majorities’ (Franco 1999, 3). The corollary of their 
theoretical incapacity to account for class struggle is their policy prescription: stubbornly 
persist with the neoliberal reforms in the hope that the corporatist interests will finally be 
broken.   
On the other side of the political and ideological gulf, neodevelopmentalist writers 
offer an alternative narrative. Their point of departure is precisely the recognition of the 
distance between the neoliberal promises and the results actually achieved: ‘an actual 
neoliberal fantasy took over the country, creating an enormous moat between what was 
announced and what has been revealed after its implementation’ (Pochmann 2001, 7). 
Stressing the irreplaceable role of the state in controlling capital and directing 
investments in order to promote development, these analysts see the poor results achieved 
in the neoliberal decade as a consequence of the retreat of the state, in particular in the 
productive sector. According to Pochmann, in the aftermath of privatisations, the 
participation of state companies was reduced from 100% to 32.6% in the public service 
sector (water, energy, communications); 61.3% to 35.5% in the banking sector; 68.8% to 
9.3% in the mining sector and 64.6% to 0.6% in the steel sector. ‘So far, the private sector, 
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in face of the retreat of the state in the productive sector, is still unable to promote the 
urgently necessary socioeconomic development’ (Pochmann 2001, 34). 
Coupled with the state’s loss of capacity to determine productive investments, the 
reduction of trade tariffs broke national production chains, leading to a substitution for 
imports (the reverse of ISI traditional model) and to the relative specialisation in sectors 
with less aggregate value (Coutinho, Hiratuka, and Sabbatini 2003). Finally, the 
overvaluation of the exchange rate and the financial liberalisation opened avenues for 
speculative capital and created permanent imbalances in the balance of payments 
(Mantega 2001). In short, for neodevelopmentalists, the neoliberal development strategy 
did not deliver on its promises because it rolled back the state. 
The neodevelopmentalist perspective is often complemented by a geopolitical 
view, which seeks to explain the dynamics of economic cycles and external crises. 
According to this nationalist perspective, the disappointing development results of the 
1990s can also be seen as a consequence of the hegemonic position of the US and of the 
imposition of neoliberal policies by the IMF (Tavares and Fiori 1997; Fiori 2004; 
Guimarães 2007). The dependence on volatile external capital and the fragility in face of 
international crisis are portrayed, therefore, not as simple accidents, but as intended 
outcomes of an imperial strategy of domination by US capital in Latin America.  Just like 
its neoliberal counterpart, the neodevelopmentalist narrative culminates with policy 
prescriptions. These may vary, but in general comprise halting the privatisation process, 
keeping the exchange rate undervalued, resisting further trade liberalisation, expanding 
the regulatory power of the state, controlling capital flows, increasing social spending and 
refusing guidance from international financial institutions.   
The critique offered by neodevelopmentalists is surely much richer than the very 
limited neoliberal self-criticism. Nevertheless, because it is based on the faith that a 
national interest driven state should be the necessary actor in bringing about development, 
it has important limitations. Firstly, it cannot make sense of some important features of 
the neoliberal reforms. The economic explanations that focus on the retreat of the state 
do not explain why the privatisation process halted in 1999, before reaching all state-
owned companies, both in the productive and the financial sectors. Secondly, they also 
cannot explain how a supposedly shrinking state dramatically increased the tax burden. 
Furthermore, explanations that stress the negative consequences of the exchange rate 
anchor have difficulties in accounting for the continuation of external imbalances after 
the adoption of the flotation regime in Cardoso’s second administration. Finally, and most 
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importantly, if the neoliberal development strategy was not compatible with national 
development, why did some sectors of the society support it in the first place?  
The geopolitical explanation offered by Tavares and Fiori (1997) tells half of the 
story by putting the neoliberal reforms into the international context, marked by the 
expansion of US hegemony in the final years of the Cold War. Nevertheless, external 
pressures cannot be seen as the only drivers of the reforms, because on a number of 
occasions there were important tensions between the Brazilian government and 
international financial institutions. Despite the best efforts of the neoliberal foreign policy 
in embracing globalisation and engaging in a non-conflictive relation with the US, at key 
moments some autonomy was maintained, as in the refusal to send troops to the gulf war, 
or the refusal to establish a currency board in the aftermath of the 1998 crisis. Indeed, 
although the reforms were certainly supported by international financial institutions and 
the US government, the role of Brazilian social actors must also be taken into account.  
The second half of the story, insufficiently explored in the neodevelopmentalist 
literature, is to be found in the class dynamics of Brazilian society under the whip of 
external necessity. Referring back to the theoretical perspective adopted in this thesis 
(chapter 2), development is defined as the material changes in productive structures 
caused by the interrelation of class struggle and international relations. To understand the 
uneven and combined development produced in Brazil in the aftermath of the neoliberal 
decade, and explain why it came so far short of matching the idealised view of 
development announced in the official discourse, it is necessary to take a closer look at 
the class alliance behind the neoliberal development strategy. 
The extensive work of Gramscian sociologist Boito Jr. is the most complete and 
insightful attempt to explain Brazilian neoliberalism in terms of class struggle (Boito Jr 
and Randall 1998; Boito Jr 2006; Boito Jr and Resende 2007; Boito Jr 2007; Boito Jr and 
Saad-Filho 2016). Building on Poulantzas’ concept of class fraction, Boito Jr claims that, 
in Brazil, neoliberalism was the hegemonic project of the financial fraction of the ruling 
class, in association with international capital. One of the most important features of this 
period is the acceleration of profits and concentration of capital in the banking sector. The 
profits of the ten largest banks in Brazil increased by 1039% in less than ten years, 
between 1994 and 2003 (Boito Jr 2006, 275). This formidable increase was a consequence 
of the high interest rates paid by the state on its bonds, which are held by the private 
banks, constituting up to 40% of their total investment portfolios (Boito Jr 2006, 273). 
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The increase in the profits of the financial sector was directly linked to the increase in 
public debt, driven by astronomic interest rates (see section 4.2).     
The hegemonic position attained by the financial sector of the ruling class in the 
1990s was something new in Brazilian capitalism. During the previous fifty years, the 
developmentalist state induced the accumulation of capital in the industrial sector, via 
tariff protection, subsidies, technological assistance and control over labour demands. 
The displacement of the industrial fraction from the top of the social pyramid should not 
be seen as a smooth process. Industrial entities such as the Federation of Industries from 
Sao Paulo (FIESP) and the National Confederation of Industry (CNI) issued a number of 
press releases criticising the burden of the interest rates and the overvaluation of the 
exchange rates, going as far as to support the general strike against unemployment 
summoned by major trade union federations in 1996 (Boito Jr 2006, 275). 
 Nevertheless, the interests of the financial and the industrial fractions of the ruling 
class could be partially reconciled, thanks to other important elements of the neoliberal 
development strategy. These included the privatisation process, allowing for the 
concentration and consolidation of some production chains, with private companies 
incorporating their former suppliers or competitors and intensifying the exploitation of 
labour. One example among many is the steelmaker Gerdau, which acquired a number of 
its previously state-owned competitors in the first wave of privatisations. Immediately 
after taking over the USIBA steel plant, Gerdau fired more than half of its 1400 
employees, managing at the same time to increase productivity by 161% in four years 
(Pinho and Silveira 1998, 88).  
Apart from providing new lucrative opportunities for productive capital, 
privatisations effectively married the industrial and the financial fractions of the ruling 
class, by forging new associations. To quote another example from the steel-making 
sector, the Companhia Sideraurgica Nacional (CSN) – the first large steel mill in Brazil, 
a symbol of the developmentalist era – was acquired by the textile giant Vicunha, in 
association with Bamerindus Bank and the mining giant Companhia Vale do Rio Doce 
(itself privatised years later) (Pinho and Silveira 1998, 85). Beyond the declared 
objectives of reducing debt and enhancing productivity, the privatisation process also 
accomplished the hidden purpose of creating profitable alternatives for the productive 
fraction of capital, negatively affected by trade liberalisation, the overvalued exchange 
rate and high interest rates. These opportunities were multiplied with privatisations in the 
highly valuable service sector, making possible associations with international capital.  
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Also crucial to the cementing of the class alliance behind the neoliberal reforms 
was keeping salaries low throughout the entire period. This was achieved by the 
stagnation of salaries in the public sector, increasing competition between workers in the 
private sector (due to high unemployment) and insufficient rises in the minimum wage. 
As explained by Boito Jr and Resende, ‘the reduction of wages and the reduction or 
suppression of social rights’ end up benefiting ‘[a]ll capitalist enterprises, be they large 
or small, commercial, industrial, or agricultural, national or foreign’ (2007, 116). Despite 
the uneven gains shared by different fractions of capital, the unified interest in keeping 
the working class from appropriating a larger part of the social surplus explains why the 
Brazilian ruling class was able to temporarily put its differences aside and support 
Cardoso’s administration.            
An alliance between the big productive and the financial fractions of the ruling 
class, with the participation of international capital, would not be enough to guarantee the 
political basis necessary to pass the reforms in a liberal democratic environment, 
however. Two other social groups, to a large extent neglected in Boito Jr’s research, 
proved crucial to give Cardoso’s administration the support it needed, and shall be 
ultimately credited for its final political disintegration. The first one is the traditional 
political oligarchy organised in parties like PMDB, PFL and PPB. Undoubtedly a fraction 
of the ruling class, the material interests represented by this social stratum is diversified 
and difficult to trace – ranging from agriculture and religious lobbies to the defence of a 
myriad of regional and local privileges. Devoid of any strong ideological beliefs, apart 
from an inclination towards moral conservatism, this established political class largely 
supported the military dictatorship, but also formed part of every government since the 
return to democracy.  
In order to secure the votes from PMDB, PFL and PPB in Congress, Cardoso’s 
administration was prepared to open spaces in the public administration, naming some of 
its leaders to key positions, including ministries. Despite having said in the past that ‘the 
PFL is the very incarnation of backwardness. It symbolizes everything that is wrong with 
this country’ (cited in Power 2001, 622), Cardoso made Senator Marco Maciel – a PFL 
leader who supported the military dictatorship – his vice-president. If the extent of legal 
and illegal favours granted to the traditional political oligarchy is yet to be fully 
researched, the support obtained from the aforementioned mentioned parties was 
substantial. Between 1995 and 1998, when the most important reforms were approved, 
PMDB followed the government directions in 63.1% of the voting; PPB in 67.0%; and 
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PFL in 77.5%, surpassing the fidelity levels of president Cardoso’s own party (PSDB, 
which supported the government in 77.3% of the cases) (Nicolau 2000). 
The final social group that supported the neoliberal reforms can be broadly 
described as the ‘middle class’. Structurally a fraction of the working class, inasmuch as 
its earnings come from labour, instead of from capital, the Brazilian middle class is 
actually formed by independent professionals, public service employees and the higher 
ranking workers in the services sector, mainly concentrated in cities like Sao Paulo, Rio 
de Janeiro, Brasilia and Belo Horizonte. Because of its sui generis class position, based 
on the monopoly of symbolic and cultural capital, the Brazilian middle class is defined 
by Jessé Souza (2002) as a ‘class of privilege’. In a highly unequal country, this middle 
class is part of the richest 2/5 of the population, which appropriated 83% of the total 
income in the year 2002 (see graph 16).  
This urban middle class was largely favoured by the stabilisation of inflation, trade 
liberalisation and the overvaluation of the exchange rate. Imported goods, whose 
purchase was perceived as a sign of social status after years of national industry 
protection, became suddenly accessible, connecting this privileged social group with 
international consumption standards. Miami and Buenos Aires became very popular 
holiday destinations. During the first booming years of the Real Plan, registered expenses 
from international travel jumped from U$ 2.2 billion in 1994 to 5.7 billion in 1998. 
Furthermore, the very person of the president – a successful and cultivated white 
gentleman, fluent in English and French – projected exactly the image the middle class 
had of itself. 
Taking into account the complex sociological background against which the 
reforms unfolded – largely ignored by the neoliberal and neodevelopmentalist literatures 
– it is possible to trace the interplay between class struggle and international relations, 
revealing the uneven and combined developmental outcomes of the neoliberal 
development strategy. In his first period in office, the macroeconomic model adopted by 
the Cardoso administration was largely imbalanced. It was characterised by fiscal deficits, 
high interest rates and overvalued exchange rates – compensated for by the attraction of 
international capital, and privatisations. Instead of being ill conceived, this model 
precariously combined the interests of the middle classes (cheap imported goods, travel), 
the financial fraction of capital (high interest rates, privatisations), and the political 
oligarchy (government jobs, local spending).  
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The heterogeneous neoliberal coalition rested upon too many contradictory 
demands. The exchange rate opposed the middle classes to the industrial fraction of the 
ruling class. The privatisations opposed the political oligarchy and part of the middle class 
(defending jobs in the public sector) to the financial and industrial fractions of the ruling 
class. The rising public debt opposed the political oligarchy and the middle class (resistant 
to budget cuts) to the financial sector and international capital (eager to guarantee that the 
government would have means to pay the high interests rates). Necessarily unstable, the 
entire edifice would crumble due to an external shock – the international capital shortage 
in the aftermath of the Russian crisis of 1998. Nevertheless, it was the contradictions 
within the coalition that made it dependent on constant influx of international capital in 
the first place.  
The crisis of January 1999, leading to the devaluation of the Brazilian currency, 
prompted the middle class to withdraw its support for the government and triggered a 
period of very low popularity for Cardoso. The opposition forces, representing fractions 
of the working class originally excluded from the neoliberal project, started to campaign 
under the leadership of the PT for the deposition or renunciation of the just re-elected 
President Cardoso.  
The rapid deterioration of political support undermined the chances of the 
government to continue the privatisation of highly popular companies like Petrobras and 
the public banks. At the same time, the devaluation of the Real, against the will of the 
IMF, hit the financial sector, especially international capital, which expected revenue in 
dollars. Quickly reaffirming its commitment to this sector, the hegemonic core of the 
neoliberal coalition, the government named a man from the international stock-markets 
as head of the Central Bank, renegotiated the terms of the agreement with the IMF and 
committed to strict fiscal discipline, as well as increasing interest rates. This course 
correction in macroeconomic policy, as well as the slowdown of the privatisations after 
1999, are therefore best understood as consequences of the rearrangement of the 
neoliberal social coalition in the aftermath of the Russian 1998 crisis. When the whip of 
external necessity forced the change of course of the macroeconomic policies, the 
Cardoso administration had to prioritise, and the weakest part of the neoliberal coalition, 
the middle classes, were forced to partake in the socialisation of losses that the working 
class had been experiencing since the start of the neoliberal reforms.  
If the devaluation of the exchange rates alienated the middle class and the fiscal 
austerity undermined the support of the traditional political oligarchy, the productive 
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fraction of capital nominally benefited from it, recovering conditions for external 
competitiveness. In fact, 2000 was the only year in Cardoso’s presidency that industry 
led the GDP growth, jumping 5.7% after a decrease of 1.9% in the previous year. After 
the 1999 devaluation, the agriculture sector also received a major boost (see graph 14). 
High interest rates, however, kept the productive fractions of capital under permanent 
pressure, discouraging investments in less profitable areas and leading to further 
specialisation in primary sectors. Moreover, the continued fiscal austerity prevented the 
growth of internal demand, and unemployment levels remained high. In short, the 
reorganization of the neoliberal coalition after the 1999 collapse included only some of 
its original components. If, in strict economic terms, the model adopted after 1999 was 
less fragile for avoiding growing debt and international imbalances, in political terms it 
was not sustainable, for it excluded important fractions of the ruling class, as well as the 
middle class and virtually all of the working class.   
In a nutshell, international and internal factors interacted and reinforced each other 
to produce changes in the productive structures observed in Brazil during the neoliberal 
decade. The stagnation in per capita GDP levels and the evident failure to realise idealised 
views of development as catch-up shall not lead us to the conclusion that the neoliberal 
policies failed to produce any kind of development. The concept of uneven and combined 
development accurately captures the outcomes of these policies. In the specific case 
analysed, development can be described as uneven, in the double sense that it did not 
point towards international convergence and that it unequally affected different classes 
and class fractions, further intensifying class struggle. Development was also combined 
in a double sense. Far from being exclusively determined by internal factors, it was 
directly affected by the international dynamics of capital accumulation, and further 
affected class struggle in other parts of the world, notably in Argentina. Indeed, the 
Brazilian crisis of 1999 would have for Argentina a similar effect that the Russian crisis 
of 1998 had for Brazil, only intensified by the commercial relations between two 
countries in the Mercosur. Finally, development was combined in the sense that it resulted 
in mixed productive structures, instead of assuming the idealised ‘modern’ form 
announced in the neoliberal discourse.  
 My claim is that, in Brazil, the neoliberal development strategy failed not due to 
the incompleteness of the reforms – as neoliberals insist – nor simply due to the rollback 
of the state – as suggested by neodevelopmentalists. Instead, much more important than 
looking for errors in the neoliberal development strategy in the vain hope of fixing it, is 
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understanding what kind of development was actually produced, and who benefited from 
it. Brazil did not catch up with the developed world, but its productive and social 
structures changed. The changes in the productive structures – to the benefit of fractions 
of the ruling class, especially financial capital – were the result of the interaction between 
class struggle and international constraints and opportunities.  
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Conclusion to Part 2 – Crisis and class struggle 
 
In the previous chapters, I argued that international crises played a key role in 
undermining the class alliances sustaining the neoliberal reforms in Brazil and in 
Argentina. In both countries, the neoliberal development strategy was premised on the 
misrepresentation of the international market as a sphere of opportunities for 
development, ignoring its disruptive effects. In face of contracting flows of international 
capital, the neoliberal administrations had to extend the socialisation of losses to the 
middle classes, hurting their own bases and undermining the political support for the 
neoliberal development strategy. In short, the coalescing of international pressures and 
class struggle represented a structural constraint to development, at least in the idealised 
catch-up form promised in the political discourse. What resulted instead was an uneven 
and combined form of development, involving winners – national and international 
capital, particularly in the financial sector – as well as losers – users of public services, 
jobless workers, and later, the middle classes. 
 Exactly because these constraints were not only determined by external factors, 
but also by the local conditions of class struggle, they played out differently in the two 
cases analysed. One fundamental difference is the historical working class basis of 
Menem’s Justicialist Party in Argentina, compared to the middle-class basis of the 
Cardoso’s Social Democrat Party in Brazil. Facing less organised opposition, the 
privatisation process in Argentina could get much further. In Brazil, the political and 
social opposition to Cardoso’s government would find institutional expression in the 
Workers Party. In Argentina, the opposition to Menem’s government had no equivalent 
institutional expression, opening up in a myriad of decentralised social movements as the 
socialisation of losses expanded. Consequently, neoliberalism would be defeated in Brazil 
through a regular electoral process, culminating with the triumph of the Workers Party 
and its leader, Lula da Silva (chapter 5), while in Argentina it would be defeated in a 
popular uprising with no clear leadership, resulting in a period of institutional instability 
(chapter 6). In both cases, however, the downfall of neoliberalism would involve the 
redefinition of the respective development strategies and the turn towards 
neodevelopmentalism.   
 These comparative notes shall not be taken as a standard positivist comparison 
between the cases, as they cannot be properly isolated. Therefore, I make no generalizable 
158 
 
 
claims – except that, when hit by similar whips of external necessity (in the form of 
international financial crises), different societies will tend to suffer different effects and 
react differently, based on their class configuration. In other words, what precise 
combination of socialisation of losses and privatisation of gains will result from an 
international constraint cannot be theoretically predicted.  
Nevertheless, the contrast between the cases of Brazil and Argentina can be used 
to illustrate one interesting aspect of inter-societal relations conceptualised earlier in this 
thesis (chapter 2). International financial crises, which appear in the contemporary world 
as concrete instantiations of the whip of external necessity to societies affected by them, 
are, at the same time, products of class struggle in the societies where they originate. Put 
differently, inasmuch as no society is isolated, class struggle in one place generates 
consequences that affect other places as externalities.  
The Brazilian crisis of 1999 – caused, in turn, by the shortage of international 
capital after the Russian crisis of 1998, as well as by the irreconcilable demands of the 
different class fractions supporting Cardoso’s government – hit Argentina as an external 
shock. The reduction of imports, the devaluation of the Brazilian currency and the further 
increase in the perception of risk by international capital owners complicated the already 
fragile economic situation in Argentina. Coupled with the dissolution of the neoliberal 
class alliance, these factors culminated in the 2001 Argentinian crisis. Conversely, this 
later crisis reappeared in Brazil as yet another external shock, hindering economic 
recovery and sealing the fate of Cardoso’s government.  
The juxtaposition of the two case studies reveals that the interplay between class 
conflicts and international pressures is magnified by societal multiplicity. It echoes 
through the international system, resulting in uneven and combined forms of 
development. Brazilian and Argentinian development in the 1990s can be described as 
uneven and combined in multiple ways, following the definitions of unevenness, 
combination and development proposed in chapter 2.  
Firstly, unevenness in the particular cases analysed means that there was no sign 
of convergence between consumption and production standards in the countries analysed 
and the global north, as expected by neoliberal theorists. But development was also 
uneven in the sense that it produced differentiated social results, involving socialisation 
of losses and privatisation of gains. Also, development was combined because it 
happened under international pressure – represented in my narrative by the recurring 
international crises – and further reverberated internationally, affecting other societies. 
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Finally, the combined nature of development appears in many instances of amalgamated 
discourses, capitals and social practices.  
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Part 3 – Neodevelopmentalism and state utopia 
 
Introduction 
 
 Although the concept of neodevelopmentalism was firstly proposed by Ruy 
Mauro Marini (1978) forty years ago as a critique to Cardoso’s reformist dependency 
theory, politically it is a new phenomenon. As a development strategy, it emerged in the 
aftermath of the neoliberal debacle, having its epicentre in Brazil and in Argentina, and 
later spreading to other Latin American countries. Both in Brazil and Argentina, the 
disappointing results achieved by neoliberal administrations provided the grounds for the 
emergence of left-leaning governments that, at the discursive level, radically opposed 
neoliberalism. In place of the market utopia, the neodevelopmentalist discourse is based 
on a state utopia. It portrays the state as a virtuous entity, capable of bridging class 
conflicts, neutralising external influences and, finally, delivering catch-up development.      
The advent of neodevelopmentalism puzzled and divided the contemporary 
political economy literature in Latin America. Over the last two decades, a growing 
number of scholars have written in support of the model, stressing its economic and social 
achievements (Lavargna 2003; Bresser-Pereira and Theuer 2012; Mercadante 2010 
Pochman 2010; Kicillof 2016). At the other end of the spectrum, neoliberal writers, 
demoralised after the 2001 Argentine crisis and the almost universal shaming of the 
Washington Consensus, quickly regrouped and started denouncing what they perceive as 
the return of populism (Franco 2011; Giambiagi and Schwartsman 2014; Lanata 2014; 
Lucca 2015). The English language literature largely reproduced this divide, locating 
neodevelopmentalism within the rise of the left in Latin America, poorly conceptualised 
as a ‘Pink Tide’. 53  Moderate neodevelopmentalist administrations were celebrated 
(Cohen 2013, 2016; Nederveen Pieterse and Cardoso 2014). Nevertheless, the ‘populist 
temptation’ (Castaneda 2006; Kaufman 2011) was always on the prowl, as exemplified 
by the experiences of Bolivia and, above all, Venezuela.54  
                                                          
53 The term ‘Pink Tide’ appeared for the first time in the New York Times, in reference to moderate left-
wing governments in Latin America (Rohter 2005). The use of such a thin concept in tens of articles and 
books reveals the difficulty of the academic literature in conceptualising the phenomenon.    
54 For a critical review of the literature on the rise of the left in Latin America in general, see Webber 
(2017, chapter 3).  
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Marxist writers were also initially divided. While some saw the simple 
continuation of neoliberalism (Maldonado Filho 2003; Antunes 2004; Boito Jr 2006), 
others perceived the ascension of left-wing administrations as a momentous event (Sader 
2008). The victory of President Lula da Silva in the 2002 elections, for instance, was 
proclaimed nothing less than ‘the greatest political triumph of the Brazilian working class 
since the abolition of slavery, in 1888’ (Saad-Filho 2003, 15). The passing of time only 
thickened the plot, as both the social achievements and the un-revolutionary character of 
neodevelopmentalism became crystal clear.  
In the last few years, a more nuanced understanding of what neodevelopmentalism 
actually is and what are its inherent potentialities and limitations started to emerge, at the 
same time that the political cycles of neodevelopmentalist administrations approached 
their exhaustion in Brazil and in Argentina. Singer (2012, 2015); Boito Jr (2013); Katz 
(2014); Feliz (2014); Boito Jr and Berringer (2014); Boito Jr and Saad-Filho (2016) all 
arrived at class relational perceptions of neodevelopmentalism, successfully identifying 
the material sources of its policy differences in relation to neoliberalism. While the 
neoliberal development strategy relies on a class alliance between all fractions of the 
ruling class, the neodevelopmentalist strategy is based on a difficult and unstable class 
alliance between fractions of the working class and fractions of the ruling class. As a 
result, while the policies implemented in the context of neoliberal development strategies 
tend to favour capital over labour and increase or perpetuate wealth inequalities, 
neodevelopmentalist polices are mixed and contradictory, sometimes favouring labour, 
other times favouring capital. 
My argument in the two chapters that follow builds on that class relational 
perspective of neodevelopmentalism, adding an important dimension so far not 
systematically explored: the international. From an uneven and combined development 
perspective, I claim that international pressures and opportunities are inextricably 
intertwined with the dynamics of the neodevelopmentalist class alliances in Brazil and in 
Argentina. In both countries, the alliances between fractions of the ruling class and 
fractions of the working class were premised on a utopian view of the state as capable of 
guaranteeing cooperation and continued socialisation of gains for both labour and capital. 
For a short period of time, in an exceptional context of expanding international economy, 
high commodity prices, and constant increases in tax revenues, both the Brazilian and the 
Argentinian states could indeed fulfil this role, albeit imperfectly. After the 2008 crises, 
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however, and particularly after the drop in commodity prices in 2014, this Sisyphean task 
became increasingly more difficult to undertake.  
At that point, showing that international conditions are key, but developmental 
outcomes can only be explained in reference to concrete class relations, both countries 
took different paths. In Brazil, the more conciliatory administration of President Rousseff 
tried to keep the neodevelopmentalist class alliance together by sharing the burden and 
socializing the losses broadly. In Argentina, the more confrontationist administration of 
Cristina de Kirchner chose to alienate part of the neodevelopmentalist class alliance, 
privatising the losses to particular fractions of the ruling class. In both cases, after a period 
of intense political disputes (2014-2015), the strategies failed. The Brazilian and 
Argentinian ruling classes soon regrouped in broad fronts of the bourgeoisie, sabotaged 
the ongoing public policies and defeated the neodevelopmentalist strategy – in Brazil 
through a parliamentarian coup d’état, in Argentina through elections.   
The recent neodevelopmentalist experience in Brazil and in Argentina reveals the 
limits of the idealised notion of the state that lies at the core of neodevelopmentalism. 
Instead of a neutral actor whose sole concern is to promote the national interest, the state 
is better understood as a historically constituted institution, an object of disputes between 
classes and class fractions, under constantly changing international pressures and 
opportunities. As such, the state could not consistently do the two things 
neodevelopmentalists expected it to do, namely bridge internal class conflicts and 
neutralise external threats. The fact that neodevelopmentalism did not live up to the catch-
up promises contained in its political discourse is, therefore, not a mere accident.  
Chapters 5 and 6 substantiate these claims through an in-depth analysis of 
neodevelopmentalism in Brazil and in Argentina. The analysis is carried out in four steps. 
Firstly, I explore the neodevelopmentalist political discourse and show how it is based on 
two complementary elements: an idealised view of the state and constantly reaffirmed 
promises of development. After that, I concentrate the analysis on two crucial sets of 
policies: macroeconomic management and foreign policies. The focus on the ministries 
of finance and foreign affairs is justified by the fact that they were supposed to perform 
exactly the two crucial tasks neodevelopmentalists expect from the state at large – i.e. 
class conciliation through socialisation of gains, and the neutralisation of international 
barriers to development. Each chapter finishes with an analysis of the actual results of the 
neodevelopmentalist cycle from an uneven and combined development perspective.   
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Chapter 5 – Neodevelopmentalism in Brazil – the future that never arrives. 
 
Development does not happen by spontaneous generation, and Brazil 
needs the state action to promote increasing wellbeing for the society.  
    
Guido Mantega, Finance Minister between 2003-2012 (2005, 11) 
   
 
On the 11th April 2016, a country torn apart saw in the TV the live casting of a 
crucial vote in the lower chamber of the national Congress. The matter being decided was 
the admissibility of an impeachment process against the sitting president, Dilma Rousseff. 
People for and against the impeachment gathered in streets and squares across Brazil, 
cursing or vibrating with every vote, as if at a football championship final. A wall was 
installed in the huge Ministerial Boulevard in front of Brazilian Congress, in Brasilia, 
dividing it, allegedly to avoid fights. Inside the Congress itself, the division could not be 
clearer. Each one of the 511 Members of the Congress present at the voting (two failed 
to attend) had their one minute of fame, declaiming his or her vote to the entire nation in 
front of the cameras. Some celebrated democracy, some denounced what they perceived 
as a coup d'état. One member of the Congress launched a confetti cannon. One resurrected 
the memory of a famous military official who tortured Dilma Rousseff when she was an 
anti-dictatorship rebel in her twenties. Many dedicated their votes to their families. 
Casting a vote, the President of the lower chamber, Eduardo Cunha, a fierce enemy of the 
Worker’s Party and the man who decided to take the matter to vote in the first place, 
paraphrased the bible: ‘May God have mercy on this nation – my vote is yes’ (Cunha 
2016). 
During the following months, the removal of the wall in the Ministerial Boulevard 
could not close the wounds of a deeply divided society. The 367 votes in favour of the 
admissibility of the impeachment process sealed Rousseff’s fate. Although the final 
decision was to be taken by the Senate, it was clear from the start that the upper house of 
Brazilian Congress would not save her presidential mandate. The neodevelopmentalist 
cycle came to a dramatic end, culminating in the deepest economic crisis in recorded 
history, coupled with the worst political crisis since the return of democracy, turning the 
Brazilian catch-up development dreams into a nightmare. Since 2015, per capita GDP has 
fallen by almost 15%, regressing to the levels of 2004. Brazilian multinational 
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corporations were dragged into the crisis by corruption allegations, losing billions of 
dollars in international contracts and cutting thousands of jobs. From a celebrated rising 
global power endowed with stable democratic institutions, Brazil fell back to its reality 
as a peripheral Latin American country, prone to international crises, struggling with 
poverty, unemployment and fragile democratic institutions.    
  The contemporary crisis of Brazilian neodevelopmentalism is multifaceted and 
can be framed from different perspectives. One of the most useful and influential 
narratives is suggested by Professor Andre Singer, recently praised by Perry Anderson as 
‘the most impressive social thinker of his generation in Latin America’ (2016, 22). In his 
landmark book Os Sentidos do Lulismo (Lulism and its Meanings 2012), Singer identifies 
an important reshuffling of class alliances taking place between the 2002 and the 2006 
elections. Relying on quantitative surveys on voting intentions and on the actual results 
of the elections, Singer convincingly shows that the poorest layers of the population – 
conceptualised by him as sub-proletariat – became a key part of the social base supporting 
President Lula’s second administration. This happened because the development strategy 
adopted under Lula was capable of promoting real gains for the sub-proletariat while 
maintaining the social order, consisting in a ‘weak reformist’ program defined by the 
author as ‘Lulism’. Successfully mobilising the state capacities without confronting long-
lasting privileges, Lula forged a heterogeneous national alliance for development, backed 
by fractions of the ruling class, organised labour and the sub-proletariat. Singer compares 
the gradual process of social change inaugurated in the second half of Lula’s first term 
with the Rooseveltian New Deal. With cautious optimism, the author envisaged a 
potentially long cycle of economic growth and social ascension, giving birth to a 
developed capitalist society (Singer 2012, chap. 3; Anderson 2011, 9). 
 This long cycle of prosperity and social ascension failed to materialise. After a 
short-lived period of intense growth between 2004 and 2010, relative stagnation followed 
for another three years. A period of social dispute marked by growing protests and rising 
inflation was inaugurated in 2013. Finally, the Lulist class alliance sustaining the 
neodevelopmentalist strategy broke apart soon after Rousseff’s re-election in the second 
half of 2014. The substitution of Guido Mantega with Joaquim Levy as Finance Minister 
and the restrictive policies adopted by the latter in 2015 drove the country into recession, 
making ‘the incremental Lulist process to retrocede to the starting point of Lula’s first 
term in office’ (Singer 2015, 69). If that is the case, what caused the ‘Lulist’ class alliance 
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to collapse, bringing a premature end to the neodevelopmentalist program of gradual 
reforms? 
 It is no exaggeration to say that this is the most relevant question challenging 
social scientists interested in making sense of Brazilian contemporary political economy. 
The question itself is certainly not original. It has been proposed in different forms by 
neoliberal, neodevelopmentalist and Marxist writers. The approach I suggest in this 
chapter builds on the Marxist literature – particularly the sociological analysis of Singer 
(2012, 2014, 2015); Boito Jr (2006; 2007; 2013); Boito Jr and Berringer (2014); Boito Jr 
and Saad-Filho (2015, 2016) and Claudio Katz (2014). I seek to expand these class 
relational perspectives by systematically introducing an international perspective, which 
allows me to describe the social and productive changes produced in Brazil as instances 
of uneven and combined development. Hence, the narrative that follows organically 
correlates class conflicts and international pressures and opportunities in order to uncover 
the intrinsic limitations of the neodevelopmentalist strategy.  
 My argument in this Chapter is that the neodevelopmentalist coalition was 
necessarily fragile, because the contradictory class interests represented in it could not be 
reconciled by the state in the long run. Disappointed with the results of neoliberal policies, 
and facing external competition from East Asian cheap industrial imports and from US’ 
and European capitals, the productive fraction of the ruling class embraced the 
neodevelopmentalist catch-up project for a short period, in coalition with organised 
labour and, posteriorly, the sub-proletariat. Nevertheless, the state could only socialise 
gains for all social classes and class fractions in the neodevelopmentalist class alliance in 
a context of rapid GDP growth. When the international economic circumstances changed, 
in the aftermath of the 2008 financial crisis and the reduction of Chinese growth rates, the 
components of the Lulist coalition started to compete for the state’s limited resources. 
The political confrontation was finally won by the ruling class, whose fractions were 
capable of quickly reorganising themselves as a broad front – led by financial capital –, 
while the working classes failed to do so, mainly because of the political demobilisation 
of the sub-proletariat and the alienation of the middle classes.  
 Since the neodevelopmentalist strategy rested from the very start on the 
international expansion of Brazilian capital and on a contradictory class alliance for 
development, and taking into account the non-confrontational, reformist character of 
Lulism, implying the demobilisation of the sub-proletariat, my conclusion is that the 
catch-up development promises in the neodevelopmentalist discourse could never be fully 
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delivered. In other words, the neodevelopmentalist project depended on two unrealistic 
assumptions: long term internationally favourable conditions for capital expansion and 
the state’s capacity to suspend (or postpone) class struggle. Therefore, the 
neodevelopmentalist strategy suffers from intrinsic limitations and cannot be saved by re-
knotting the broken ties between the productive fraction of the ruling class and the 
working class, as has been once again suggested by neodevelopmentalists in a recent 
Manifesto (Projeto Brasil Nacao 2017).  
 In the remaining of this chapter, I substantiate the above outlined argument in four 
steps. First, I analyse the neodevelopmentalist political discourse in order to show how it 
idealises the role of the state in promoting catch-up development, represented as an 
uncontested goal of a fundamentally non-conflicted society. The expectation of 
development and the faith in the state’s capacity to socialise gains and neutralise external 
shocks were the glue holding the Lulist class alliance together. Having established the 
promises and the core beliefs of neodevelopmentalism, I take a closer look at a set of 
policies actually adopted during the neodevelopmentalist cycle, privileging two key 
areas:  macroeconomic management and foreign policy. By doing so, I unpack the 
particular means through which the state was mobilised to do the two things expected 
from it, namely reconciling class interests and guaranteeing externally favourable 
conditions for development. Finally, in the last section I summarise my argument and 
contrast it with competing neoliberal and neodevelopmentalist explanations for the 
disappointing results actually achieved after almost 15 years of neodevelopmentalism. I 
conclude by arguing that the shortcomings of neodevelopmentalism were not caused 
simply by errors of policy implementation or unfortunate international circumstances. 
Instead, they can be better described as a necessary mismatch between a utopian view of 
the state’s capacities and the bitter reality of class conflict and international competition. 
 
 
5.1 Change and social development – the promises of neodevelopmentalism in 
Brazil 
 
 The Brazilian 2002 elections took place under the banner of change. None of the 
candidates – including Minister Jose Serra, officially endorsed by the incumbent 
administration – could avoid criticising Cardoso, particularly regarding his 
macroeconomic policies. The ‘development strategy’ announced by Cardoso in his first 
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election, in 1994, had come to a premature end, without delivering its promised results 
(see chapter 4). After a decade of sluggish growth rates and high unemployment, amidst 
yet another economic crisis and facing energy rationing, Cardoso reached the last year of 
his second term in office with very low popularity rates. According to a survey conducted 
by Datafolha in 2002, 36% considered Cardoso’s administration bad or very bad, while 
only 26% would classify it as good or very good. Perhaps more revealing, for 33% of the 
interviewees politicians were the social group most privileged under Cardoso’s 
presidency, closely followed by bankers (29%). Contrastingly, 49% believed that the 
working class was the social group that suffered the most (DATAFOLHA 2002). In this 
context, it is not difficult to understand why every presidential candidate wanted to 
present himself as a champion of change.  
Apart from the fringe left-wing candidacies of Rui Costa Pimenta (PCO) and Jose 
Maria (PSTU), the most vocal critique of Cardoso’s administration came from the PT, 
the largest opposition party in the Brazilian Congress. Lula da Silva, the former union 
leader defeated once by Collor de Mello (in 1989) and twice by Cardoso (in 1994 and 
1998), found himself in an excellent position to embody the change people desired and 
finally win the elections (Carreirão 2004, 179). In order to do so, his campaign aimed not 
only to confront Cardoso’s neoliberal model, but also to gain the support of more 
conservative voters, dissatisfied with the government but historically suspicious of the 
PT’s socialist inclinations. As a result, Lula’s presidential campaign precariously 
combined calls for social change with promises of development and exhortations for 
solidarity with the poorest. Looking deep into the camera in a television spot aimed 
specifically at voters inclined towards voting for him, Lula declared:   
 
Now you see, my almost-Lula friends. I know you also want our country to 
change. I know you understand the necessity for Brazil to have a government that 
will be concerned with development, with the future, but also that will not forget 
the small ones, the weak, and the hungry ones, always so much forgotten. I need 
your vote of confidence (…). See, my friend almost-Lula, just like you want to 
be happy, not almost-happy, Brazil needs change, not almost-change. Because 
we have to face a crisis, not almost-a-crisis. And you need a job, not almost-a-
job. Isn’t that so? (…) May God enlighten you (Da Silva 2002a). 
 
 The best textual example of the contradictory balance Lula’s campaign was trying 
to strike between the left-wing origins of the PT and the appeal to conservative voters and 
fractions of the ruling class was the ‘Letter to the Brazilian people’. This symbolic 
document issued by Lula da Silva just before the official start of the 2002 presidential 
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race attracted immediate criticism from the left because of its explicit commitment to key 
pillars of neoliberal macroeconomics. The Letter was the idea of Antonio Palocci,55 one 
of the coordinators of Lula da Silva´s campaign and future Finance Minister, and was 
crafted to send a signal to the Brazilian ruling classes, especially to the financial sector. 
The very wording of the commitment to keep fiscal austerity contained in the Letter was 
discussed between Palocci and Joao Roberto Marinho, CEO of the Globo Organisation, 
the most important media conglomerate in Brazil – one of the uncontested representatives 
of the Brazilian bourgeoisie. The sentence ‘we will keep primary surplus as much as 
necessary to keep the internal debt from increasing; which would destroy, as a 
consequence, the trust in the capacity of the government to honour its commitments’ (Da 
Silva 2002b, 4–5)  was approved by Mr. Marinho himself, after expressing his preference 
for a numeric public surplus target above 4% of the GDP (Palocci 2007, 32).  
 For Palocci, the commitment to fiscal austerity, floating exchange rates and 
inflation targeting – the neoliberal macroeconomic triad implemented by Arminio Fraga 
in the aftermath of the 1998 crisis (see chapter 4) – was not a concession to ‘the market’, 
as alleged by left-wing sectors of PT. ‘Later, it was necessary some effort to explain, 
repeatedly and with a lot of patience, that it was simply a set of commitments 
recommended by political and economic common sense, and that the economic 
intervention mechanisms were the same used in the best economies of the world’ (Palocci 
2007, 36).   
 The left had real reasons to complain, nonetheless, and not only because of the 
condescending tone with which Mr. Palocci dismissed any possibility of real change in 
macroeconomic management. In practical terms, the commitment to fiscal austerity 
implied less resources for social expenditure. The maintenance of inflation targets and 
floating exchange rates, in their turn, represented a de facto surrender of the monetary 
policy into the hands of the financial fraction of the ruling class, a move confirmed with 
the subsequent naming of Henrique Meirelles56 as head of the Central Bank.  
                                                          
55 Antonio Palocci, a former Trotskyist militant, was one of the ascending political figures in the PT. As 
mayor of Riberao Preto, a rich city in the countryside of Sao Paulo, he forged solid relationships with 
capital owners, particularly in the agrarian and financial sectors. His memoires (Palocci 2007) reveal a 
wholehearted conversion to economic orthodoxy. After Lula’s election, he was named Finance Minister. 
As I write these lines, he is in jail, accused of influence trafficking, in the context of the ‘Lava Jato’ 
operation.   
56 Henrique Meirelles is a banker and politician. He made his career as an assets manager at BankBoston 
and was elected member of the Congress in 2002, running for Cardoso’s PSDB. He accepted Lula’s 
invitation to be the head of the Brazilian Central Bank, giving up his party membership. After the 
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 Although the ‘Letter to the Brazilian People’ was meant as a concession to the 
ruling class, it is also interesting to notice within it traces of Lula’s former strong reformist 
rhetoric. In fact, Cardoso’s administration is severely criticised for its incapacity to bring 
about economic growth, and Lula does not shy away from his condition as an opposition 
candidate:  
 
The Brazilian People want real change. They refuse any form of continuity, be it explicitly 
announced or masked. They want to follow (…) the path of structural reform, actually 
capable of modernising and democratising the country, making it fairer, more efficient, 
and, at the same time, more competitive in the international market (Da Silva 2002b, 2). 
 
The powerful discursive glue capable of holding together different classes and 
class fractions whose interests are materially contradictory was the state and its supposed 
capacity to promote development. This grand goal, to be achieved by a national alliance 
between capital and labour – politically represented by Lula’s invitation to Jose Alencar57 
to run alongside him as vice-president – potentially postponed class struggle to an 
indefinite future. Coming together, workers and capitalists could bring about the 
productive transformations Brazil needed, thereby improving everyone’s lives.  ‘Brazil 
wants to change’ - announced the Letter in its first sentence – ‘Change to grow, to include 
and to pacify. Change to conquer the economic development that we do not have now 
and the social justice that we seek’ (Da Silva 2002b, 2). At the end of the text, the 
development promise is reiterated: ‘Brazil needs to sail in the open seas of economic and 
social development’ (Da Silva 2002b, 5). 
 Six months after publicly presenting the ‘Letter to the Brazilian people’ at a press 
conference crowned with ‘total success’ (Palocci 2007, 36), Lula took office as Brazil’s 
first factory worker to ever become president. In his inauguration speech, the curious 
nautical development metaphor with which he finished the Letter reappears: 
 
In order to bring Brazil back to the path of growth, so as to create the jobs we 
need so badly, we need an authentic social pact for change and an alliance that 
objectively intertwines work and productive capital, the creators of the 
fundamental wealth of the nation, allowing Brazil to overcome present stagnation 
and resume sailing on the open seas of economic and social development (Da 
Silva 2014 [2003], 11). 
                                                          
deposition of Dilma Rousseff, in 2016, he would return as Finance Minister in President Temer’s de facto 
administration. 
57 Jose Alencar was one of the most important Brazilian industrialists in the textile sector. Initially 
rejected by the left, he became one of the most progressive voices during Lula’s first term in office. He 
died in 2011.  
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In fact, Lula’s first inauguration speech is a very clear expression of the 
neodevelopmentalist political rhetoric. After severely criticising the previous (neoliberal) 
development model, which ‘instead of generating growth, produced stagnation, 
unemployment and hunger’, Lula claims that the country cannot be left ‘adrift (…) 
lacking a truly national development project’. This ‘national development project’, in its 
turn, was supposed to rest on a class compromise between labour and capital, involving 
continuous increase in productivity, economic growth and incremental gains for the 
workers over time. Radical demands for social change had no place in the social pact Lula 
proposed to the nation: ‘we have to keep our many legitimate social demands under 
control, so that they can be fulfilled in due pace and at the right moment’. With patience, 
however, and after the implementation of reforms, development would finally come for 
all: ‘I believe in a magnificent future for Brazil’ (Da Silva 2014 [2003], 8). 
 The appeal of such a discourse for the ruling class was obvious, particularly 
coming from the most popular left-wing leader in Brazil’s contemporary history. Taxation 
of fortunes, auditing of the public debt, breaking up of media oligopolies, and the 
expropriation of the means of production – historical demands of the radical left – are 
totally absent from Lula’s inauguration speech. A ‘peaceful, organised and planned’ 
agrarian reform is quickly mentioned, just prior to effusive praise for Brazilian 
agribusiness, whose productivity in certain regions ‘is higher than in Australia and the 
United States’ (Da Silva 2014 [2003], 10).   
 The grain of radicalism remaining in the speech is wisely channelled towards the 
‘struggle against hunger’, a priority capable of touching even the most insensitive 
neoliberal heart. Using vivid colours, Lula reminds the audience made up of well-fed 
heads of state and congressmen that ‘millions of Brazilians (…) are, at this very moment, 
lacking food’. Here is the only part of the speech where a concrete aim is announced: 
‘That is why I hereby claim – let us bring to an end the hunger in our country’ (Da Silva 
2014 [2003], 9). 
 There are striking similarities between Lula’s and Cardoso’s first inauguration 
speeches. Notwithstanding very clear differences of style, and despite Lula’s strong 
criticism of the previous administration, the general message conveyed by the two 
presidents is basically the same: Brazil can have a bright future as a developed capitalist 
country. In order to reach that future, different social groups should put their differences 
aside and work together, under the guidance of the state. Development, in the form of 
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economic growth and increased productivity, would mean gradual material gains for both 
the ruling class and the working class, without substantial subversion of class structures. 
In this context, Cardoso represented himself as the enlightened intellectual conscience of 
Brazil’s social injustices, while Lula played the role of the responsible labour leader, 
willing to make mutually beneficial deals with capital owners. Even the most radical part 
of Lula’s speech, the promise of defeating hunger, echoes Cardoso’s unfulfilled promise 
of sweeping ‘hunger and misery off the Brazilian map’ (1995b, 32). 
The same cannot be said about the two presidents’ second inauguration speeches, 
nevertheless. While Cardoso stepped back from his previous proto-neodevelopmentalist 
stand and subordinated the possibility of development to the implementation of neoliberal 
reforms, Lula moved forward and reaffirmed the neodevelopmentalist social pact in his 
triumphant speech on the first day 2007, after receiving almost 60 million votes in the 
2006 elections (60% of the total in the second round). Of course, the circumstances of 
both speeches were quite different. Cardoso was facing the consequences of the 1998 
crisis and used his second inauguration speech to anticipate some of the sacrifices 
required in the adjustment policies he was about to launch, a move that would severely 
impact his popularity. Lula, on the other hand, was in the ascendant, after resisting the 
first corruption allegations against the PT (Carvalho 2006). The outcomes of his poverty 
alleviation programs could already be seen, as well as the positive economic results driven 
by a surge in exports coupled with the expansion of internal consumption (see section 5.2 
below). Therefore, when Lula reaffirmed bold promises in his second inauguration 
speech, development appeared for the first time in contemporary Brazilian history as 
something actually within reach, not merely as a vague aspiration for the future. ‘My 
second administration will be the administration of development, with wealth distribution 
and quality education’ (Da Silva 2007). 
Perhaps more importantly, a clear political contrast between the neoliberal and the 
neodevelopmentalist development strategies could finally be made. By reaffirming the 
role of the state in his neodevelopmentalist speech and refusing the neoliberal wisdom 
according to which development would only come through market-friendly reforms, Lula 
apparently proved that another way was possible: ‘I was reappointed as President of the 
Republic by the majoritarian will of the Brazilian people.(…) The people made a 
conscious choice. Beyond a man, the people have chosen a proposal, have opted for one 
side’ (Da Silva 2007). Although tangible, development was still to be fully realised. At 
this point, the neodevelopmentalist program assumes an explicit catch-up character:  
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What other countries did back in the 19th and 20th century, we will have to do in 
the next few years. I’m talking about overcoming the big educational deficit that 
afflicts us and, at the same time, move in accelerated steps towards the 
transformation of our country into a knowledge society, allowing us to have a 
competitive and sovereign insertion in the world (Da Silva 2007). 
 
 Educational and scientific catch-up was to be achieved by decisive state 
intervention – in the form of scholarships, increase in public investments in science and 
technology, and the creation of new universities. Moreover, instead of focussing on the 
formation of a cheap yet skilled labour force in order to boost capital accumulation, Lula’s 
political proposal takes on a truly emancipatory character, finally echoing some historical 
aspirations of the left that were carefully diluted in Lula’s first inauguration speech:  
 
Within ten to fifteen years, Brazil will witness the emergence of a new generation 
of intellectuals, scientists, technicians and artists coming from the poorest layers 
of the population. This has always been our intention: democratise not only the 
income, but also knowledge and power (Da Silva 2007). 
 
 
 Despite potentially revolutionary excerpts like this one – coming close to 
transcending the narrow limits of neodevelopmentalist reforms – the general tone of the 
speech is certainly not confrontational. Class struggle is still absent. There are no losers 
in Lula’s promise of development, just winners. The improvement in the living conditions 
of the poor, and even the ‘democratisation’ of ‘knowledge and power’ are not to be 
realised at the expense of the ruling class. In an ever expanding economy, the 
contradictory demands of different classes and class fractions could be reconciled. 
Unsurprisingly, Lula finishes the speech with an emotional call for national unity, placing 
himself above petty political disputes and perfectly embodying the spirit of national 
development. Addressing congressmen from opposition parties, Lula declares:           
 
I want to simply ask you to look more to the things uniting us than to the things 
dividing us (…). Only by doing so can we all can serve this country that we love 
so much. I, myself, will govern for all, without looking at skin colour, belief, 
ideological or party option. More than ever, I am a man of only one cause. And 
this cause is called Brazil (Da Silva 2007). 
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 Certainly lacking the charisma and political skills of her predecessor, Dilma 
Rousseff repeated much of the same message in her first inauguration speech, in 2011. 
Elected to build on Lula’s legacy, Rousseff was an outsider in the Brazilian political 
establishment, as she had never fought an election before. Nevertheless, and despite not 
being a professional public servant, she was seen as a competent public administrator. 
Her management of the crisis in the energy sector after the ill-conceived privatisations of 
the 1990s (see chapter 4) and her moral integrity paved her way to the command of Casa 
Civil – the most powerful of the Ministries, responsible for the administrative 
coordination of the entire government. Her ascent was facilitated by the relative vacuum 
of power within the PT in the aftermath of the corruption scandal of 2005, which resulted 
in the detention of senior politicians from the party and their public demoralisation by the 
corporate media (Miguel and Coutinho 2007).  
Reflecting her technocratic style, the personal touch Rousseff included in the 
neodevelopmentalist discourse involved a strong commitment to the ‘permanent fight’ 
against corruption, a renewed valorisation of technology as the passport to the future, and 
calls for ‘efficiency’ in public spending. Nevertheless, the central message was the same 
as that of Lula’s second inauguration speech – Brazil was well on its way towards 
development, thanks to the neodevelopmentalist policies being adopted by the state. In 
Rousseff’s own words:    
 
A lot of things improved in our country, although we are living just the beginning 
of a new era. It is the waking up of a new Brazil. (…) For the first time Brazil 
finds itself facing the real possibility of becoming, of being, a developed nation. 
(Rousseff 2011) 
 
 At the very end of her first inauguration speech, however, Rousseff deviates from 
the script and, instead of repeating promises of state-led development, she enigmatically 
declaimed a poem by Guimaraes Rosa, an internationally renowned Brazilian modernist 
writer: ‘The stream of life shuffles around everything. / Life is like this: it heats and cools, 
/ it squeezes and then releases, / it calms down and later disturbs. / What it wants from us 
is courage’ (Rosa cited in Rousseff 2011). The quotation could not be more prescient, as 
it anticipates the political turmoil of her presidency and the disintegration of the catch-up 
development dream, which seemed so real in the previous years. Unfortunately, contrary 
to the poet’s verse, and building on Lula’s old nautical metaphor, ‘courage’ would not 
suffice to keep the neodevelopmentalist ship afloat. 
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 The zenith of the neodevelopmentalist political discourse in Brazil also marks the 
start of the rapid dismantling of the achievements of the previous decade. The overcoming 
of hunger and extreme poverty – a promise repeated in every single presidential speech 
since 1994 – is proudly announced as a fact by Rousseff in her second inauguration 
speech: ‘In my first term, Brazil achieved a historic feat: we overcame extreme poverty. 
But (…) the end of extreme poverty is just the beginning’. This remarkable discursive 
turn from mere promises to the actual announcement that extreme poverty had been 
eradicated was presented as a concrete step towards development: ‘Brazil will not always 
be a developing country. Its destiny is to be a developed and fair country (…).’ Rousseff 
goes on and reminds the audience of the impressive achievements of the previous 
governments, including the creation of millions of formal jobs, the accumulation of U$ 
370 billion in international reserves and the successful control of inflation rates (Rousseff 
2015). 
 The triumphant tone of Rousseff’s second inauguration speech – only tempered 
by occasional remarks about the necessity of reigniting growth rates – offers a sharp 
contrast to the reality of deep economic and political crisis in which Brazil was about to 
fall in the following months. Just when development seemed so close, the economic 
activity shrank by 3.5% for two years in a row, causing per capita GDP to fall by almost 
10%. Unemployment levels rose again, and inflation rate finished 2015 well above the 
official target.  
The most dramatic mismatch between Rousseff’s speech and the bitter reality that 
soon would confront the neodevelopmentalist project was regarding the sustainability of 
the broad political alliance forged by Lula in his first term in office. Following her 
predecessor’s repeated calls for national unity under the development banner, Rousseff 
declared:    
   
I know I can count on your support, ladies and gentlemen members of the 
Congress, the legitimate representatives of the people in this national Congress. I 
know I can count on the support of my dear vice-president Michel Temer, my 
partner in every moment. I know I can count on the efforts of the men and women 
of the judiciary. I know I can count on the strong support of my Congress allies, 
on each party leader among them, and on the ministers who, from today, will be 
working alongside me for Brazil (Rousseff 2015). 
 
 Only 15 months later, it became clear that she should have known better. 367 of 
513 member of the lower house of Brazilian Congress voted against her and authorised 
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the quick start of an impeachment process based on extremely fragile allegations. Among 
the impeachment enthusiasts were some of her former ministers and many of her 
presumptive allies. Michel Temer, her ‘partner in every moment’, actively manoeuvred 
politically to guarantee her removal from office. Before completing half of her second 
term as president, Rousseff was suspended from office. The catch-up development 
promise contained in the neodevelopmentalist political speeches – so real in the previous 
years – now sounds like a tragicomic illusion.  
 
 
5.2. – From neoliberal orthodoxy to the ‘new economic matrix’ and back – the 
three phases of the neodevelopmentalist cycle from a macroeconomic perspective. 
     
 The Brazilian neodevelopmentalist cycle comprised three distinct phases 
regarding macroeconomic management. The first one, between 2003 and 2006, is actually 
better described as a continuation of the orthodox neoliberal strategy adopted in the 
second administration of Cardoso, with an important if limited increase in poverty 
alleviation programs. A second phase, characterised by more active industrial policies, 
substantive state investments in infrastructure, reduction of interest rates and less fiscal 
rigidity took place between 2006 and 2013, after Guido Mantega assumed office as 
finance minister. This period is the short-lived golden age of Brazilian 
neodevelopmentalism, when the state seemed to be able to fulfil its expected task and 
catching-up with developed countries appeared to be only a matter of time. Finally, from 
2015 to 2016, many of the policies of the previous phase were reversed in the hope of 
avoiding the deterioration of the public budget and the tendency towards rising inflation 
– and, I argue, in order to appease increasingly rebellious fractions of the ruling class.      
Given the commitments to capital owners made by Lula during his presidential 
campaign of 2002 – most notably in the ‘Letter to the Brazilian People’ – the continuation 
of the macroeconomic strategy that had been adopted since Cardoso’s second term could 
hardly be viewed as a surprise. Nevertheless, the extent of the adhesion initially shown 
by Lula’s administration to neoliberal orthodoxy went beyond the expectations of both 
critics and partisans of the PT. Led by Antonio Palocci, the team of experts assigned to 
key positions in public administration included economists known for their commitment 
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to fiscal discipline such as Joaquim Levy. Appointed originally as Treasury Secretary58 
in 2003, Levy would come back in 2015 as Finance Minister under Dilma, marking the 
end of the second phase of the neodevelopmentalist cycle. Heterodox and Keynesian 
economists, historically closer to the PT, were barred from the Finance Ministry and 
found some limited space in the less powerful Planning Ministry, led by Guido Mantega, 
and in the Brazilian Development Bank (BNDES), led by Carlos Lessa. 
As mentioned in chapter 4, after the devaluation of the Real in 1999, Cardoso’s 
administration adopted an orthodox macroeconomic triad composed of floating exchange 
rates, inflation targets and primary fiscal surpluses. The key instrument used in order to 
deliver the targeted inflation rate was interest rates manipulation by the Central Bank, 
leading to disproportionately high returns to financial investments. High interest rates 
paid on public bounds represented, on their turn, a permanent strangling of the public 
budget, requiring consistent primary fiscal surpluses in order to reassure debt owners – 
mainly Brazilian banks and investment funds – of the state’s capacity and willingness to 
keep rolling its debts. According to the critics of the model, this structurally reduced the 
budgetary space for social spending and productive investments, rendering the economy 
particularly prone to external shocks (Mantega 2001). The picture was completed by a 
long term tendency towards exchange rate overvaluation, given the permanent attraction 
of international capital due to the high interest rates, as well as the nature of Brazilian 
foreign exchange, heavily dependent on primary commodities (Bresser-Pereira 2006, 
2012).  
The possibilities of rapid economic growth under this strategy were severely 
curtailed, inasmuch as the attractiveness of productive investments – particularly in the 
industrial sector – were dumped by high interests and the overvalued exchange rates, in 
face of cheap imports from Asia. During the presidential campaign of 2002, the scenario 
became even grimmer, as capital owners feared a reversion of the macroeconomic model 
notwithstanding Lula’s reassuring words in the ‘Letter to the Brazilian People’. Between 
January and October 2002, the value of the US Dollar in Brazilian Reais jumped from R$ 
1.95 to R$ 3.99 (Mollo and Saad-Filho 2006, 112), reflecting a looming balance of 
payment crisis. Despite a modest increase in exports, the Brazilian current account closed 
the year of 2002 with a deficit amounting to U$ 7.6 billion, aggravated by a deficit of 
                                                          
58 In the Brazilian government system, ‘treasury secretary’ is a sub-ministerial position, under the 
Ministry of Finance, responsible for overseeing the public budget. 
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U$3.9 billion in the financial account.59  In the context of pressure against Brazilian 
limited international reserves, and to avoid a technical default, the government had to 
resort to a new IMF loan totalling US$ 30 billion, the third during Cardoso’s presidency. 
At the end of 2002, just before Lula took office, Brazilian international reserves totalled 
US$ 37.8 billion, of which US$ 20.8 billion corresponded to the IMF loan (Barbosa Filho 
and Souza 2010, 2).  
As usual, the agreement with the IMF included ‘conditionalities’, most notably in 
the form of primary fiscal surplus targets for the following years, fixed at 3.75% of the 
GDP. The Brazilian government also committed to structural reforms – including the 
restructuring of public pensions – and reaffirmed its inflation targets. Although the 
agreement had been negotiated by Cardoso’s orthodox economic team, led by Arminio 
Fraga and Pedro Malan, Lula was pressured to endorse it before being elected (Mollo and 
Saad-Filho 2006, 113).  
Lula’s administration started, therefore, under severe financial, political and 
institutional constraints. Facing an inherited balance of payment crisis, lacking a stable 
majority in both houses of the Congress, and officially tied to the IMF austerity measures, 
the room for substantial change in macroeconomic policies in the short run was severely 
limited (Saad-Filho 2003). In the first phase of the neodevelopmentalist cycle, therefore, 
the ‘macroeconomic triad’ was not only kept, but effectively reinforced. The primary 
budget surplus delivered in 2003 amounted to 4.36% of the GDP, well above the IMF 
target. Soon after the new president took office, the Central Bank increased the interest 
rates at two consecutive board meetings. Nominal interest rates reached 26.5%/year and 
remained at that level for three months (Paiva 2006, 201). Considering the falling inflation 
rates (12.5% in 2002; 9.3% in 2003 and 7.6% in 2004), the debt burden on the public 
budget increased in real terms. In short, the monetary policy initially adopted under Lula 
was at least as restrictive as before, while the fiscal policy was ‘significantly more 
restrictive than in the previous administration’, entailing a reduction of public spending 
amounting to 2.8% in real terms in 2003’ (Giambiagi et al. 2005, 210). 
During this phase, Lula’s administration received much praise from the financial 
fraction of the ruling class, international financial organisations and their organic 
intellectuals. Williamson, for instance, notes that Lula embraced ‘the basic notions that 
were embodied in the original concept of the Washington Consensus’, despite rhetorically 
                                                          
59 For the analysis that follows, I rely on statistics from the United Nations Economic Commission for 
Latin America and the Caribbean (CEPAL 2017) unless another source is indicated.   
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rejecting it (2003b, 110). For Fraga, ‘[f]rom a macroeconomic standpoint, the aftermath 
of Lula’s election has proven to be quite encouraging’ (2004, 98). After a meeting with 
the Brazilian President in September 2004, Rodrigo Rato, Managing Director of IMF 
declared: ‘The advances made by the Brazilian government are very impressive. President 
Lula's administration has adhered to disciplined macroeconomic policies and developed 
an ambitious structural reform agenda’ (Rato 2004).  
The results of the restrictive macroeconomic policies adopted between 2003 and 
2006 were mixed. Regarding macroeconomic stabilisation, this first phase of the 
neodevelopmentalist cycle can only be considered successful. Fears of a massive capital 
flight, unbridled acceleration of inflation and debt default were revealed as unjustified, as 
quickly recognised by neoliberal scholars (Giambiagi et al. 2005; Fraga 2004). Putting it 
in sociological terms, President Lula’s first administration successfully managed to 
neutralise the opposition of the financial fraction of the ruling class, which menaced the 
PT’s government from the start. Proof of this perceived success was the fact that the 2006 
elections ran much more smoothly than four years before for the PT, with no sign of panic 
in the capital markets. 
From the perspective of the working class, however, the picture of this first period 
is much less brilliant. The disappointment with President Lula’s administration was soon 
reflected in the left-leaning academic literature, which clearly identified the continuities 
with the previous neoliberal development model  (Maldonado Filho 2003; Boito Jr 2006; 
Carvalho 2006; Morais and Saad-Filho 2005; Anderson 2011; Saad-Filho 2003; Leher 
2005; Arestis and Saad-Filho 2007; Oliveira 2003; 2006). The disagreements with the 
economic strategy in place were not just theoretical. Unemployment rates rose to an 
unprecedented 12.9% in the third trimester of 2003 (graph 21). Workers’ average incomes 
also diminished by 15% in 2003 (Ferrari-Filho and Maldonado Filho 2007, 59). Nominal 
increases in the legal minimum wage were insufficient in face of the high inflation, 
resulting in very limited increases in real terms. In January 2003, the legal minimum wage 
represented 15% of the living wage. In 2005, that proportion had risen to only 18% 
(DIEESE 2016), a disappointingly slow improvement. Redistributive initiatives 
historically advocated by the PT – such as land reform and over-taxation of fortunes – 
were not implemented.  
The PT’s adhesion to neoliberal orthodoxy had important political consequences, 
menacing the party’s very social basis. Two examples should suffice to illustrate my point 
here: in a quantitative survey carried out in May 2005, Datafolha found that 59% of the 
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people believed that ‘Lula has stopped advocating most of the ideas he had before being 
elected’, while only 34% believed he ‘still advocates most of [those] ideas’ 
(DATAFOLHA 2005). Secondly, the PT lost important municipal elections in 2004, 
including Sao Paulo, where the voting of the middle class is decisive, and Porto Alegre, 
a traditional bulwark, where flagship left-wing policies such as the participatory budget 
were firstly implemented (Baiocchi 2005). 
At the same time, the orthodox macroeconomic choices triggered the growing 
opposition of the productive fraction of the ruling class and, most traumatically, caused 
an early division within the government’s party itself. Carlos Lessa, an old school 
heterodox economist – collaborator of legends of Brazilian classical developmentalism 
like Celso Furtado and Conceição Tavares – was fired from the Presidency of the National 
Development Bank after calling the monetary policy ‘a nightmare’ in an interview (Lessa 
2004). The vice-President himself, seen as a spokesmen of the industrialists, manifested 
on several occasions his disapproval regarding the interest rates levels. Further towards 
the left, one Senator and three Congressman were expelled from the PT for voting 
consistently against the party orientations, particularly on the reform of the pension 
system required by the IMF. Together with a number of supporters and intellectuals 
disappointed with the perceived abandonment of the PT’s historical program, they 
founded the PSOL in 2004. The new party would grow significantly over the next few 
years, in the aftermath of corruption allegations affecting senior PT members (Anderson 
2011). 
The shift in the orientation of the macroeconomic management that happened 
towards the end of Lula’s first term in office is recognised by neoliberals and 
neodevelopmentalists alike (Giambiagi 2009; Barbosa Filho and Souza 2010). Which 
event marked this inflection and at what exact point in time it is to be located is still open 
to debate, however. The periodisation I propose here establishes the start of the proper 
neodevelopmentalist phase of the PT’s administration at the inauguration of Guido 
Mantega as Finance Minister, on the 28th of March 2006. Although in the previous years 
some increase in salaries and poverty alleviation programs had been announced by the 
government, the focus of the macroeconomic management was still on maintaining 
stability, mainly through orthodox means (i.e. fiscal discipline, interest rate 
manipulation). The faith in the capacity of ‘markets’ to promote development was still 
prevalent.   
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From 2006, the priority of Lula’s administration clearly shifted towards 
accelerating economic growth, ideally without abandoning macroeconomic stability. The 
endeavour of bridging social inequality was not being achieved in any meaningful way 
by the market forces. Therefore, in order to guarantee economic growth it was decided 
that more state intervention was needed. Minister Mantega’s mandate was announced by 
President Lula himself in a speech during his nomination: 
  
It was not only once, twice or three times that (…) someone presented to society 
an economic model that was supposed to save Brazil. Then the model resisted 
sometimes for three months, occasionally one year, maybe two; what we want to 
guarantee to the Brazilian people is a cycle of say one decade, eventually two, 
maybe three decades of virtuous growth, so that we can recover, in some years, 
the social debt accumulated for centuries in this country. So, my dear Guido, good 
luck to you; from now on, those wanting to complain about the economy shall 
stop blaming Palocci and can start blaming Guido Mantega (Da Silva 2006).  
   
Initially, during the period between 2006 and the world financial crisis of 2008-
2009, the endeavour to accelerate economic growth was indeed reconciled with the 
maintenance of macroeconomic stability. The economic tripod was not officially 
abandoned, although the fiscal ‘leg’ of the strategy progressively lost its strength, 
particularly after the contra-cyclical measures adopted in response to the crisis 
(Schwartsman 2012). In fact, despite the substantial increase in public spending, debt as 
a percentage of the GDP did not increase substantially, remaining consistently below 60% 
until 2014 after reaching 78% in 2002. In other words, in the short golden age of 
neodevelopmentalism, the government managed to spend more and, at the same time, 
save more. During that phase, strong fiscal surpluses stabilised and eventually even 
reduced the ratio between debt and GDP to historically low levels (see graph 17). 
This apparent economic contradiction was possible due to three factors which 
combined to create a positive spiral of capital accumulation. First, an increase in GDP 
growth rates (graph 18), driven by internal and external demand (high commodity prices). 
Second, a decrease in interest rates (graph 19), reducing the cost of the debt and further 
stimulating domestic demand. Third, an increase in tax revenues, going from 30% of the 
GDP in 2000 to 35% in 2013 (graph 20), thereby allowing for further spending, which 
created further internal demand, refeeding the cycle.  
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2002 2003 2004 2005 2006 2007 2008 2009 2010 2011 2012 2013 2014 2015 2016
Brazil 78.1 72.4 69.6 66.7 55.8 57.2 57.5 59.6 52.0 50.8 55.3 56.7 58.9 66.5 70.3
Argentina 166.4 138.7 118.1 80.2 70.3 61.8 53.6 55.2 43.2 38.7 40.2 43.3 44.4 53.6 53.9
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The limits of this cycle would become clear when external demand dropped and 
room for further cuts in interest rates and increase in tax revenues were blocked. 
Nevertheless, before the neodevelopmentalist strategy reached its limits – far sooner than 
2003 2004 2005 2006 2007 2008 2009 2010 2011 2012 2013 2014 2015 2016
Argentina 9.30 1.48 5.99 7.27 9.05 11.35 13.98 12.25 11.79 12.75 14.57 26.66 26.96 28.79
Brazil 23.79 16.37 19.10 15.40 12.02 12.44 10.13 9.90 11.75 8.46 8.44 11.02 13.58 14.17
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Graph 19 - Brazil - Interest rates (annual official Central Bank rates -
source: CEPALSTAT)
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2001 2002 2003 2004 2005 2006 2007 2008 2009 2010 2011 2012 2013
Brazil 31.0 32.1 31.5 32.3 33.7 33.6 34.0 34.2 32.9 33.1 34.9 35.5 35.6
Argentina 17.5 16.6 19.6 22.0 22.1 22.2 23.0 24.7 25.6 26.7 27.7 29.5 31.2
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Graph 20 - Brazil - Tax revenues (Including social contributions, % of 
GDP. Source: CEPALSTAT)
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suggested by Lula in Mantega’s inauguration – important gains for different social classes 
and class fractions were achieved. Substantial increases in the minimum wage were 
granted (16.7% in 2006 alone). The public sector was revalorised, reversing a tendency 
towards the dismantling of social services during the neoliberal cycle. Salaries increased 
substantially in the public sector, and many new jobs were created, including the founding 
of 27 new public, tuition free university campuses. From 2007, massive investments in 
infrastructure were launched under the Growth Acceleration Program (PAC). For the 
period 2007-2010, total planned investments amounted to more than R$ 500 billion (U$ 
230 billion in January 2007 exchange rates), privileging sectors such as transport, energy 
and social infrastructure (Barbosa-Filho and Souza 2010, 15). 
One particular class fraction, the poorest layers of the working class – called the 
‘subproletariat’ by Andre Singer (2012) and the ‘rabble’ by Jesse Souza (2012) – received 
for the first time at least part of their share of the economic prosperity. The Bolsa Familia 
program is possibly the most well-known social policy of the neodevelopmentalist cycle 
in Brazil (Saad-Filho 2015). Its management, components and results have been intensely 
studied in the academic literature on development and are normally presented as a success 
story to be emulated by other developing countries (Neri 2010; Sader and Costa 2013). 
Indeed, in little more than one decade, Bolsa Familia had grown from the unification of 
a set of relatively small scale scattered programs to become one of the biggest cash 
conditional transfer programs in the world, reaching more than 14 million families (50 
million people) in 2014, starting from a number of 3.6 million families in 2003. During 
the same period, the total value transferred jumped from R$ 4.22 billion to R$ 24.7 billion, 
or 0.5% of the GDP. The average payment was R$167 per family in June 2014, little more 
than U$ 73, composed of fixed and variable elements, depending on the number of 
children in the family and other conditions (MDS 2014). 
At the same time, the very top of the social pyramid kept on receiving generous 
state resources. If the Bolsa Familia program stands as an example of the PT’s pro-poor 
social policies, pro-rich policies were exemplary implemented by the National Bank for 
Economic and Social Development (BNDES). Founded by President Vargas in 1952, this 
100% state owned bank played a key role in supporting long term productive investments 
and import substitution during Brazilian classic developmentalist cycle. In the 1980s and 
particularly in the 1990s, the bank was instrumental in the implementation of the 
neoliberal reforms, centralising and structuring privatisations (Fontes 2010). During the 
neodevelopmentalist cycle, BNDES’ role changed again. The bank grew to become 
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bigger than the World Bank itself (Stiglitz 2014) and was explicitly considered a key tool 
in promoting ‘better coordination between government and markets’, a precondition for 
‘economic development’ (Mantega 2005, 11).  
The coordinating role of BNDES meant, in practice, offering favourable financing 
conditions for large, long term investments, discouraged by the extremely high interest 
rates offered by commercial banks – a consequence of the concentration of capital 
markets in Brazil and the high basic interest rates offered by the Central Bank itself (graph 
19). Accordingly, the total volume of loans offered by BNDES jumped from R$ 35.1 
billion in 2003 to R$ 168.4 billion in 2010, corresponding to 4.6% of Brazilian GDP, or 
about eleven times the amount spent on Bolsa Familia during the same year (Bugiato 
2016, 174; MDS 2014). In 2014, total loans increased further to R$ 187.8 billion – U$ 70 
billion at 2014 exchange rates (BNDES 2014).  
The neodevelopmentalist strategy was tested in the 2008-2009 financial crisis, and 
reached its best performance in 2010, when GDP grew 7.6% (graph 18). In a presentation 
delivered in September 2009 at FGV/SP (the same think thank where the ten Theses on 
New Developmentalism would be announced a few years later), Minister Mantega 
claimed that Brazil was one of the most successful countries in the world in facing the 
international crisis. This, according to him, was due to a solid financial system and 
adequate monetary policies, but mainly because of the ‘active fiscal policy’ practiced 
under his supervision. Examples of fiscal expansion quoted by the Minister included R$ 
100 billion made available for the National Development Bank; R$ 68 billion destined to 
the popular housing program ‘Minha casa minha vida’; R$ 107 billion in incentives to the 
agriculture sector through ‘Plano Safra’; expansion of poverty alleviation programs; 
increases in transfers for provincial governments and municipalities and the continuation 
and expansion of PAC. Mantega also announced an ambitious program of tax cuts, 
benefiting the industrial sector (less IPI), the financial sector (less IOF) and individual tax 
payers (adjusting of IRPF).60 The total effect of the fiscal expansion on the GDP was an 
estimated increase of 2.5% to 3.0% in 2009 alone (Mantega 2009).  
Indeed, the fiscal expansion made true Lula’s prediction in 2008 that the financial 
crisis was a tsunami for the US, but just a small ripple for Brazil (Anderson 2011, 6) – at 
least initially. By the end of 2009, all major risk assessment agencies had upgraded Brazil 
to their respective investment grades. In November of that year, the journal The 
                                                          
60 IPI = Tax on industrialized goods; IOF = Tax on financial operations; IRPF = Income tax of individual 
taxpayers.   
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Economist – whose sympathy for the PT was from the start rather limited – would publish 
its famous cover on Brazil, depicting the Christ Statue in Rio being launched up rocket-
style: ‘Brazil Takes Off’ – read the headline, echoing Rostow’s outdated modernization 
theory (The Economist 2009). In an atmosphere of the triumph of neodevelopmentalism, 
Dilma Rousseff was elected despite her absolute lack of charisma and political skills. 
Lula’s blessing was enough. According to a quantitative survey carried out during his 
final months in office, 84% of the people believed that Lula was handing on to his 
successor a better country than the one he had received at the beginning of his 
administration, compared with only 35% who would say the same about Cardoso. Most 
tellingly, ‘workers’ are mentioned as the social group that benefited the most under Lula 
(33%), beating ‘politicians’ (13%) and ‘bankers’ (13%)(DATAFOLHA 2010). 
The fiscal policy part of the neodevelopmentalist strategy started to be 
implemented from 2006, and was reinforced in the aftermath of the financial crises of 
2008-2009, when primary surpluses were reduced and the ratio debt/GDP started to rise 
again (graph 17). In that phase, the socialisation of gains could be done without any 
meaningful privatisation of losses, thereby partially fulfilling the neodevelopmentalist 
class conciliation promises. The monetary policy part of the neodevelopmentalist cycle, 
however, was much more delicate to implement, inasmuch as it represented a direct 
confrontation of the interests of the financial fraction of the ruling class. Consistent 
reduction in the interest rates would only be forcefully tried in Rousseff´s first term in 
office, with the substitution of Henrique Meirelles for Antonio Tombini61 as head of the 
Central Bank.  
After a fiscal adjustment in her first year in office, in order to contain rising public 
debt and inflation caused by the contra-cyclical measures taken over the previous two 
years,62 Rousseff´s administration advanced against Brazil’s historically high interest 
rates, only marginally reduced during the previous years. The effort to drive down 
financial costs included not only cutting the official Central Bank rates, but also involved 
open political pressure to force private banks to lower the interest rates they charged on 
final credit takers. The difference between the cost of capital attraction and the cost of 
                                                          
61 Contrary to previous Heads of the Brazilian Central Bank, Alexandre Tombini did not have a solid 
background in the private financial market, having spent most of his career in the Central Bank itself.  
62 Serrano and Summa (2015) find in the fiscal adjustment policies of 2011 the origins of the crises that 
would result in the dismantling of the neodevelopmentalist model in the following years. Although my 
approach here puts more emphasis on social disputes and the effects of the international crisis, 
particularly the drop in commodity prices, it is worth noticing that their analysis certainly captures one of 
the hidden causes of the crises of neodevelopmentalism in Brazil.  
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capital lending by banks – the interest rates spread in the financial jargon – gave room to 
what Andre Singer labelled the ‘spread battle’, opposing Rousseff´s administration and 
private banks in a war of contradictory declarations. Eventually, the forceful mobilisation 
of the lending capacity of the public banks lead the private banks to partially cut their 
own interest rates, in a perceived victory for the neodevelopmentalist side (Singer 2015, 
51).     
Far from being an expression of unbridled left-wing confrontation against capital 
in general, the battle to force down interest rates actually aimed at creating conditions for 
further capital accumulation in the real sector of the economy. In the context of 
decelerating economic activity after the 2011 fiscal adjustment, Rousseff´s administration 
– with Guido Mantega still as head of the finance Ministry – tried to rekindle the 
neodevelopmentalist virtuous cycle described above. Falling international demand, 
reflected in falling prices for Brazilian commodity exports, was supposed to be 
compensated for by extra incentives to domestic demand, via an increase in the legal 
minimum wage and more government spending. New investments in infrastructure were 
announced as the second phase of the Growth Acceleration Program. Specific sectors 
were targeted for special credit conditions under the National Development Bank. In this 
context, reducing the interest rates was perceived as essential to facilitate an expansion 
of credit for consumption and investments. 
This time, however, contrary to what had happened in the first two years of the 
golden age of neodevelopmentalism – just before the 2008-2009 crisis – the government 
could not repeat the ascending cycle of simultaneous increase in expenditure and in 
primary surplus. The room for increasing taxes was very small, given the tax burden 
already in place and the weak economic activity. It was expected that an increase in the 
level of activity would generate enough tax revenues to sustain the ambitious fiscal 
expansion ex post. However, internal demand was not sufficient to compensate for the 
fall in international prices of commodities, leading instead to a deterioration in the 
commercial balance as imports increased. In other words, to keep on socialising gains in 
the absence of positive international conditions, some privatisation of losses would be 
necessary – and a sacrifice was required from the financial fraction of the ruling class, in 
the form of lower interest rates.  
After the disappointing economic growth in 2012 and 2013, the government 
became increasingly reluctant to admit the worsening of its fiscal position. At that point, 
officially abandoning the fiscal leg of the macroeconomic triad by admitting primary 
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deficits instead of surpluses could potentially lead to further distrust in economic 
management by capital owners, forcing interest rates up again and postponing any short 
term recovery. In this context, weak budget surpluses were masked by extraordinary 
revenues from public concessions to private capital (particularly in infrastructure and 
energy), resembling the situation of the first Cardoso administration (see chapter 4). 
Furthermore, expenditures from Petrobras, Eletrobras and other investments in the 
context of the Growth Acceleration Program were excluded from the primary surplus 
accounting. Finally, the so-called ‘creative accounting’ adopted by Rousseff’s 
administration involved postponements of the central government payments to public 
banks – in charge of implementing social policies – generating thereby transitory relief to 
public budget (for critiques to the deterioration of the fiscal policy and public accounting, 
see Cruz 2016; Barros and Afonso 2013; Ter-Minassian 2013; Schwartsman 2012). This 
last practice – nicknamed by the mainstream media as ‘fiscal peddling’ would later 
became the core of the fragile juridical allegations used to justify Rousseff’s impeachment 
in 2016.      
Despite looming difficulties, the economic situation was not yet perceived as a 
crisis back in 2013. Unemployment rates were at low levels (graph 21) and salaries were 
increasing in real terms. Inequality was being reduced (graph 22). Prices were under 
control, partially because of freezing of public tariffs. Rousseff’s administration was 
considered good or excellent by 65% of the people according to a survey carried out in 
March 2013. Furthermore, 51% of the people believed that the economic situation was 
about to improve, against only 10% that believed it would get worse. An astonishing 75% 
believed they ran no risk of losing their jobs, and 76% believed Brazil was a good or 
excellent place to live in (DATAFOLHA 2013). In short, the early signs of crisis of the 
neodevelopmentalist model were not perceived by the vast majority of the population 
until the middle of 2013. 
188 
 
 
 
 
 
 
0.0
5.0
10.0
15.0
20.0
25.0
2
0
0
2
 /
 2
2
0
0
2
 /
 4
2
0
0
3
/2
2
0
0
3
 /
 4
2
0
0
4
 /
 2
2
0
0
4
 /
 4
2
0
0
5
 /
 2
2
0
0
5
 /
 4
2
0
0
6
 /
 2
2
0
0
6
 /
 4
2
0
0
7
 /
 2
2
0
0
7
 /
 4
2
0
0
8
 /
 2
2
0
0
8
 /
 4
2
0
0
9
 /
 2
2
0
0
9
 /
 4
2
0
1
0
 /
 2
2
0
1
0
 /
 4
2
0
1
1
 /
 2
2
0
1
1
 /
 4
2
0
1
2
 /
 2
2
0
1
2
 /
 4
2
0
1
3
 /
 2
2
0
1
3
 /
 4
2
0
1
4
 /
 2
2
0
1
4
 /
 4
2
0
1
5
 /
 2
Graph 21 - Brazil - Unemployment rate - second and fourth quarters of each 
year. (In % of the Economic Active Ppopulation. Source: CEPALSTAT)
Argentina Brazil
2002 2004 2006 2007 2008 2011 2013
Poorest 20% 2.40 2.60 2.80 2.80 2.80 3.20 3.20
Second Poorest 20% 5.40 5.80 6.00 6.40 6.40 7.20 7.40
Middle 20% 9.20 9.80 10.00 10.60 10.60 11.60 11.80
Second Richest 20% 16.60 17.00 17.00 17.80 17.20 18.40 18.60
Richest 20% 66.40 64.60 64.00 62.20 63.00 59.60 59.00
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Graph 22 - Brazil - Income Distribution - Selected Years
(% of total income. Urban population only - source:CEPALSTAT) 
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The moods changed radically after massive street demonstrations in June and July 
of 2013. Explaining the sudden emergence of unprecedented protests against a seemingly 
popular administration is a contemporary problem defying some of the best Brazilian 
social scientists (Singer 2013; Ribeiro 2014; Antunes and Braga 2014; Romao 2014; 
Saad-Filho 2013). Certainly, the prolonged political crisis inaugurated in June 2013 is 
related to the poor quality of public services, the obvious inversion of priorities expressed 
in the offensive amount of money expended in events such as the World Cup and the 
Olympic Games, and the perceived widespread corruption of the Brazilian political 
system. My own interpretation of the demonstrations, coherent with the overarching 
argument of this thesis, is that the emptiness of the repeated promises of development 
made by Brazilian political elites became all too evident at the moment that the fruits of 
development were finally supposed to be ripe, triggering a mass rejection of any form of 
institutionalised political leadership, and an intense naming and blaming of professional 
politicians. In 2013, both the state and the market utopias had lost any credibility.  
Whichever the explanation of the wave of protests that began in June 2013, their 
consequences for the popularity and the stability of Rousseff’s administration were 
dramatic. The golden age of neodevelopmentalism came to an abrupt end. The second 
semester of 2013 and the first semester of 2014 were marked by political confusion and 
further deterioration of the public budget, now aggravated by accelerating inflation. The 
fiscal expansion was partially contained and interest rates started to rise again (graph 19), 
driving economic growth further down (graph 18).  
The presidential elections took place in the second semester of 2014 against a 
backdrop of deep distrust in the government and widespread suspicion of politics in 
general. With the decisive support of part of the left, including some of the most important 
leaders of PSOL, Rousseff won re-election in the second round on a clearly anti-
neoliberal platform, promising to keep the social achievements of the neodeveopmentalist 
cycle (Webber 2017, 57). Her adversary, Senator Aecio Neves63, represented the return 
                                                          
63 Aecio Neves, a former Governor and Senator (PSDB), comes from a traditional political family from 
Minas Gerais. His grandfather, Tancredo Neves, was indirectly elected President in 1985 to mark the end 
of the dictatorship, but suddenly died before taking office. After aligning himself with Lula and PT during 
the golden age of neodevelopmentalist, Aecio Neves assumed a strong neoliberal stance in the 2014 
presidential campaign, defending privatizations and claiming the legacy of Cardoso’s reforms. He is 
currently implicated in the ‘Lava Jato’ operations, accused of favoring construction companies during his 
time as Governor of Minas Gerais.   
190 
 
 
to pro-market policies. Final results were the tightest in 25 years, with President Rousseff 
winning 51.6% of the valid votes, against 48.4% for Senator Neves. During the campaign, 
a direct conflict between neoliberalism and neodevelopmentalism could be witnessed in 
the media. Organic intellectuals of each camp were enlisted to the battle of ideas. One of 
the high moments of the confrontation was the televised debate between Guido Mantega 
and Arminio Fraga. While Fraga declared the present development cycle exhausted, 
calling for fiscal restriction and inflation control, Mantega blamed the ongoing 
international crisis for disappointing GDP growth results and announced further state 
programs to stimulate the economic activity (Fraga and Mantega 2014). 
Once re-elected, however, Rousseff abandoned the neodevelopmentalist strategy 
– in crisis since 2013 – and embraced a strong neoliberal adjustment program. Guido 
Mantega was replaced by Joaquim Levy at the Finance Ministry, marking the start of the 
third phase of the neodevelopmentalist cycle, which in fact corresponded to an attempted 
return to the first phase. Interest rates rose, public investments were postponed, the 
government sent to Congress a proposal involving the curtailing of social security rights, 
public banks’ subsidised loans were reduced, and new primary budget surplus targets 
were announced. In short, Levy tried to implement part of the neoliberal agenda espoused 
by Senator Neves in the Presidential campaign –an agenda that he had informally helped 
Arminio Fraga to formulate (Sadi and Nery 2014). The political consequences of 
Rousseff’s neoliberal turn were momentous: ‘[o]verwhelmingly, the reaction among her 
voters was that her victory was an estelionato, an embezzlement: she’d cheated her 
supporters by stealing the clothes of her opponents. Not just disillusion, but anger 
followed’ (Anderson 2016, 2; see also Webber 2017, 58).    
 If between 2003 and 2006, Antonio Palocci succeeded in implementing a fiscal 
adjustment and reversing negative expectations regarding Lula’s administration, this time 
Joaquim Levy could not repeat his former bosses’ achievements. The falling prices of 
commodities and the abrupt contraction of internal demand after the misguided fiscal 
adjustment combined to produce a sharp recession of -3.5% in 2015 alone, followed by a 
further recession of –3.5 in 2016. In the context of contracting economic activity, tax 
revenues frustrated original expectations, making it impossible to deliver the targeted 
primary surpluses. Indeed, instead of a budget surplus, the government delivered a 
primary deficit in 2015, causing the ratio between public debt and GDP to increase (graph 
17). The rapid deterioration of the public budget prompted all major rating agencies to 
downgrade Brazil’s debt bonds. From January 2015 to January 2016, the nominal 
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exchange rate between Brazilian Reais and US Dollars went from R$ 2.66 to R$ 3.90. 
Debt default was avoided, nevertheless, thanks to country’s massive international 
reserves accumulated during the golden age of neodevelopmentalism and the debt profile, 
largely owned by domestic capitalists and denominated in Brazilian Reais. 
 In short, regarding macroeconomic management, the neodevelopmentalist cycle 
was characterised by a relatively short initial period of fiscal and monetary restraint (until 
2006), followed by an uneven period of first fiscal and then monetary expansion (2006-
2014), and finally by a second contractionary period (2015-2016), which contributed to 
the final collapse of Rousseff’s second administration, amidst a political and economic 
crisis.  
 
 
5.3 - Brazil in the age of giants – neodevelopmentalist geopolitics and the national 
interest 
 
The ‘active and bold foreign policy’ (Amorim 2010, 239) adopted since 2003 is a 
key component of the neodevelopmentalist strategy. Its principles and strategic vision are 
clearly defined by Ambassador Pinheiro Guimarães (2008a; see also chapter 1), who 
served as vice-Minister of External Relations (2003-2009) and Minister of Strategic 
Issues (2009-2010). The post-Cold War world was perceived as an increasingly 
competitive system, heavily influenced by the actions of a reduced set of superpowers. 
Given the geopolitical constraints to development in such a system, the only hope for 
Brazil to catch-up and finally become a developed country was to constitute a political 
and economic bloc in South America, capable of being one of the emerging power centres 
in this competitive world.  
This anti-liberal foreign policy narrative, sceptical of trade liberalisation and 
critical of the renewed engagements in international regimes undertaken in the 1990s (see 
chapter 4), fits extremely well with the neodevelopmentalist economic narrative. 
Although not rejecting market forces totally, both place the state in a central position 
regarding the promotion of development. Accordingly, in the neodevelopmentalist cycle 
the professional bureaucracy of the Ministry of External Relations was revalorised. 
Salaries increased substantially, the diplomatic corps were expanded by 40%, and tens of 
new embassies were opened. Between 2006 and 2010, more than 100 new recruits a year 
were admitted to the Brazilian diplomatic academy (Rio Branco Institute - IRBr), 
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arguably helping the traditionally elitist Ministry of External Affairs to become more 
representative of the diversity of Brazilian society. The new diplomats – myself included 
– were trained by Ambassador Pinheiro Guimarães himself. Ha-Joon Chang's Kicking 
away the ladder? (2002) became required literature in formation courses at IRBr.         
Although profoundly nationalist and assertive in its formulation, the 
neodevelopmentalist foreign policy skilfully avoided direct confrontations with the 
United States, distancing itself from President Kirchner’s and President Chavez’ 
ferocious anti-imperialist discourse. Instead, Ambassador Celso Amorim – Minister of 
External Affairs between 2003 and 2010 – was able to translate the neodevelopmentalist 
priorities into a dignified defence of multilateralism, against unilateral decisions of 
superpowers (Amorim 2013; 2015). The corollary of that principled discourse was a 
repeated call for reform of international organisations, so as to better represent the post-
Cold War international reality. In practical terms, it meant replacing the G-8 with the G-
20 as the privileged forum for world political concertation, increasing the voting share of 
Brazil and other emerging powers in the IMF and the World Bank, creating coalitions 
among countries in the Global South in order to increase Brazil’s influence in 
international organisations such as the WTO and, last but not least, broadening the UN 
security council, so as to include Brazil as a permanent member – a long lasting aim of 
Brazilian diplomacy.  
Good personal understandings between President Lula and President Bush – and 
later President Obama – also helped to avoid the deterioration of bilateral relations with 
the US, despite Brazil’s regional and global ambitions (Vigevani and Cepaluni 2007, 307; 
Neves and Spektor 2011). Indeed, Lula's growing international stature as a popular leader 
of the Global South was apparently met with respect by US authorities. After President 
Lula left office, however, an important moment of tension in the US-Brazil bilateral 
relations emerged. NSA secret reports released by Edward Snowden revealed that the 
agency actively spied on President Rousseff and the national oil company, Petrobras 
(Bauman et al. 2014, 128). After the release of documents confirming these accusations 
in the international media (Greenwald 2013), President Rousseff was prompted to cancel 
a state visit to the United States in 2013, marking a historic low in bilateral relations.  
The above mentioned Brazilian regional and global ambitions were not simply 
vague ideas of greatness. Objectively, they were materialised through the formation of 
international alliances, regional blocs and concrete foreign policy initiatives. One 
example of these alliances is the BRICS, a political concertation of self-perceived 
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emerging powers, including China, Russia, India, and later South Africa. Less frequently 
mentioned are the pioneering summits between South American and African countries 
and South American and Arab countries. The Brazilian presence in Africa and the 
Caribbean was reinforced through the opening of a number of Embassies and the 
launching of cooperation programs to fight hunger and extreme poverty (Pinheiro, Hirst, 
and Soares de Lima 2010). Unprecedentedly, Brazilian diplomacy even tried to influence 
issues traditionally reserved to great powers, such as international peace and security. The 
agreement with Iran regarding a swap of nuclear material and limits to uranium 
enrichment – intermediated by Brazil and Turkey in 2010 – was not immediately 
successful due to the stepping back of the US, but paved the way for future negotiations 
(Amorim 2015; Fitzpatrick 2010).   
These global initiatives were ultimately premised on South American economic 
and political integration and on Brazil’s ability to coordinate and represent the region.64 
In this context, Mercosur, which started in the 1990s as a neoliberal commercial initiative 
– a step towards full trade liberalisation (Menem 1998) – was re-signified, to become the 
core of the region's development bloc. The inclusion of Venezuela as a full member, in 
2012, was justified in clear geopolitical terms. Beyond Mercosur, broader international 
political organisations were launched, like UNASUR – formed by all South American 
Countries – and CELAC – including all Latin American and Caribbean countries, and 
excluding the United States.   
These momentous foreign policy initiatives are sometimes misinterpreted as the 
ultimate materialisation of the PT’s left-wing ideologies (Almeida 2004; 2006; 2010; 
Cason and Power 2009). At their worst, these interpretations fall back on conspiracy 
theories that see a subordination between Brazilian state policies and the PT’s 
international party alliances in the context the Sao Paulo Forum.65 Although it is evident 
that long-lasting international connections of the PT helped in the political concertation 
with left-wing Latin American governments, portraying the neodevelopmentalist foreign 
policy as intentionally putting party socialist ideologies above the ‘national interest’ is 
deeply misleading. Because the ‘national interest’ is never given, every political group 
                                                          
64 One important challenge for Brazilian neodevelopmentalist diplomacy in the region was the 
nationalisation of gas fields in Bolivia in 2006, just after Evo Morales came to power. The move directly 
affected Petrobras’ interests. Bearing the internal costs of avoiding a more confrontationist instance vis-à-
vis the Bolivian government, the neodevelopmentalist diplomacy managed to scale down the conflict, 
renegotiate contracts and satisfy some of the Bolivian government’s demands (Duarte, Saraiva and Bone 
2008; Glachant and Hallack, 2009; Fuser 2014).   
65 The Sao Paulo forum is a coordinating mechanism of left-wing Latin American parties. 
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represents it in different ways. Therefore, denouncing a foreign policy for its partisanship 
and lack of concern with the ‘national interest’ can only be seen as a partisan critique in 
itself. In fact, as mentioned earlier, a clear vision of the ‘national interest’ was presented 
in the work of the main idealiser of the neodevelopmentalist foreign policy (Guimarães 
2007; 2008a). Accordingly, the Brazilian foreign policy initiatives under Presidents Lula 
and Rousseff are better understood as concrete efforts to make Brazil a great power in an 
emerging multipolar world – seen as a necessary condition to make possible the country’s 
capitalist development. In other words, the neodevelopmentalist foreign policy represents 
a proactive response to perceived international limitations to development.  
Evidence of the non-socialist character of the neodevelopmentalist foreign policy 
is the international expansion of Brazilian private capital under privileged conditions. 
Here again, the BNDES played an important role in providing very attractive credit 
opportunities for Brazilian companies to expand their business overseas, taking over their 
international competitors. What is more, the strengthening of national capital was even 
formulated as a state policy. As explains Joao Carlos Ferraz, one of the Bank’s top 
executives, ‘there is no example of a country wanting to have a proper place in the concert 
of nations that fails to have powerful companies’ (cited in: Garcia 2012, 122). To quote 
a well-researched example, between 2005 and 2010, BNDES financed the successive 
taking over of Argentinian and US’ companies by JBS Friboi, making it the largest meat 
producer in the world, operating in more than ten countries and making around 70% of 
its revenues abroad. The creation of this Brazilian multinational – and a number of others 
– was only possible with the active participation of the Brazilian state via its development 
bank, which injected R$ 6 billion into the company in 2010 alone (Garcia 2012, 122; see 
also: Bezerra et al. 2016; Lethbridge 2009; Bugiato 2016).  
   Beyond extraordinarily attractive credit conditions, Brazilian private capital 
counted on the active engagement of the Brazilian Ministry of External Relations in 
opening new markets and guaranteeing favourable conditions for Brazilian investments 
(Boito Jr and Berringer 2014, 106). ‘Lula became something of an Ambassador for 
Brazilian capital abroad’ (Webber 2017, 54). Indeed, President Lula took pride in 
traveling worldwide with big Brazilian entrepreneurs, intermediating the political 
contacts of Brazilian capitalists and foreign governments, particularly in Africa and Latin 
America. In his own words:  
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I am very proud to be an advertiser of Brazilian products – whichever they are. That is 
the way we build a great nation. You know what? I am ready to travel across the African 
continent selling machines, tractors, biofuels, whatever is there to sell. I have no problems 
in being Brazil’s peddler’ (Da Silva 2008).  
 
A good example of the use of political relations to open profitable opportunities 
for big Brazilian corporations is the reform and enlargement of the port of Mariel, in 
Cuba, where a new special economic zone is to be established. The civil works – 
estimated to be U$ 957 million, of which US 662 million were financed by BNDES – 
were conducted by the Brazilian multinational Odebrecht (Vigevani and Aragusuku 2016, 
285). Indeed, during the neodevelopmentalist cycle, good relations with neighbouring 
Latin American countries paved the way for an unprecedented international expansion of 
Brazilian construction firms, which gained public contracts in Bolivia, Ecuador, 
Venezuela, Argentina and Nicaragua, among other countries. 
It is true that the Brazilian foreign policy under the PT’s administration cannot be 
reduced to the simple defence of the interests of big national corporations. In fact, the 
Brazilian Ministry of External Affairs has always privileged the agenda set up by the 
ruling class, including promotion of Brazilian capital abroad. In this regard, the novelty 
represented by the PT was more a matter of intensity than the mere fact of using state 
means to promote private interests artificially conflated with ‘the national interest’ – a 
rather common practice of capitalist states everywhere in the world. Indeed, promising 
spaces for social participation were created, particularly in the context of Mercosur and 
with regard to regional policies for family farming (Patriota 2013, 213; Dolce Faria 2015). 
Notwithstanding the pioneering opening of the Brazilian Ministry of External Relations 
to the influence of subordinated social classes and class fractions, there is no doubt that 
the spaces for social participation were very limited. The partial inclusion of fractions of 
the working class in the definition of the foreign policy actually mimicked the logic of 
the neodevelopmentalist project in general, involving marginal concessions for the 
working class, under the undisputed hegemony of the productive fraction of the national 
ruling class.  
In short, the limits of the neodevelopmentalist social alliance can be seen not only 
in the macroeconomic management. Neodevelopmentalism also materialised itself 
through a coherent and well-tuned foreign policy, explicitly committed to catch-up 
development, and willing to elevate private interests to the level of national interests in 
order to achieve this goal.      
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5.4 Beyond the crises of neodevelopmentalism – uneven and combined development 
 
 Not even the most enthusiastic PT supporter would dare to argue that in 2016, 
when the party was ousted from power, Brazil was ‘sailing in the open seas of economic 
and social development’, as promised by President Lula when the PT came to power, 
fourteen years earlier (Da Silva 2014 [2003]). Without belittling the important social 
achievements of Presidents Lula’s and Rousseff’s administrations, there can be no doubt 
that neodevelopmentalist policies have failed to live up to the promises contained in the 
neodevelopmentalist political discourse. The national union announced by President Lula 
da Silva clearly broke apart in 2015, when President Dilma Rousseff was abandoned by 
almost all political forces supporting her government, including industrial and agrarian 
organisations, political parties, and her own vice-President.  The state could not fulfil the 
moderating role neodevelopmentalists expected from it – in a moment of economic 
contraction, class conflict returned with a vengeance. Despite Brazil’s active foreign 
policy, the state was also unable to shield the country from international negative 
pressures. In the absence of favourable external conditions, the socialisation of gains 
halted, eventually reverting to a socialisation of losses during Rousseff’s second term. As 
a result, several years of rapid economic growth and wealth distribution were balanced 
by very poor GDP performance in other years, culminating in the dramatic recession in 
2015 (-3.5%) and 2016 (-3.6%) (graph 18).  
 What went wrong with a development strategy that, during its short-lived golden 
age (2004-2010), seemed to have put Brazil on the track to becoming a developed 
country? This momentous question is currently a matter of heated political and academic 
debate, and the answers once again divide the neoliberal and the neodevlopmentalist 
fields.  
 For neoliberals, PT’s administrations were based on a fundamentally misguided 
anti-markets ideology. Ignoring the best economic practices, the state heavily intervened 
in varied aspects of the economy. This ended up causing uncertainty among economic 
agents, halting investments and reigniting inflation. While the positive results are 
dismissed as a form of ‘zodiacal paradise’ (Giambiagi and Schwartsman 2014, 6) – 
meaning a confluence of good luck – the bad results, particularly after 2010, are directly 
attributed to the interventionist public policies implemented by the PT. These policies 
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were ultimately responsible for bringing down capital productivity and profits, curtailing 
the attractiveness of new investments (Holanda and Pessoa 2014). Equally damaging was 
the PT’s lack of fiscal discipline in the aftermath of the 2008 crisis (Franco 2011; 
Schwartsman 2012). The result of excessive state spending and intervention – as 
neoliberals anticipated – was a mismatch of relative prices, the deterioration of the public 
budget, unrealistically high salaries, and artificially low employment rates.  
This economic analysis is coupled with a similar argument made in relation to the 
neodevelopmentalist foreign policy, perceived as ideologically driven, detached from 
reality and privileging party over national interest (Almeida 2004, 2006, 2010, 2011; 
Abdalla 2016). Finally, in the context of the heavily politicised investigations of the ‘Lava 
Jato’ operation, a complementary argument is being made by some journalists and 
political analysts. For them, the real drivers of the neodevelopmentalist errors were not 
only misguided ideological views, but the actual intention of favouring a set of big 
companies, which in turn would reward PT and its leaders with funding for campaign and 
private favours (Leitao 2017). 
 With different nuances, the neoliberal argument focusses on perceived liabilities 
stemming from the state’s intervention in the economy, thereby falling back on the market 
utopia that characterises the neoliberal ideology. Although they explicitly recognise that 
the state is supposed to play an important role, by guaranteeing stable macroeconomic 
conditions and sound fiscal policies, the driver of development should unquestionably be 
market forces. Excessive state intervention – mainly in the form of fiscal and monetary 
expansion, but also by putting a thumb on the scales in favour of labour through pressing 
for high salaries – is doomed to cause market inefficiencies and backfire in the medium 
term. In short, for neoliberals the neodevelopmentalist strategy implemented during the 
PT’s administrations is fundamentally mistaken and should be replaced by a more market-
friendly strategy, based on a new set of market reforms in order to rebalance the state 
budget, recover profitability and increase productivity of capital.           
A totally different narrative is made by neodevelopmentalist authors. For them, 
the PT’s government can be considered largely successful, as shown by high growth taxes 
between 2004 and 2010, but most importantly by the unprecedented social ascension of 
the poorest layers of the population (Mercadante 2010; Sader and Costa 2013). By 
rebuilding the state’s capacity to intervene positively in the economy, a number of 
successful public policies were implemented, including flagship programs like Bolsa 
Familia, and Minha Casa Minha Vida. Thanks to state investments and political support, 
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positive results were arguably produced in the areas of science and technology (Machado 
Rezende 2013), public health (Costa 2013), woman’s rights (Menicucci de Oliveira 2013) 
and racial equality (Ferreira 2013). The neodevelopmentalist foreign policy is described 
as hugely successful, raising Brazil’s profile internationally and prompting the country to 
have important participation in the context of the WTO, the G-20 and climate change 
negotiations, among others (Amorim 2013, 2015). Concrete steps were taken towards 
South American integration, such as the constitution of UNASUR, coming close to the 
perspective of making the region as a whole an emerging power pole in a multipolar world 
(Guimarães 2009).  
The disappointing economic results after 2010 are attributed to factors beyond the 
control of the government, particularly the international crisis of 2008, and the subsequent 
drop in international liquidity and commodity prices (Barbosa Filho 2013, 80; 2015). In 
fact, the immediate response to the crisis is praised as bringing back the state’s capacity 
to promote contra-cyclical expansionist policies in order to maintain the level of activity 
and employment (Mantega 2009). Nevertheless, the sluggish recovering of international 
demand, the decelerations of Chinese growth rates, the second fall in international 
commodities prices in 2014, and the rising inflation rates (graph 23) arguably exhausted 
the possibilities of contra-cyclical policies. Increasing government spending was not met 
with economic growth and tax revenues, raising therefore the public debt as a percentage 
of the GDP (graph 17). Another unforeseen circumstance was the severe drought that 
occurred in the Southwest region of Brazil, forcing water rationing in the state of Sao 
Paulo (Soriano et al. 2016). Because the Brazilian system is heavily dependent on 
hydroelectricity, the water shortage triggered the use of auxiliary fossil fuel power plants, 
driving up energy prices and further impacting on inflation.   
There is an interesting parallel between the two mainstream narratives about the 
neodevelopmentalist cycle in Brazil. For neoliberals, the positive results achieved during 
the years of economic expansion were exogenously produced, while the negative results 
were a consequence of the PT’s disastrous policies. For neodevelopmentalists, the inverse 
is true. The positive results are perceived as the consequence of socially progressive 
public policies, while the poor results are seen as being ultimately exogenously 
determined. These two opposing narratives are both consistent with their respective 
utopias. If the impersonal forces of international markets are the source of prosperity and 
the state is the source of inefficiency and corruption, logically the good results can be 
attributed to the former and the bad results to the latter. On the other hand, if the 
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international capitalism is a source of threats and imbalances while the state is the key 
actor to promote development, then logically the good results shall be attributed to the 
latter, while the bad results are produced by the former. Therefore, even when 
neodevelopmentalist writers recognise actual mistakes made by PT administrations – 
particularly regarding high exchange rates, lack of fiscal responsibility and high interest 
rates (Bresser-Pereira 2013; Barbosa-Filho 2015) – the underlying presupposition is that 
the model itself has to be preserved. The faith in the state’s capacity to tame markets and 
lead the country to development remains unshakable.   
 
 
 
What is missing is a narrative capable of organically correlating the recent 
developmental dynamics of Brazilian society with international constraints and 
opportunities. Recently, a growing literature in sociology and political economy, 
including some authors sympathetic to neodevelopmentalism (Singer 2013, 2014, 2015, 
Souza 2012, 2015), and others critical of it (Castelo 2012; Boito Jr and Berringer 2014; 
Boito Jr 2013; Boito Jr and Saad-Filho 2015, 2015; Katz 2014)  provides one key element 
of that missing narrative, by bringing to the forefront of their analyses the shifting class 
relations during the neodevelopmentalist cycle. All these authors see the development 
2001 2002 2003 2004 2005 2006 2007 2008 2009 2010 2011 2012 2013 2014 2015 2016
Argentina -1.1 25.9 13.4 4.4 9.6 10.9 8.8 8.6 6.3 10.5 9.8 10.0 10.6 21.4 21.5 40.5
Brasil 6.8 8.5 14.7 6.6 6.9 4.2 3.6 5.7 4.9 5.0 6.6 5.4 6.2 6.3 9.1 8.7
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Graph 23 - Brazil  - Inflation (Official figures- Source: CEPASTAT)
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strategy adopted during the PT administration as more than a simple set of economic and 
social policies, involving an unstable class alliance between fractions of the ruling class 
and fractions of the working class.  
Accordingly, the first years of the PT administration are seen as the forging of the 
‘Lulist’ class alliance (Singer 2012), which included an ‘unusual economic arrangement’ 
(Barbosa-Filho 2008), meaning gains for the very richest (through high interest rates) and 
the poorest (through social policies). In the golden age of neodevelopmentalism, other 
class fractions were progressively incorporated. Organised labour benefited from 
increasing salaries, and the national productive capital received cheap credit from public 
banks and preferential treatment on government purchases. The crisis of 
neodevelopmentalism is, therefore, explained by a dissolution of that broad and 
contradictory class alliance.  
If that is the case, the next question to ask is what caused the dissolution of the 
neodevelopmentalist class alliance? Particularly puzzling is abandonment of the 
neodevelopmentalist project by the productive fraction of the ruling class, which largely 
benefited from it. The financial fraction of the ruling class had material reasons to oppose 
the government after the forceful reduction of interest rates. But the same policy actually 
was meant to favour industrialists and agrarian producers. Indeed, during the almost 
fifteen years of the PT administration, the productive fraction of the ruling class – in its 
rural and industrial parts – was consistently benefited by subsidised credits from public 
banks, government contracts, and a foreign policy that explicitly tried to promote agrarian 
exports and the interest of Brazilian multinational corporations abroad. Contrary to what 
happened in Argentina, where Cristina de Kirchner antagonised rural producers (see 
chapter 6 below), President Rousseff’s administration tried to please industrial and 
agrarian producers until the very end, naming their representatives to key ministerial 
positions. Nevertheless, during the tumultuous years of 2015 and 2016, both the National 
Confederation of Agrarian producers and the Federation of Industries of Sao Paulo, the 
two most powerful representative organisations of Brazilian capital, formally declared 
their support for the impeachment process (FIESP 2015; CNA 2016).   
This apparently irrational behaviour of part of the Brazilian bourgeoisie can only 
be understood as a defensive strategy of class reproduction in the face of international 
pressures, a point largely missed by the existing literature. As it became clear, the 
adhesion of the productive fraction of the ruling class to the neodevelopmentalist project 
was premised on their perception of the state’s capacity to moderate labour demands and 
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guarantee continued gains for capital. When international conditions were exceptionally 
favourable, the PT’s administration could indeed reconcile those demands with some 
gains for the working class, particularly to its poorest layers, through social policies and 
cash transfer programs. The neodevelopmentalist class alliance depended, therefore, on 
the state’s capacity to promote continued socialisation of gains. The perspective of 
continued gains for both, capital and labour, was galvanised through the insistently 
repeated promise of development, as seen in the neodevelopmentalist political discourse 
analysed earlier.  
When the whip of external necessity lashed for the first time, in the aftermath of 
the international financial crisis, the contradictory demands of the different fractions of 
the neodevelopmentalist class alliance emerged, putting the PT administration in 
complicated circumstances. The problem could initially be postponed by the fiscal 
expansion starting in 2009, which generated the best GDP growth results of the entire 
neodevelopmentalist cycle in 2010 (graph 18). Only one year later, however, the fiscal 
adjustment carried out in the first year of Rousseff’s administration and the deceleration 
of growth that followed started to put the neodevelopmentalist project under threat. For a 
short period, the government tried to preserve social achievements by concentrating the 
burden on the financial fraction of the ruling class, through new regulations and political 
pressure for interest rate reduction, the so-called ‘spread battle’ (Singer 2015, 51).  
The strategy of privatising losses for the financial fraction of the ruling class was 
not enough, however. The social struggle for shrinking resources had been unleashed. On 
the labour side, growing impatience with poor quality public services, insufficient salary 
gains and increasing cost of life prompted the appearance of new social movements, and 
culminated in the mass protests of 2013 (Antunes and Braga 2014). On the capital side, 
beyond the open dissatisfaction of private banks with the forced reduction of interest 
rates, the industrial and agrarian capital reinforced their demands for subsidised credits, 
debt restructuring and tax breaks. In the context of growing distributive disputes, 
increasing pressure on the public budget and rising energy costs, inflation accelerated 
(graph 23), worsening the perception of a looming crisis, and driving interest rates up 
again (graph 19).  
The precarious re-gathering of the neodevelopmentalist front in the 2014 elections 
could not resist the second and worse fiscal adjustment implemented by Rousseff at the 
very beginning of her second term. At the same time, the whip of external necessity lashed 
again, with a second drop in commodity prices. Iron ore prices, for instance, went from 
202 
 
 
U$ 128 (dry ton) in January 2014 to U$ 67 in January 2015. Soybeans went from U$ 547 
(metric ton) in April 2014 to U$ 357 in April 2015. The barrel of crude oil went from U$ 
108 in June 2014 to U$ 47 in January 2015 (INDEXMUNDI 2017), menacing the 
profitability of oil production in Brazil’s recently developed off-shore fields, with 
profound impacts on the whole oil production chain. Facing shrinking economic activity 
and tax revenues, the government moved to a dramatic phase of socialisation of losses, 
through a combination of inflation, taxation, exchange rates devaluation and cuts in public 
expenditure.  
At that point, perceiving the erosion of the neodevelopmentalist class alliance both 
on the side of labour and on the side of capital, the political opposition defeated in the 
2014 election did not hesitate to use corruption allegations to demoralise the government. 
Despite the fact that President Rousseff was not directly implicated, the impeachment 
process prospered based on extremely fragile allegations of budget mismanagement, 
leading to the voting mentioned in the introduction of this chapter. The technical merits 
of the impeachment allegations clearly did not matter (Singer et al. 2016). The 
neodevelopmentalist strategy was totally discredited, and the class alliance supporting it 
did not exist anymore.   
In a sense, the neoliberal, the neodevelopmentalist and the critical class-relational 
arguments mentioned early are all at least partially right, although they all also largely 
miss the point. Each of them successfully captures one angle of the story. The crisis of 
neodevelopmentalism in Brazil can indeed be attributed to its unsustainable 
macroeconomic policies (Giambiagi and Schwartsman 2014), to the international crisis 
(Barbosa Filho 2013, 2015), and to shifting class alliances (Singer 2013, 2014, 2015). In 
fact, if the uneven and combined character of Brazilian recent development is taken into 
account, all three elements can be seen as intertwined. The macroeconomic policies were 
misguided precisely because they responded to contradictory pressures of an 
unsustainable class alliance in a context of external pressure. As with the neoliberal 
development strategy fifteen years earlier, neodevelopmentalism fell prey to its own 
theoretical and political contradictions. In a context of international crisis and contracting 
activity levels, the state could not play the class conciliatory role neodevelopmentalists 
expected from it.     
In conclusion, the kind of development that actually resulted from the 
neodevelopmentalist strategy was very different from the idealised catch-up development 
promised in the political discourses. Productive and social structures changed, but Brazil 
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did not become a developed country. Instead, Brazilian development over the last 15 years 
can be better conceptualised as uneven and combined. Unevenness and combination 
resulted in a particular balance of socialisation and privatisation of gains and losses, 
determined by differentiated state responses to class conflicts and international pressures 
and opportunities. 
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Chapter 6 – Neodevelopmentalism in Argentina: from class conciliation to 
confrontation 
 
Let it be clear, this is not an economic model. Let it be clear, this 
is a political project with economic, social and cultural aims. 
 
   President Cristina Fernandez de Kirchner (2013) 
 
 
 At midnight on the 9th December 2015, Cristina de Kirchner’s mandate as 
President of the Argentine Republic officially expired. A new President was not 
immediately sworn in, however. It took more than 12 hours for Mauricio Macri, the 
winner of the 2015 elections by a margin of less than 3% of the votes, to be officially 
nominated President by the Argentine Congress. The departing President refused to attend 
the transfer ceremony.  
During the previous week, tension between the entering and the departing 
Presidents mounted, as they could not agree on the protocol to be followed. Mauricio 
Macri wanted to receive the baton and the ribbon that symbolise the Presidency at the 
Casa Rosada, after the Constitutional ceremony in the Congress, while Cristina de 
Kirchner insisted that the attributes of the Presidency needed to be transposed in the 
Congress itself. The controversy culminated in a bitter telephone call between the two, 
followed by a series of twitter exchanges in which Cristina de Kirchner accused Macri of 
shouting at her. In a letter released one day later, she went on and revealed the harsh 
responses she gave to the President elect in three points: 1) She was not his escort; 2) The 
inauguration day was not Macri’s birthday party; 3) She would not keep on silently 
accepting his personal and public mistreatments (De Kirchner 2015). Macri responded by 
taking the case to court. Finally, a judge decided that Cristina de Kirchner term should 
officially terminate in the final minute of the 9th of December, creating a 12-hour 
presidential vacuum just before Macri could finally take office.  
  The anecdotal conflict about the protocol to be followed in the Presidential 
transition is actually much more than a silly political controversy in an eccentric 
underdeveloped country, as much of the international media covered it. It represents the 
degree of polarisation in Argentine society after 12 years of substantial political, social 
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and economic change. The transfer of power was perceived by both sides as a crucial 
moment. Much more than a simple change of command, it entailed a substantial shift in 
the political discourse, the class alliance in power, the economic policies adopted and the 
relations the Argentine society would seek to establish with other societies – in short, it 
represented a change of development strategy. It was the end of the neodevelopmentalism 
cycle and the return of neoliberalism.  
 Such transition would have seemed highly improbable only one decade earlier. In 
the heyday of neodevelopmentalism, between 2003 and 2008, the economy was growing 
at Chinese rates, exports were booming, Argentina was accumulating international 
reserves, industries were reopening and unemployment and inequality rates were falling. 
During that short period, neodevelopmentalism came the closest to the ideal presented in 
Bresser-Pereira’s theory and in the ‘Ten Theses on New Developmentalism’ (see chapter 
1). In an internationally favourable setting, different class interests were reconciled 
through the state, provisionally able to socialise gains without privatising losses. In 
accordance with the neodevelopmentalist political discourse, a progressive, class-neutral 
state was apparently guiding the country towards development.  
The setting would rapidly change after the double political and international crisis 
of 2008. From that point on, a period of growing social conflict emerged. The 
neodevelopmentalist discourse progressively abandoned its class reconciliation features 
and became more and more conflictive. In order to keep on socialising gains, or at least 
to defend the achievements of the previous years, the economic policies could not avoid 
privatising losses, thereby progressively alienating fractions of the neodevelopmentalism 
class alliance. The limited possibilities of the Argentine state to reconcile class conflicts 
and shield the national economy against external pressures became clear. The final 
electoral defeat of Argentine neodevelopmentalism after a long period of crisis shows the 
limits of the reformist strategy of Cristina de Kirchner, and of neodevelopmentalism at 
large. Despite the important incremental gains achieved by the working class in the 
period, the neodevelopmentalist long-term project was aborted before it could accomplish 
its declared goals of eradicating poverty and promoting long lasting social justice.   
My argument is that the shortcomings of neodevelopmentalism in Argentina are 
better explained by the limitations of the model itself than by fortuitous accidents or 
mistakes in its implementation. Taking into account the necessarily uneven and combined 
character of development, the disruptive effects of the 2008 crisis cannot come as a 
surprise. Indeed, development possibilities are conditioned by the interplay between 
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international pressures and opportunities and the class structure of societies. From the 
start, the Argentine model was based on two interrelated fragile assumptions that ignored 
unevenness and combination in the development process: the existence of continued 
internationally favourable conditions and the possibility of permanent class conciliation 
based on an idealised state. Mirroring what happened in Brazil, when international 
conditions reverted – i.e., when the price of export commodities dropped – disputes for 
the shrinking social resources re-emerged with a vengeance, cracking the 
neodevelopmentalist class alliance apart. Contrary to Dilma Rousseff, however, Cristina 
de Kirchner did not step back, compromising the core of her political discourse in order 
to try to recompose the developmentalist class alliance. Instead, the Argentine president 
reacted by radicalising discourse and policies, thus pushing neodevelopmentalism to its 
limits. 
In this chapter, I make the above outlined argument in four steps. Firstly, I analyse 
the neodevelopmentalist political discourse, showing how it progressively lost its class 
conciliation aspects, while keeping other essential traits of neodevelopmentalism, such as 
the idealised role of the state and the promise of development. After that, I show how the 
shift in the neodevelopmentalist discourse went hand in hand with a shift in the economic 
policies. The third section explores the neodevelopmentalist foreign policy, focusing on 
its insufficient answers to the international pressures threatening the development model. 
Finally, in the last section, building on the Argentine Marxist literature, I question the 
interpretations offered by contemporary neoliberal and neodevelopmentalist writers for 
the crisis of neodevelopmentalism. Going beyond the debate about the failure or the 
success of the so-called ‘won decade’, I conclude that the mixed results actually obtained 
after 12 years of neodevelopmentalism are better understood as consequences of the 
structural limitations of neodevelopmentalism itself. 
 
 
6.1 From unity to overcome the crisis to the ‘won decade’ – Neodevelopmentalist 
political discourse in Argentina 
 
The neodevelopmentalist cycle in Argentina passed through different moments, 
surviving three consecutive presidential elections (2003, 2007 and 2011) and generally 
corresponding to the period in which the Kirchner family remained in charge (2003-
2015). In fact, in the aftermath of the political and economic crisis of 2001-2002, the 
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provisional administration of President Duhalde – indirectly elected by the Congress after 
a series of three resignations – can also be seen as laying down the foundations for 
Argentine neodevelopmentalism. Nevertheless, a consolidated neodevelopmentalist class 
alliance was to be forged only during the disputed 2003 elections. This class alliance 
progressively changed to include broader fractions of the working class, alienating as a 
result some fractions of national capital that adhered to the neodevelopmentalist project 
in its first years – particularly agrarian and financial capital. The gradual shift in Argentine 
neodevelopmentalism has its correlate in the political discourse about development. From 
clear catch-up developmentalist propositions under Duhalde and Néstor Kirchner to a 
defiant twist towards social justice and egalitarianism, particularly in Cristina Kirchner's 
last term in office.   
 President Duhalde came to power in extremely delicate circumstances. After 
losing the 1997 elections to De la Rúa, who promised a change of course in the Argentine 
neoliberal model but ended up reinforcing it by naming Domingo Cavallo (the original 
architect of the convertibility plan) as his finance minister, Duhalde was finally sworn in 
as President in the aftermath of successive resignations. Amidst deep economic and 
political crisis, he was indirectly chosen by the Senate to complete the presidential 
mandate of De la Rúa and call new elections in 2003. In his first speech before the 
Argentine Congress, in January 2002, he described the ongoing crisis in vivid colours: 
 
(…)I want to tell you that the financial crisis of the public sector, as you know, has no 
precedents. We have no money to face the obligations of salaries, pensions, and bonuses 
of the National State. The exceptional fall in the economic activity is translated into a 
strong fall in tax collection. This generates a vicious, perverse circle that leads our 
country to the brink of disintegration and chaos (Duhalde 2002).  
 
This situation had been brought about by ‘an exhausted model that has caused 
despair to the great majority of our people.’ Therefore, the task Duhalde defined for 
himself was to ‘set the basis for a new model, which is capable of recovering the 
production, the Argentines’ jobs, its domestic market, and promoting a fairer distribution 
of wealth.’ Preaching on national unity around his program of ‘national salvation’, 
President Duhalde not surprisingly appealed to the perspective of future development, 
conflated with economic growth. According to him, ‘the only way to face our domestic 
and external commitments is through the growth of our economy that produces an 
authentic human development’ (Duhalde 2002).   
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Duhalde's political speech brings together all the elements of the 
neodevelopmentalist discourse, as seen in relation to President Lula's speeches in Brazil 
(chapter 5). Starting with the denunciation of the neoliberal ‘model’ adopted in previous 
years – portrayed as anti-national and anti-productive –, it promises growth and 
development as a result of national unity around a new model, anchored on the productive 
sector and in the national interest. 
Néstor Kirchner's political discourse also gravitates towards the same broad 
themes. Once again, for the seventh time in less than fifteen years, a new president took 
office amid a crisis. Notwithstanding the precarious stabilisation accomplished by 
Duhalde and his finance minister, Roberto Lavagna (see 6.2 below), the political 
conjuncture remained explosive. Peronism, Argentina's undisputed hegemonic political 
force, faced a profound identity crisis after Menem's neoliberal reforms. Contrary to the 
party’s traditional nationalist and statist convictions, the extended program of 
privatisation, deregulation and denationalisation carried out by Menem – with the support 
of Peronist trade union leaders – demoralised and split the Peronist field and its official 
party, the PJ. New, independent social movements, with horizontal forms of organisation, 
emerged as important political actors from the non-Peronist left (Sitrin 2006; Etchemendy 
2011). Nevertheless, their refusal or incapacity to structure a party hindered their electoral 
expression (Sader 2008, 17).  
Accelerating inflation, persistently high unemployment rates and the political 
fragility of the indirectly elected government fuelled the street protests, repressed by 
central and local authorities. Social instability culminated with the ‘Avellaneda Massacre’ 
of the 26th of June 2002. In a brutal attack against protesters blocking a major bridge 
connecting the city of Buenos Aires with part of its southern suburbs, the police killed 
two young activists (Maximiliano Kosteki, 22 years old, and Darío Santillan, 21), and 
injured tens of others. The episode further deepened the social crisis, forcing the 
government to hold early general elections. Under pressure, and losing political support, 
President Duhalde gave up his plans of running for office (Weinfeld 2016, 40).  
As a result of the political fragmentation, in the 2003 elections three main 
candidates could claim Peronist credentials. Adolfo Rodríguez Saá, the former governor 
of San Luis and interim president for seven days in December 2001; Néstor Kirchner, the 
former governor of Santa Cruz; and Carlos Menem, running again for the presidency on 
the promise of bringing back the booming years of the early 1990s. Carlos Menem and 
Néstor Kirchner (supported by Duhalde) finished first and second in the first round, 
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getting respectively 24.45% and 22.24% of the valid votes. Only a few days after 
celebrating his provisional lead, Menem announced he was stepping out of the 
presidential race. As a consequence, Kirchner won the second round by default. 
The particular circumstances of his elections raised some important questions 
about Kirchner’s program, which was not made entirely clear during the campaign. In the 
video spot announcing his withdrawal, Menem claimed that the Argentine people were 
being ‘submitted to the moral violence of having to choose a presidential candidate they 
barely know (…), not as an expression of adhesion to a proposal and a program that he 
refused to discuss publicly, but with the only purpose of preventing the victory of another 
presidential candidate’ ( Menem 2003). Certainly the majority of the Argentine people 
had good reasons to reject Menem. Nevertheless, the fact remains that Kirchner – then 
the governor of a remote and scarcely populated province closer to Antarctica than to 
Buenos Aires – was an outsider whose program was only vaguely suggested in his short 
presidential campaign. Beyond nationalist calls for union and a confrontational tone 
regarding the foreign holders of Argentina’s defaulted debt, the only certainty Kirchner 
had to offer was the promise to keep the finance minister, Roberto Lavagna, whose 
neodevelopmentalist program based on a massive devaluation of the Argentine peso was 
already starting to show some results. 
In this context, Néstor Kirchner's first presidential speech was particularly 
important. Elected with less than a quarter of the total votes due to his adversary's 
abdication, this speech can be seen as both, a public self-introduction and the laying down 
of the political foundations of Argentine neodevelopmentalism. Unsurprisingly for a 
country torn apart, the elected president started with a call for national unity, which is 
revealing for its explicitly international comparison. According to Kirchner, Argentina 
should follow the example of ‘civilised countries with high intensity democracies’, where 
‘adversaries discuss and disagree but keep on cooperating’. More than just calling for 
national unity, however, Kirchner announces a clear break with the neoliberal past. ‘It 
should be absolutely clear that, in the Argentine Republic, in order for us to have a future 
and not repeat our past, we need to thoroughly face the challenge of changing. (…) 
Change is the name of the future’ (Kirchner 2003a).  
At this point, instead of echoing Menem’s grandiose plans to reinsert Argentina 
into the first world, Kirchner preferred a much more sober posture, praising hard work 
and public administration effectiveness. The endeavour to make Argentina a ‘normal’ 
country is repeated four times in this speech.  The new president explicitly refused ‘big 
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plans, followed by frustration due to the lack of results’. Indeed, according to him, ‘an 
administration should not distinguish itself by its official’s speeches, but by the actions 
undertaken by its teams’ (Kirchner 2003a).  
This apparent departure from the neodevelopmentalist political discourse – in 
whose core lay exactly big promises of future development – has the rhetorical purpose 
of establishing a difference of style in relation to Carlos Menem. However, only a few 
minutes later, Kirchner cannot avoid resuming development promises. Argentina is 
forecasted to experience vigorous economic growth based on internal consumption, 
which is set to be ‘in permanent expansion’, thanks to higher salaries and more job 
opportunities. ‘The result shall be the doubling of [national] wealth every fifteen years 
(…) strengthening the middle class and recovering from poverty all our fellow 
compatriots’ (Kirchner 2003a). 
The most important neodevelopmentalist mark in Néstor Kirchenr’s speech is not 
the promise of vigorous economic growth – which is also to be found in neoliberal 
speeches (see chapters 3 and 4) – not even the key role attributed to the internal market, 
as opposed to the neoliberal emphasis on comparative advantages activated through 
international trade. Kirchner's speech is a perfect example of the centrality of the state in 
the neodevelopmentalist project. The idea that the state can and must manage the national 
economy and bridge social conflicts so as to provide capitalist development is the 
cornerstone of the model he espoused. This notion is further reinforced in reference to 
‘developed countries’, whose pattern of capital accumulation is to serve as a model: 
 
In our project we place in a central position the perspective of rebuilding a 
national capitalism that generates alternatives that allow the resuming of 
ascending social mobility. (…) It suffices to look at how more developed 
countries protect their producers, their industries, their workers. (…) It is about 
giving birth to an Argentina of social progress (…). In order to do that, it is 
necessary to promote public policies conducive to the development and economic 
growth of the country. (…) Naturally the State has a key role in that, as the 
presence or the lack of the State constitutes a political attitude (Kirchner 2003). 
  
Finally, after calling for national unity, refusing the presuppositions of the 
previous neoliberal model, promising economic growth and stressing the role of the State 
in bringing about ‘social progress’ and ‘development’, Néstor Kirchner finishes his 
inauguration speech on a high note, announcing his views for the future of Argentina: 
 
I come to propose to you a dream, I want a united Argentina. I also want a normal 
Argentina. I want us to become a serious country. But I also want a fairer country. 
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I wish that following this way a new and glorious nation will rise on the face of 
the Earth. Our nation (Kirchner 2003). 
 
It is interesting to notice here the conflation between national pride and 
development, a notion also present in Brazilian neodevelopmentalist discourses. 
According to this narrative, further elaborated in speeches delivered at International 
forums,66 the world is characterised by competing national interests. Therefore, the path 
to development is also the path to international glory. This vision guided a marked shift 
in Argentine foreign policy, from the attempt to establish privileged relations with the US 
to the adhesion to the endeavour of building a power pole in South America in association 
with Brazil (see 6.3 below). At the same time, the perspective of becoming a ‘glorious 
nation’ seems to fit oddly with the ‘dream’ of becoming a ‘normal’ country, unless normal 
countries are deemed as glorious, in which case the whole notion of glory is somewhat 
emptied.    
In short, Néstor Kirchner’s inauguration speech is a particular affirmation of the 
neodevelopmentalist ideology, adapted to the Argentine political culture. The class 
conciliation aspect – highlighted in the speech Lula da Silva delivered only a few months 
earlier in the Brazilian Congress – is also present here, albeit with less emphasis. So is 
the explicit comparison with ‘developed countries’, taken as examples to be followed, 
and the denunciation of the previous neoliberal model. The promise of vigorous and fast 
economic growth is key. The perspective spelt out for Argentina is clear: becoming a 
developed and glorious capitalist country in the foreseeable future. Finally, repeated calls 
for social justice are added as an unmistakable mark of the Peronist affiliation claimed by 
Néstor Kirchner.  
Cristina Fernández de Kirchner, former Senator from the provinces of Santa Cruz 
and Buenos Aires, and President from 2007 to 2014, progressively polarised the 
neodevelopmentalist discourse, erasing its conciliatory elements and stressing the notions 
of social justice and national pride. The first woman elected President of Argentina67 
came to power in much more favourable circumstances than her husband four years 
earlier. The promising economic results of Nestor Kirchner’s administration and his 
ability to reduce social tensions – not by repressing social movements, as was the case 
                                                          
66 See, for instance, Kirchner Speeches at the United Nations General Assembly and in the inauguration 
of the Summit of the Americas (Kirchner 2003b, 2005). 
67 Isabelita de Peron was the first woman to become President of Argentina, in 1974, although she was 
not directly elected, being sworn in as President after the passing of her husband, Juan Domingo Peron. 
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with President Duhalde, but by a complex mix of concessions, co-option and diversion  – 
resulted in the expressive victory of Cristina de Kirchner, with 45% of the votes. Her 
closest adversaries were the moderate leftist Elisa Carrio (23%) and Roberto Lavagna 
(17%), the former finance minister under Nestor Kirchner and Duhalde. The coalition 
supporting Cristina Kirchner’s candidacy also won comfortable majorities in both Houses 
of the Argentine Congress, confirming a tendency that had already appeared in the 2005 
legislative elections (Levitsky and Murillo 2008). 
The political discourse in the campaign assumed a professorial tone and 
frequently evoked Cristina de Kirchner’s identity as a woman (Vitale and Maizels 2011; 
Vitale 2014). The television spots, on an invariably positive note, celebrated the country’s 
economic recovery and, again, stressed on the union of the Argentinians. This union was 
represented by the very alliance the Kirchners built, broad enough to include tiny fringe 
communist parties and a significant part of the centrist UCR – traditionally the main 
political adversaries of Peronism. In exchange for the support of the latter, the UCR 
dissidents indicated the vice-President, Julio Cobos, the former Governor of Mendoza 
Province – a bold political deal that would reveal its price only a few months later. 
The expressive electoral victory was crowned by a triumphant inauguration 
speech. Unlike the carefully crafted speech Nestor Kirchner read four years earlier before 
the Congress, Cristina de Kirchner delivered a passionate, improvised speech, 
occasionally stopping to cast a deep gaze at her husband – seated next to her –, salute the 
militants and nod in agreement with their patriotic ovation. The economic and political 
message, however, remained substantially the same one delivered four years earlier by 
Nestor Kirchner. The union of the Argentinians, under the strong leadership of the state, 
representing the national interest, was the key to development. According to her, the work 
done so far by her husband’s administration not only rescued Argentina from its most 
dramatic crisis, but paved the way to its effective development: 
    
He has done it on behalf of his convictions, the same as mine and many other 
Argentinians, who have always believed in the country and in its men and 
women, in the people and in the Nation, words that in times of globalisation do 
not sound well, or at least sound rare. But it suffices to know the countries with 
more economic and social development and ask the reasons for their growth and 
development to find in the unrestricted defence of their own interests, as States 
and societies, the key to that advanced condition, to that development (De 
Kirchner 2007). 
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The experience of ‘developed’ countries, therefore, is evoked as evidence that a 
country must care about its ‘own interests’, despite the recognition that this idea does not 
fit well in ‘times of globalisation’. Accordingly, Cristina de Kirchner reaffirmed the 
importance of having a ‘political project’ for development. At that point, looking at her 
husband with a discrete smile, the incoming President said:  ‘You, after all, have never 
been a postmodern: in times of postmodernity, you were a President of modernity, and I 
guess I am too’ (De Kirchner 2007). 
It is very interesting to notice the conflation between globalisation, postmodernity 
and neoliberalism in Cristina Kirchner inauguration speech. The political project she 
represented, on the contrary, is perceived as national, modern and conducive to 
development. It is premised on the mobilisation of the national productive sector in its 
different fractions, under the promise of a ‘better life’ for all:  
 
I want to propose, therefore, this new economic model of a diversified matrix, of 
accumulation with social inclusion (...); a model that recognises in labour, 
production, industry, exports, in the countryside, the moving forces that made it 
possible for millions of Argentinians to recover not only their work, but also the 
hope and belief that a better life is possible (De Kirchner 2007). 
 
 
Despite nominally recognising the importance of all sectors of the economy – and 
particularly the traditionally powerful agrarian export sector, the speech echoes the 
classical Peronist view in prioritising industry as the key sector to generate development. 
Once again here, ‘developed’ countries appear as a model to be emulated: 
 
I think we have to overcome this historical taboo that has always existed among 
the Argentinians about the model being either the industry or the countryside. I 
believe that we can, and we are showing that a model of accumulation based on 
countryside and industry has synergy. I always say that, I would love to live in a 
country where the higher incomes came from industry, maybe. Then we would 
surely be living in one of the great developed countries, where the industry has 
always subsidised the countryside (De Kirchner 2007). 
 
Defence of the national interest, social unity, a strong and benign state, focus on 
the production – particularly on the industrial sector – these are, in short, the key elements 
of Cristina Kirchner’s first inauguration speech, firmly anchored in neodevelopmentalist 
ideas. There is an important discursive twist, however. The perspective of social justice, 
and the final overcoming of poverty, which appeared in Nestor Kirchner’s speech in an 
oblique way, is elevated to the highest aim of the ongoing political project. After all, 
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Nestor Kirchner’s government achieved ‘important triumphs, but not the definitive one, 
because the definitive victory will be always lacking while there is a single poor person 
in the Fatherland. This is absolutely clear to us’ (De Kirchner 2007).  
Finally, it is important to notice that this ‘definitive victory’ is obviously to be 
achieved on a national basis. The development of Argentina is supposed to put an end to 
poverty in that country, and only there. In other words, it is up to Argentina to overcome 
its own underdevelopment in a competitive world. As Cristina de Kirchner makes clear 
towards the end of the speech: ‘maybe we are a little more modest and humble now. In 
those years we dreamt of changing the world; now we acquiesced to change this country 
of ours, our home’ (De Kirchner 2007). 
Contrary to the relatively stable four years preceding it, the period of Cristina de 
Kirchner’s first term (2007-2011) was marked by the re-emergence of latent social 
conflicts. The government clashed with agrarian producers, powerful trade unions, 
foreign companies and the corporate media – always claiming to represent the national 
interest. After broadening her electoral base in the 2011 elections (getting 54% of the 
votes, in comparison to 45% in 2007), Cristina de Kirchner felt emboldened enough to 
double down on her bet and deliver a defiant second inauguration speech on the 10th of 
December 2011. 
This time, however, Nestor Kirchner was not beside her. The former president had 
died one year earlier from a sudden stroke at only 60 years old. The 2011 presidential 
inauguration speech can be seen as an important mark in the active discursive construction 
of the image of Nestor as a national hero, who saved the country from the neoliberal 
debacle and laid down the basis of a new development model. Dressed in black, Cristina 
de Kirchner began her speech on an emotional tone: ‘As you all can imagine, today is not 
an easy day for this President. Despite the joy of the striking popular vote, there is 
something missing, there is someone missing’ (De Kirchner 2011).  
After this dramatic start, the work of Nestor Kirchner and his vision for the 
country is taken as the guiding line for the long and improvised speech, many times 
interrupted by shouting and applause coming from the crowd of militants occupying every 
available space in the Congress’ galleries and overflowing into large square in front of it. 
Nestor Kirchner is not referred to by his name one single time, but the listeners can have 
no doubt about whom is Cristina de Kirchner is talking about:  
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That man also said, from this very place, a sentence that possibly even he himself 
could not have realised how much of prophecy it contained. (…) ‘Change is the 
name of the future’. My God, things have really changed since that 25th May 
2003, not only in Argentina, but in the world as well! We are in a new Argentina, 
but we also are in a new world, meaning greater challenges and greater decisions 
in commitment with the interests of our people and our society. Argentina has 
undergone a phenomenal leap (…), today we have a country that has passed 
through the largest growth cycle in its 200 years of history. Moreover, its per 
capita GDP had one of the most important, or even the most important, result in 
the world in terms of growth, surpassed nevertheless by industrialisation levels. 
In fact, the economic activity, which grew at Chinese rates, was exceeded by the 
rates of industrialisation, and the two things are not unconnected, quite on the 
contrary, they were perfectly articulated (De Kirchner 2011). 
 
   
 Repeating and reinforcing the call to end poverty made four years earlier, the 
President declared: ‘I said that while we have a single poor person in Argentina, the 
national and popular project will not be complete’ (De Kirchner 2011). Here, the 
adjectives ‘national and popular’ are added to the original sentence, in a significant 
conceptual shift from the calls of national unity of the early neodevelopmentalist 
speeches. Although Cristina de Kirchner still summons the notion of a national interest, 
this time there is a privileged social group that is placed at the centre of her development 
model: ‘the people’. Vague as this social group may be, placing herself as the legitimate 
heir of the ‘national popular’ model started by her husband allows her to antagonise other 
class fractions – represented as ‘non-people’ –, and demand that they too do their part for 
the development of the nation as a whole. For instance, referring to business owners:   
 
That is why I advise to all sectors to not spit at the sky, because it is not a good 
method and it never produced good results for the Argentinians to spit at the sky. 
Let us take care of our accomplishments during these years, when small 
entrepreneurs became mid-range, when mid-range entrepreneurs became big, and 
when the big ones got tired of making money; and that is alright, I do not 
complain about those who make money, I just ask for their fair and intelligent 
contribution, not even patriotic, simply the fair and intelligent contribution to a 
virtuous economic model (…) (De Kirchner 2011).   
 
Among the social and political sectors mentioned in the speech in a critical or 
demanding tone are the international financial system, the media conglomerates and even 
Peronist trade unions who, according to Cristina de Kirchner, abused the right to strike: 
‘with us the right to strike is recognised; but I mean the right to strike, not to do blackmail 
and extortion’. Puzzlingly enough, the agrarian sector, with which the government had an 
important confrontation, is not directly mentioned, except for an elliptical reference to 
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‘the biggest and longest political conflict in memory, at least since the advent of 
democracy’ (De Kirchner 2011). 
Beyond the breach in the national unity discourse, in favour of a more popular 
perspective, another important difference in relation to previous speeches is the role 
attributed to ‘developed’ countries. Instead of a source of inspiration, this time the scarce 
references to the ‘developed nations’ are made in a critical and defiant tone. Amidst the 
Greek crisis, global north nations are represented as hostages of the financial sector. The 
United States is not mentioned at all, while the Brazilian President, Dilma Rousseff, 
present at the ceremony, is explicitly acknowledged. In fact, the few foreign policy 
comments present in the speech are mainly directed to Latin American countries and the 
perspective of regional integration, including a public acknowledgement of Venezuela’s 
help to Argentina by buying Argentina’s debt.    
It is extremely challenging to grasp the central point of the 2011 inauguration 
speech. Different from the much shorter 2003 and the 2007 speeches, which clearly 
revolved around key neodevelopmentalist themes – such as the necessity of national 
union for development, and the perspective of catching-up with ‘developed’ countries – 
the 2011 speech is fragmented and convoluted, including random references to the 
naming of an asteroid after a young anti-dictatorship activist. The stream of the argument 
is interrupted many times by side comments, rhetorical questions and anecdotes. Overall, 
however, a certain vision of the future provides the leitmotiv of the entire speech. Despite 
the opposition of unpatriotic and short-sighted groups, Argentina was well on its way to 
development and social justice, and the government was determined to continue the 
country’s march to the future.  
The same idea appears in its clearest form in a historical speech delivered two 
years later. On 25th of May 2013, still wearing mourning clothes, Cristina de Kirchner led 
the celebrations of the Argentine Independence Day in the historic Plaza 25 de Mayo. In 
this speech, the President launched the catchy expression ‘decada ganada’, or the ‘won 
decade’ – an obvious contrast to Latin America’s infamous ‘lost decade’. This time, the 
expression is used to characterise the cycle that started ten years earlier when her husband 
came to power. More importantly, she exhorted her fellow Argentinians to keep on 
progressing towards a new ‘won decade’. After mentioning the avalanche of critiques 
against her government, and comparing herself and her husband with Juan Domingo and 
Eva Peron, she gravely said:    
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But I do not complain. We know [that this is what happens] when we affect 
interests, when we stand by the most vulnerable sectors, when we incorporate 
millions of Argentinians to work (…) in this ‘won decade’. (…) We successfully 
managed to articulate this, and this is the best tribute we can make to those men 
and women that freed our people 203 years ago. But their task was not completed, 
because we keep on struggling, not for freedom anymore, but for equality, which 
is the great sign of this decade, and of the next ones. I also want to summon the 
Argentinians to this creation; may this won decade be followed by another one, 
in which the Argentinians keep on winning. (…) It is necessary to empower the 
people, the society, with these reforms and these achievements, so that no one 
can ever take it away, and I know what I am talking about (De Kirchner 2013). 
 
 The defiant tone of the speech is complemented by praises for ‘other patriots’, 
such as Presidents Lula da Silva of Brazil, and Hugo Chavez of Venezuela. Global north 
countries are totally absent from the speech, except from a quick mention of the economic 
difficulties affecting the world as a whole, ‘even Sweden’. Finally, towards the end of the 
speech, Cristina de Kirchner provided the best insight into her development strategy: ‘Let 
it be clear, this is not an economic model. Let it be clear, this is a political project with 
economic, social and cultural aims’ (De Kirchner 2013). 
   In summary, the political cycle starting in 2003 provides paradigmatic examples 
of neodevelopmentalist discourse. From the conventional call for national unity against 
international financial interests made by Nestor Kirchner to the confrontational tone 
adopted by Cristina de Kirchner, the common element of the neodevelopmentalist 
political discourse in Argentina is an always repeated idea of national interest, represented 
by the state, and a vision of continuous progress towards a developed condition. This 
discourse meets its limits when the very notion of development is decisively extended 
beyond the perspective of catching-up with nations of the global north to include 
potentially disruptive elements, such as social justice, equality and people’s 
empowerment.   
 
 
6.2 The political economy of confrontation – testing the limits of 
neodevelopmentalism 
 
 The gradual shift in the neodevelopmentalist discourse in Argentina is 
intrinsically intertwined with the shifts in macroeconomic management and other public 
policies implemented by the Argentine state during the same period. Far from being 
simply an expression of Cristina de Kirchner's irascible personality or emotional 
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instability – as implied by opposition journalists in misogynous notes  (Castro 2015) – 
the changes in the political discourse announce and justify a deeper change in Argentina’s 
neodevelopmentalist model itself. 
 When Nestor Kirchner was sworn in as President, on 25th of May 2003, 
Argentina’s economy was already showing the first signs of recovery. After free falling 
for four years and reaching a historic contraction of -10.9% in 2002 alone68, the GDP 
finally started an upward trend, growing by 8.8% in 2003 (graph 24). Although 
unemployment and poverty rates remained alarmingly high (graphs 25 and 26), a positive 
tendency was already noticeable. 
 
 
 
                                                          
68 For the analysis that follows, I rely on statistics from the United Nations Economic Commission for 
Latin America and the Caribbean (CEPAL 2017) unless another source is indicated.   
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Those limited but promising results were a direct consequence of the policies 
being adopted by the finance minister Roberto Lavagna from April 2002 on. Lavagna’s 
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strategy was based on building on the immediate shock of competitiveness Argentine 
national production received after the debt default, the imposed conversion of bank 
deposits from dollars to pesos, and the subsequent official abandoning of the 
convertibility law. These extremely unpopular measures, announced between December 
2001 and January 2002, sparked continued protests, as the Argentine middle classes saw 
the real value of their savings being dilapidated without being able to take out their money 
from the bank due to withdrawal restrictions (the infamous corralito). Nevertheless, the 
consequent sharp devaluation of the Argentine peso had a silver lining. Between the last 
days of convertibility, in December 2001 and the end of 2002, the nominal exchange rate 
between US dollars and Argentine pesos went from U$ 1.00 = 1.00 Ar$ to U$ 1 = 3.06 
Ar$, or put in other terms, the Argentine currency lost two thirds of its value in less than 
one year. The new exchange rate immediately discouraged imports, boosted exports and 
reduced real domestic production costs, recreating conditions for capital accumulation in 
the real sector of Argentine economy.  
 The break with the convertibility law and the devaluation were not so much a 
choice as a necessity, given the drought of international capital influx and the consequent 
lack of dollars to keep the exchange rate parity (Frenkel 2002; Kicillof, Nahón, and Costa 
2006). Nevertheless, Lavagna seized the opportunity to ‘transform this particular 
conjuncture into a macroeconomic policy regime’ (Kulfas 2016, 109), despite the 
opposition of more orthodox economists, represented by the President of the Central Bank 
Prat-Gay. 69  The guiding lines of the new ‘regime’ were presented in an extensive 
document launched by the Argentine Finance Ministry, the CEPAL and the Inter-
American Development Bank in the last months of 2002, and published only a few days 
before Kirchner took office (Kosacoff 2003).  
The document started with a an essay by the Finance Minister, in which he 
deplored the fact that in most of the previous three decades the exchange rate had been 
overvalued. ‘This means that (…) 80% of the time passed (22 out of 27 years) was wasted 
in terms of sustainable development’ (Lavagna 2003, 1). The lessons to be learned from 
the disappointing results of the previous period were to keep better control over 
speculative capital influxes, which tended to overvalue the exchange rate in the short run, 
and also avoid public deficits, which had to be covered by foreign capitals. The Finance 
Minister noted that despite its legal strength – guaranteed by a series of laws and 
                                                          
69 Prat-Gay would return years later as Finance Minister now under Mauricio Macri’s neoliberal 
administration. 
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international commitments – the convertibility could not be kept in the absence of 
macroeconomic sustainability. As a consequence, he suggests that the conditions for 
competitiveness must be built within the real sector of the economy. Finally, Lavagna 
refuses the advice given by international financial institutions for their lack of sensibility 
to the particularities of each national economy (Lavagna 2003, 5-6). The same points, 
particularly the importance to keeping ‘competitive’ exchange rates, were later reaffirmed 
in a self-congratulatory book Lavagna published revisiting his period as Finance Minister 
(2011). 
Although Lavagna never goes as far as presenting an explicit and all-
encompassing economic plan (Kicillof, Nahón, and Costa 2006), the guiding lines of the 
macroeconomic regime replacing the convertibility were clear enough. The Argentine 
economy was to be rekindled through a combination of undervalued exchange rates and 
primary surpluses. By regaining control over monetary and fiscal policies, the 
government would be able to keep the exchange rates at competitive levels in the long 
run, thereby guaranteeing the profitability of national producers and discouraging 
imports. Complementarily, in order to avoid the revalorisation of the Argentine currency 
after the boost in exports seen in 2002, the government imposed fixed export taxes on 
agrarian commodities, reinforcing its own financial position and making possible the 
primary fiscal surpluses and the accumulation of reserves. In short, the model adopted by 
Lavagna comes very close to the ‘new developmentalist’ policies suggested by Bresser-
Pereira and the other authors of the ‘Ten Theses on New Developmentalism’ (2012 - see 
chapter 1), and was explicitly recognised as so by Bresser-Pereira himself (Bresser-
Pereira and Theuer 2012, 826; Bresser-Pereira 2013b).  
The initial success of the transition from a regime of overvalued exchange rates 
and financial valorisation – dependent to the constant influx of international capitals – to 
a regime of undervalued exchange rates, based on current account and fiscal surpluses, 
was possible due to two key factors: the growing international demand for Argentine 
exports and the successful renegotiation of the defaulted debt. In the first case, the solid 
expansion of the world economy as a whole in the first half of the 2000s, driven by the 
high growth rates of East Asian countries, increased the prices of raw materials and 
agricultural commodities, such as soy beans and minerals.  
The second key factor that made possible the consolidation of the new economic 
regime – the renegotiation of the defaulted debt – is directly related to the government’s 
decision to curb the influx of short term capitals in order to keep the exchange rate at a 
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favourable level. Furthermore, the pesification (the forceful conversion of US dollar 
denominated assets into pesos) eased the urgency of recovering external sources of 
financing in the short run. At its peak, in 2002, the debt represented 166% of the country’s 
GDP (graph 27). The default and the posterior renegotiation of the debt provided an 
important relief for the public budget, allowing for some fiscal expansion over the 
following years, despite the substantial budget surpluses delivered by the Argentinian 
government since 2002.     
 
 
 
The renegotiation of Argentina’s foreign debt – crucial to guarantee the fiscal 
surplus – was the first decisive political victory of Kirchner’s government. After two 
proposals presented by the Argentine government and substantial pressure from the IMF 
and private debtholders, the swap mechanism was officially launched in January 2004, 
reaching 76.15% of acceptance a few months later (Damill, Frenkel, and Rapetti 2006, 
28). More than 150 different defaulted bonds, worth nominally US$ 104 billion, were 
swapped for three new bonds, whose value was US$ 35 billion. On average, the Argentine 
government achieved a remarkable reduction of about 65% in the swapped bonds, 
arguably one of the most successful debt swaps in history (Kulfas 2016, 155; Cunha and 
Ferrari 2006, 288; Levitsky and Murillo 2008, 17).  
0.0
20.0
40.0
60.0
80.0
100.0
120.0
140.0
160.0
180.0
2002 2003 2004 2005 2006 2007 2008 2009 2010 2011 2012 2013 2014 2015 2016
Graph 27 - Argentina - Public Debt - (Central Government % of the GDP. 
Source: CEPALSTAT)  
Brazil Argentina
223 
 
 
The swap and the consequent debt reduction were consistent with the fiscal 
surplus targets agreed with the IMF in January and September 2003 as a condition for the 
restructuring of the part of the Argentine debt held by the Fund itself and multilateral 
banks (Ferrer 2003). Most importantly, it was consistent with the official political 
discourse. In his first participation in the General Assembly of the UN, Nestor Kirchner 
insisted that ‘nobody has ever heard of someone being able to collect debt from the 
deceased’ (Kirchner 2003b). According to that logic, the agreement with the IMF and the 
debt swap gave the fiscal space for keeping the Argentine economy alive, so that it could 
grow and meet its financial obligations in the future. The first phase of the successful debt 
restructuring was completed when Argentina anticipated its payments and liquidated the 
debt with the IMF. On 15th December 2005, Nestor Kirchner summoned provincial 
governors, national authorities and social movement’s leaderships to announce the end of 
IMF tutelage over Argentina. During January 2006, about U$ 10 billion from the 
country’s reserves were transferred back to the Fund (Brenta 2013, 329). 
The immediate results of the neodevelopmentalist macroeconomic policies in 
Argentina were more than encouraging. Between 2002 and 2007, the GDP grew between 
8% and 9% a year (graph 24), quickly recovering the losses of the previous four years. 
The growth in the industrial sector was even more impressive, reaching 16% in 2003 and 
12% in 2004. Production of cars, for instance, more than tripled between 2003 and 2007, 
coming very close to 400 thousand units in 2008 – the best result in the historical series. 
Salaries also recovered, encouraged by collective negotiations sponsored by the 
government. Finally, unemployment and poverty rates fell sharply, reaching respectively 
9% and 27% in 2007, roughly half the rates seen five years before (Levitsky and Murillo 
2008, 17).  
Notwithstanding the encouraging results just mentioned, the limits of the model 
soon started to become evident. Inflation, which had peaked in 2002 (25.9%) after the 
end of the convertibility regime, decelerated sharply in 2003 (13.4%) and 2004 (4.4%), 
but resumed an upward trend in 2005 (9.6 %) and 2006 (10.9 %) (graph 28). In January 
2007, the government intervened in the national statistics institute (INDEC), changing 
the methodology for inflation monitoring. Since then, an information war started, with 
multiple inflation rates being released by different sources.  
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The accelerating demand, driven by increase in salaries and exports, met the 
limitations of Argentine’s productive capacities and the low levels of investment during 
the neoliberal period. At the same time, government regulated prices (energy, transports, 
etc.), frozen to help the control of inflation after the end of convertibility, became clearly 
underestimated, undermining the attractiveness of new private investments, and 
prompting a dispute between the government and the privatised companies. Finally, in a 
context of stable nominal exchange rates, the accelerating inflation meant an appreciation 
of the Argentine pesos in real terms (for estimations, see Arceo et al. 2010, 33), 
weakening one key pillar of the regime.    
In fact, the continuity of the macroeconomic model adopted in the aftermath of 
convertibility meltdown had been called into question earlier, when its main architect left 
office. After disputes with other Ministers – particularly the Peronist Planning Minister 
Julio de Vido – and even with President Nester Kirchner himself, Lavagna was urged to 
resign in November 2005. The government had just achieved an important victory in the 
legislative elections held one month earlier, and Kirchner felt emboldened enough to take 
the key economic decisions into his own hands (Kulfas 2016, 120). Lavagna would 
challenge the Kirchners in 2007, running for President against Cristina de Kirchner, and 
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losing by a wide margin.70 The model he left behind, however, would not be immediately 
replaced, but gradually eroded between the end of 2005 and 2008. In the last year of the 
period, two complementary crises would change the situation substantially. 
First, the dispute between the government and rural producers, in the aftermath of 
the hike in export taxes on agrarian commodities. These kinds of taxes, strongly 
discouraged by neoliberal economists for their distorting effects, performed a key task in 
the neodevelopmentalism model, for their potential to neutralise the so-called ‘Dutch 
Disease’ (Bresser-Pereira 2012a; 2012b). Because the commodities being produced in the 
resource rich sector (in the case of Argentina, particularly soybeans) are extremely 
competitive, they attract dollars and investments, causing the overvaluation of the 
exchange rate. In other words, commodities produced in the resource rich sector can be 
exported at a lower exchange rate than the one needed to make the industrial sector 
internationally competitive. Furthermore, specifically in the case of Argentina, because 
soybeans were displacing more basic traditional agrarian products, sold at the same time 
internally and internationally (meat, milk, wheat), the offer of these products was being 
reduced, and their prices were pressured up, fuelling the inflation cycle. 
In the first months of 2008, as the macroeconomic regime bequeathed by Lavagna 
showed signs of exhaustion in face of rising inflation, the government found itself in a 
dilemma. A further devaluation of the exchange rates to keep international 
competitiveness would mean an extra spur to inflation rates, and a reduction of salaries 
in real terms. Such an alternative would penalise mainly workers and the urban middle 
classes, with foreseeable negative consequences for the government’s popularity. At the 
same time, failure to revert the exchange rate appreciation and the diminishing current 
account surpluses would predictably mean a reduction of the GDP growth rates. 
The solution proposed by the government was exactly the one suggested in 
neodevelopmentalist theory: increase the tax burden on the resource rich sector (Bresser-
Pereira 2012a; 2012b; Ten Theses 2012). This was supposed to even the economic 
playing-field and channel investments away from that sector to other productive sectors, 
particularly industry. Furthermore, it could have a positive impact on the exchange rate, 
easing the tendency of appreciation caused by super-competitive agrarian exports. 
Finally, it would have positive effects on the public budget, creating space for further 
state-directed investments. Internationally increasing prices of commodities offered a 
                                                          
70 Cristina de Kirchner was elected in the first round with 45% of the votes, against 23% of centre-leftist 
Elisa Carrio and 17% for Lavagna.  
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good window of opportunity to implement this solution – just when a record harvest was 
expected (Kulfas 2016, 130).71 
On the eleventh of March 2008, the Finance Minister Martin Lousteau 72 
announced the controversial Resolution 125/2008. It replaced the linear export tax 
adopted after the fall of the convertibility regime for a complex system of variable taxes, 
according to the volumes being exported, the kind of agrarian commodity and the prices 
on the international market (Silva 2015, 152). In its very text, Resolution 125 affirms that 
the persistence of high international prices and the volatility of the markets could cause 
‘negative repercussions on the economy as a whole through higher internal prices, less 
distributive equality and growing uncertainty [in the] agriculture and husbandry sector’ 
(Argentina 2008). At the press conference summoned for the announcement of the 
Resolution 125, Lousteau warned against the ‘soybeanisation’ of Argentine fields – with 
negative effects on the prices of basic consumption goods such as meat, milk and wheat 
– and affirmed that the bill represented a ‘consolidation of the model that was initiated 
five years ago’ (Lousteau 2008). 
The response of the agrarian sector came quickly. Overcoming historical 
divisions, organisations of small and large producers promoted a series of strikes and road 
blockages demanding the annulment of Resolution 125 (Silva 2015). The conflict 
extended in time, with long and unfruitful negotiations between the parts (Hora 2010). 
Purveyance of basic consumption goods in Argentinian cities was menaced, forcing the 
Finance Minister to step down in April, just one month after announcing the plan. 
Nevertheless, Cristina de Kirchner’s administration insisted on the tariff hike, bringing 
the conflict to its limits. Despite having the constitutional powers to modify the tariffs by 
executive act, the government decided to submit the bill to the Congress for approval, 
confident in a comfortable majority in both Houses. Indeed, the bill was approved in the 
Lower House, but in the Senate resistance proved stiffer.  
After a series of defections of Senators supporting the government, the bill was 
finally put to vote in 17th July 2008. In a tense session, the Senate came to a draw, with 
36 Senators voting for the bill and the same number against it. According to the Argentine 
                                                          
71 For a comprehensive study of the economic and technical conditions behind the strong performance of 
the Argentine agrarian sector in that period, see Bisang (2007). 
72 Martin Lousteau, a young economist trained at the LSE, was Finance Minister between December 2007 
and April 2008. After leaving the government, he tried to position himself as an independent political 
force, but ended up adhering to Mauricio Macri neoliberal government in the condition of Ambassador to 
the United States. 
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Constitution, this rare circumstance would call for the decisive vote of the Vice-President, 
who also presided over the session. Visibly tense and undecided while his vote was being 
broadcasted live to millions of Argentinians, Vice- President Julio Cobos, himself from a 
mainly agrarian Province (Mendoza), imposed a remarkable defeat upon Cristina de 
Kirchner’s administration by voting against Resolution 125. ‘History will judge me. I beg 
for pardon if I am mistaken’ – declared the Vice-President, casting his vote (Cobos 2008). 
After the session, Cobos fled the Congress through a back door and drove more than 1000 
kilometres to his hometown, where he was greeted as a hero. Meanwhile, thousands of 
Peronist militants gathered in Plaza de Mayo denouncing him as a traitor.         
 The defeat in the government’s arm-wrestling with the agrarian sector brought 
momentous consequences. Politically, it substantially weakened the Kirchnerist support 
base, affecting the government’s popularity73 and producing an important fissure in the 
neodevelopmentalist coalition. As an offspring of the agrarian crisis, the tense relations 
between the government and the corporate media74 – particularly Argentina’s largest 
media conglomerate, El Clarin – deteriorated further, presaging another major crisis that 
would erupt in the forthcoming years. Economically, the strikes and blockages caused 
considerable losses in terms of exports and internal consumption. Finally, the economic 
imbalances that prompted Cristina de Kirchner’s administration to adopt the tax hike in 
the first place remained unresolved. 
 When the international financial crises unfolded, in the second semester of 2008, 
the economic situation was already deteriorating fast. Growth rates had more than halved 
in relation to the previous year (4.1% in 2008 against 9% in 2007 –graph 24), current 
account surpluses also reduced by about U$ 700 million, and inflation reached 22.7%, 
according to unofficial estimates (Salama 2012, 158). Because of accelerating inflation, 
real exchange rates presented a long term tendency towards appreciation, compromising 
the international competitiveness of Argentinian exports, particularly in the industrial 
sector. At the same time, imports increased from U$ 18 billion in 2003 to U$ 68 billion 
in 2008. On the bright side, contrary to what had happened in previous crises, a debt 
default was not on the horizon. Thanks to the successful debt swap of 2004 and the 
                                                          
73 According to opinion pools, in 2009 the disapproval rates of Cristina de Kirchner’s administration 
surpassed the approval rates for the first time, reaching respectively 67% and 33% towards the end of that 
year (Rouvier 2016, 333).   
74 For a quantitative analysis of the media coverage of the agrarian conflict, see Zunino (2015).  
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cancellation of the debt to the IMF in 2006, a long-lasting source of external fragility was 
under control.     
 The effects of the international crisis of 2008-2009 on Argentina’s 
neodevelopmentalist strategy would be substantially different from the effects of the 1995 
and 1999 crises on the previous neoliberal strategy (see chapter 3). If in 2002 the ratio 
debt/GDP reached 166%, six years later this proportion was only 53%, of which roughly 
half was actually internal debt (see graph 27). The 2008 crisis did not affect Argentina’s 
capacity to roll its public debts, as the debt burden was relatively low and the country had 
already been virtually excluded from international capital markets since the 2002 default. 
Instead, two other mechanisms, more related to the real economy, explain the propagation 
of the international crisis and its negative effects. In Argentina – and in most of Latin 
America – ‘the economic crisis did not evolve into a financial crisis’ (Arceo et al. 2010, 
94) . 
 The first propagation mechanism of the 2008 crisis was through a reduction in the 
prices and quantities of exported commodities (Varesi 2011, 45). Wheat, soybeans, soy 
oil, meat, all lost value in 2009 in relation to 2008 (see graph 29). Globally, exports in 
2009 were U$ 16 billion smaller than in 2008. Secondly, the crisis also affected Argentina 
through a further relative exchange rate appreciation. In other Latin American countries 
with floating exchange rates, the crisis was immediately met with a currency devaluation. 
In Argentina, although the nominal exchange rates actually devalued, the government 
kept it from floating dramatically in the last months of 2008, which would increase the 
already high inflation rates (for numeric evidence, see Arceo et al. 2010, 95). This, in 
turn, prompted two related problems: a capital flight, due to global aversion to risk and 
the expectation of imminent exchange rate devaluation, and a further loss of 
competitiveness in industrial goods, particularly in relation to Brazil, whose currency had 
been drastically devalued. 
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 The defeat in the conflict against agrarian producers and the 2008 financial crisis 
marked the lowest point of the neodevelopmentalist strategy in Argentina. In 2009, GDP 
contracted for the first time since 2002, shrinking by 5.9% (graph 24). In the mid-term 
legislative elections, the Kirchnerist coalition came first nationally, but only by a very 
small margin, being unable to secure a firm majority in the Congress. Nestor Kirchner 
himself, who ran for member of the Congress as head of the list in Buenos Aires, could 
not prevent his coalition from ending up second, with 32% of the votes.  
In face of the political and economic crises, the Kirchners doubled down their bet. 
From 2008, Argentine neodevelopmentalism departed from a perspective of moderate 
intervention to a decided state management of strategic economic activities and direct 
wealth distribution. At the same time, Cristina de Kirchner did not shy away from 
assuming new political conflicts and radicalising old ones – including, this time, the 
attempt to split media conglomerates, challenge conservative and religious sectors over 
gay rights and demand productive investments from the national bourgeoisie. The shift 
in the discourse identified in section 6.1 above was, therefore, paralleled by a shift in 
concrete public policies.  
2002 2003 2004 2005 2006 2007 2008 2009 2010 2011 2012 2013 2014 2015 2016 2017
Meat 66 65 70 75 75 78 79 75 88 122 125 128 123 152 104 116
Wheat 53 64 70 65 70 86 158 106 87 141 120 142 118 107 88 84
Soy oil 39 53 65 52 53 69 127 79 92 137 121 118 94 80 72 87
Soy beans 42 54 78 58 57 68 120 92 97 127 111 132 126 94 82 94
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Graph 29 - Argentina - Export Commodities (International price index. 
January of each year. Source: CEPALSTAT)
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 There are many examples of renewed impetus with which the 
neodevelopmentalist strategy was relaunched in the aftermath of the crisis. Perhaps the 
most symbolic one was the confrontation with the President of the Central Bank, Martin 
Redrado, over the use of international reserves to cover upcoming debt obligations 
amounting to U$ 18.8 billion in 2010 (Kulfas 2016, 141). Once again alienating the 
financial fraction of the ruling class and challenging the consolidated neoliberal practice 
of isolating the Central Bank from direct political pressures, Cristina de Kirchner opposed 
Redrado’s plan to reinsert Argentina in the international financial market and take on new 
loans in order to cover the impact of the upcoming debt payment on the country’s 
reserves. Instead, Cristina de Kirchner fired Redrado, who refused to leave office based 
on the autonomy of the Central Bank approved in 1992. The political confrontation 
escalated, with Redrado receiving support from opposition members of the Argentine 
Congress, but finally being abandoned by the majority of the Senate. In his place, Cristina 
de Kirchner named Marco del Pont, a devoted developmentalist economist, with no 
background in the financial sector.75 Over the following two years, the Organic Charter 
of the Central Bank of Argentina would be reformed along neodevelopmentalist lines.   
 The re-nationalisation of pension funds is another crucial policy decision taken in 
that period.76 By reversing the pro-market reform of this sector carried out in the 1990s, 
the Argentine state regained control over funds worth of US$ 97 billion, plus annual 
contributions of US$ 12 to 15 billion (Varesi 2011, 46). What is more, among the assets 
in the pension funds were financial options of a number of private companies, potentially 
further stretching the government’s influence in their management (Kulfas 2016, 138). 
The significant resources of pension funds could then be channelled to counter-cyclical 
macroeconomic policies, helping to keep the level of activity in periods of crisis, when 
private investment would tend to shrink (Arceo et al. 2010, 163; Kulfas 2016, 138). 
 Another key policy implemented during that period was the Argentine conditional 
cash transfer program. Normally given less mention in the international literature than its 
Brazilian or Mexican equivalent, this program arguably had an important impact on 
reducing poverty, extreme poverty and school evasion, at the same time representing an 
important boost in Argentine aggregate domestic demand. Extensive research based on 
                                                          
75 Marco del Pont’s economic vision is strikingly similar to Bresser-Pereira’s, including an emphasis on 
the real sector of the economy and the defence of industrially competitive exchange rates (Del Pont 
2016).  
76 For a detailed overview of the sector, see Arceo et al. (2010, chap. 3). For a critique of the reform, see 
Mesa-Lago (2009). 
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household surveys by Agis, Cañete, and Panigo (2010) show a reduction of 55% to 70% 
in extreme poverty linked to the program, as well as positive impacts on the Gini index, 
placing Argentina amongst the least unequal countries in Latin America. In 2010, one 
year after its implementation, the program guaranteed modest but important cash transfers 
(up to US$ 45.00, or Ar$ 180.00 per children/month) to more than 3.5 million children. 
The total cost, amounting to 0.6% of the GDP in 2010, meant an expansion of 1.5% to 
1.8% in aggregate demand  (Marques 2013, 307). Beyond its impressive social and 
macroeconomic impact, the program marked a shift away from the Peronist’s traditional 
predilection for programs subject to being captured though clientelism – as was the case 
with social works of trade unions or local authorities – towards a truly universal program 
of social inclusion, capturing, thereby, one of the key banners of the Argentine left 
(Zarazaga 2015, 339–40). 
 Furthermore, the government announced the re-nationalisation of symbolic 
Argentinian companies, which had been privatised to international groups in the 1990s. 
Aerolineas Argentinas, the country’s largest airline, was renationalised after passing 
through two crises (2001 and 2008) that threatened its very existence, essential to 
guarantee connectivity in a country of continental dimensions. The nationalisations 
included the national mail company and industries, such as the Fabrica Argentina de 
Aviones (Argentine Aircraft Industry). The most important of the series of 
nationalisations, however, was the national oil company (YPF).77 In this case, the national 
government regained control over a strategic sector, which had suffered from insufficient 
investments over the previous decades, turning Argentina into a net importer of fossil 
fuels (Gaggero, Schorr, and Wainer 2014, 144). After the re-nationalization, YPF 
intensified its investments, focusing on shale oil (Kulfas 2016, 163). The reduction of the 
price of oil towards the end of the neodevelopmentalist period, however, negatively 
impacted the profitability of these investments.    
The implementation of large scale cash transfer programs, the re-nationalisation 
of pension funds, the intervention on the Central Bank, and the taking over of symbolic 
companies can all be understood  in the context of the response to the 2008-2009 political 
                                                          
77 The nationalisation of YPF, involving the compulsory sale of assets from the Spanish Oil company 
Repsol, occasioned an avalanche of critiques of Cristina de Kirchner’s administration from the liberal 
writers (Melgarejo Moreno, López Ortiz, and Montaño Sanz 2013; Costamagna et al. 2015). Given the 
perceived predatory policy Repsol, other writers took the direct opposite view, criticising Cristina de 
Kichner’s administration for even agreeing to pay indemnity (Katz 2014, 124). Despite the critiques, there 
is no doubt the nationalisation was a popular measure, intensely exploited by the government in the 
following years. 
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and economic crisis. In fact, previous to the decisive renationalisation of YPF, in 2012, 
the expansion of direct state control over privatised companies can hardly be regarded as 
a general and coherent strategy, being better explained as ad-hoc governmental answers 
to problems of particularly important sectors (Gaggero, Schorr, and Wainer 2014, 142). 
After the double shock of the conflict with agrarian producers and the international crises, 
however, these policies became an integral part of the neodevelopmentalist strategy.  
 Intertwined with these economic responses is the political reorganisation of 
Kirchnerism after the agrarian fraction of the ruling class moved decidedly to the 
opposition. The crack in the neodevelopmentalist class alliance forged by Nestor Kirchner 
during his first election, in 2003, was compensated for by the emergence of a stronger 
‘Kirchnerist’ hard core, consisting of loyal politicians, organic intellectuals, 78  trade 
unions and some social movements. This process can be described as the emergence of a 
new political identity within the Peronist tradition, which moved from being an ‘impure’ 
form of Peronism to constitute full-fledged ‘pure Kirchnerism’ (Montero and Vincent 
2013).  
The most important of the new social actors emerging in that period is the youth 
organisation La Campora, named after the ex-president Hector Campora, famous for his 
loyalty to Peron. Indeed, he won the 1973 elections in Peron’s name, since the latter was 
in exile. His victory paved the way for the return of the mythical leader to Argentina. 
Similarly, La Campora professes loyalty to the Kirchners, organising regular 
demonstrations in support of the government and acting as the spearhead of Kirchnerism, 
thus progressively conquering spaces within the national administration. At the same 
time, the emerging Kirchnerist political camp was galvanised though new successive 
conflicts, with the corporate media,79 international corporations (like Repsol) and the 
favourite neodevelopmentalist adversary, the national and international financial sector. 
Finally, the sudden death of Nestor Kirchner, in 2010, made possible the discursive 
construction of the movement’s eternal hero – ‘that man’ who saved Argentina from 
economic collapse under neoliberalism.  
                                                          
78 For instance, the group ‘Carta Abierta’, including influential intellectuals like Ernesto Laclau, was 
constituted in 2008 in support of Cristina de Kirchner’s government amidst the conflict with agrarian 
producers.  
79 The conflict with the corporate media – particularly the group Clarin – emerged after the 
overwhelmingly negative coverage of the failed attempt at raising export taxes for agrarian producers. In 
response, Cristina de Kirchner’s administration passed a law establishing limits for market concentration 
in the broadcasting sector, but couldn’t fully apply it due to contrary judicial decisions. For an overview 
of the ‘epic battle’ between Kirchnerism and the corporate media, see Weinfeld (2016, 275–94). 
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 Responding to the policies mentioned, the political reshuffling of the 
neodevelopmentalist class alliance and the improvement in international conditions – 
particularly the increase in the commodities prices (graph 29) driven by Chinese demand 
and Brazil’s fast recovery – the Argentine economy showed strong results in 2010 and 
2011. The GDP grew 10.1% in 2010 and 6.0 % in 2011, after the negative results of 2009 
(graph 24). Exports grew to U$ 81 billion in 2010, almost recovering 2008 levels, after 
reaching only U$ 66 billion in 2009. In 2011, exports achieved the best result in the 
historic series, U$ 99.6 billion, although a substantial increase in imports and rents meant 
that the global results of the current account actually showed a negative trend since 2010 
(Graph 30). Most importantly, unemployment rates fell from 8.8% in the second quarter 
of 2009 to 6.4% at the end of 2013 (graph 25). As a consequence of the accelerating 
economic activity and of the cash transfer program, extreme poverty fell from 3.8% in 
2009 to 1.7% in 2012, while poverty fell from 11.3% to 4.3% during the same period 
(graph 26). In short, defying the Washington Consensus recipe, the country apparently 
showed a strong recovery from the double (political and international) 2008-2009 crisis 
(Cohen 2013, 2016).  
 The good results and the overall optimism produced a short lived ‘Kirchnerist 
spring’ (Kulfas 2016, 144) between 2010 and 2013, the peak of which was the landslide 
victory of Cristina de Kirchner in the first round of the 2011 elections, with more than 
54% of the votes – the most decisive electoral performance since the return of democracy 
in the1980s. In a context of fragmented opposition, with no clear alternative to the 
neodevelopmentalist project represented by Cristina de Kirchner, her alliance won in 
most of the provinces as well, besides guaranteeing comfortable majorities in both houses 
of the Congress (Catterberg and Palanza 2012). At that point, the promises of totally 
eradicating poverty seemed real, and the Argentine model after 2003 was perceived as a 
viable alternative to neoliberalism, particularly in face of the Greek and Spanish crises 
(Cohen 2013, 2016). Nevertheless, a series of external pressures would soon undermine 
Argentine neodevelopmentalism, leading to the unexpected defeat of Peronism in the 
2015 elections. 
     In the first case, as already mentioned, the rise of commodities’ prices after 
2010 (graph 29) boosted Argentine exports. Nevertheless, the continuous imbalance 
between inflation in Ar$, R$, and US$ kept the Argentine currency overvalued in real 
terms (Kulfas 2016, 156), thereby promoting a disproportionate increase in imports of 
goods and services. Global current account results were consistently negative after 2010, 
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reaching a US$ 5 billion deficit in 2014 alone (graph 30), thereby putting pressure on the 
international reserves. In the absence of a higher tax on agrarian exports, as suggested by 
the neodevelopmentalist literature, in order to revert that situation the government would 
have to promote regular devaluations of the Argentinian peso. However, that would be 
very unpopular, increasing the cost of imported goods, refeeding inflation and directly 
affecting the living standards of Cristina de Kirchner’s own political base.  
 
 
 
Instead, the government chose to deal with the shortage of dollars – a recurrent 
phenomenon well-known in the local political economy literature as ‘external restriction’ 
(Gaggero, Schorr, and Wainer 2014; Manzanelli et al. 2014; Kulfas 2016, chap. 5) – by 
trying to regain some access to international markets, and by tightening state controls on 
the exchange markets. These controls included non-automatic import licences, meaning 
that importers had to apply for authorisation. In fact, importers were stimulated to do joint 
operations with exporters in order to generate enough dollars to cover their external 
obligations, thereby creating the unusual circumstance of prompting international 
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companies like Porsche or Mitsubishi to get involved in the export of Malbec wine and 
peanuts (Schmall 2012). The restriction on the exchange market was nicknamed by the 
corporate media (now in open opposition to the government) as cepo cambiario – or the 
‘exchange rate trap’. This consisted of the imposition of limits and bureaucratic checks 
for the acquisition of foreign currency by individual buyers. 80  As a consequence, a 
parallel market of US$ dollars and Brazilian R$ mushroomed in the streets of downtown 
Buenos Aires, offering foreign currency at prices that eventually doubled the official 
exchange rate.  
 At the same time, the government expected to ease the ‘external restriction’ by 
attracting international investments and regaining access to international financial 
markets. In fact, given Argentina’s low level of indebtedness since the renegotiation 
conducted by Kirchner in the first years of his administration (graph 27), the space for a 
controlled debt increase in order to gain time for a smooth exchange rate devaluation and 
for the further improvement of the international economic setting was theoretically given. 
Nevertheless, another unpredicted external shock blocked this alternative. In October 
2012, the US Judge Thomas Griesa gave an unconventional decision in favour of the so 
called ‘vulture funds’81 that controlled a minor part of Argentina’s defaulted debt and 
refused to accept previous restructuring offers. Ignoring the successful debt swap 
negotiations and the international practice in similar cases, the US Judge determined that 
the Argentine state would have to repay the full face value on the defaulted bonds held 
by the two funds moving the case, plus interest.  
The total amount, U$ 1.6 billion, was substantial and unfair, considering that the 
vulture funds had acquired the defaulted bonds under judicial dispute for only US$ 80 
million (Kulfas 2016, 171). Nevertheless, it was not in itself impossible to cover, taking 
into account the proportions of Argentina, a country with a nominal GDP close to U$ 450 
billion in 2012 and international reserves then estimated at U$ 27 billion (Cantamutto and 
Ozarow 2016, 133). The problem was that the repayment of this marginal fraction of the 
debt (1.5%) could potentially trigger the dismantling of the painfully achieved debt 
restructuring as a whole. This is because the previous debt swaps included a clause stating 
                                                          
80 For a defence of this policy, based exactly on the ‘external restriction’ argument, see Kicillof (2016, 
200). 
81 The Vulture Funds are private speculative investment funds which buy defaulted sovereign debt papers 
or other low values assets in the hope of recovering part of their value through negotiation and judicial 
litigation. For a detailed overview of the Argentinian case, see Kupelian and Rivas (2014). For a critique 
of Judge Griesa’s decision see  Stiglitz and Guzmán (2014). 
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that if a better offer was made later to any remaining bond holder, that offer would have 
to be extended to all – thereby nulling the substantial reduction achieved in the previous 
negotiations.  
In June 2014, exactly when Cristina de Kirchner’s administration had made 
important progress towards reopening international credit possibilities for Argentina – 
through negotiations with the Paris Club, and the payment of compensations to Repsol 
for the renationalisation of YPF – the US Supreme Court refused Argentina’s appeal and 
confirmed Judge Griesa’s decision. Because Argentina refused to comply, giving a 
political answer through its foreign policy instead (see 6.3 below), the payment of parts 
of the restructured debt that was due on that month was blocked by the US justice. This 
caused Argentina to technically fall into default again.  
This US’ Supreme Court decision had momentous negative effects for the world 
financial system as a whole (Vernengo 2014; Stiglitz and Guzmán 2014). For Argentina, 
particularly, this unexpected external pushback contributed to worsening the economic 
situation. The government contained an incipient capital flight by allowing a 30% 
nominal devaluation of the Argentinian peso in the first months of 2014, but the galloping 
inflation rapidly eroded its real effects. In an atmosphere of uncertainty, the GDP closed 
2014 with a contraction of -2.5% (graph 24). Politically incapable of promoting further 
devaluations, barred from international markets, the dollar shortage limited any 
possibility of a second round of expansive fiscal and monetary policies, such as those 
used to overcome the 2009 crisis.  
         
 
6.3 Damage control and international space for development - Neodevelopmentalist 
foreign policy in Argentina. 
 
 The relation between international constraints and opportunities and Argentine 
neodevelopmentalism was certainly not a one way street. Although, as explored above, 
the different moments of the neodevelopmentalist cycle were in many ways conditioned 
by external factors over which policy makers in Argentina had little or no control – like 
the fluctuation of commodity prices or judicial decisions in the US – foreign policy 
responses to these international circumstances formed an integral part of the 
neodevelopmentalist strategy. Accordingly, it is possible to analyse the Argentine foreign 
policy in the neodevelopmentalist period as underpinned by two complementary 
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imperatives: controlling the damages caused by external pressures, and actively trying to 
build an international economic, political and institutional setting in which state-led 
development strategies could prosper.     
 Contrary to the foreign policy adopted under President Menem in the neoliberal 
cycle, based on the postulates of ‘Peripheral Realism’, it is particularly challenging to 
analyse the Argentine foreign policy in the neodevelopmentalist cycle given the lack of a 
clear overarching narrative contextualising and justifying Argentina’s diplomatic actions. 
Indeed, there is nothing equivalent to the influential works of  Escudé (1992, 1995) and 
Fonseca (1998) – respectively the ideologues of Argentinian and Brazilian neoliberal 
diplomacy – or Guimarães (2007, 2008a, 2008b, 2009) – the international strategist of 
Brazilian neodevelopmentalism. This absence has puzzled local analysts, generating 
contradictory interpretations, ranging from the denunciation of a total lack of a strategy 
(Tokatlian 2011), to the hypothetical postulation of many conflicting theoretical 
influences (two variations of realism plus two of liberalism) behind Argentina’s foreign 
policy under the Kirchners (Corigliano 2008). 
 Taking into account that the development strategy implemented in the period was 
explicitly not limited to ‘an economic model’ but constituted ‘a political project with 
economic, social and cultural aims’ (De Kirchner 2013), I suggest that the Argentine 
foreign policy is better understood as an intrinsic part of the neodevelopmentalist strategy. 
Therefore, even in the absence of a clear diplomatic narrative, the key aspects of the 
country’s foreign policy are intelligible in relation to the political economy of Argentine 
neodevelopmentalism. In other words, the same particular interplay between international 
pressures and opportunities and class struggle that explain the economic and social 
policies implemented by the class alliance which gained access to the State apparatus with 
the rise of Kirchnerism also explains its foreign policy choices. The active resistance 
against the proposed Free Trade Area of the Americas (FTAA), the permanent challenge 
to International Financial Institutions and the call for their reform, the distancing in 
relation to the US, the closer relations with China, the key role attributed to Brazil, the 
priority given to South American integration, and finally, the mobilization of third world 
countries against ‘vulture funds’ and unilateral judicial decisions, all can be understood 
as foreign policy responses to the ‘external’ factors perceived as affecting Argentina’s 
development.  
 The great debut of Argentina’s neodevelopmentalist foreign policy was the Mar 
del Plata Conference in 2005, officially called IV Summit of the Americas. This major 
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diplomatic event, which Argentina committed to hosting in 2001, attracted 34 heads of 
State or Government, including Venezuela’s President Hugo Chavez and US President 
George W. Bush, then in open confrontation with each other after the US backed attempt 
at a coup d’état in Venezuela three years earlier. In the opening statement of the 
conference, Nestor Kirchner broke with protocol. Instead of simply extending an insipid 
diplomatic welcome to the visiting authorities, the Argentine president delivered a strong 
anti-neoliberal speech. Kirchner pointed the finger at international financial institutions 
for their one-size-fits-all theories and practices, citing Argentina as an example of the 
negative consequences of the ‘Washington Consensus’. Furthermore, in an outstanding 
example of the neodevelopmentalist discourse, he emphasised the role the state should 
play in promoting development, and blamed the protectionism and the lack of support 
from ‘developed countries’ as the underlying causes of the difficulties faced by 
developing nations (Kirchner 2005). 
The confrontational tone established by Kirchner culminated with Mercosur’s and 
Venezuela’s coordinated refusal to commit to specific dates to the implementation of the 
FTAA, in practice burying the trade liberalization negotiations started in the First Summit 
of the Americas, held in Miami one decade earlier. Leading a massive political rally 
which included hundreds of Latin American trade unions and social movements in the 
local stadium, President Chavez denounced the imperial pretentions of the US and 
declared: ‘each one of us has brought a gravedigger’s shovel here, because here in Mar 
del Plata is the grave of FTAA’. To the ovation of the crowds, the Venezuelan president 
went on and famously led the protest chanting: ‘Alca, al carajo!’ – ‘Fuck the 
FTAA’(Chavez 2005). Cornered by the street protests and the unfriendly atmosphere in 
the high level meeting rooms, George W. Bush spent less than 36 hours in Argentina. 
Only after the end of the three Kirchner administration, more than ten years later, would 
a US’ President dare to set foot in Argentina again. 
 The coordination of anti-neoliberal Latin American administrations in order to 
stop the US’ backed FTAA is perceived as a sign of the rise of the left in the region (Sader 
2008, 2009). Kirchner’s administration was instrumental in constituting this left 
momentum in Latin America, establishing special relations with Chavez’s administration, 
despite the marked differences between Argentina’s neodevelopmentalism and 
Venezuela’s 21st Century socialism (Katz 2014). These special relations are explained by 
part of the literature as a form of ‘balancing’, counterweighting the disproportionate 
influence of Brazil in the region (Saraiva and Briceño Ruiz 2009; Cepik and Silva 2012). 
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Beyond those geopolitical concerns, a priori supposed by the authors based on underlying 
realist assumptions, it is clear that the bilateral relations between Venezuela and 
Argentina were premised on an extensive material interests, expressed, for instance, in 
the substantial growth of bilateral trade (Roark and Giglio 2010) and in the acquisition of 
U$ 1 billion worth of Argentine bonds by the Venezuelan government (Bonvecchi and 
Giraudy 2008).      
 Brazil also played a key role as a privileged diplomatic partner to Argentina, 
particularly during Lula’s administration. After a long history characterised by moments 
of both rivalry and cooperation (Candeas 2010), since the 1980s the two biggest countries 
of South America decidedly moved towards regional integration while dismantling their 
respective developmental states. Mercosur, formed in the neoliberal decade as a step 
towards future trade integration in the FTAA, substantially increased bilateral commerce 
and investments. The customs union forged a new set of common interests between 
Brazilian and Argentinian ruling classes, besides intensifying the effects of the economic 
performance of one nation on the other, as seen in the 1998 Brazilian crisis and the 2001 
Argentinian crisis. Despite nationalism being one of the distinctive traces of the 
neodevelopmentalist strategy, bilateral and regional integration were not immediately 
reversed, neither by Lula’s nor by Kirchner’s administration. Instead, in both cases 
regional integration was represented as congruent with the national interest, as opposed 
to continental integration under US leadership.  
   From the Brazilian perspective, the tension between nationalism and regional 
integration was dissolved by the expansion of Brazilian capital, which made South 
America a privileged space for accumulation by rising Brazilian multinationals (chapter 
5). From the Argentine perspective, this tension was partially accepted as inevitable in 
face of the absence of credible alternatives. The decision to reverse the country’s 
dependent association with the US – marking a ‘180 degree shift in the Argentine foreign 
policy’ (Taiana 2016) – left Argentina’s diplomacy with few alternative options. 
Furthermore, well established Brazilian neodevelopmentalist diplomatic discourse 
(Guimarães 2007, 2008a, 2008b, 2009), which represented the contemporary world as 
heading towards an increasingly multipolar configuration, provided a convincing 
rationale for regional integration. The concertation of Brazilian and Argentinian 
neodevelopmentalist foreign policies thus added an important political dimension to the 
previously existing economic regional integration framework, allowing for its notable 
institutional consolidation after 2003. 
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 At some points, however, material contradictions emerged between the perceived 
national interest and the efforts towards regional integration. One example well explored 
in the literature was the long controversy with Uruguay regarding the building of 
allegedly polluting paper mills on the Uruguayan side of the Uruguay River, which 
delimits the border between the two countries (Landau 2006; Escude 2006; Vara 2007; 
Sannazzaro 2011). Pressured by local groups opposing the factories, the Argentine 
Government adopted a hard stance against Uruguay, escalating the controversy to the 
International Court of Justice and thereby creating a major source of instability within 
Mercosur. Another example is the adoption of the previously mentioned import licences, 
which affected Mercosur partners, Brazil in particular. In short, Argentina’s commitment 
to regional integration seemed to be subordinated to the perception that it corresponded 
to the best expression of the national interest – defined in terms of development. 
Whenever a perceived conflict between the two seemed to appear, the choice was to 
privilege the latter.    
 Lacking the global dimension and the extended resources of Brazilian 
neodevelopmentalist foreign policy – for instance, Argentina was not included in the 
BRICS – the Argentine diplomacy concentrated its extra-regional efforts in some key 
areas. One of them was certainly the bilateral relations with China, whose trade flux with 
Argentina more than tripled between 2001 and 2006 (Bolinaga 2007, 9). Chinese 
investments in the country also increased substantially, opening up a badly needed new 
source of capital in the aftermath of the debt default (Yue 2013). In 2004, both countries 
signed a Memorandum of Understanding through which Argentina recognised China as 
a market economy, an important diplomatic concession in the context of China’s 
accession to the WTO three years earlier. After the 2009 crisis, however, the strategy of 
promoting closer ties with China in the hope of increasing exports and investments 
showed its limitations, as the bilateral trade balance reverted and Argentina started 
accumulating trade deficits (Bekerman, Dulcich, and Moncaut 2014, 66).  
On the multilateral scene, Argentine diplomacy tried to capitalise on the country’s 
positive records regarding human rights protection in recent years. In fact, one of the 
distinctive traces of Kirchner’s administration was the determination to finally come to 
terms with the tragic human rights violations during the country’s dictatorship, fully 
disclosing one of the darkest chapters of the country’s history (Weinfeld 2016, chap. 5; 
Jozami 2016). Accordingly, high ranking military personnel were publicly recognised as 
responsible for state terrorism and had their honours revoked, marking a striking contrast 
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with Brazil, where bridges, schools, public buildings and roads are still named after 
human rights offenders. Building on that moral high ground, Argentine foreign policy 
efforts were instrumental in consolidating the concept of ‘Right to Truth’ within the UN 
Human Rights system (Taiana 2016, 84). 
The most important multilateral achievement of Argentina’s neodevelopmentalist 
foreign policy came in the last years of Cristina de Kirchner’s administration. During the 
1990s, Menem’s administration distanced Argentina from Third World forums, 
particularly the non-aligned movement, in an unsuccessful attempt to accede to first world 
organisations, such as the NATO and the OECD (chapter 3). In the context of the dispute 
against the vulture funds, however, the Argentine government managed to partially 
reverse this strategy. Embracing Argentina’s condition as an underdeveloped country 
menaced by speculative financial capital, it gathered substantive international support.  
The first time third world solidarity against the vulture funds had to be mobilised 
was in 2012, when the Argentine War frigate Libertad was arrested in Ghana under 
judicial orders to guarantee debt payment.82 After the controversial decisions in favour of 
the vulture funds in the US judicial system, Argentina’s diplomacy showed its capacity 
of coordinating a rapid international political response, obtaining favourable declarations 
of support by International Organisations such as UNASUR, CELAC, OAE and UN 
Human Rights Council. Finally, with the crucial support of G-77 countries (mainly from 
Africa and Latin America), and despite the opposition of the US, the UK, Germany and 
other developed countries, Argentina managed to pass Resolution 69/319 in the UN 
General Assembly, establishing guidelines for debt restructuring that are largely 
favourable to States, to the detriment of investment funds.      
 In short, Argentina’s neodevelopmentalist foreign policy explicitly departed from 
the previous neoliberal paradigm (Taiana 2016). While in the 1990s the national interest 
was defined in terms of forging a special relationship with the US and being perceived as 
part of the first world, in the 2000s priority was given to South American integration, 
strategic bilateral relations with Venezuela, Brazil and China, and the gathering of 
international support against the vulture funds. Consistent with the overall development 
                                                          
82 The Frigate liberty case is particularly complicated, involving conflicting interpretations of 
international law. In short, an Argentine war ship was kept under arrest for months in the port of Accra as 
a guarantee to Argentine standing debt with the vulture funds. See Pereira da Silva and Pereira (2013) for 
an overview of the case from an international legal perspective. 
242 
 
 
strategy, Argentina’s neodevelopmentalists diplomacy tried to give political answers to 
perceived external threats to the country’s development.   
 
 
6.4 ‘Won Decade’? Uneven and combined development in neodevelopmentalist 
Argentina. 
 
 Kirchnerism produced deeply controversial results, which have been the object of 
heated political debate within Argentine political economy. Anti-Kirchner neoliberals 
insist that what Cristina de Kirchner tried to label ‘the won decade’ was actually a period 
of thriving corruption, populism and inefficiency (Lucca 2015; Lanata 2014). They stress 
that a heavy burden – in the form of high inflation, institutional degradation, imbalance 
in relative prices, increasing current account deficits, and falling international reserves – 
was bequeathed to the next administration (Cachanosky 2016). In short, according to 
them, neodevelopmentalism failed to deliver development. 
This ‘failure’ narrative is reinforced by the IMF. In a press release issued after the 
first IMF mission to Argentina in more than ten years, the staff led by Roberto Cardarelli 
praised the ‘transition toward a better economic policy framework’ undertaken by 
President Macri’s administration, and declared that:  
 
Upon taking office in December last year, Argentina’s new government faced 
pervasive macroeconomic imbalances, microeconomic distortions, and a 
weakened institutional framework. Consumption levels were unsustainably high, 
investment reached historically low levels, and large fiscal deficits were financed 
by money creation, which lead to high inflation. Distortions at the micro level 
included an extensive network of administrative controls (for example, trade 
barriers, foreign exchange restrictions, and price controls) and a business 
environment that eroded competitiveness and undermined medium-term growth 
(IMF 2016). 
 
The argument made on the neoliberal side criticises the excessive and misguided 
state intervention, seen as a source of ‘imbalances’ that disturb the ‘business 
environment’ and the ‘competitiveness’, the real keys to sustainable economic growth. 
Although this argument is attentive to the limitations of the state in promoting 
development, it too easily falls back into the neoliberal market utopia. By simply 
replacing state utopia with market utopia once again, the argument offers only a very 
partial take on Argentine neodevelopmentalism. Furthermore, this argument cannot 
243 
 
 
explain the unquestionably positive results in terms of GDP growth and poverty 
reduction. 
A diametrically opposed narrative is offered by pro-Kirchner analysts. Nestor 
Kirchner is portrayed as the man who saved the country from neoliberalism by cunningly 
manoeuvring the political system in order to bring the state back to the centre of the stage 
(Weinfeld 2016). Using the state as ‘the battle ram of social change’ (Trotta 2016), the 
Kirchners’ administrations managed to tame the markets and promote social and 
economic policies to the benefit of the poorest, lifting millions out of poverty. Although 
some shortcomings are recognised (Filmus 2016), those are caused by mistakes that can 
and will eventually be fixed, not however by limitations of the model and its theoretical 
presuppositions per se. Finally, the re-emergence of Argentina from ‘the ashes of 
neoliberalism’ was limited by the ‘external restriction’ (Del Pont 2016), particularly after 
the international crisis. Favourite villains are the drop in commodity prices and the 
conflict with the vulture funds.   
Although better historically situated and less incoherent than the neoliberal 
discourse, the neodevelopmentalist narrative is also ultimately based on a utopian 
presupposition. Instead of the market, the state appears as the privileged institution 
responsible for bringing about catch-up development. Failure to achieve that idealised 
goal, taken as an unquestionable end societies should naturally aim for, is always seen as 
contingent and, therefore, externalised. The international crisis, the US judicial system, 
greedy agrarian producers – all these are to blame for the shortcomings of 
neodevelopmentalism. The assumption that the state is a virtuous institution ultimately 
capable of bridging class conflicts, neutralising external pressures, and delivering catch-
up development persists, nevertheless.  
There can be no doubt that the neodevelopmentalist cycle produced better results 
than the previous neoliberal model. Without belittling its important social achievements, 
it is also clear that Argentina did not catch-up with the ‘developed’ countries, the 
underlying objective of neodevelopmentalism. Indeed, despite modest increases in life 
expectancy and per capita GDP, between 2003 and 2014 Argentina fell from the 34th to 
40th position in the human development index (UNDP 2014). The ‘dream’ proposed by 
Nestor Kirchner in his first inauguration speech did not come true. Deeply divided, facing 
yet another crisis, struggling with high inflation and low growth rates, hounded by vulture 
funds, the Argentina of 2015 was arguably not the ‘new and glorious nation’ Kirchner 
promised to make ‘rise on the face of the Earth’ (Kirchner 2003). 
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Writers coming from the Marxist and the dependency traditions have offered 
better explanations for the shortcomings of neodevelopmentalism in Argentina, calling 
the model itself into question. For Claudio Katz, ‘the neodevelopmentalist essay has 
failed because of the government’s incapacity to increment the state appropriation of soy 
plantation rents’ (2014, 121). This incapacity was not perceived as contingent, however, 
but rather as a consequence of a model itself, which relies on unstable class alliance with 
fractions of the ruling class. The faith in the progressive character of the national 
bourgeoisie is also called into question by Gaggero, Schorr, and Wainer (2014). Mariano 
Feliz highlights that the neoliberal cycle of the 1990s created the conditions for a new 
cycle of accumulation by pressing down salaries. The initial dynamism of the 
neodevelopmentalism cycle was, therefore, limited to the reduction of capital returns as 
soon as salaries recovered (Féliz 2012, 2014).   
These critiques of the neodevelopmentalist model have so far concentrated on the 
fact that the state could not perform one of the two fundamental tasks 
neodevelopmentalists expect of it – namely, to permanently reconcile class conflicts. 
Eventually, the contradiction of material interests between different classes and class 
fractions – particularly between industrial and agrarian capitals and the unionised 
working class – outgrew the state capacity to provide constant gains for all. Nevertheless, 
the second structural problem of neodevelopmentalism – the faith in the state capacity to 
consistently neutralise international pressures and promote a truly ‘national’ development 
– has so far not been sufficiently explored.  
From an uneven and combined development perspective, however, we can see 
that the two shortcomings of neodevelopmentalism are in fact interrelated. Taking inter-
societal interaction and class struggle as premises, it is possible to realise that state 
responses are doubly conditioned by the character of the international impulse (expansive, 
contractive) and by the concrete configuration of the class alliance in power. When the 
international situation was favourable, between 2003-2008 and again 2010-2012, the state 
could socialise the gains of rising commodity prices through taxation and focused 
spending. During that short period, a mirage of the neodevelopmentalist state utopia was 
produced, and the state seemed indeed capable of delivering gains for the whole of 
society. When the international situation reverted, firstly in the 2008 crisis, and again after 
2012, this mirage melted into air, calling the neodevelopmentalist class alliance into 
question. Conversely, the defeat of the neodevelopmentalist class alliance in the struggle 
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with the agrarian capital in 2008 rendered the state less capable of dealing with the 
upcoming international crisis.    
The two premises of the neodevelopmentalist model were, therefore, dramatically 
tested in the crucial year of 2008. Firstly, the state’s capacity to guarantee continued gains 
for both capital and labour was called into question in the conflict with the agrarian 
producers. Secondly, the state’s capacity to face external threats to development was 
challenged by the contraction of commodity prices and the capital flight. After this double 
setback, Argentina’s neodevelopmentalism would not be able to show consistently good 
economic results again. Instead of a ‘won decade’ for the whole of Argentine society, as 
implied in the neodevelopmentalist discourse, or a complete disaster, as suggested by 
neoliberals, the picture is much more nuanced. During the six years of exceptional 
growth, a real socialisation of gains was extended to all parts of the class alliance in 
power, including the working class. After 2008, successive privatisations of losses had to 
be imposed, progressively alienating class fractions that had initially supported the model.   
Despite the frustration with the economic results of Cristina de Kirchner’s second 
term – particularly in comparison with the booming years between 2003 and 2007, and 
the ‘Kirchnerist spring’ of 2010-2011 – political support for the incumbent President 
remained relatively high. The hard core of the Kirchnerist militancy, represented by La 
Campora, fulfilled its promises and remained loyal to Cristina, promoting regular 
demonstrations in support of her and her ‘national and popular’ government. Romantic 
graffitis of the Kirchner Presidential couple proliferated on the walls of Buenos Aires. If 
the conflict with the ‘vulture funds’ damaged the possibility of accessing new sources of 
external investments, politically it provided extra fuel to Kirchner’s nationalist rhetoric, 
offering an irresistible foreign enemy the Argentinians could unite against. At the same 
time, the political polarisation produced by years of social conflict against fractions of the 
ruling class also generated a vociferous anti-Kirchnerist hard core, at the head of which 
were the corporate media, affected by the broadcasting reform. 
At the crucial moment of the 2015 elections, the political limitations of the 
confrontational tactics adopted by Argentine neodevelopmentalism became clear. 
Because Cristina de Kirchner herself could not run for a second re-election, the movement 
she led lacked a clear substitute. Daniel Scioli, former vice-President under Nestor 
Kirchner and twice Governor of the Buenos Aires Province (2007-2015) failed to 
mobilise the Kirchnerist militant base, and was only reluctantly supported by Cristina de 
Kirchner herself (Alles, Jones, and Tchintian 2016, 185). Nevertheless, he attracted the 
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fierce opposition from the anti-Kirchnerist pole, led by the former Mayor of Buenos 
Aires, Mauricio Macri. At the same time, counting on the firm support of the corporate 
media and of the anti-Kirchnerist groups, Macri could afford to soften his neoliberal 
discourse and present himself as the candidate of moderate change (Kulfas 2016, 177), 
thus reaching undecided voters at the centre of the political spectre. Scioli’s defeat in the 
second round of the 2015 elections is certainly an indication of the inherent difficulties 
faced by the neodevelopmentalist project in Argentina, marking the end of a period. 
Multiple sources of instability – stemming from international factors, but also from the 
particular characteristics of class struggle in Argentina itself – severely limited the 
possibilities of the neodevelopmentalist project, and finally aborted it, giving rise to a 
neoliberal restoration from 2016.  
Instead of a complete disaster, as suggested by neoliberals, or a ‘won decade’, as 
Kirchnerists insist, the kind of development actually produced in Argentina over the last 
15 years can be better described as uneven and combined. Class conflicts and 
international pressures and opportunities resulted in a particular balance of socialisation 
of gains and privatisation of losses. In the end, the Argentine society was substantially 
different from how it was in 2002, although its consumption and productivity standards 
had not converged to those seen in the global north. 
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Conclusion to Part 3 – Kirchnerism and Lulism as actually existing 
neodevelopmentalism. 
 
 The parallelism between the recent neodevelopmentalist experiences in Brazil and 
Argentina is striking. In both countries, the neoliberal strategy implemented in the 1990s 
came to a disappointing end in 2001-2002. In both countries, the neodevelopmentalist 
political discourse was initially used by charismatic leaders to mobilise hope in state-led, 
catch-up development and forge contradictory class alliances between fractions of the 
working class and fractions of the ruling class. Both countries shifted their foreign 
policies away from a perspective of privileged relations with the US, refused to join the 
AFTA and invested in regional integration. Both countries experienced a remarkable 
cycle of growth coupled with social inclusion, lifting millions out of poverty. Both 
countries benefited from the international high prices of commodities and the rise of 
China. Both countries were affected by the 2008-2009 international financial crises, but 
showed the capacity to quickly recover in 2010 using expansionist macroeconomic 
policies. In both countries, the original neodevelopmentalist leaders were able to elect 
their successors – two powerful women, both of whom faced clearly misogynous 
prejudices from traditionally patriarchal societies. In both countries, traditional elites, 
particularly the corporate media, offered fierce opposition to the neodevelopmentalist 
political project. In both countries, the economic situation deteriorated after 2011 – 
growth rates decelerated, and inflation rose. In both countries, the neodevelopmentalist 
class alliance came under increasing pressure in the context of economic contraction. In 
both countries, the question about the results of the neodevelopmentalist cycle divides the 
political economy literature between neoliberals, who stress the economic shortcomings 
of the model, and neodevelopmentalists, who stress its social achievements. Both 
countries are deeply politically divided along similar lines. Finally, both countries are 
now passing through a painful neoliberal restoration, initiated in 2016. 
 This long list of similarities, which could be expanded further upon, is largely 
explained by the adoption of a substantially similar development strategy, based on a 
common state-led development utopia and on similar class alliances. Furthermore, 
although Brazil is a much larger country than Argentina, both occupy roughly equivalent 
positions in the world division of labour.  Brazil and Argentina were similarly affected 
by the 2008-2009 crisis and the subsequent drop in commodity prices in 2014, as both are 
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major producers of agrarian commodities besides having sizeable and technologically 
equivalent industrial economies.  
 Given the many similarities just mentioned, the interesting point to be made here 
is, therefore, about the differences between the two processes. Because in each country 
the incumbent administrations tried to get around similar problems in different ways, a 
contrast between them may shed some light on the inherent limitations of the 
neodevelopmentalist strategy. In fact, during the expansionist cycle prior to the 2008-
2009 crisis, in both countries the positive international impulse was translated into a 
socialisation of gains – although in Brazil this socialisation was done primarily through 
cash transfer policies aimed at the very bottom of the social pyramid, while in Argentina 
the recovery of salaries initially played a primordial role, aiming at organised labour. 
Even before the reversal of the international circumstances, in the first months of 2008, 
Cristina de Kirchner confronted some selected class fractions – in particular the national 
and international financial capital and agrarian producers – assuming the necessity of 
some privatising losses in order to keep socialising gains. In fact, Argentina’s cash 
transfer policies were implemented in the aftermath of the crisis, coupling with decisive 
nationalisation of financial assets (pension funds) and big companies (YPF, Aerolineas 
Argentinas) to confirm a clearly confrontational approach to neodevelopmentalism. 
In Brazil, Rousseff’s administration insisted on the non-confrontationist line 
bequeathed by President Lula for several years after the international crisis. In fact, the 
immediate response to the crisis tried to avoid privatisation of losses, insisting on a 
socialisation of gains through fiscal expansion. The fiscal adjustment of 2011 halted the 
socialisation of gains. Nevertheless, it did not aim at any specific sector, trying instead to 
preserve social achievements, while avoiding confrontation with fractions of the ruling 
class at any cost. Only after 2012, when the negative effects of the international crises 
proved to be long-lasting, did Rousseff’s administration impose some losses on the 
financial fraction of the ruling class to the benefit of productive capital, forcing private 
banks to cut their interest rates through the ‘spread battle’ (Singer 2015, 51). This effort 
largely backfired, as private interest rates soon rose again when the central bank started 
an interest rates hike a few months later, trying to curb rising inflation. After this failed 
attempt at a limited confrontation, Rousseff’s administration insisted on conciliatory 
tactics until the very end. Weeks before the voting of her impeachment, yet another 
Ministerial reform was announced in the vain hope of appeasing the contradictory 
interests within Rousseff’s political base.     
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The difference between the confrontationist approach in Argentina and the 
conciliatory approach in Brazil is more than a simple expression of different personalities 
of the respective political leaders. Although both are based on contradictory associations 
between capital and labour, there are important differences between the 
neodevelopmentalist class alliances in Brazil and in Argentina, which stem from 
historical differences in the economic formation and the process of industrialisation in the 
two societies.83 Given the greater relative strength of organised labour in Argentina and 
its political representation through Peronism, it could offer a more solid base for the 
neodevelopmentalist alliance. The better cohesion of the neodevelopmentalist alliance in 
Argentina, including the very vocal youth militancy of La Campora – one element largely 
absent in the Brazilian case – guaranteed a qualitatively superior political support for 
Kirchnerism. As a consequence, the neodevelopmentalist class alliance in Argentina 
could afford confrontations with important fractions of the ruling class – particularly the 
financial capital and agrarian producers, largely seen as historical enemies of Peronism.  
In Brazil, contrastingly, the cornerstone of the neodevelopmentalist alliance was 
not organised labour, or active youth movements, but a large sector of the working class 
that had been historically marginalised – not even being regularly integrated into the 
labour market. The sub-proletariat, as identified by Singer (2012), was not politically 
mobilised, and lacked a coherent party representation, particularly if compared to 
Peronism. In its best result ever, in the 2010 elections, the PT guaranteed only 88 out of 
the 513 seats in the lower house of Brazilian Congress, and 14 out of 81 seats in the upper 
house. At the same time, the loose political identity of Lulism allowed for a broader class 
alliance, including different fractions of the ruling class.  
Exactly because of the historical fragmentation of Brazilain society, institutional 
forms of class conciliation were created within the state. One key example is the BNDES, 
which allow for targeted transfer of resources to the industrial sector, attenuating the 
potentially disruptive effects of the high interest rates practiced by the Central Bank. 
Another is the multiplication of Ministries, mounting to 39. As remarked by Souza (2016) 
the way the PT found to guarantee a minimum level of governability was to include in 
the state itself the many contradictions of Brazilian society, giving institutional space to 
large and small agrarian producers, trade union leaders and factory owners, bankers, 
protestant churches, communists, indigenous populations and slave descendants – just to 
                                                          
83 The classical references on the matter are Furtado (1969; 2005) for Brazil and Ferrer (2006) for 
Argentina. 
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mention a few. The neodevelopmentalist class alliance in Brazil was, therefore, much 
broader and less disciplined than in Argentina. As a consequence, the struggle to keep 
that alliance together severely curtailed the policy possibilities available for the PT’s 
administrations. Challenging the rural producers with an export tax, intervening in the 
Central Bank, and reversing privatisations – hallmarks of Argentine 
neodevelopmentalism – were simply not on the agenda. One of the few political spaces 
for bolder neodevelopmetalist policies was in foreign affairs, as long as no class interests 
were directly affected.     
In short, Kirchnerism and Lulism can be described as historically determined 
instantiations of the neodevelopmentalist class alliance. In its ideal form – announced in 
the neodevelopmentalist theoretical texts (chapter 1) and in the political speeches – the 
national alliance for development is supposed to conciliate all distinct class interests in a 
common catch-up project under the leadership of an idealised state, resulting in gains for 
all. In reality, as I have shown in the previous chapters, the limited means of the Brazilian 
and Argentinian states were not enough to reconcile those interests, particularly under 
adverse international circumstances. Hence, the neodevelopmentalist alliances assume 
different forms, allowing for different concrete policies.  
Because these concrete policies are always insufficient when compared to the 
ideal neodevelopmentalist policies carefully crafted to produce ‘development’, and 
because international influences can never be efficiently neutralised, the catch-up 
development promises contained in theoretical texts and political discourses necessarily 
fail to materialise. This has been the central argument of chapters 5 and 6: the mixed 
results produced by real existing neodevelopmentalism are better understood as necessary 
consequences of the interplay between class and international relations – i.e. of Brazilian 
and Argentinian recent uneven and combined development – than as policy failures. As 
defined in chapter 2, inter and intra-social forms of unevenness interacted, generating a 
combined form of development that came very far from the neodevelopmentalist 
expectations. Indeed, the neodevelopmentalist policies can only be seen to have failed in 
relation to idealised neoliberal or neodevelopmentalist policies, which could not be 
effectively applied by Lulism or Kirchnerism – the actually existing neodevelopmentalist 
class alliances.    
Accordingly, the end of the neodevelopmentalist cycles in Brazil and in Argentina 
can also be traced back to the real limitations of Kirchnerism and Lulism. True to its better 
defined political core and its confrontationist character, Kirchnerism progressively 
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alienated and antagonised enough political forces to become a minority and lose the 
presidential elections. Lulism, on the other hand, collapsed under the weight of an 
impossibly large alliance. Avoiding confrontation and trying to please every class and 
class fraction under structurally restrictive conditions, President Rousseff disappointed 
everyone and saw her political base disappear.     
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Conclusion – Challenging the oligopoly of legitimate development 
discourses 
 
While I write the final lines of this thesis, Brazil and Argentina are heading 
towards elections. In October 2018, Brazilians will go to the polls hoping to put an end 
to the prolonged political and institutional crisis unleashed in the aftermath of the 
altogether questionable ousting of President Rousseff, in May 2016. Months after the new 
President of Brazil takes office, the Argentines will start their electoral process, voting on 
the primaries for the 2019 general elections.  
Both countries are currently witnessing neoliberal restorations. Launching her 
candidacy to the Senate in the mid-term 2017 elections, former President Cristina de 
Kirchner criticised the economic policies adopted by her successor, President Macri, 
comparing the new wave of neoliberal reforms to the classic blockbuster ‘Jaws’, by 
Steven Spielberg: ‘This thing that we are witnessing with the debt and the economic plan 
is like watching Jaws 1, Jaws 2, 3, 4. I don’t want to watch Jaws 5. I know how it ends, 
and I don’t like it’ (De Kirchner 2017).    
Taking into account the social damage caused by the neoliberal economic policies 
of Presidents Mauricio Macri, in Argentina, and Michel Temer, in Brazil, the renewed 
hope eventual neodevelopmentalist candidacies are raising do not come as a surprise. 
Cristina de Kirchner and Lula da Silva are still perceived by many as the legitimate 
representatives of important fractions of the working class, whose interests have been 
directly affected by the recent neoliberal shift. 84  Their public appearances attract 
thousands of passionate supporters, contrasting with the overwhelming popular rejection 
of Temer in Brazil, and the lukewarm indoor political rallies hosted by Macri.   
The approaching electoral struggle in Brazil and in Argentina will, therefore, 
repeat once again the neoliberalism versus neodevelopmentalism divide. One side 
defending gains of efficiency through market-friendly reforms, attraction of international 
investments, privatisation and a better business environment. The other side reclaiming 
the central role of the state, announcing a pact between capital and labour and proposing 
new industrial and social policies. Both sides reaffirming their respective market and state 
                                                          
84 Examples are the labour and the pension system reforms in Brazil, as well as the tariffs hike, the labour 
reform and the austerity package in Argentina (Benedetto 2017; Casullo 2017; Katz 2017). 
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utopias, and renewing their promises of catch-up development. Unfortunately, not much 
can be expected from this limited debate, in which the priorities of subordinated classes 
are not represented. Building on Cristina de Kirchner’s cinematographic metaphor, we 
have seen this film before, and it does not end well.   
My overarching argument throughout this thesis has been that Brazilian and 
Argentinian perceived developmental shortcomings are intrinsically related to the 
oligopoly of the legitimate discourse about development shared by neoliberals and 
neodevelopmentalists. Indeed, neoliberalism and neodevelopmentalism are two 
complementary sides of the political economy of permanent underachievement. Because 
of their common representation of development as capitalist catch-up, and their respective 
state and market utopias, they are caught in a vicious circle. Continuous failure to achieve 
an idealised view of development is explained as excessive or insufficient state 
intervention in the market. This biased diagnosis is then used to justify state-led or 
market-friendly policies that, in turn, can never be fully applied. Necessarily falling short 
of their expected results, they end up confirming the narrative of failure, as a self-fulfilling 
prophecy.   
The discursive divide between neoliberalism and neodevelopmentalism, which 
reflects a real conflict of interests between different class alliances, prevents the 
appearance of theoretical and political alternatives. By contrast, building on the historical 
materialist tradition, I challenged the political economy of permanent underachievement, 
and proposed a distinctive way of conceptualising Brazilian and Argentinian recent 
development. Beyond the market and state utopias, which see the continuous 
developmental shortcomings as excess or lack of state control over markets, I suggested 
that the particular outcomes of the state reforms in Brazil and in Argentina are better 
understood as expressions of uneven and combined development. Instead of being a 
product of policy failures, the particular developmental paths followed by Brazil and 
Argentina are the result of a balance of socialisation of losses and privatisation of gains.  
In a nutshell, it is not that neoliberalism and neodevelopmentalism failed to 
produce development tout court. Indeed, some form of development resulted from both 
waves of reforms analysed in the empirical chapters of this thesis. Productive structures 
changed, so did class relations. Class conflicts interacted with international pressures and 
opportunities, bringing about important transformations in societies that are very far from 
stagnant. Yet, this development did not mean catching-up. Blind to complex forms of 
development, neoliberal and neodevelopmentalist writers fail to capture these changes. 
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All they can offer are a priori narratives about the inevitable shortcomings of the markets 
or the state, and renewed packages of policies to reignite market-friendly or state-led 
development.  
The critique of neoliberalism and neodevelopmentalism I carried out in this thesis 
was twofold. First, in Part 1, the fragile theoretical presuppositions of both streams were 
revealed though an engagement with representative neoliberal and neodevelopmentalist 
authors. After presenting my theoretical alternative in chapter 2, I moved to the empirical 
critique of the neoliberal policies adopted in Argentina (chapter 3) and Brazil (chapter 4) 
in the 1990s. The neoliberal cycle came to frustrating ends in both countries, particularly 
in Argentina. The 2001 crisis seemed to represent the defeat of the Washington Consensus 
for all Latin America, paving the way for neodevelopmentalist administrations. Yet, 
neodevelopmentalists also failed to live up to their promises of catch-up development. 
This time, Brazil was the epicentre of the crisis, facing the worst recession in its history 
in the period 2014-2017. In both countries, neodevelopmentalism took distinct political 
expressions, in the form of Lulism and Kirchnerism. The critique of Lulism is carried out 
in chapter 5, while Argentine Kirchnerism is the object of chapter 6.  
At the end of each empirical chapter, I returned to the mainstream narratives 
provided by the neoliberal and neodevelopmentalist literatures in the respective periods. 
I showed how the theoretical fragilities of neoliberalism and neodevelopmentalism not 
only resulted in bad policy strategies, but also in historical narratives unable to make 
sense of mixed forms of development. Contrary to that, and applying the alternative 
conceptual toolkit defined in chapter 2, informed by the concept of uneven and combined 
development, I sought to uncover the differentiated social gains and losses brought about 
by the neoliberal and neodevelopmentalist reforms. 
My conclusions can be summarised in five claims: 1 – although mutually 
representing each other as opposites, neoliberalism and neodevelopmentalism are based 
on similar theoretical presuppositions, namely, the definition of development as capitalist 
catching-up, and the division between states and markets; 2 – these theoretical 
presuppositions result in two competing sets of policies, informed either by the state or 
the market utopia, and politically mobilised by conflicting class alliances; 3 – whenever 
applied, these policies tend to produce mixed results, favouring the class alliance backing 
them; 4 – these results are further determined by external constraints, the most visible of 
which are international capitalist crises; 5 – the resulting form of development is uneven 
and combined. It necessarily involves a balance of socialisation and privatisation of gains 
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and losses, coming short of the catching-up promises contained in the neoliberal and 
neodevelopmentalist political discourses. 
These conclusions constitute original contributions to different theoretical and 
political debates, across different fields. The most substantial theoretical contribution is 
to contemporary Latin American political economy, by directly calling into question the 
presuppositions of its two dominant perspectives: neoliberalism and 
neodevelopmentalism. A secondary theoretical contribution to the broader fields of 
development studies, international political economy and international relations is also 
suggested, building on the contemporary literature on uneven and combined 
development. I propose a set of mid-range concepts, such as of socialisation of losses, 
privatisation of gains – and their opposite, socialisation of gains, and privatisation of 
losses – adequate to grasp relatively short-term unevenness and combination in the face 
of a specific form of the whip of external necessity, represented by international economic 
crises. The alternative narrative of the recent development processes of Brazil and 
Argentina that I suggest in the empirical chapters of the thesis is also a contribution to the 
contemporary Latin American studies literature, adding a distinctive international 
approach to established Marxist perspectives, and reclaiming some classical dependency 
theory’s insights. 
Most importantly, this thesis is intended as a political contribution to the Brazilian 
and Argentinian left, currently trapped between the devil and the deep blue sea. My claim 
is that instead of choosing sides in a rigged dispute between two false promises, 
subordinate social groups can build their own development alternative. The political 
purpose of this thesis will be accomplished if the powerful banner of development is taken 
from the hands of national ruling classes, allowing for the formulation of challenging and 
socially revolutionary claims for development.        
The contributions here suggested are to be taken more as starting points for new 
inquires than as the endpoint of a research agenda. Because this research is among the 
first to explore the potential of contemporary formulations of the concept of uneven and 
combined development for political economy analysis, and the only one to do so in 
reference to Brazil and Argentina, much room is left for further investigation. The focus 
on macroeconomic and foreign policies adopted in my empirical analysis is just one 
among many possible approaches. What other forms of external pressures – beyond 
international capitalist crisis – defined the paths of development of Brazil and Argentina 
in the last three decades? How did extreme climate change events, such as the historic 
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Brazilian drought of 2014/2015, contribute in shaping developmental outcomes? What 
other forms of combination can be observed beyond socialisation of gains and 
privatisation of losses? What role did entrenched social unevenness in terms of gender 
and race play in the neoliberal and neodevelopmentalist cycles?  
The answers to these questions lie beyond the limited scope of this thesis, pointing 
to new research avenues that I look forward to explore in the future. By undermining the 
dominant neoliberal and neodevelopmentalist narratives about Brazilian and Argentinian 
development, my aim was to open the intellectual space for these and other questions to 
be posed. The theoretical and political challenge of imagining Brazilian and Argentinian 
development beyond neoliberalism and neodevelopmentalism is just starting.  
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